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Zusammenfassung
Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Beschreibung eines effizienten Algorithmus zum
Auffinden einer elliptischen Kurve u¨ber einem endlichen Primko¨rper IFp, deren Punktegruppe
u¨ber IFp kryptographisch geeignet ist.
Der Algorithmus basiert auf der Theorie der Komplexen Multiplikation. Fu¨r kryptogra-
phische Zwecke sind nur elliptische Kurven relevant, deren Endomorphismenring eine ima-
gina¨rquadratische Ordnung ist. Wir schreiben O∆ fu¨r eine solche Ordnung. Die Theorie
der Komplexen Multiplikation erlaubt es zu entscheiden, ob zu vorgegebener Primzahlpotenz
q, positiver, ganzer Zahl N und Endomorphismenring O∆ eine elliptische Kurve u¨ber IFq
existiert, deren Punktegruppe u¨ber IFq die Ordnung N hat und deren Endomorphismenring
gleich O∆ ist. Im Falle der Existenz liefert die Theorie der Komplexen Multiplikation ferner
ein Verfahren, um zu gegebenen q, N und O∆ eine solche Kurve zu bestimmen.
Erste Arbeiten zur Erzeugung kryptographisch geeigneter, elliptischer Kurven mittels der
Theorie der Komplexen Multiplikation stammen von A.-M. Spallek ([Spa92]) und Lay/Zimmer
([Lay94], [LZ94]). Diese Arbeiten beschreiben jedoch keinen geschlossenen Algorithmus, der
bei Eingabe von gewu¨nschten Sicherheitsparametern eine entsprechende Kurve auffindet. Fer-
ner lassen die Arbeiten eine Vielzahl von Fragen ungekla¨rt, denen wir uns in dieser Arbeit
widmen.
Zuna¨chst wird in keiner der Arbeiten beschrieben, wie man effizient einen endlichen Ko¨rper
IFp und eine Ordnung einer kryptographisch geeigneten Punktegruppe u¨ber IFp bestimmt.
Abha¨ngig davon, ob p vorgegeben ist oder nicht, entwickeln wir jeweils effiziente Algorithmen
fu¨r diese Aufgabe.
Unser Algorithmus beru¨cksichtigt ferner die Klassenzahl der zu dem Endomorphismenring
geho¨renden maximalen Ordnung. Um na¨mlich Kurven zu generieren, die den Kriterien des
deutschen Signaturgesetzes genu¨gen, muss diese Klassenzahl z.Zt. gro¨ßer oder gleich 200 sein.
Daru¨berhinaus entwickeln wir ein effizientes Verfahren zur Berechnung von Klassenpolyno-
men. Die Berechnung solcher Klassenpolynome stellt einen wichtigen Teilalgorithmus dar, da
der Grad des zu berechnenden Klassenpolynoms mitentscheidend fu¨r die Gesamtlaufzeit ist.
Bisher galten lediglich Polynome vom Grad maximal 50 als verwendbar fu¨r Erzeugungsverfah-
ren basierend auf der Theorie der Komplexen Multiplikation (siehe z.B. [MP97]). Wir zeigen,
dass wir sogar Klassenpolynome vom Grad 3000 in vertretbarer Zeit berechnen ko¨nnen, also
mit einer Laufzeit von weniger als 10 Minuten auf einem handelsu¨blichen PC.
Ferner untersuchen wir die zur Berechnung eines Klassenpolynoms hinreichende Pra¨zision
und geben entsprechende Formeln an. Eine solche praktische Untersuchung ist bisher nicht
bekannt. Im Fall eines Klassenpolynoms, das von Yui/Zagier ([YZ97]) vorgeschlagen wurde,
entwickeln wir eine neue Formel, die in der Praxis eine Laufzeitverbesserung von bis zu 45%
gegenu¨ber bisherigen Vorschla¨gen ergibt.
Schließlich erweitern wir unseren Algorithmus zur Bestimmung von elliptischen Kurven u¨ber
Optimalen Erweiterungsko¨rpern, deren Punktegruppe von Primzahlordnung ist. Außerdem
entwickeln wir einen Algorithmus, der eine elliptische Kurve u¨ber IFp ausgibt, so dass die
Punktegruppen der Kurve und eines Twists u¨ber IFp zyklisch von Primzahlordnung sind.
Alle in dieser Arbeit entwickelten Algorithmen sind in C++ programmiert und in dem LiDIA-
Modul gec verfu¨gbar.

Abstract
The subject of the thesis at hand is the description of an efficient algorithm for finding an
elliptic curve over a finite prime field of large characteristic suitable for use in cryptography.
The algorithm is called cryptoCurve. It makes use of the theory of complex multiplication.
Our work relies on proposals of A.-M. Spallek ([Spa92]) and G.J. Lay/H.G. Zimmer ([Lay94],
[LZ94]). However, their work leaves several important questions and problems unanswered.
First, neither author presents an algorithm to find a suitable cardinality, that is a prime
field and a cardinality of a suitable elliptic curve group. We develop and describe a very
efficient algorithm for this task; in addition, we give upper bounds of its complexity. In this
efficient algorithm the prime field may not be chosen in advance. However, in some cases the
field is given first. For instance, all international cryptographic standards which describe an
algorithm for finding a suitable cardinality, make use of the latter approach ([P1363], Chapter
A.14.2.3, p. 155, [X9.62], Chapter E.3.2.c, p. 115-116). We show how to significantly speed
up these algorithms.
Second, no previously proposed algorithm for the generation of an elliptic curve considers
the class number of the endomorphism ring of the curve. The German Information Security
Agency requires the class number of the maximal order containing the endomorphism ring to
be at least 200 ([GIS01]). Our algorithm cryptoCurve respects this condition.
Third, we develop and thoroughly investigate different methods to compute class polynomi-
als. The computation of a class polynomial is an important subalgorithm in the complex
multiplication approach. In general the integer coefficients of a class polynomial are very
large. Hence their computation in practice is rather difficult. It was believed in the crypto-
graphic community that only class polynomials of low degree, say of degree at most 50, are
amenable to the complex multiplication approach (see for example [MP97]). However, using
our efficient algorithm, we are able to compute a class polynomial of degree up to 3000 in
reasonable time, that is in less than 10 minutes on an ordinary PC. In addition, we are able
to compute a class polynomial of degree 15000 on the same computer in less than two days.
Fourth, we carry out a detailed practical investigation of the floating point precision needed
to compute a class polynomial. The precision in use is important for the run time to compute
a class polynomial in practice. However, in order to get a correct result, we have to choose
the floating point precision with care. As of today, different precisions were proposed (see for
instance [AM93], [BSS99], [LZ94]). All of them are only based on heuristic arguments, and
none of the authors presents a practical investigation. In addition, none of the cryptographic
standards [P1363] or [X9.62] gives a hint on how to choose an appropriate floating point pre-
cision. For instance, we quote from [P1363], Annex A, p. 151: ”The above computation must
be performed with sufficient accuracy to identify each coefficient of the polynomial wD(t).
Since each such coefficient is an integer, this means that the error incurred in calculating
each coefficient should be less than 1/2.” Obviously this statement is not useful for choosing
the floating point precision in practice. Furthermore, in case of the class polynomial due to
N. Yui and D. Zagier ([YZ97]), which uses Weber functions, we propose a new floating point
precision to compute this polynomial in practice. Our precision yields a significant perfor-
mance improvement. Sample tests show an acceleration of about 45% in practice compared
to the precision proposed in [LZ94].
All algorithms of this thesis are implemented in C++ and available via the LiDIA module gec.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Preface
The subject of the thesis at hand is the description of an efficient algorithm for finding an
elliptic curve over a finite prime field of large characteristic suitable for use in cryptography.
The algorithm is called cryptoCurve.
The group of rational points of an elliptic curve over a field F of characteristic not in {2; 3}
is the set of solutions of an equation of the form y2 = x3 +ax+ b over the field F, where both
a and b are elements of F. The formal definition of these terms will be given in Section 2.3.
Although elliptic curves were studied thoroughly for a dozen of decades in the framework of
number theory and algebraic geometry, their applications in practice evolved rather recently.
For instance, in 1987 H.W. Lenstra proposed a new algorithm for factoring large integers
using elliptic curves over factor rings of integers ([Len87]). In addition, A.O.L. Atkin and
F. Morain, using ideas of S. Goldwasser and J. Kilian ([GK86]), developed and implemented
an algorithm for primality proving that employs elliptic curves ([Mor88], [AM93]). Finally,
N. Koblitz ([Kob87]) and V.S. Miller ([Mil86]) independently proposed the use of rational
points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field in cryptography.
Once we know that the set of rational points of an elliptic curve over a finite field actually
is an Abelian group, we may define the discrete logarithm problem in this group as usual.
However, since the use of elliptic curves in cryptography, various algorithms to solve the
discrete logarithm problem in the group of rational points of an elliptic curve have been
found. Hence, in order to keep the discrete logarithm problem intractable, we have to choose
the elliptic curve diligently.
As of today the security of an elliptic curve cryptosystem is determined by the cardinality of
the group of rational points of the elliptic curve in use. Thus in order to decide whether a
group of rational points is suitable for use in cryptography, we have to know its group order.
It turns out that in general this is a burdensome and nontrivial task. If the elliptic curve is
defined over a finite prime field of large characteristic, two approaches have been proposed to
find a curve with group of rational points which is suitable for use in cryptography:
The first approach, mostly referred to as the random approach, first chooses random parame-
ters a and b. Using point counting algorithms, the group order of the set of rational points is
determined. Once the cardinality is known, we can decide whether the group is suitable for
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use in cryptography or not. If it turns out that the curve does not yield a secure cryptosys-
tem, new random parameters a and b are chosen. The most efficient algorithm to count the
number of points of an elliptic curve group over a large finite prime field is due to R. Schoof,
N. Elkies, and A.O.L. Atkin, the SEA-algorithm. It has been successfully implemented and
improved by V. Mu¨ller ([Mu¨l95]). The theoretical complexity of the SEA-algorithm can be
shown to be O(log4+ε p), where p is the cardinality of the prime field and ε > 0. Although
the SEA-algorithm is polynomial in the bitlength of p with low degree, we have to choose
various parameters a and b before finding suitable ones, and in either case we have to apply
the SEA-algorithm.
However, relying on the work of A.O.L. Atkin and F. Morain, A.-M. Spallek proposed a fur-
ther approach to find elliptic curve groups for use in cryptography ([Spa92]). This approach
uses the theory of complex multiplication. Hence this approach is called the complex multipli-
cation approach. Its proceeding is quite different from the random approach. In the complex
multiplication method one first searches for candidates of a suitable group cardinality. This
can be done without knowing the parameters a and b of the corresponding elliptic curves.
Once a suitable cardinality is found, the parameters a and b are determined using complex
multiplication. The ideas of Spallek were extended by G.J. Lay and H.G. Zimmer ([Lay94],
[LZ94]). However, their work leaves several important questions and problems unanswered.
First, neither author presents an algorithm to find a suitable cardinality, that is a prime
field and a cardinality of a suitable elliptic curve group. We develop and describe a very
efficient algorithm for this task; in addition, we give upper bounds of its complexity. In this
efficient algorithm the prime field may not be chosen in advance. However, in some cases the
field is given first. For instance, all international cryptographic standards which describe an
algorithm for finding a suitable cardinality, make use of the latter approach ([P1363], Chapter
A.14.2.3, p. 155, [X9.62], Chapter E.3.2.c, p. 115-116). We show how to significantly speed
up these algorithms.
Second, no previously proposed algorithm for the generation of an elliptic curve considers
the class number of the endomorphism ring of the curve. The German Information Security
Agency requires the class number of the maximal order containing the endomorphism ring to
be at least 200 ([GIS01]). Our algorithm cryptoCurve respects this condition.
Third, we develop and thoroughly investigate different methods to compute class polynomi-
als. The computation of a class polynomial is an important subalgorithm in the complex
multiplication approach. In general the integer coefficients of a class polynomial are very
large. Hence their computation in practice is rather difficult. It was believed in the crypto-
graphic community that only class polynomials of low degree, say of degree at most 50, are
amenable to the complex multiplication approach (see for example [MP97]). However, using
our efficient algorithm, we are able to compute a class polynomial of degree up to 3000 in
reasonable time, that is in less than 10 minutes on an ordinary PC. In addition, we are able
to compute a class polynomial of degree 15000 on the same computer in less than two days.
Fourth, we carry out a detailed practical investigation of the floating point precision needed
to compute a class polynomial. The precision in use is important for the run time to compute
a class polynomial in practice. However, in order to get a correct result, we have to choose
the floating point precision with care. As of today, different precisions were proposed (see for
instance [AM93], [BSS99], [LZ94]). All of them are only based on heuristic arguments, and
none of the authors presents a practical investigation. In addition, none of the cryptographic
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standards [P1363] or [X9.62] gives a hint on how to choose an appropriate floating point pre-
cision. For instance, we quote from [P1363], Annex A, p. 151: ”The above computation must
be performed with sufficient accuracy to identify each coefficient of the polynomial wD(t).
Since each such coefficient is an integer, this means that the error incurred in calculating
each coefficient should be less than 1/2.” Obviously this statement is not useful for choosing
the floating point precision in practice. Furthermore, in case of the class polynomial due to
N. Yui and D. Zagier ([YZ97]), which uses Weber functions, we propose a new floating point
precision to compute this polynomial in practice. Our precision yields a significant perfor-
mance improvement. Sample tests show an acceleration of about 45% in practice compared
to the precision proposed in [LZ94].
Finally, in order to be easily usable, we integrate cryptoCurve in the library LiDIA ([LiDIA]).
As LiDIA is implemented in C++, we make use of an object oriented approach, that is we
design a class hierarchy to implement cryptoCurve. The corresponding LiDIA-module is
called gec - generate elliptic curves. The gec-module provides a broad functionality and an
easy-to-use interface. Furthermore, the interface structure of gec is designed in a way that
the user can easily adapt gec for his needs. gec may be used as any other class in LiDIA.
In addition, we provide an interface to Java; thus once LiDIA is compiled successfully on the
platform in use, elliptic curves for use in cryptography may be generated from within the
Java Cryptography Architecture.
We tested our algorithms on three platforms: First, a SUN UltraSPARC-I running Solaris
2.6 at 167 MHz and having 256 MByte main memory. Second, a SUN UltraSPARC-IIi
running Solaris 2.6 at 333 MHz and having 512 MByte main memory. Finally, a Pentium
III running Linux 2.2.14 at 800 MHz and having 128 MByte main memory. All algorithms
are implemented in C++ using the library LiDIA 2.0 ([LiDIA]) with gmp 2.0.2 as underlying
multiprecision package. We compiled our library and test programs with the GNU compiler
2.95.2 setting the optimization flag O2. Sample tests indicate that running times on the
Pentium III are about a quarter of the timings on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided in three parts. The first part comprises this introduction and the
mathematical background of our algorithm. This background is presented in Chapter 2. As
the theory of complex multiplication is closely related to imaginary quadratic orders and class
field theory, we first introduce the relevant theory. Next we turn to the underlying theory of
elliptic curves, that is we discuss the relevant properties of elliptic curves over a general field,
over the complex numbers, and over a finite field, respectively. In addition, we present an
introduction to the theory of complex multiplication. Finally, we list the requirements for a
group of rational points of an elliptic curve to be suitable for use in cryptography. We call
the cardinality of such a group a suitable cardinality.
Next, in part II we describe in detail our generating algorithm. Part II contains the Chapters
3 to 10. First, in Chapter 3 we give an overview of our algorithm. The main algorithm splits
into various subalgorithms discussed in the subsequent Chapters.
In Chapter 4 we develop a very efficient algorithm to find a finite prime field and a suitable
cardinality. The approach of Chapter 4 is to first choose an imaginary quadratic discriminant.
This discriminant is equal to the discriminant of the endomorphism ring of the elliptic curve
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which is the output of cryptoCurve. A similar idea is due to Spallek ([Spa92]), and a
non-optimized variant may be found in [SScK01]. It turns out that the implementation
of [SScK01] is much slower than our implementation. As the discriminant is kept fixed in
the subalgorithm, we call this approach ”Fixed Discriminant Approach”. We derive various
conditions which have to be respected in order to be successful. These requirements and their
efficient implementation yield a highly efficient algorithm to find a suitable cardinality. In
addition, we provide the complexity of a non-optimized variant. Hence, we give an upper
bound of the complexity of our optimized subalgorithm.
Chapter 5 presents a subalgorithm which determines a suitable cardinality if the prime field
is given; we call this variant ”Fixed Field Approach”. Using ideas of Atkin and Morain
([AM93]), we show how to implement this approach very efficiently in practice.
In Chapter 6 we compare two approaches to compute the reduced representatives of the class
group of an imaginary quadratic order. It turns out that the well-known brute-force approach
is optimal in practice.
Chapter 7 compares the running times of the computation of various number-theoretical
functions in practice. For instance, we compare the running times of different representations
to compute the Dedekind η-function within a given floating point precision. In addition, we
show that representing the further number-theoretical functions in terms of the η-function
is the most efficient way to evaluate them in practice. The main results of this Chapter are
already published in [Bai01b] and [Bai01a].
In Chapter 8 we compare different algorithms to compute a class polynomial once its roots
are obtained. We generalize an idea due to Karatsuba ([Kar95]) and show that this approach
is superior to the standard algorithms.
In Chapter 9 we investigate the floating point precision needed to compute a class polynomial
in practice. In case of the ring class polynomial, our practical tests give evidence that a
formula due to Lay and Zimmer ([LZ94]) is appropriate. Furthermore, in case of the class
polynomial due to Yui and Zagier ([YZ97]), which uses Weber functions, we propose a new
formula of the floating point precision. In addition, basing on a large database of practical
tests we show that this precision is sufficient to compute this polynomial in practice.
Next, in Chapter 10 we determine an upper bound of the complexity of our generating algo-
rithm. In addition, we discuss some security considerations related to our algorithm. More
precisely, we investigate the number of different elliptic curves which may be generated by our
algorithm. The term different depends on the attacks we take into account. We develop two
attacker models and show that in either model the number of different curves is sufficiently
large.
Finally, the Chapters 11 and 12 form the closing part III. In Chapter 11 we first provide
practical performance results proving the efficiency of our algorithms. For instance, we show
that our algorithm finds a prime p and parameters a and b of an elliptic curve in about 12
seconds on an ordinary PC. The group of rational points of this curve over IFp is of suitable
cardinality. Furthermore, we describe two extensions of our algorithm. First, we show how
to efficiently find an elliptic curve over a finite prime field such that both the curve and a
twist of it are of prime order and suitable for use in cryptography. An application of this
algorithm is a pseudo random number generator using elliptic curves (see [Kal86], [Kal88],
[Lip00]). Second, we show how to efficiently find an elliptic curve over an Optimal Extension
Field suitable for use in cryptography (see also [Bai01c], [Bai01d]).
1.3 Notation 7
Chapter 12 describes the class hierarchy and the interface of our library gec. In addition,
it presents the interface of gec to Java. Furthermore, we mention two applications of this
interface: a Graphical User Interface and a webinterface.
The final appendix gives additional information to some Chapters and presents various sample
elliptic curves suitable for use in cryptography. In addition, the appendix contains the manual
of our library gec.
1.3 Notation
We outline the notation used in this thesis. Some symbols have different meanings; however,
the meaning becomes evident in the respective context.
First, we introduce some notation for integers with special relevance.
p a rational prime ≥ 5
pj the j-th odd prime, that is p1 = 3, p2 = 5, ...
q a power of p, i.e. q = pn
r the cryptographic prime factor
k the cofactor
We next describe symbols used for sets of numbers.
IN the set of positive rational integers
ZZ the ring of rational integers
IP the set of positive rational primes
Q the field of rational numbers
IR the field of real numbers
C the field of complex numbers
Ĉ the set C ∪ {∞}, i.e. the projective closure of C
h the upper complex half plane
F a field
F the algebraic closure of a field F
F× the multiplicative group of a field F
K an imaginary quadratic number field
L a ring class field
IFq the finite field of q elements
R an integral domain, i.e. a commutative ring with 1 having no zero divisors
In addition, we introduce the following symbols in the context of lattices, imaginary quadratic
orders, and ring of integers.
L a lattice in C
∆ an imaginary quadratic discriminant
∆K a fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant
O∆ the imaginary quadratic order of discriminant ∆
a a fractional ideal of an imaginary quadratic order
I(O∆) the set of invertible fractional ideals of O∆
P (O∆) the set of principal invertible fractional ideals of O∆
h(∆) the class number of discriminant ∆
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C(∆) the set of all reduced representatives of ideal classes of discriminant ∆
hp(∆) the number of reduced representatives (a, b, c) of discriminant ∆ with b ≥ 0
OF the ring of integers in a number field F
N(α) the norm of an element α ∈ OF
N (I) the norm of an (integral) ideal I ⊂ OF (p. 17)
We will make use of the following symbols to represent a class polynomial.
C a class polynomial
H a ring class polynomial
G a class polynomial corresponding to γ2 due to Atkin and Morain
W a class polynomial corresponding to Weber functions due to Yui and Zagier
Furthermore, we introduce some notation in the context of elliptic curves.
E an elliptic curve over a field
(a, b) the parameters of an elliptic curve
E(F ) the group of rational points of E over a field F
O the point at infinity
∆(E) the discriminant of an elliptic curve E = (a, b), that is ∆(E) = −16(4a3 + 27b2)
j(E) the j-invariant of an elliptic curve E
E an elliptic curve over a number field
G a base point of an elliptic curve cryptosystem
Finally, we define some well-known functions and relations.
log x, x ∈ IR+ the natural logarithm
lg x, x ∈ IR+ the logarithm to the base 10
pi(n), n ∈ IN the number of rational primes ≤ n
li(n), n ∈ IN logarithmic integral: li(n) = ∫ n2 dtlog t
χ∆ the quadratic character associated to ∆ (p. 14)
L(s, χ∆) the Dirichlet L-series associated to χ∆ (p. 14)
a = b mod N, a, b ∈ ZZ, N ∈ IN the unique integer a, 0 ≤ a ≤ N − 1, with a ≡ b mod N
f(n) ∼ g(n), f, g : IN→ IR+ asymptotically equal, that is limx→∞ f(n)g(n) = 1
∈R choose an element randomly
Chapter 2
Mathematical Background
In this chapter we introduce the underlying mathematics of our generating algorithm. The
algorithm is called cryptoCurve. The main theory of cryptoCurve is the concept of complex
multiplication discussed in Section 2.3.3. However, this theory links different areas of number
theory and algebra. For instance, complex multiplication is closely related to imaginary
quadratic orders and class field theory. Hence in Section 2.1 we first present the theory of
imaginary quadratic orders. Next, in Section 2.2 we turn to that part of class field theory
which is relevant in our context. Finally, Section 2.3 deals with the theory of elliptic curves
related to our algorithm.
2.1 Imaginary Quadratic Orders and Quadratic Forms
One basic object in cryptoCurve is an imaginary quadratic order. This section presents
the theory of imaginary quadratic orders which is relevant to explain and understand our
algorithm cryptoCurve. In addition, we introduce quadratic forms which play a crucial role
in one of our subalgorithms. Furthermore, we show that quadratic forms and fractional ideals
of imaginary quadratic orders are essentially the same number-theoretical object.
This section is organized as follows: First, in Section 2.1.1 we introduce imaginary quadratic
orders and present their basic properties which are important in our context. Next, in Section
2.1.2 we discuss quadratic forms and show their close relation to quadratic orders. Finally,
Section 2.1.3 works out some results on representing integers by quadratic forms. We will
make use of these results to improve the efficiency of cryptoCurve.
2.1.1 Imaginary Quadratic Orders
We introduce the basic terms and basic facts in the framework of imaginary quadratic orders.
As this theory is well studied, we present all theorems without proof. For more details we
refer to [BS66], [Buc01], [Coh95], [Cox89], or [Lan70].
We begin our study with the definition of an imaginary quadratic order. Recall that the
ring of integers of a finite extension F of Q is the set of all elements of F whose minimal
polynomial over Q has integer coefficients.
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Definition 2.1.1 An imaginary quadratic field denoted by K is a field of degree 2 over Q
with K ⊂ C and K 6⊂ IR. An imaginary quadratic order is a subring of the ring of integers
of K which contains 1. We denote an imaginary quadratic order by O . The ring of integers
of K is called the maximal imaginary quadratic order of K. It is denoted by OK .
Imaginary quadratic orders may be described using imaginary quadratic discriminants. We
first explain this term and then present the link in Theorem 2.1.3.
Definition 2.1.2 An imaginary quadratic discriminant denoted by ∆ is a negative integer
either congruent 0 or 1 modulo 4. In addition, let f denote the largest integer such that ∆/f2 is
an imaginary quadratic discriminant, too. Then f is called the conductor of ∆. Furthermore,
∆/f2 is called the field discriminant of the imaginary quadratic field Q(
√
∆). Finally, if f = 1
then ∆ is said to be fundamental. We denote a fundamental discriminant by ∆K .
For instance, the largest imaginary quadratic discriminants are −3, −4, −7, −8, and −11.
Obviously, all of them are fundamental. However, −12 is not a fundamental discriminant,
as −12 = −3 · 22. Hence −12 is a discriminant of conductor 2. Its corresponding fundamen-
tal discriminant is −3. As quoted in the preceding sentence we will often use the shortcut
discriminant to denote an imaginary quadratic discriminant.
We are now able to give the link between imaginary quadratic orders and imaginary quadratic
discriminants.
Theorem 2.1.3 Let O be an imaginary quadratic order. Then there is a unique imaginary
quadratic discriminant ∆ with
O = ZZ[(∆ +
√
∆)/2] = ZZ + (∆ +
√
∆)/2 · ZZ . (2.1)
If O is maximal, then ∆ is fundamental. In addition, suppose O1 and O2 to be imaginary qua-
dratic orders of discriminant ∆1 and ∆2, respectively, and let f1 and f2 be the corresponding
conductors. Then O1 ⊂ O2 if and only if ∆2 | ∆1 and ∆1/f21 = ∆2/f22 .
We denote the imaginary quadratic order of discriminant ∆ by O∆ . We will also make use
of the notation O for the imaginary quadratic order of discriminant ∆ if the discriminant of
O is obvious from the context. It is easy to see that O∆ = ZZ[
√
∆] or O∆ = ZZ[(1 +
√
∆)/2]
depending on whether ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4 or ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4, respectively. If c1, c2 ∈ C, c1 and c2
linear independent over ZZ, we make use of the notation [c1, c2] := c1ZZ + c2ZZ.
We next turn to ideals of an order O∆ . From Definition 2.1.1 it is clear that O∆ is a com-
mutative ring with 1 having no zero divisors, that is O∆ is an integral domain. Let I ⊂ O∆
be an ideal of O∆; we call such an ideal an integral ideal. It is well known that every integral
ideal of O∆ may be written as
I = m
(
aZZ +
b+
√
∆
2
ZZ
)
, (2.2)
where a,m ∈ IN, b ∈ ZZ, c := (b2 −∆)/(4a) ∈ ZZ, and gcd(a, b, c) = 1. However, in general we
have to deal with fractional ideals.
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Definition 2.1.4 Let O∆ be an imaginary quadratic order and K its field of fractions. A
fractional ideal of O∆ denoted by a is a finitely generated O∆-submodule of K. A principal
fractional ideal is a fractional ideal of the form αO∆ for some α ∈ K×.
We remark that integral ideals are obviously fractional. However, in general a 6⊂ O∆ for a
fractional ideal a of O∆ . Nevertheless, similar to Equation (2.2) for integral ideals, we may
write a fractional ideal a as
a = α
(
aZZ +
b+
√
∆
2
ZZ
)
, (2.3)
where α ∈ K×, a ∈ IN, b ∈ ZZ, c := (b2−∆)/(4a) ∈ ZZ, and gcd(a, b, c) = 1. The multiplication
of elements in K induces a multiplication of fractional ideals of O∆ as usual; if a and b are
fractional ideals of O∆, their product is simply given by a · b := {
∑N
k=1 akbk : ak ∈ a, bk ∈
b, 1 ≤ k ≤ N}. We next discuss invertible ideals.
Definition 2.1.5 Let O∆ be an imaginary quadratic order and a a fractional ideal of O∆ . a
is invertible if there exists a fractional ideal b of O∆ with a · b = O∆ . The set of invertible
ideals of O∆ is denoted by I(O∆). Furthermore, the set of principal non-zero fractional ideals
is denoted by P (O∆).
Obviously, both P (O∆) and I(O∆) form an Abelian group with the multiplication of ideals
as group operation. In addition, if a ∈ P (O∆), that is if a = αO∆ for some α ∈ K×, then
a ∈ I(O∆); it is easy to see that b := 1/α · O∆ is a principal fractional ideal with a · b = O∆ .
Hence, we have shown P (O∆) ⊂ I(O∆). The factor group I(O∆)/P (O∆) is rather important.
Definition 2.1.6 Let O∆ be an imaginary quadratic order. Then the group I(O∆)/P (O∆)
is called the ideal class group of discriminant ∆. We denote the ideal class group by Cl(O∆).
The next theorem states that the group Cl(O∆) is finite.
Definition and Theorem 2.1.7 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant and let
Cl(O∆) be the ideal class group of discriminant ∆. The cardinality of Cl(O∆) is finite. It is
denoted by h(O∆) and called the ideal class number.
Before stating the important theorem on representing the elements of Cl(O∆), we introduce
the term of equivalence of fractional ideals.
Definition 2.1.8 Let O∆ be an imaginary quadratic order and let K denote its field of frac-
tions. In addition, let a and b be fractional ideals of O∆, respectively. The ideals a and b are
equivalent, if there exists an α ∈ K× with a = αb; we denote this by a ∼ b.
Obviously the relation ∼ of Definition 2.1.8 induces an equivalence relation on the set of
fractional ideals of O∆ . As usual, if a is a fractional ideal of O∆, we write [a] for its equivalence
class inO∆ . Let α(aZZ+(b+
√
∆)/2·ZZ) be its representation from Equation (2.3). We conclude
that a is equivalent to an ideal b of the form [1, (b +
√
∆)/(2a)]. Hence, we have [a] = [b].
In addition, it is easy to see that [a] = [b] if and only if aP (O∆) = bP (O∆). The following
theorem shows that for each element of the ideal class group we find a unique fractional ideal
a representing the element aP (O∆).
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Definition and Theorem 2.1.9 Let Cl(O∆) be the ideal class group of discriminant ∆. Let
aP (O∆) be an element of Cl(O∆). There exists an ideal b = ZZ + (b+
√
∆)/(2a) · ZZ with the
following properties:
1. aP (O∆) = bP (O∆).
2. a ∈ IN, b ∈ ZZ, c = (b2 −∆)/(4a) ∈ ZZ, gcd(a, b, c) = 1.
3. b ≤ a ≤ c, and b ≥ 0 if either |b| = a or a = c.
The ideal b is called the reduced representative of the class bP (O∆). We denote its class by
(a, b, c).
Finally, let ∆ denote an imaginary quadratic discriminant. If ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4, then (1, 0,−∆/4)
obviously is the reduced representative of the ideal class P (O∆). Furthermore, if ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4,
then (1, 1, (1 − ∆)/4) is the reduced representative of the ideal class P (O∆). To sum up, if
b2 ≡ ∆ mod 2, b2 ∈ {0, 1}, then we may write (1, b2, (b2−∆)/4) for the reduced representative
of the ideal class P (O∆).
2.1.2 Quadratic Forms
In this section we describe the basic properties of integral binary quadratic forms of negative
discriminants. In addition, we discuss the relation of quadratic forms and quadratic orders.
Again, we just summarize the main results. For details and proofs we again refer to [BS66],
[Buc01], [Coh95], [Cox89], or [Lan70].
Definition 2.1.10 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. An integral binary quad-
ratic form of discriminant ∆ is a triple (a, b, c) ∈ ZZ3 with ∆ = b2 − 4ac. If gcd(a, b, c) = 1
the integral binary quadratic form (a, b, c) is called primitive.
We abbreviate the term ”integral binary quadratic form” by ”quadratic form”. Let f =
(a, b, c) be a quadratic form. We associate with f the bivariate polynomial f(X,Y ) = aX2 +
bXY + cY 2. Hence, we have the identity
f(X,Y ) = (X,Y )
(
a b/2
b/2 c
)(
X
Y
)
. (2.4)
We write M(f) for the matrix corresponding to f. Obviously the map f 7→M(f) is injective,
and it is easy to recover f from M(f). Using the special linear group SL(2,ZZ), that is the
set of all 2 × 2 matrices of determinant 1 with integer coefficients, we may define a relation
on the set of quadratic forms of discriminant ∆ as follows.
Definition 2.1.11 Let f and g be quadratic forms of discriminant ∆. The forms f and g
are said to be equivalent, if there is a matrix T ∈ SL(2,ZZ) with M(g) = T−1M(f)T. If f
and g are equivalent, we write f ∼ g.
The relation of Definition 2.1.11 clearly defines an equivalence relation on the set of quadratic
forms of discriminant ∆. As usual, we denote the equivalence class of f by [f ]. Similar to
Theorem 2.1.9, there is a unique representative for either equivalence class.
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Definition and Theorem 2.1.12 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant, and let f
be a primitive quadratic form of discriminant ∆. There exists a matrix T ∈ SL(2,ZZ) such
that the quadratic form (a, b, c) corresponding to the matrix T−1M(f)T has the following
properties:
1. f ∼ (a, b, c).
2. a ∈ IN, b ∈ ZZ, c = (b2 −∆)/(4a) ∈ ZZ, gcd(a, b, c) = 1.
3. b ≤ a ≤ c, and b ≥ 0 if either |b| = a or a = c.
The quadratic form (a, b, c) is called the reduced representative of the equivalence class [f ].
For instance, as discussed at the end of Section 2.1.1, if b2 ≡ ∆ mod 2, b2 ∈ {0, 1}, then
(1, b2, (b2−∆)/4) is a reduced representative. The corresponding quadratic form is called the
principal form or main form of discriminant ∆.
Definition 2.1.13 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. The set of equivalence
classes of primitive quadratic forms of discriminant ∆ is called the form class group of dis-
criminant ∆. We denote the form class group of discriminant ∆ by Cl(∆).
We have to explain that Cl(∆) actually is a group. However, in order to explain the group
law on equivalence classes of primitive quadratic forms of discriminant ∆, we have to map
quadratic forms to fractional ideals of quadratic orders. More precisely, the following theorem
states that the form class group Cl(∆) and the ideal class group Cl(O∆) are two sides of the
same coin.
Theorem 2.1.14 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant, and let (a, b, c) be a prim-
itive quadratic form of discriminant ∆. Define the map Φ by
Φ : (a, b, c) 7→ [a, (−b+
√
∆)/2] , (2.5)
where a := [a, (−b+√∆)/2] is a fractional ideal of O∆ . Then a is invertible. In addition, Φ
induces a bijection between the form class group Cl(∆) and the ideal class group Cl(O∆).
Using the bijection Φ, we get an obvious composition law on Cl(∆). Hence, Φ actually induces
an isomorphism between Cl(∆) and Cl(O∆). We will refer to both Cl(∆) and Cl(O∆) as the
class group of discriminant ∆, and we write Cl(∆) for the class group. In addition, Theorem
2.1.14 shows |Cl(∆)| = |Cl(O∆)| = h(O∆). Thus, we set h(∆) := h(O∆) and refer to h(∆)
as the class number. In our algorithm we are only concerned with reduced representatives of
form classes. Thus we introduce the following notation.
Definition 2.1.15 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant, and let Cl(∆) be the class
group. We write C(∆) for the set of all reduced representatives of form classes of discriminant
∆.
We will often refer to the set C(∆) as the class group, too. We conclude this section with a
deep result concerning the growth of the class number of imaginary quadratic discriminants.
This result is a consequence of the analytic class number formula given in Theorem 2.1.17.
In order to state the analytic class number formula we have to introduce two terms ([Zag81],
p. 38, 41).
14 Mathematical Background
Definition 2.1.16 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant.
1. The quadratic character χ∆ : IN→ {0; 1;−1} associated to ∆ is defined by
χ∆(p) ≡ ∆(p−1)/2 mod p, χ∆(p) ∈ {0; 1;−1} if p is an odd prime,
χ∆(2) = 0, 1,−1 for ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8,
∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, respectively,
χ∆(nm) = χ∆(n)χ∆(m) for all n,m ∈ IN.
2. The Dirichlet L-series associated to χ∆ is defined by
L(s, χ∆) =
∞∑
k=1
χ∆(k)
ks
, s ∈ C,Re(s) > 0.
We are now able to state the analytic class number formula ([Zag81], Equation (13) and (14),
p. 103).
Theorem 2.1.17 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. Then
L(1, χ∆) =
2pi
u
· h(∆)√|∆| (2.6)
where u denotes the number of units in O∆ .
It is well known that L(1, χ∆) is bounded by log |∆|. Thus using the O-notation we sum up
Theorem 2.1.17 as |∆| = O(h(∆)2) and h(∆)2 = O(|∆|).
2.1.3 Representing Integers by Quadratic Forms
In our generating algorithm cryptoCurve we are concerned with the fundamental problem in
number theory to decide whether a given integer n may be represented by a quadratic form
or an element of a quadratic order. In this section we prove some results in this context to
improve the efficiency of cryptoCurve. The results of this section will be used in Chapter 4
to efficiently find primes represented by a given quadratic form. However, we have to explain
the term representation
Definition 2.1.18 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. In addition, let n ∈ ZZ
and f = (a, b, c) be a primitive quadratic form of discriminant ∆. n is represented by f, if
there is a pair (x,w) ∈ ZZ2 with n = ax2 + bxw+ cw2 =: f(x,w). Furthermore, n is the norm
of an element of O∆, if there exists an element pi ∈ O∆ with n = pipi.
From Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 we are already aware of the close relationship between quadratic
forms and quadratic orders. In this section we present some basic facts concerning represen-
tations of integers by norms of elements of quadratic orders and by quadratic forms. The
outlined facts will be very useful in Chapter 4, when we have to find primes for our generating
algorithm. We first develop a requirement to check whether a given integer is norm of an
element of O∆ . It turns out that this property is much easier to check in practice.
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Proposition 2.1.19 Let ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 mod 4 be an imaginary quadratic discriminant.
Furthermore, let n be an integer. There exists an element pi ∈ O∆ with n = pipi if and only if
there are integers t and y with 4n = t2 −∆y2.
Proof: I. Let pi ∈ O∆ satisfy n = pipi. We haveO∆ = [1, (∆+
√
∆)/2]. Thus, there are integers
a and b with pi = a+b∆+
√
∆
2 . It follows n = pipi = (a+b
∆+
√
∆
2 )(a+b
∆−√∆
2 ) = (a+
b∆
2 )
2−b2 ∆4 ,
i.e. 4n = (2a+ b∆)2 − b2∆. If we set t := 2a+ b∆ and y := b, we have 4n = t2 −∆y2.
II. Now let 4n = t2 −∆y2 with integers t and y. It is easy to see that 4n = t2 −∆y2 implies
t ≡ y∆ mod 2, and pi := t−y∆2 + y∆+
√
∆
2 is an element in O∆ of norm n. uunionsq
Next we show that there is no difference in saying ”p is the norm of an element of O∆” and
”p is represented by the main form of discriminant ∆”. However, we first have to introduce
some new notation.
Definition 2.1.20 Let ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 mod 4. Furthermore, let f be the main form of
discriminant ∆. For an integer n we denote by N∆(n) the set of pairs of integers (t, y) for
which we have 4n = t2−∆y2, and we write R∆,f (n) for the set of pairs of integers representing
n by f ,i.e.
N∆(n) = {(t, y) ∈ ZZ2 : 4n = t2 −∆y2} , (2.7)
R∆,f (n) = {(x,w) ∈ ZZ2 : n = f(x,w)} . (2.8)
Proposition 2.1.21 Let ∆, f, and n be as in Definition 2.1.20. The map ρ defined by
ρ : N∆(n)→ R∆,f (n), (t, y) 7→
{
( t2 , y) : ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4
( t−y2 , y) : ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4
is a bijection from N∆(n) to R∆,f (n) with inverse
ρ−1 : R∆,f (n)→ N∆(n), (x,w) 7→
{
(2x,w) : ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4
(2x+ w,w) : ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4 .
Proof: We have f = (1, 0, −∆4 ) in case of ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4 and f = (1, 1, 1−∆4 ) in case of
∆ ≡ 1 mod 4. According to Proposition 2.1.19, an integer n is the norm of an element of O∆
if and only if there are integers t and y with 4n = t2 −∆y2.
I. We first show ρ(N∆(n)) ⊆ R∆,f (n). Let (t, y) ∈ N∆(n). If ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4 we have n =
t2
4 −∆4 y2 ∈ ZZ, i.e. t
2
4 ∈ ZZ. We set x = t2 and w = y; then n = f(x,w) follows. If ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4,
we have ∆ ≡ 1 mod 2; in addition, t ≡ y mod 2 holds (see the proof of Proposition 2.1.19).
We set x = t−y2 and w = y; again n = f(x,w) follows.
II. We prove that the image of the map
λ : R∆,f (n)→ ZZ2, (x,w) 7→
{
(2x,w) : ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4
(2x+ w,w) : ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4
is a subset of N∆(n) Let (x,w) ∈ R∆,f (n). We first assume ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4. It follows n = x2−
∆
4 w
2, i.e. 4n = (2x)2−∆w2. Therefore, (2x,w) is an integer solution of 4n = t2−∆y2. Next
we assume ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4. Thus n = x2 +xw+ 1−∆4 w2 and 4n = (2x)2 +2 ·(2x)w+w2−∆w2 =
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(2x+ w)2 −∆w2 follow. Hence, (2x+ w,w) is an integer solution of 4n = t2 −∆y2.
III. Finally we prove λ ◦ ρ = idN∆(n) and ρ ◦ λ = idR∆,f (n). From these identities we deduce
that ρ and λ = ρ−1 are bijective.
For a pair (t, y) ∈ N∆(n) we have
λ ◦ ρ(t, y) =
{
λ( t2 , y) = (2 · t2 , y) = (t, y) : ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4
λ( t−y2 , y) = (2 · t−y2 + y, y) = (t, y) : ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4.
This proves λ ◦ ρ = idN∆(n). For (x,w) ∈ R∆,f (n) we have
ρ ◦ λ(x,w)
{
ρ(2x,w) = (2x2 , w) = (x,w) : ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4
ρ(2x+ w,w) = (2x+w−w2 , w) = (x,w) : ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4
and ρ ◦ λ = idR∆,f (n) follows. uunionsq
Hence, Proposition 2.1.19 and Proposition 2.1.21 imply that a rational prime p is the norm
of an element of O∆ if and only if p is represented by the main form of discriminant ∆.
Finally, we show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between positive integers t and y
and primes of the form (t2 −∆y2)/4. We will need this theorem in Section 4.2 to determine
the complexity of one of our subalgorithms to find a suitable prime.
Theorem 2.1.22 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant with fundamental discrimi-
nant ∆K < −4. In addition, let t and y be positive integers such that p := (t2 −∆y2)/4 is an
odd prime. Then t and y are uniquely determined by p.
Proof: Let (t, y) ∈ IN2 with p = (t2 − ∆y2)/4. The proof of Proposition 2.1.19 shows that
each of the four pairs (±t,±y) yields a different element of O∆ of norm p. Thus there are at
least four elements in O∆ of norm p.
We next prove that there are exactly 4 elements in O∆ of norm p. Let pi ∈ O∆ with p = pipi.
Furthermore, let pi′ ∈ O∆ be a further element of norm p. Hence, we have p = pipi = pi′pi′.
The last equation shows (pi/pi′)(pi/pi′) = 1. Thus, pi/pi′ is a complex number of norm 1. Let
K = Q(
√
∆) denote the field of fractions of O∆ . Then we have pi/pi′ ∈ K. Thus pi/pi′ is
a root of unity and hence an element of O∆K . However, the assumption ∆K < −4 yields
O×∆K = {1,−1}. Hence, pi′ ∈ {pi,−pi} follows. Thus there are four elements in O∆ of norm
p : pi, −pi, pi, and −pi. uunionsq
2.2 Class Field Theory
In this section we introduce the relevant theory of class fields. It turns out that imaginary
quadratic orders and this theory are closely linked. The link is given by the theory of complex
multiplication.
In Section 2.2.1 we begin our studies with the basic properties of number fields. Using these
results we are able to introduce in Section 2.2.2 the most important class fields in our context,
ring class fields. In one of our subalgorithms we have to compute a polynomial which generates
the ring class field. Thus in Section 2.2.3 we discuss three different polynomials suitable for
this purpose.
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2.2.1 Number Fields
This section summarizes the basic theory of number fields. Similar to the factorization of
rational integers into a product of rational primes, the focus of our study lies on the decom-
position of an ideal in the ring of integers of a number field into prime ideals. We first turn
to the definition of number fields.
Definition 2.2.1 A number field denoted by F is a subfield of the complex numbers C having
finite degree over the rationals Q. The degree of F over Q is denoted by [F : Q].
For instance, an imaginary quadratic field K is a number field with [K : Q] = 2. As usual
we denote by OF the ring of integers of the number field F. In addition to integral ideals of
imaginary quadratic orders, we present some properties of OF -ideals.
Definition and Theorem 2.2.2 Let F be a number field and I ⊂ OF a non-zero OF -ideal.
Then the quotient ring OF /I is finite. Its cardinality is called the norm of I. The norm of I
is denoted by N (I).
We remark that if I = αOF is principal, then N (I) is equal to the norm |NF/Q(α)| of the
algebraic integer α. We next turn to the unique decomposition of non-zero OF -ideals into
prime ideals. Similar to the main theorem of number theory stating the unique factorization
of integers, the following holds in a ring of integers (see [Cox89], Corollary 5.6, p.99).
Theorem 2.2.3 Let F be a number field and I ⊂ OF a non-zero OF -ideal. Then I can be
written as a product
I =
N∏
k=1
pekk , (2.9)
where the pk are pairwise different non-zero prime ideals in OF . The decomposition of Equa-
tion (2.9) is unique up to order of the prime ideals pk. In addition, the ideals pk are exactly
the prime ideals in OF containing I.
According to Theorem 2.2.3 it is common to call a prime ideal p 6= (0) a prime of F. The primes
of number fields play a rather important role in class field theory and complex multiplication.
We present a further correspondence between rational primes and primes of a number field.
If p is a rational prime, the factor ring ZZ/pZZ is the field of p elements. A similar general
theorem holds for primes of number fields.
Theorem 2.2.4 Let F be a number field and p a prime of F, that is p is a non-zero prime
ideal in OF . Then OF /p is a finite field.
However, in contrast to ZZ, the field OF /p is in general not a prime field. We next turn to
the decomposition of primes of F in finite field extensions E/F. If p is a prime of F, then it
is common to denote by pOE the ideal generated by p in OE . According to Theorem 2.2.3
we have a unique decomposition
pOE =
N∏
k=1
Pekk , (2.10)
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where the Pk are pairwise different prime ideals in OE containing pOE . In addition, it is easy
to see that OE /Pk : OF /p is a finite extension of finite fields. We introduce the following
terms.
Definition 2.2.5 Let E/F be a finite extension of number fields E and F. In addition, let p
be a prime of F, and pOE =
∏N
k=1 P
ek
k be its factorization in OE . The integer ek is called
the ramification index of p in Pk. Furthermore, if we set fk := [OE /Pk : OF /p], then fk is
named the inertial degree of p in Pk.
In our application, we only have to deal with finite Galois extensions E/F. In this case, there
is a close relationship between the degree [E : F ], the ramification indices ek, and the inertial
degrees fk.
Theorem 2.2.6 Let E/F be a finite Galois extension of number fields E and F. In addition,
let p be a prime of F, and let pOE =
∏N
k=1 P
ek
k be its factorization in OE . Then all rami-
fication indices ek are equal. In addition, all inertial degrees fk are the same. Let e and f
denote the ramification index and inertial degree of p in either prime Pk, respectively. Then
efN = [E : F ] .
Let E, F and p be as in Theorem 2.2.6. We say that p ramifies in E if e > 1, and we say
that p splits completely in E, if f = e = 1. It is well known that for a given field extension
E/F the number of primes of F which ramify in E is finite.
2.2.2 The Ring Class Field
In this section we study ring class fields and a special case of ring class fields, the Hilbert
class fields. However, in order to define and explore the basic facts of ring class fields, we
first present the main results of class field theory. We follow the approach of [Cox89], §8 A.
As our algorithm restricts to ring class fields of imaginary quadratic orders, we discuss class
field theory under this aspect.
Definition 2.2.7 Let K be an imaginary quadratic field. A modulus of K denoted by m is a
non-zero ideal in OK . Furthermore, an ideal a ⊂ OK is relatively prime to m, if m+a = OK .
If the modulus m is of the form f OK for some f ∈ IN, then an ideal a ⊂ OK is relatively
prime to m if and only if gcd(f,N (a)) = 1. The concept of a modulus yields a generalization
of ideal class groups as introduced in Section 2.1.1. Similar to invertible ideals of an order
O∆, we introduce sets of fractional ideals of maximal orders as follows.
Definition 2.2.8 Let K be an imaginary quadratic field, and let m be a modulus of K.
1. By IK(m) we denote the group of all fractional ideals of OK generated by ideals a ⊂ OK
relatively prime to m.
2. In addition, we denote by PK,1(m) the group of all principal fractional ideals generated by
principal ideals αOK with α ∈ OK , α ≡ 1 mod m.
3. Finally, let f ∈ IN. We denote by PK,ZZ(f OK) the group of all principal fractional ideals
generated by principal ideals αOK with α ∈ OK , α ≡ a mod f OK , gcd(a, f) = 1.
2.2 Class Field Theory 19
Obviously we have PK,1(m) ⊂ IK(m) and PK,1(f OK) ⊂ PK,ZZ(f OK) ⊂ IK(f OK) for all
f ∈ IN. It is easy to see that IK(m)/PK,1(m) is finite. A subgroup G of IK(m) with PK,1(m) ⊂
G ⊂ IK(m) is called a congruence subgroup for the modulus m. In addition, the factor group
IK(m)/G is called a generalized ideal class group for the modulus m. For instance, let ∆K be a
fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant, and let K = Q(
√
∆K). If m = OK , obviously
IK(m) = I(O∆K ) and PK,1 = P (O∆K ). Hence the ideal class group Cl(O∆K ) is a generalized
ideal class group. However, the same holds if ∆ is not fundamental, as we will now state.
Theorem 2.2.9 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of conductor f. Furthermore,
let K = Q(
√
∆). Then we have Cl(O∆) ' IK(f OK)/PK,ZZ(f OK).
Theorem 2.2.9 states that we may express the ideal class group of an order by sets of fractional
ideals of the corresponding maximal order.
As summarized in [Cox89], ”the basic idea of class field theory is that the generalized ideal
class groups are the Galois groups of all Abelian extensions of K”. A field extension E/K is
called Abelian, if it is a Galois extension and if the Galois group is commutative. However,
we have to explain how to link generalized ideal class groups to field extensions. The crucial
observation is that there is an outstanding K-automorphism of E, the Artin symbol. However,
we first have to state the underlying theorem.
Definition and Theorem 2.2.10 Let E/F be a finite Abelian extension of number fields,
and let p be a prime of F which is unramified in E. If P is a prime of E containing p, then
there is a unique element σ ∈ Gal(E/F ) such that for all α ∈ OE we have
σ(α) ≡ αN (p) mod P.
The automorphism σ only depends on p and is independent of the choice of P. It is called the
Artin symbol and denoted by
(
E/F
p
)
.
Let K be an imaginary quadratic field and let E be an Abelian extension of K. In addition,
let m be a modulus of K which is divisible by all primes of K which ramify in E. Hence, if p
is a prime not dividing m, then we may define the Artin symbol
(
E/K
p
)
. In order to define
the Artin map for E/K and m, we have to extend the Artin symbol to fractional ideals in
IK(m). Hence, let a ∈ IK(m). We may write a = I1/I2, where both I1 and I2 are integral
ideals in OK relatively prime to m. Thus, from Theorem 2.2.3 we deduce that we may write
a =
N∏
k=1
pekk (2.11)
with primes pk of K relatively prime to m and ek ∈ ZZ. The Artin symbol of a is defined as(
E/K
a
)
=
N∏
k=1
(
E/K
pk
)ek
. (2.12)
The Artin map for E/K and m denoted by Φm maps the fractional ideal a to the automor-
phism of Equation (2.12). It is well known that Φm : IK(m) → Gal(E/K) is a surjective
homomorphism.
The following theorem of class field theory referred to as the Existence Theorem is crucial for
defining the ring class field.
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Theorem 2.2.11 Let K be an imaginary quadratic field and m be a modulus of K. In addi-
tion, let G be a congruence subgroup for m. Then there is a unique Abelian extension E of
K, all of whose ramified primes divide m, such that if Φm : IK(m)→ Gal(E/K) is the Artin
map for E/K and m, then G = ker(Φm).
Finally, we are able to define the ring class field and Hilbert class field.
Definition 2.2.12 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of conductor f. In addi-
tion, let K = Q(
√
∆), and let G denote the congruence subgroup PK,ZZ(f OK). According to
Theorem 2.2.11 there is a unique Abelian extension L/K which corresponds to G. It is called
the ring class field of the order O∆ . If f = 1, L is called the Hilbert class field.
We conclude this section by discussing some properties of the ring class field. Let ∆ be an
imaginary quadratic discriminant of conductor f. First, if p is a prime of K = Q(
√
∆) which
ramifies in the ring class field L of O∆, then p divides the modulus f OK . Equivalent to this
statement is that if p is a prime not dividing f OK , then p is unramified in L. Second, Theorem
2.2.9, Theorem 2.2.11, and the remark following Equation (2.12) yield the isomorphism
Cl(O∆) ' IK(f OK)/PK,ZZ(f OK) ' Gal(L/K) . (2.13)
Thus we conclude [L : K] = h(∆). Finally, it is obvious that we may characterize the Hilbert
class field as the maximal unramified extension of the base field K.
2.2.3 Polynomials Generating the Ring Class Field
In this section we present three polynomials in ZZ[X] which generate the ring class field L/K.
The order of magnitude of their coefficients is crucial for the running time of our generating
algorithm cryptoCurve in practice. More precisely, in order to speed up cryptoCurve, the
coefficients should be as small as possible (with respect to their absolute value).
Definition 2.2.13 Let L/K be the ring class field of an imaginary quadratic order O∆ . A
monic polynomial C ∈ ZZ[X] is called a class polynomial if K(α) = L for any root α of C. A
root of a class polynomial C is called a class invariant.
In order to define the class polynomials we make use of in our algorithm, we introduce some
well known functions from number theory. All these functions are defined on the upper
complex half plane which we denote by h.
Definition 2.2.14 Let τ ∈ h and set q = e2piiτ . The function η defined by
η(τ) = q
1
24 ·
∞∏
n=1
(1− qn) (2.14)
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is called Dedekind’s η-function. Furthermore, the functions
f(τ) = q−
1
48
∞∏
n=1
(1 + qn−
1
2 ) , (2.15)
f1(τ) = q−
1
48
∞∏
n=1
(1− qn− 12 ) , (2.16)
f2(τ) =
√
2q
1
24
∞∏
n=1
(1 + qn) (2.17)
are called the Weber function f, f1, and f2, respectively. Finally, if we set
γ2(τ) =
f24(τ)− 16
f8(τ)
, (2.18)
j(τ) = γ32(τ), (2.19)
then j is called the modular function j.
It is well known that γ2 may be expressed as
γ2(τ) =
f24(τ)− 16
f8(τ)
=
f241 (τ) + 16
f81(τ)
=
f242 (τ) + 16
f82(τ)
. (2.20)
Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. We next explain how to map a reduced
representative (a, b, c) of the class group Cl(∆) to an imaginary quadratic number. Let
Q = (a, b, c) be an element of C(∆). We make use of a map which is similar to the function
Φ of Theorem 2.1.14, that is we set τQ = (−b + i
√|∆|)/(2a). It is obvious that τQ ∈ h. Let
g denote one of the functions of Definition 2.2.14. With each Q ∈ C(∆) and g we associate
the complex number g(τQ). In addition, if Q is obvious from the context, we make use of the
notation g(τ), too.
We turn to the discussion of class polynomials. We first present the ring class polynomial.
However, before we are able to define it, we state the First Main Theorem of complex multi-
plication ([Cox89], Theorem 11.1, p.220).
Theorem 2.2.15 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant, and let K = Q(
√
∆). In
addition, let Q ∈ C(∆) be the main form. Then j(τQ) is an algebraic integer and K(j(τQ))
is the ring class field of the order O∆ .
Once, we know that j(τQ) is an algebraic integer for the main form, we may define its minimal
polynomial.
Definition 2.2.16 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. In addition, let Q be the
main form of discriminant ∆. The minimal polynomial of j(τQ) over Q is called the ring
class polynomial. It is denoted by H∆.
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We will often write H for the ring class polynomial H∆, if the discriminant is fixed. It is well
known, that H is irreducible in K[X], too. Hence, H is the minimal polynomial of j(τQ) over
K, too. In particular, H is a polynomial of degree h(∆). However, for H actually to be a class
polynomial, we have to show that H(j(τQ)) = 0 for all reduced representatives Q ∈ C(∆).
The following theorem states this fact ([Cox89], Proposition 13.2, p. 286).
Theorem 2.2.17 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of class number h, and let
K = Q(
√
∆). In addition, let Q1, . . . , Qh be the reduced representatives of C(∆). Then the
ring class polynomial H∆ is given by
H∆ =
h∏
k=1
(X − j(τQk)) .
Hence if Q ∈ C(∆), the complex number j(τQ) is a class invariant. We next introduce a class
polynomial due to Atkin and Morain ([AM93]) which we denote by G. G is a polynomial
associated to the cube root γ2 of j. It turns out that G has much smaller coefficients than the
ring class polynomial H. However, we have to restrict the residue of ∆ mod 3.
Theorem 2.2.18 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of class number h, and let
K = Q(
√
∆). Assume ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3. If we set ζ3 = e2pii/3, then the polynomial G∆ given by
G∆ =
∏
(a,b,c)∈C(∆)
(
X − ζb(a−c+a2c)3 γ2(τ(a,b,c))
)
is a class polynomial.
We conclude from Theorem 2.2.18 that ζb(a−c+a
2c)
3 γ2(τ(a,b,c)) is a class invariant if (a, b, c) ∈
C(∆). Furthermore, it is easy to see that if α is a root of G∆, then α3 is a root of H∆. Finally,
we introduce a class polynomial denoted by W which is due to Yui and Zagier ([YZ97]).
Again, we impose restrictions on the residue of the imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆.
Theorem 2.2.19 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of class number h, and let
K = Q(
√
∆). In addition, assume ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8. Furthermore, let ζ48 = e2pii/48.
Basing on the Weber functions of Definition 2.2.14, define a function f by
f(τ(a,b,c)) :=

ζ
b(a−c−ac2)
48 · f(τ(a,b,c)) if 2 | a, 2 | c ,
(−1)∆−18 · ζb(a−c−ac2)48 · f1(τ(a,b,c)) if 2 | a, 2 - c ,
(−1)∆−18 · ζb(a−c+a2c)48 · f2(τ(a,b,c)) if 2 - a, 2 | c .
(2.21)
Then the polynomial W∆ given by
W∆ =
∏
(a,b,c)∈C(∆)
(
X − f(τ(a,b,c))
)
is a class polynomial.
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Again we deduce that if ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, then f(τQ) is a class invariant. In
addition, it is easy to see that j(τQ) = (f24(τQ)− 16)3/f24(τQ) .
We conclude this section by estimating the size of the coefficients of the ring class polynomial
H. Their order of magnitude is crucial if we want to compute the polynomial in practice, as
the floating point precision in the computation depends on this magnitude. We set q = e2piiτQ
with Q = (a, b, c). We first remark that for (a, b, c) and (a,−b, c) the appropriate values of q are
conjugate complex numbers. In addition, using the Fourier series of j (which we will present
in Section 7.1.1), it is easy to see that j(τ(a,−b,c)) = j(τ(a,b,c)). Thus computing j(τ(a,b,c)) yields
j(τ(a,−b,c)) for free in this case. Hence we can restrict to the hp(∆) reduced representatives
(a, b, c) with b ≥ 0. Furthermore, we have |q| = e−pi
√
|∆|/a. Hence |q| only depends on a. Again
making use of the Fourier series of j, we deduce |j(τQ)| ≈ |1/q| = epi
√
|∆|/a. Thus the constant
term of H is up to sign of order of magnitude epi
√
|∆|∑(a,b,c)∈C(∆) 1a . In most cases the constant
term of H is up to sign the biggest coefficient. Hence the decimal length of the coefficients is
approximately bounded by
pi
√|∆|
log 10
·
∑
(a,b,c)∈C(∆)
1
a
. (2.22)
Indeed, Lay and Zimmer ([LZ94]) propose to use the floating point precision F, where F is
defined as
F = 5 +
h(∆)
4
+
pi
√|∆|
log 10
·
∑
(a,b,c)∈C(∆)
1
a
. (2.23)
We discuss in detail the problem of choosing an appropriate floating point precision in Section
9.
2.3 Elliptic Curves
In this section we present those aspects of the theory of elliptic curves we make use of in our
algorithm. First, in Section 2.3.1 we give a compact introduction to elliptic curves over a
field. Next, as our generating algorithm is closely related to elliptic curves over the complex
numbers C, we discuss this theory in Section 2.3.2. Based on this theory we introduce complex
multiplication in Section 2.3.3. Finally, we turn to elliptic curves over finite fields in Section
2.3.4 and discuss the requirements for their use in cryptography in Section 2.3.5. The relevant
literature we cite is [BSS99], [Cox89], [Men93], and [Sil86].
2.3.1 Elliptic curves over Fields
We introduce the basic facts of elliptic curves over a general field. In our generating algorithm
we are only concerned with elliptic curves over fields of characteristic different from 2 and 3.
Hence in our investigation of elliptic curves we mainly restrict to this case ([Sil86], p. 50).
Definition 2.3.1 Let F be a field with char(F ) 6∈ {2; 3}. The pair (a, b) ∈ F 2 is called an
elliptic curve defined over F if 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. The elliptic curve is denoted by E. The set of
rational points on E over F denoted by E(F ) is
E(F ) = {(x, y) ∈ F 2 : y2 = x3 + ax+ b} ∪ {O} , (2.24)
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where O is the projective closure of the equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b. The point O is called the
point at infinity. We set O = (∞,∞).
The equation y2 = x3 + ax + b defined by the elliptic curve (a, b) is called the Weierstrass
equation of (a, b). It is easy to see that the property 4a3+27b2 6= 0 ensures that the polynomial
X3 +aX+ b has no multiple roots over F ; hence the polynomial Y 2−X3−aX− b ∈ F [X,Y ]
is irreducible in F [X,Y ].
It is a basic fact that E(F ) carries a group structure with the point at infinity acting as the
zero element. The binary operation of rational points in E(F ) is commonly denoted as an
addition. Once we investigate the case F = C in Section 2.3.2, we will identify the addition of
points in E(C) with adding complex numbers modulo a lattice. However, it turns out that in
case of a general field F the addition of points in E(F ) has a simple geometric interpretation,
too. The addition law uses the chord-tangent process. First, if P ∈ E(F )\{O}, P = (x, y), we
obviously have (x,−y) ∈ E(F )\{O}, too; we set −P := (x,−y). Next, let P,Q ∈ E(F )\{O},
P 6= Q, and P 6= −Q, that is P and Q have different x-coordinates. It is easy to see that the
line through P and Q intersects E(F ) in a third point R ∈ E(F )\{O}. We set P +Q := −R.
Finally, if P ′ 6= O and P ′ 6= −P ′, the tangent to E(F ) at P ′ intersects E(F ) in a further
point R′ ∈ E(F ) \ {O}, and we set 2P ′ := −R′. For the elliptic curve (−1, 0) over IR, that is
the elliptic curve with Weierstrass equation y2 = x3 − x, the chord-tangent process is shown
in Figure 2.1. The formal description of this geometric interpretation is given in Theorem
2.3.2 ([Men93], Theorem 2.3, p. 18).
Theorem 2.3.2 Let F be a field with char(F ) 6∈ {2; 3}, and let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve
over F. We define a binary operation denoted by + in E(F ) as follows:
1. P +O = O + P = P for all P ∈ E(F ).
2. If P = (x, y) ∈ E(F ) \ {O}, set −P = (x,−y). In addition, set O = −O. Furthermore,
let P + (−P ) = O.
3. Let P,Q ∈ E(F )\{O}, P 6= −Q, P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2). Set λ = (y2−y1)/(x2−x1)
if P 6= Q, and λ = (3x21 + a)/(2y1) if P = Q. In addition, set P + Q = (x3, y3) where
x3 and y3 are defined as
x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2, y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 .
Then (E(F ),+) is an Abelian group.
We next turn to maps φ : E(F )→ E(F ) which respect the structure of an elliptic curve.
Definition 2.3.3 Let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve over a field F, char(F ) 6∈ {2; 3}. The
integral domain F [E] := F [X,Y ]/(Y 2−X3− aX − b) is called the coordinate ring of E. The
corresponding field of fractions is called the function field of E, denoted by F (E). An element
of F (E) is called a rational function of E. The rings F ′[E] and F ′(E) for an extension field
F ′/F comprise all elements of F [E] and F (E), respectively, which are invariant under the
action of Gal(F : F ′). A rational function r is defined over an extension field F ′/F, if there
is a representation r = f/g with f, g ∈ F ′[E].
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Figure 2.1: Addition law on the elliptic curve E = (−1, 0) over IR.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field F. Let P ∈ E(F ) and r ∈ F (E). We follow
[Men93], p. 29-31, to define r(P ). First, let P 6= O. Then r is said to be defined at P if
there are elements g, h ∈ F [E] with r = g/h and h(P ) 6= 0. If this is true, then we set
r(P ) = g(P )/h(P ). It is easy to see that this definition is well-defined. If r is not defined at P
we set r(P ) =∞. Next, let P = O. For g ∈ F [E] there is a unique representation g = v+wY,
where both v, w ∈ F [X]. As usual we set deg(g) = max(2 deg(v), 3 + 2 deg(w)), that is X and
Y are of weight 2 and 3, respectively. Now let r = g/h, where both g and h have the form
v + wY from above. Then r(O) = 0 or r(O) =∞ depending on whether deg(g) < deg(h) or
deg(g) > deg(h), respectively. Otherwise we set r(O) = c/d where c and d are the coefficients
of the highest terms of g and h, respectively. We are now able to define an isogeny (see for
instance [BSS99], p. 44).
Definition 2.3.4 Let E = (a, b) and E′ = (a′, b′) be elliptic curves over a field F. A non-
constant isogeny from E to E′ is a pair of rational functions (r, s) ∈ F (E)2 with s2 =
r3 + a′r + b′ and (r(O), s(O)) = (∞,∞). In addition, the map φ0 : P 7→ O for all P ∈ E(F )
is called the constant isogeny. An isogeny is defined over an extension field F ′ of F, if r and
s are both defined over F ′.
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It is a basic fact that any isogeny φ : E → E is a homomorphism of E(F ) to itself, i.e. an
endomorphism of E(F ). Hence if the isogeny φ is defined over F ′ it gives an endomorphism
of E(F ′). However, an isogeny has stronger properties, as it respects the analytic structure of
E(F ). This will be rather important when considering elliptic curves over C. Once we know
that isogenies respect the addition law of E(F ), we may use the composition of isogenies to
define the endomorphism ring of E ([Sil86], p. 71).
Definition 2.3.5 Let F be a field and E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve defined over F. The
set of all isogenies E → E is called the endomorphism ring of E. It is denoted by End(E).
In addition, the set of all isogenies (r, s) : E → E, where both r and s are defined over F is
called the endomorphism ring of E over F. It is denoted by EndF (E).
We next consider the map [m] : P 7→ [m] · P for m ∈ ZZ and P ∈ E(F ). The formulae in
Theorem 2.3.2 show that this map is in both EndF (E) and End(E). Hence both EndF (E)
and End(E) contain a subring isomorphic to ZZ. The image of P under the map [m] is denoted
by [m]P. We next define the central term of complex multiplication. ([Sil86], p. 73).
Definition 2.3.6 Let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve defined over a field F. The elliptic curve
is said to have complex multiplication if the endomorphism ring End(E) is strictly larger
than ZZ.
We define two important terms related to a given elliptic curve E : The discriminant ∆ and
the j-invariant of an elliptic curve ([Men93], p. 19).
Definition 2.3.7 Let F be a field with char(F ) 6∈ {2; 3}, and let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve
defined over F. The discriminant of E is defined as ∆(E) = −16(4a3 + 27b2). In addition,
the number j(E) = 1728 · 4a3/(4a3 + 27b2) is called the j-invariant of E.
As char(F ) 6= 2, we obviously have ∆(E) 6= 0 for an elliptic curve E over F. The name j-
invariant comes from the invariance of this quantity under isomorphisms. Isomorphic elliptic
curves have the same j-invariant ([Hus87], p. 68). Conversely, if the field F is algebraically
closed, then two elliptic curves with the same j-invariant are isomorphic ([Men93], Theorem
2.5, p. 19).
We show that every element of a field F, char(F ) 6∈ {2; 3}, is the j-invariant of some elliptic
curve over F. First, assume j0 ∈ F, j0 6∈ {0; 1728}. In addition, set
κ = j0/(1728− j0) and E = (3κ, 2κ) . (2.25)
Then we have ∆(E) = −1728κ2(κ + 1). Obviously κ = −1 is equivalent to 1728 = 0, which
contradicts char(F ) 6= 2. In addition, j0 6= 0 induces κ 6= 0. Thus we have ∆(E) 6= 0. Hence
E is an elliptic curve over F. Furthermore, we determine the j-invariant of E to
j(E) = 1728 · 4a3
4a3+27b2
= 1728 · 1
1+ 27b
2
4a3
= 1728 · 1
1+ 27·4κ2
4·27κ3
= 1728 · 1
1+ 1
κ
= 1728 · 1
1+
1728−j0
j0
= 1728 · j0j0+1728−j0
= j0.
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Second, it is easy to see that the elliptic curves (0, 1) and (1, 0) have j-invariant 0 and 1728,
respectively. Thus we have proven the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3.8 Let F be a field, char(F ) 6∈ {2; 3}, and let j0 ∈ F. There is an elliptic
curve E defined over F with j(E) = j0.
2.3.2 Elliptic curves over C
In order to explain the theory of complex multiplication, we have to discuss elliptic curves over
the complex numbers C. It is the aim of this section to present the basic facts in this context.
We will show that elliptic curves over C and complex lattices are essentially the same object.
This identification yields a natural explanation of the addition law of points in the group of
rational points of an elliptic curve over C. Furthermore, basing on these investigations we will
be able to introduce the theory of complex multiplication in Section 2.3.3. We first introduce
the fundamental term of a lattice ([Cox89], p. 200).
Definition 2.3.9 Let ω1, ω2 ∈ C, linearly independent over IR. The additive subgroup L =
ω1ZZ + ω2ZZ is called a lattice in C. We also write L = [ω1, ω2]. Two lattices L1 and L2 are
homothetic if there is a λ ∈ C× with L1 = λL2.
For instance, fractional ideals a of imaginary quadratic orders O∆ are lattices, as already
discussed in Section 2.1.1. In addition, homothety of lattices induces an equivalence relation
on the set of lattices. We define the modular function j on a homothety class of lattices as
follows: Let L := [ω1, ω2] be a lattice in C. Obviously, the lattice [1, ω2/ω1] is homothetic to
L, where we may assume without loss of generality that ω2/ω1 ∈ h. We set j(L) := j(ω2/ω1).
To justify this definition we remark that the value of j(L) is independent of the choice of
the representant L and the generators ω1 and ω2. Once, we have a lattice L in C, we define
Eisenstein series related to L ([Kob93], p. 109).
Definition 2.3.10 Let L = [ω1, ω2] be a lattice in C. The complex numbers
G2(L) :=
∑
ω∈L\{0}
1
ω4
and G3(L) :=
∑
ω∈L\{0}
1
ω6
are called Eisenstein series for the lattice L. In addition, we set g2(L) := 60G2(L) and g3(L) :=
140G3(L).
For each lattice there is a class of meromorphic functions on C defined as follows ([Cox89],
p. 200).
Definition 2.3.11 Let L = [ω1, ω2] be a lattice in C. In addition, let f : C → Ĉ be a
meromorphic function on C. Furthermore, assume that f is periodic with respect to L, that is
f(z) = f(z + ω) for all z ∈ C, ω ∈ L. Then f is called an elliptic function for the lattice L.
We remark that an elliptic function is a doubly periodic meromorphic function. We next
introduce the most important elliptic function, the Weierstrass ℘-function. It is common to
define the ℘-function as an infinite sum ([Cox89], p. 200).
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Definition 2.3.12 Let L be a lattice in C. The function ℘ : C → Ĉ defined as
℘(z;L) : z 7→
{
1
z2
+
∑
ω∈L\{0}
(
1
(z−ω)2 − 1ω2
)
, if z 6∈ L ,
∞ , if z ∈ L
is called the Weierstrass ℘-function for the lattice L.
If we work with a fixed lattice, we will usually write ℘(z) instead of ℘(z;L). We next cite a
theorem stating that the ℘-function actually is an elliptic function. In addition, ℘ satisfies a
differential equation which is very important to link lattices to elliptic curves over C ([Cox89],
Theorem 10.1, p. 200; [Cox89], Proposition 10.7, p. 206).
Theorem 2.3.13 Let ℘ be the Weierstrass ℘-function for the lattice L.
1. ℘(z) is an elliptic function for L whose singularities consist of double poles at the points
of L.
2. ℘(z) satisfies the differential equation
℘′(z)2 = 4℘(z)3 − g2(L)℘(z)− g3(L) . (2.26)
3. We have g2(L)3 − 27g3(L)2 6= 0.
From Equation (2.26) it is easy to see that ℘ yields an elliptic curve; more precisely, di-
viding Equation (2.26) by 4, defining (a, b) := (−g2(L)/4,−g3(L)/4), and scaling (x, y) :=
(℘(z;L), ℘′(z;L)/2) gives an equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b. In addition, property 3
of Theorem 2.3.13 shows −16(4a3 + 27b2) = g2(L)3 − 27g3(L)2 6= 0. Hence E := (a, b) is an
elliptic curve over C with corresponding Weierstrass equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b.
We get a map C → E(C) as follows: If z ∈ C \ L, we set z 7→ (℘(z;L), ℘′(z;L)/2). In case of
z ∈ L, we set z 7→ O. As both ℘ and ℘′ are periodic for L, this yields a well-defined map from
C/L → E(C). We denote this map by H. It is a fundamental fact that H is an isomorphism.
Thus we can add two points P,Q ∈ E(C) by P + Q := H(H−1(P ) + H−1(Q)), where the
addition in C/L is simply the addition in C modulo L. Indeed, this addition may be described
in terms of the formulae in Theorem 2.3.2.
We have previously discussed that any lattice in C yields an elliptic curve over C. We next
show that the converse is true, too ([Cox89], Proposition 14.3, p. 309).
Theorem 2.3.14 Let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve over C. Then there is a unique lattice
L ⊂ C such that a = −g2(L)/4 and b = −g3(L)/4.
We conclude that lattices in C and elliptic curves over C are two sides of the same coin. We
make use of this close relationship in the following section to introduce complex multiplication.
2.3.3 Complex Multiplication
In this section we sketch the theory of complex multiplication. The central object in this
theory is the endomorphism ring of an elliptic curve E. In Section 2.3.1 we already stated
that End(E) contains a subring isomorphic to ZZ. However, in case of elliptic curves over C
the endomorphism ring is well known ([Cox89], p. 312).
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Theorem 2.3.15 Let E be an elliptic curve over C, and let L be the corresponding lattice.
Then End(E) ' {α ∈ C : αL ⊂ L}.
Thus the problem of finding endomorphisms of E is reduced to the problem of finding all
complex numbers α which leave the lattice L corresponding to E invariant under multiplica-
tion. The next theorem demonstrates the close relationship between endomorphism rings of
elliptic curves over C and imaginary quadratic orders ([Cox89], Theorem 10.14, p. 209).
Theorem 2.3.16 Let L be a lattice in C. For a number α ∈ C \ ZZ the following statements
are equivalent:
1. The lattice L is invariant under multiplication with α, i.e. αL ⊂ L.
2. There exists an order O∆ in an imaginary quadratic field K such that α ∈ O∆ and L is
homothetic to an invertible fractional ideal of O∆ .
Theorem 2.3.16 constitutes a fundamental result for our generating algorithm as it relates
elliptic curves to imaginary quadratic orders as follows: Let O be an imaginary quadratic
order. As usual we identify an elliptic curve E over C with the corresponding lattice L.
According to Theorems 2.3.16 and 2.3.15 E has O as its endomorphism ring if and only if L
is homothetic to an invertible fractional ideal of O . Hence in order to study elliptic curves
over C with End(E) ' O it is sufficient to take invertible fractional ideals of O into account.
In addition, it is easy to see that two equivalent fractional ideals of O determine isogenous
elliptic curves; indeed, the isogenous curves are isomorphic. However, as equivalent ideals
determine the same ideal class in Cl(O) we state the following (a variant of it may be found
in [Cox89], Corollary 10.20, p. 212).
Theorem 2.3.17 Let O be an imaginary quadratic order. In addition, let I(O) be the group
of invertible fractional ideals of O . In addition, let C be the set of isomorphy classes of elliptic
curves E over C with End(E) ' O . Define a map ρ : Cl(O)→ C which sends an ideal class
aP (O) to the isomorphy class represented by the elliptic curve corresponding to a. Then ρ
is bijective. In addition, we have j(a) = j(E), where j(a) denotes the modular function j
evaluated for the homothety class of a and j(E) denotes the j-invariant of an elliptic curve
in the class ρ(a).
We remark that the value j(E) is independent of the choice of the elliptic curve in ρ(a).
Next we relate elliptic curves over C having O as their endomorphism ring to the ring class
polynomial H. If L denotes the ring class field of O, we denote by E an elliptic curve defined
over L. We stated in Proposition 2.3.8 that for all j0 ∈ L there exists an elliptic curve E
defined over L with j(E) = j0. In addition, if j0 6∈ {0; 1728}, the relation between j0 and E is
given by Equation (2.25). Furthermore, Theorem 2.2.17 shows that if a is a fractional ideal of
O, we have K(j(aP (O))) = L, where K is the field of fractions of O . In addition, Theorem
2.2.17 states that all values j(aP (O)) are conjugate.
It is well known that j(O−3) = 0 and j(O−4) = 1728 (for instance, see [Cox89], p. 261).
In addition, if ∆ < −4 and a is a fractional ideal of O∆, then j(aP (O∆)) 6∈ {0; 1728}
follows. Hence, if ∆ < −4, using Theorem 2.3.17, we deduce the following: Let E be an
elliptic curve defined over C and having O∆ as its endomorphism ring. In addition, let
aiP (O∆), 1 ≤ i ≤ h(∆), be all elements of the ideal class group Cl(O∆). Let k be any
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element of {1, . . . , h(∆)}, and let E be the elliptic curve over L defined by Equation (2.25)
with j0 = j(akP (O∆)). Then the lattices corresponding to E and E are homothetic. Thus up
to homothety any elliptic curve E over C with End(E) ' O∆ is already defined over L.
We next fix an index k ∈ {1, . . . , h(∆)}. Again let E be defined by Equation (2.25) with
j0 = j(akP (O∆)). We claim that E is not defined over a proper subfield of Q(j0). Hence let
E = (a, b) be defined over F ( Q(j0). Then by Definition 2.3.7 we have j0 = 1728 ·4a3/(4a3 +
27b2) ∈ F, hence [Q(j0) : Q] < h(∆), a contradiction.
2.3.4 Elliptic curves over Finite Fields
We next introduce the relevant theory of elliptic curves over finite fields. Let E = (a, b) be
an elliptic curve defined over the finite field IFq, where q = pn is a prime power. If E(IFq)
is suitable for use in cryptography the requirements of Section 2.3.5 show that End(E) is
an imaginary quadratic order O . The central theorem of this section states that there is an
elliptic curve E = (α, β) defined over the ring class field L of O and a prime P ⊂ OL of
inertial degree n over p with (a, b) = (α mod P, β mod P). The facts of this section build the
underlying theory of our generating algorithm cryptoCurve.
We first state the fundamental theorem concerning the cardinality of the group of rational
points of an elliptic curve over a finite field. Let IFq be a finite field with char(IFq) ≥ 5, and
let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve defined over IFq. The Weierstrass equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b
shows |E(IFq)| ≤ 2q + 1. However, there is a much better bound due to Hasse, who proved
a conjecture of Artin. We remark that an elliptic curve over a field of characteristic 2 or 3
may be described in terms of a similar Weierstrass equation. Hence the following theorem of
Hasse is true even if char(IFq) ∈ {2; 3}.
Theorem 2.3.18 (Hasse) Let p be a prime, and let q = pn. Let E be an elliptic curve over
IFq. Then ||E(IFq)| − (q + 1)| ≤ 2√q.
The theorem of Hasse states that there is a t ∈ ZZ, |t| ≤ 2√q with |E(IFq)| = q + 1 − t. The
integer t is called the trace of E over IFq. It turns out that elliptic curves over finite fields
come in two categories, ordinary and supersingular, as determined by their endomorphism
rings (see [Cox89], Theorem 14.14, p. 316).
Definition and Theorem 2.3.19 Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field IFq. The
endomorphism ring End(E) is either an imaginary quadratic order or an order in a quaternion
algebra. In the first case, E is called ordinary or non-supersingular. In the second case, E
is said to be supersingular.
Later on we will see that only ordinary elliptic curves are of interest in cryptographic appli-
cations. There are a lot of equivalent criteria for E to be supersingular. However, once we
know the cardinality of an elliptic curve over a finite prime field, it is easy to decide to which
category the curve belongs to ([Cox89], Proposition 14.15, p. 316).
Theorem 2.3.20 Let p ≥ 5 be a prime, and E be an elliptic curve over IFp. Then E is
supersingular if and only if |E(IFp)| = p+ 1.
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Equivalent to Theorem 2.3.20 is the statement that an elliptic curve over a finite prime field
of characteristic at least 5 is supersingular if and only if its trace t is equal to 0.
In Definition 2.3.4 we introduced isogenies as maps between elliptic curves. We stated that
isogenies respect the structure of an elliptic curve. In case of finite fields, the structure of
isomorphisms is as follows ([Len87], 1.3, p. 653). In addition, we introduce the important
term of twists of elliptic curves.
Definition and Theorem 2.3.21 Let E = (a, b) and E′ = (a′, b′) be elliptic curves defined
over IFq, char(IFq) ≥ 5.
1. Let φ : E → E′ be an isogeny defined over IFq. In addition, assume E(IFq) and E′(IFq) to
be isomorphic. Then there is an α ∈ IF×q with a′ = a ·α4 and b′ = b ·α6. The curves are called
IFq-isomorphic. We denote IFq-isomorphic elliptic curves by E/IFq ' E′/IFq.
2. The curves E and E′ are said to be IFq-twisted iff there exists a non-square β ∈ IF×q with
a′ = a · β2 and b′ = b · β3. If E′ is IFq-twisted to E we say that E′ is a twist of E over IFq.
We next prove some well-known results. We will make use of these results in our algorithm
cryptoCurve.
Theorem 2.3.22 Let E = (a, b) be an elliptic curve defined over IFq, char(IFq) ≥ 5. Let E′
be a twist of E over IFq. In addition, if b = 0 we assume q ≡ 1 mod 4. Then we have:
1. E(IFq) 6' E′(IFq).
2. E(IFq2) ' E′(IFq2).
3. |E(IFq)|+ |E′(IFq)| = 2q + 2.
Proof: As E′ is a twist of E over IFq there exists a non-square β ∈ IF×q with E′ = (a·β2, b·β3).
1. Assume, that E(IFq) ' E′(IFq) holds. Hence there is a field element α ∈ IF×q with E′ =
(a · α4, b · α6). If b 6= 0 we have β3 = α6, hence −1 = (β3)(q−1)/2 = (α6)(q−1)/2 = 1, which
is a contradiction. If b = 0 then β2 = α4 follows. Let ξ be a generator of IF×q . As β is a
non-square, there is a 1 ≤ s < (q − 1)/2 with β = ξ2s+1. Furthermore, assume α = ξu. Hence
we have ξ4s+2 = ξ4u yielding 4s+2 ≡ 4u mod q−1. Thus we deduce q−1 = 4 ·v | 4(s−u)+2
for an integer v. However, this is impossible.
2. Let α ∈ IFq2 be a square root of β. Thus E′ = (a · α4, b · α6) follows, and we have
E(IFq2) ' E′(IFq2).
3. Let f = x3 + ax + b and f ′ = x3 + aβ2x + bβ3. We show that for each x0 ∈ IFq there
are exactly two points in either E(IFq) or E′(IFq) having x-coordinate x0 or βx0, respectively.
If f(x0) = 0, then (x0, 0) ∈ E(IFq) and (βx0, 0) ∈ E′(IFq) follows. If f(x0) is a square in
IF×q , then the two different points (x0,±
√
f(x0)) are in E(IFq). However, obviously f ′(βx0)
is a non-square in IF×q . Hence there is no point in E′(IFq) having x-coordinate βx0. Finally,
let f(x0) be a non-square. In this case there is no point in E(IFq) having x-coordinate x0.
However, f ′(βx0) is a square in IF×q . Thus the two different points (βx0,±
√
f ′(βx0)) are in
E′(IFq). uunionsq
Finally, we turn to the relationship between ordinary elliptic curves over finite fields and
elliptic curves over number fields. As usual, let O be an imaginary quadratic order and L its
ring class field. If E is an elliptic curve over IFq with End(E) ' O, then according to Definition
2.3.19 E is ordinary. In addition, in Section 2.3.3 we stated that any elliptic curve over C
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having O as endomorphism ring may be represented up to homothety of the corresponding
lattice by an elliptic curve E defined over L. Thus it is not surprising that there exists a close
relationship between ordinary elliptic curves E over IFq and elliptic curves E over L both
having O as their endomorphism ring. Before we can state the fundamental theorem due
to Deuring, we have to explain how to reduce elliptic curves E over number fields to elliptic
curves over finite fields.
Let E = (α, β) be an elliptic curve over a global number field F. In addition, let P be a prime
of F, i.e. a prime ideal P 6= (0) of OF . Thus, according to Theorem 2.2.4, OF /P ' IFq for
some prime power q = pf . We assume p ≥ 5. In addition, as F is the field of fractions of
OF , there are elements α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ OF with α = α1/α2 and β = β1/β2. If both α2 6∈ P
and β2 6∈ P, then a := α1 · α−12 mod P and b := β1 · β−12 mod P are in IFq. Furthermore, if
4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 we say that E has good reduction modulo P. We set E = (a, b) and say that
E is the reduction of E modulo P.
The following theorem due to Deuring is the main theorem of our generating algorithm
cryptoCurve ([LZ94], Theorem 4, p. 251).
Theorem 2.3.23 (Deuring) Let O be an imaginary quadratic order of conductor f, K its
field of fractions, and L its ring class field. In addition, let p be a rational prime which splits
completely in K, and let P be a prime of L containing pOL . Furthermore, let fP denote the
inertial degree of P over pZZ. We assume f 6∈ P. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over L with
End(E) = O and having good reduction modulo P. Denote by E the reduction of E modulo P.
Then there is an element pi ∈ O \pO with
pi · pi = pfP , |E(IF
p
fP )| = pfP + 1− (pi + pi). (2.27)
In addition, End(E) ' O . Finally, every elliptic curve E over IF
p
fP with End(E) ' O arises
in this way.
We discuss the relevance of Theorem 2.3.23 to algorithm cryptoCurve. The main observation
concerns the ring class polynomial H. Let p and P be primes as in Theorem 2.3.23, and let E be
an elliptic curve with End(E) = O . From the end of Section 2.3.3 (see for instance Theorem
2.3.17 and the subsequent discussion) we know that H(j(E)) = 0. In addition, j(E) :=
j(E) mod P is a root of H mod p. It is a basic fact of class field theory that j(E) ∈ IF
p
fP , but
j(E) 6∈ IFq for any proper subfield IFq of IFpfP . Thus H mod p splits into different irreducible
factors of degree fP. Conversely, let jp be a root of H mod p. In addition, let ∆ < −4. As
discussed in Equation (2.25) of Section 2.3.1 we set κp = jp/(1728− jp) and E = (3κp, 2κp).
Then using the last statement of Theorem 2.3.23 there is an element pi ∈ End(E) such that
|E(IF
p
fP )| = pfP + 1− (pi + pi).
We are now able to explain the significance of Theorem 2.3.23 for our algorithm cryptoCurve.
In cryptoCurve we are mostly concerned with maximal orders. Hence it follows f = 1 for
the conductor f of O . Thus we conclude f 6∈ P for any prime P of L. Furthermore, the ring
class field actually is the Hilbert class field. In addition, we have to generate elliptic curves
over finite prime fields, that is the inertial degree fP is assumed to be 1, too. We make use
of the following theorem to decide whether fP = 1 (a variant of it may be found in [Cox89],
Corollary 5.25, p. 109).
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Theorem 2.3.24 Let p be a rational prime and OK be a maximal imaginary quadratic order.
In addition, assume pOK = pp with p 6= p. Finally, denote by fP the inertial degree of a prime
P of the Hilbert class field of OK over p. Then fP = 1 if and only if p is principal.
Hence Theorem 2.3.24 shows that for a prime p which splits completely in K the reduced
curve of Theorem 2.3.23 is defined over IFp if and only if there is a pi ∈ OK with p = pipi.
We refer to an equation of the form p = pipi as a norm equation. Our efficient algorithms to
solve a norm equation in Section 4 will make use of our investigations of Section 2.1.3. Let
pi ∈ OK with p = pipi. In Proposition 2.1.19 we proved that there are integers (t, y) ∈ ZZ2
with 4p = t2 −∆y2. It is easy to see that t is the trace of pi, that is pi + pi = t. Hence, using
Theorem 2.3.23 and a root of H mod p as discussed above yields a curve of order p+ 1− t.
We conclude this section with an explanation of mapping roots of a class polynomial to roots
of the ring class polynomial. First, let ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆. Then the polynomial W∆ from
Theorem 2.2.19 is a class polynomial. If p is a prime as in the theorem of Deuring, then the
splitting behavior of W∆ mod p and H∆ mod p is the same. If wp denotes a root of W∆ mod p,
then (w24p −16)3/w24p is a root of H∆ mod p. Second, let 3 - ∆. Then the polynomial G∆ from
Theorem 2.2.18 is a class polynomial. Again, let p be a prime as in the theorem of Deuring.
Then the splitting behavior of G∆ mod p and H∆ mod p is the same. In addition, if gp denotes
a root of G∆ mod p, then g3p is a root of H∆ mod p.
2.3.5 Elliptic Curves in Cryptography
In this section we discuss elliptic curves in cryptography. The main purpose of our discussion
is to present the requirements for a group of rational points of an elliptic curve to resist
all known attacks. As our algorithm shall generate elliptic curves being in conformance
with the German Digital Signature Act, we present the conditions published by the German
Information Security Agency (GISA). However, GISA restricts to finite prime fields and finite
fields of characteristic 2. In the latter case point counting is superior to our approach. Hence
we only consider elliptic curves over finite prime fields of large characteristic.
Let IFp be a finite prime field of large characteristic, say for instance p ≥ 2159. In addition,
let E be an elliptic curve defined over IFp. Once we know that E(IFp) is an Abelian group, we
can define the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem as usual.
Definition 2.3.25 Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite prime field IFp. In addition, let
G ∈ E(IFp) be a point of order N. For an integer l, 1 ≤ l ≤ N − 1 set P = [l]G. Given IFp,
E, G, and P, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is to determine the integer l.
We abbreviate the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem as ECDLP. In order for an ECDLP
to be intractable, that is the integer a may not be computed in reasonable time in practice, we
have to choose the parameters such that we can preclude the success of all known algorithms
to solve the ECDLP. A detailed discussion of all currently known attacks may be found in
[BSS99], Chapter V, [Eng99], Chapter 4, or [Men93], Chapter 5. We call the elliptic curve E
cryptographically strong if it satisfies the following conditions which make the cryptosystems,
in which E is used, secure and efficient.
We first consider security. In order to make the application of known discrete logarithm
algorithms impossible, we require that E satisfies the following conditions ([GIS01], section
3.3a, p. 5-6). We remark that these conditions are very strong, as we will see below.
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1. We have |E(IFp)| = r · k with a prime r > 2159 and a positive integer k ≤ 4.
2. The primes r and p are different.
3. The order of p in IF×r is at least 104.
4. The class number of the maximal order which contains End(E) is at least 200.
The condition that r is at least a 160-bit prime excludes the application of ECDLP algorithms
whose running time is roughly the square root of the largest prime factor of the group order
(see for example [vOM99]). Hence r is often referred to as the cryptographic prime factor. In
addition, the positive integer k is called the cofactor. The condition k ≤ 4 is for efficiency
reasons and will be discussed below. The second condition makes the anomalous curve attack
impossible (see for instance [Sem98], [Sma99]). The third condition excludes attacks which
reduce the discrete logarithm problem in E(IFp) to the discrete logarithm problem in a finite
extension field of IFp. The degree of this extension over IFp is at least the order of p in IF×r .
The reductions make use of the Weil-pairing and the Tate-pairing, respectively. They are due
to Menezes, Okamoto, Vanstone ([MOV91]) and Frey, Ru¨ck ([FR94],[FMR98]), respectively.
The third condition is based on the assumption that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in
a finite field, whose degree is at least 104 over IFp is intractable. For instance, if p ≈ 2160, we
would have to solve the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field of size about 21600000, which
is a rather strong requirement. According to widely accepted international standards such as
[X9.62], [P1363], or [SEC1] the DLP in a finite field of cardinality about 22000 is considered
not to be computable in practice. For instance, [SEC1] requires the order of p in IF×r to be
at least 20 (see [SEC1], chapter 3.1.1.1, p. 17). It is well known that for supersingular curves
the order of p in IF×r is at most 6. Hence the third condition implies that the endomorphism
ring End(E) is an imaginary quadratic order, i.e. E is ordinary.
Finally, the fourth condition is an additional and exclusive security requirement of the GISA; it
does not find consensus in the cryptographic community and may not be found in any standard
of elliptic curve cryptography. In addition, it is not clear why the class number of the maximal
order containing End(E) defines the security level, and not the class number of End(E) itself.
We quote a leading cryptograph in the field of elliptic curve cryptography in view of this
discussion (the quotation is part of some comments regarding our paper [Bai01c]). ”Some
researchers (presumably including the authors, in view of their endorsement of requirement 4
at the top of p. 4) have been telling the German Information Security Agency that they must
insist on curves whose CM ring has class number at least 200. There is no known reason for
wanting this. In particular, it forces one to exclude the curves defined over IF2 that have been
shown by Solinas to be very efficient. The only justification I have seen for the ridiculous
requirement 4 is that some day someone might find a way to use smallness of the class group
in an attack. But no one has ever suggested a way this could be done.”
However, we discuss the supporters’ argument of this requirement. Let h denote the class
number of End(E). Among all ordinary elliptic curves over IFp only very few have endomor-
phism rings with small class numbers, say h ≤ 50. So those curves may be subject to specific
future attacks. However, no such attacks are known. Nevertheless, we point out that in order
to generate curves being in conformance with the German Digital Signature Act we have to
respect condition 4.
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As we will see in Chapter 8 the running time of the generating algorithm in practice highly
depends on the class number. Hence it was believed in the cryptographic community that
elliptic curves with h ≥ 200 are not computable using complex multiplication in reasonable
time. It is one of the aims of this thesis to prove that the contrary is true.
Let us now consider efficiency. Suppose that an elliptic curve E over a prime field IFp satisfies
the security conditions. If this curve is used in a cryptosystem, the efficiency of this system
depends on the efficiency of the arithmetic in IFp. So p should be as small as possible. It
follows from the theorem of Hasse (Theorem 2.3.18) that(√
|E(IFp)| − 1
)2
≤ p ≤
(√
|E(IFp)|+ 1
)2
. (2.28)
Hence, we try to make |E(IFp)| as small as possible. Now the first security condition implies
|E(IFp)| = r · k with a prime number r > 2159 and the cofactor k. The security of the
cryptosystem, in which E is used, is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm
problem in the subgroup of order r in E(IFp). This security is independent of k. Therefore, k
can be as small as possible. In our algorithm k = 1 is not always possible. However, k ≤ 4 is
a suitable choice, as we will prove in Section 4.3.
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Part II
The Generating Algorithm

Chapter 3
Overview
We present our main algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0), which bases on the theory presented
in Chapter 2. The algorithm consists of various, highly optimized subalgorithms, which we
develop in the following sections. We will show that cryptoCurve is very fast in practice
even for large class numbers. Its input are positive integers r0, k0, and h0. cryptoCurve
returns a fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with h(∆) ≥ h0. In addition, it
returns rational primes p and r, and a positive integer k with r ≥ r0, k ≤ k0, and blog2 pc =
blog2 rkc = blog2 r0k0c; the last property ensures that the prime p is of minimal bitlength for
given r0 and k0. Finally, cryptoCurve returns a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over
IFp with |E(IFp)| = rk and End(E) = O∆, and a point G ∈ E(IFp) of order r. In order to be in
conformance with the requirements of GISA (see Section 2.3.5), we have to ensure r0 ≥ 2159,
k0 ≤ 4, and h0 ≥ 200. We introduce two terms, which we need in our further discussion.
Definition 3.0.1 1. Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant. A rational prime p is
suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆, if there exists a pi ∈ O∆ with p = pipi.
2. Let I = [i0, i1] ⊂ IN and let K ∈ IN with mK = i1− i0 + 1. For 0 ≤ s ≤ K− 1 let Is denote
the s-th subinterval of I of length m, that is Is = [i0 + sm, i0 + (s+ 1)m− 1]. A subset S ⊂ I
is K-uniformly distributed in I if |S ∩ Is1 | = |S ∩ Is2 | for all 0 ≤ s1 < s2 ≤ K − 1.
We first discuss some requirements on the prime p. First, p has to be suitable for the CM-
method of discriminant ∆. Second, for efficiency reasons, the prime p should be as small as
possible. Obviously, due to the theorem of Hasse, if r0 and k0 are given, blog2 r0k0c + 1 is
the maximal lower bound of the bitlength of p. Hence, if we set b = blog2 r0k0c, i0 = 2b, and
i1 = 2b+1 − 1, the algorithm will output primes p ∈ [i0, i1]. Finally, for security reasons, the
primes p should not be special in any sense. More precisely, p should be uniformly distributed
in the set of primes in [i0, i1], which are suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆.
However, in Section 4.2 we will see, that this requirement is too strong for our efficient
algorithms. Hence, we weaken this requirement by considering K-uniform distributions. To
summarize, the primes p returned by cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) have the following properties:
(P1) p is suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆.
(P2) p ∈ [i0, i1], where b = blog2 r0k0c, i0 = 2b, and i1 = 2b+1 − 1.
(P3) The distribution of the primes is K-uniformly in [i0, i1] for a large K, say K ≥ 240.
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cryptoCurve first checks whether the input fits to the requirements of Section 2.3.5; if this is
not the case, the algorithm outputs an error message and terminates. Otherwise, cryptoCurve
invokes two subalgorithms, findPrime and findCurve, which we discuss in what follows.
Algorithm 3.1: cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0)
Input: Positive integers r0, k0, and h0.
Output: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with h(∆) ≥ h0.
Rational primes p and r, and a positive integer k with r ≥ r0, k ≤ k0, and blog2 pc = blog2 rkc =
blog2 r0k0c.
A cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp with |E(IFp)| = rk and End(E) = O∆ .
A point G ∈ E(IFp) of order r.
if r0 < 2159 OR k0 > 4 OR h0 < 200 then
Output( ”Invalid input.” ); terminate;
(∆, p, r, k)← findPrime(r0, k0, h0);
(E,G)← findCurve(∆, p, r, k);
return (∆, p, r, k, E,G);
We explain algorithm findPrime. Its task is as follows: Let r0, k0, and h0 be given. We
have to find a fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ of class number at least h0.
Furthermore, we have to determine a rational prime p, which may be written as 4p = t2−∆y2
with (t, y) ∈ ZZ2, such that either p+ 1− t = rk or p+ 1 + t = rk holds with a prime r ≥ r0
and a positive integer k ≤ k0. In addition, rk has to be the cardinality of a group of rational
points of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFp.
We investigate two different approaches of findPrime. It turns out that the first one is much
faster in practice.
1. Our very efficient first approach first fixes a fundamental discriminant ∆ with h(∆) ≥ h0.
Once, ∆ is chosen, we determine p = t
2−∆y2
4 , r, and k. As ∆ is fixed, we call this proceed-
ing Fixed Discriminant Approach. The corresponding algorithm findPrimeDeltaFixed is
discussed in Chapter 4. We compare different algorithms and give upper bounds for their
complexities. For instance, we prove that the complexity of findPrimeDeltaFixed is at most
O(h2 log5(r0k0)/|∆|). We derive necessary conditions on t and y for t2−∆y24 to be prime and
either p+ 1− t or p+ 1 + t to be not divisible by small, odd primes (i.e. 3,5,7). In addition,
we introduce sieving methods. It turns out that this approach is the most efficient one in
practice. For example, a sample input of r0 = 2159, k0 = 4, and h0 = 200 gives a running time
of about 0.2 seconds on the Pentium III. Finally, we investigate the conformance of our theo-
retical complexity considerations with practical results. We are not aware of any comparably
efficient algorithm.
2. Our second design of findPrime first fixes a rational prime p and finds a suitable discrimi-
nant ∆ afterwards. As the field is chosen first, we name this approach Fixed Field Approach.
We present the according algorithm findDiscriminant in Chapter 5. Although this ap-
proach was already proposed by Atkin, Morain [AM93], [X9.62], and [P1363], we show how
to optimize it using Legendre symbols and pre-computations. The idea of using Legendre
symbols was already described by Atkin and Morain. However, the applicability of these
ideas to cryptography and the implementation of the optimization is a new contribution.
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We next give a formal description of findPrime. Its input are the bounds r0, k0, and h0.
We first decide which approach we follow. If we set p = 0, we use the Fixed Discriminant
Approach. If p 6= 0, we assume p to be prime and follow the Fixed Field Approach. Both
subalgorithms and hence findPrime return a fundamental discriminant ∆ and appropriate
p, r, and k.
In order to decide whether a given positive integer n is prime, we make use of the function
isPrime(n,m). isPrime requires two positive integers n and m as input. It implements the
Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test as described in [BS96], p.282. The positive integer
m is the number of independent Miller-Rabin tests performed on n. isPrime returns true
if n cannot be shown to be composite by m independent Miller-Rabin tests. Otherwise,
isPrime returns false. According to common standards (e.g. [X9.62], A.2.1, p. 46) m = 50
is sufficient in practice.
Algorithm 3.2: findPrime(r0, k0, h0)
Input: Positive integers r0, k0, and h0.
Output: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with h(∆) ≥ h0.
Rational primes p and r, and a positive integer k with r ≥ r0, k ≤ k0, and blog2 pc = blog2 rkc =
blog2 r0k0c, such that a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp exists with |E(IFp)| = rk
and End(E) = O∆ .
Input p; m← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
if p = 0 then
findPrimeDeltaFixed(r0, k0, h0);
else if isPrime(p,m) = true AND blog2 pc = blog2 r0k0c then
findDiscriminant(p, r0, k0, h0);
else
Output( ”Invalid p” ); terminate;
Once, ∆, p, r, and k are known, cryptoCurve invokes findCurve(∆, p, r, k). Let H∆ be the
Hilbert polynomial corresponding to O∆ . We denote it by H in what follows. From Section
2.3.4 we know that H splits modulo p into pairwise different linear factors. Let jp be a zero of
H mod p, sp a quadratic non-residue mod p, and (ap, bp) = (3κp, 2κp) with κp = jp/(1728−jp).
Then one of the elliptic curves (ap, bp) or (aps2p, bps
3
p) is of order rk. By choosing points on
each curve and testing whether their order is a divisor of rk, the curve of order rk can easily
be identified.
It remains to explain algorithm findRoot(∆, p). Given the imaginary quadratic discriminant
∆ and the prime p, findRoot returns a root jp of the Hilbert polynomial H modulo p. First, we
have to determine the h(∆) reduced representatives of C(∆). We will address this problem
in Chapter 6: Our algorithm classGroup(∆) requires the discriminant ∆ and returns an
array R storing the h(∆) reduced representatives of discriminant ∆. In addition, classGroup
returns the class number h(∆).
Next, we have to compute a generating polynomial of the Hilbert class field. As stated
in Section 2.2.3 depending on ∆ mod 24, we may use alternative polynomials with smaller
coefficients than the Hilbert polynomial H. According to Definition 2.2.14 and Theorems
2.2.18 and 2.2.19 we have to evaluate the η-function, and either the Weber functions f, f1, and
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Algorithm 3.3: findCurve(∆, p, r, k)
Input: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆.
Rational primes p and r and a positive integer k such that there exists an elliptic curve E over IFp
with |E(IFp)| = rk and End(E) = O∆.
Output: An elliptic curve E over IFp with |E(IFp)| = rk and End(E) = O∆.
A point G ∈ E(IFp) of order r.
jp ← findRoot(∆, p);
Select a quadratic non-residue sp mod p; κp ← jp/(1728− jp); ap ← 3κp; bp ← 2κp;
E1 ← (ap, bp); E2 ← (aps2p, bps3p);
while true do
Q1 ∈R E1(IFp) \ {O}; Q2 ∈R E2(IFp) \ {O}; //Choose random, non-trivial points
if kQ1 6= O AND krQ1 = O then
return (E1, kQ1);
else if kQ2 6= O AND krQ2 = O then
return (E2, kQ2);
f2, the function γ2, or the modular function j, respectively. Hence, in Chapter 7 we investigate
in detail efficient algorithms for computing these functions. The result of Section 7 is that
using a representation of the η-function as a sum is the most efficient way to evaluate η(τ)
in practice. In addition, we will show that it is optimal to compute the further functions
by a representation via the η-function. Our algorithm computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R)
implements our optimized algorithms of Chapter 7. It requires the discriminant ∆, its class
number h(∆), and an array R storing the h(∆) reduced representatives of discriminant ∆ as
input. Depending on the value of ∆ mod 24, the algorithm chooses a generating polynomial
of the Hilbert class field with rather small coefficients, as explained in Section 2.2. We
denote such a class polynomial by C. Using the most efficient representation of the according
numbertheoretical function, computeClassInvariants computes the h(∆) roots of the chosen
class polynomial C; it returns them as an array I.
Algorithm 3.4: findRoot(∆, p)
Input: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ and a rational prime p which is suitable
for the CM-method of discriminant ∆.
Output: A root jp of the Hilbert polynomial of discriminant ∆ modulo p.
(R, h)← classGroup(∆);
I ← computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R);
C ← computeClassPolynomial(I, h);
cp ← find root(p, C);
if ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 AND 3 - ∆ then
return ((c24p − 16)3/c24p );
else if 3 - ∆ then
return (c3p);
else
return (cp);
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Once, all the roots of C are computed, we have to compute C itself. In Chapter 8 we present
our optimized algorithm for this task. It turns out that generalizing an idea due to Karatsuba
([Kar95]) yields a very efficient algorithm. Our algorithm implementing these ideas is named
computeClassPolynomial(I). As input the algorithm gets an array I holding the roots of C;
computeClassPolynomial returns the according class polynomial C.
Finally, we have to determine a root of C mod p and map it to a root of H mod p. We denote
a root of C mod p and H mod p by cp and jp, respectively. In order to compute cp we make
use of the LiDIA-function find root(p, C). As input this function requires a prime p and a
polynomial C ∈ ZZ[X] which splits into linear factors modulo p. It returns a zero of C mod p.
find root uses the Cantor-Zassenhaus split as explained in [Coh95], section 3.4.4, p.126-127,
and a very efficient polynomial arithmetic due to Shoup ([Sho95]). As explained on Page 33,
depending on the value of ∆ mod 24, findRoot maps cp to jp and returns jp.
In addition, we investigate the floating point precision for computing a class polynomial in
Chapter 9. We present explicit formulae. In case of the Weber polynomial W, basing on
a large database of practical tests, we develop a new formula yielding a precision, which is
significantly better than any previously proposed one. Finally, in Section 10.1 we investigate
the complexity of algorithm cryptoCurve.
We conclude this section with our algorithm isStrong(r0, k0, p,N). It gets the bounds r0 and
k0 as input. In addition, it requires a prime p and the order N of an elliptic curve over IFp.
isStrong returns the prime r, if N = rk is the order of a cryptographically strong elliptic
curve over IFp with r ≥ r0 and k ≤ k0, respectively. Otherwise isStrong returns 0. In order to
decide whether N is the order of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFp isStrong
implements the requirements of Section 2.3.5. As we ensure h(∆) ≥ h0 in our algorithm
findPrime, we do not have to check this condition in isStrong.
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Algorithm 3.5: isStrong(r0, k0, p,N)
Input: Positive integers r0 and k0.
A prime p and the order N of a group of rational points of an elliptic curve over IFp.
Output: A prime r if N = rk is the order of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFp with
r ≥ r0 and k ≤ k0, and 0 otherwise.
m← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
r ← 0; k ← 0; //initialize r and k with 0, respectively
//check by trialdivision if cofactor is at most k0; if not, return 0
for i← 1; i ≤ k0; i← i+ 1 do
if i | N AND isPrime(N/i,m) = true then
r ← N/i; k ← i; break;
if r = 0 then
return (0);
//check if curve is anomalous; if yes, return 0
if p = r then
return (0);
//check if order of p in IF×r is at least 10
4
pr ← 1 mod r;
for i← 1; i ≤ 104; i← i+ 1 do
pr ← p · pr mod r;
if pr = 1 then
return (0);
return (r);
Chapter 4
Finding a Suitable Cardinality:
A Fixed Discriminant Approach
In this chapter we develop our very efficient algorithm findPrimeDeltaFixed(r0, k0, h0).
Given r0, k0 and h0, the algorithm first chooses a fundamental discriminant ∆ of class num-
ber at least h0 as explained below. Once, ∆ is chosen, findPrimeDeltaFixed computes a
prime p suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆ such that there exists a cryptographi-
cally strong elliptic curve over IFp with endomorphism ring of discriminant ∆. The algorithm
returns ∆, p, r, and k. findPrimeDeltaFixed will be presented in Section 4.3.
We investigate in detail algorithms to find primes suitable for the CM-method of discriminant
∆, if the discriminant ∆ is fixed. In this chapter, we discuss two different approaches: Our
first one, which we present in Section 4.1, first chooses a prime p and decides whether it is
suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆. The second one, presented in Section 4.2,
starts with a pair (t, y) ∈ ZZ2 and tests t2−∆y24 for primality. As we randomly choose the trace
t we name this algorithm generatePrimeRandomTrace. It turns out that the latter approach
is faster in both theory and practice.
Then, in Section 4.3 we turn to the problem of finding appropriate values p, r, and k for given
r0, k0, and h0. As the approach of finding primes suitable for the CM-method of Section
4.1 is rather slow, we only take algorithm generatePrimeRandomTrace into account. We
first extend it to an algorithm named generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace. This algorithm is
non-optimized. However, we prove that its bit-complexity is O(h2 log5(r0k0)/|∆|). Hence, we
deduce that the bit-complexity of our optimized algorithm findPrimeDeltaFixed is bounded
by O(h2 log5(r0k0)/|∆|). In addition, we give evidence that findPrimeDeltaFixed is very
efficient in practice. For instance, if r0 = 2160 and k0 ≤ 4, its running time is about 0.2
seconds on the Pentium III for discriminants of class number 200.
In order to implement findPrimeDeltaFixed, we make use of our database delta h. delta h
stores all discriminants ∆ with |∆| < 108 according to their class numbers. If the user does
not specify a discriminant, using the database delta h, findPrimeDeltaFixed chooses the
largest fundamental discriminant ∆ of class number h0. For instance, ∆ = −21311 is the
largest fundamental discriminant of class number 200. Hence, we often make use of this
discriminant in our practical tests.
In our investigation we will search for primes p in an interval I = [i0, i1]. Mostly, i0 and i1 will
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be of the form i0 = 2b and i1 = 2b+1 − 1 for some positive integer b, respectively. The reason
is that only the bitlength of the prime r is of cryptographic relevance, where we assume rk
to be the order of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFp. Hence, in practice, r0
is of the form 2b0 . In addition, k0 ∈ {1; 2; 4}. According to the theorem of Hasse (Theorem
2.3.18) we mostly have blog2 r0k0c = blog2 rkc = blog2 pc. Thus we search for a prime p with
p ∈ [2b0k0, 2b0+1k0 − 1]. Typical values are b0 ∈ {159; 160} and k0 ∈ [1; 4]. Hence we often set
i0 = 2b with b ∈ {159; 160; 161; 162}.
4.1 Finding Primes Suitable for the CM-method: Choosing
the Prime first
In this section we discuss two approaches for the following problem: Let an interval I = [i0, i1]
and an imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ be given. Find a prime p ∈ I suitable for the
CM-method of discriminant ∆. It turns out that the primes returned by both approaches
are uniformly distributed in the set of primes in I which are suitable for the CM-method of
discriminant ∆.
Our first approach discussed in Section 4.1.1 simply chooses random integers in I until a prime
suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆ is found. The second algorithm presented in
Section 4.1.2 chooses random primes in I until a suitable one is found. It turns out that the
bit-complexity of both algorithms is O(h · log4 i1). However, both algorithms are rather slow
in practice.
4.1.1 Finding Suitable Primes by Randomly Choosing Integers
In this section we present our first approach to find a prime p in a given interval I which is suit-
able for the CM-method of a given discriminant ∆.We name this algorithm generateIsPrime.
It is rather trivial: Given ∆ and I, we randomly choose an integer n ∈ I and test it for pri-
mality; again, we make use of the function isPrime(n,m) as explained on Page 41. If n turns
out to be prime, we have to check whether it is suitable for the CM-method of discriminant
∆. In order to do so, we make use of an algorithm due to Cornacchia ([Coh95], Section 1.5.2,
p. 34-36): cornacchia(∆, p) requires an imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ and an odd
prime p with 4p > |∆| as input. It returns 0, if the equation 4p = t2 −∆y2 does not have a
solution (t, y) ∈ ZZ2, and t of an integer solution (t, y) with t > 0 otherwise.
generateIsPrime obviously has the properties (P1) and (P2) of Chapter 3. In addition, as the
integers are chosen at random, generateIsPrime returns primes being uniformly distributed
in the set of primes, which are suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆. This property
is stronger than property (P3) of Chapter 3. Furthermore, our practical results indicate that
the primes suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆ are not uniformly distributed in a
given interval I. For example, using generateIsPrime(−21311, [2162, 2163− 1]), we generated
20000 primes. The distribution of the primes is plotted in Figure 4.1.
We next investigate the bit-complexity of generateIsPrime. First, we estimate the probabil-
ity P that generateIsPrime succeeds for a randomly chosen n. We need the following term
(a more general definition may be found in [Cox89], p. 169):
4.1 Choosing the Prime first 47
Algorithm 4.1: generateIsPrime(∆, [i0, i1])
Input: A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 mod 4.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN.
Output: A prime p ∈ [i0, i1] and an integer t such that 4p = t2 −∆y2 with an integer y.
m← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
n ∈R [i0, i1];
if isPrime(n,m) = true then
t← cornacchia(∆, n);
if t 6= 0 then
return (n, t);
Definition 4.1.1 Let IP denote the set of rational primes, and let S be a subset of IP. The
Dirichlet density δ(S) of S is defined as
δ(S) = lim
s→1+
∑
p∈S p
−s
− log(s− 1)
provided the limit exists.
We remark that the Dirichlet density δ(S) actually represents the density of S in IP. The
following theorem provides the Dirichlet density of the primes suitable for the CM-method of
discriminant ∆. We adapt it from a more general theorem in [Cox89] (Theorem 9.12, p. 188);
we remark that in Theorem 9.12 of [Cox89] the densities 1h(∆) and
1
2h(∆) are given in the
wrong order.
Theorem 4.1.2 Let ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 mod 4. Set S = {p ∈ IN : p prime, p = pi·pi for a pi ∈
O∆}. Then the Dirichlet density δ(S) exists and is equal to 12h , where h denotes the class
number of O∆.
Let S be as in Theorem 4.1.2. We make the following assumption: If I is not ”too small”
(e.g. i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159) the asymptotic formula δ(S) = 12h is valid in I. Making use of this
assumption and the logarithmic integral li, our approximation of P is
P = δ(S) · ]{p ∈ I, p prime}
]{x ∈ I} =
1
2h
· li(i1)− li(i0)
i1 − i0 + 1 . (4.1)
We remark that we estimate both the number of primes in I by computing li(i1) − li(i0)
and the proportion of primes which are suitable for the CM-method by the Dirichlet density
δ(S). However, our practical tests indicate that li(i1)− li(i0) approximates well the number of
primes in I. Furthermore, the results of our practical experiments in Table 4.1 affirm Formula
(4.1).
Example: For cryptographic purposes we have the boundary condition h0 ≥ 200. Further-
more, assume I = [2162, 2163 − 1]. Formula (4.1) yields
P =
1
400
· li(2
163 − 1)− li(2162)
2162
=
1
400
· 5.1883 · 10
47
2162
≈ 1
45070
.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of primes returned by generateIsPrime(−21311, [2162, 2163 − 1]).
We evaluate 20000 primes. We subdivide the interval [2162, 2163−1] in 100 subintervals charted
at the abscissae. In y-direction we illustrate the ratio of the number of primes in a subinterval
to the mean value 200.
Hence, before succeeding we expect to pass approximately 45000 times through the while-loop
of generateIsPrime. This means that on average we have to choose 45000 random integers
in I and test all these integers for primality. This is rather burdensome. Practical results can
be found in Table 4.1. These results affirm our theoretical estimation.
∆ Number of Number of Number of Time of
tests tested integers tested primes generateIsPrime in seconds
-21311 5000 44782 395.67 179.05
-23639 5000 43906 388.59 168.28
-24311 5000 46201 409.84 178.76
-25151 5000 45071 400.19 174.25
Table 4.1: Data delivered by generateIsPrime(∆, [2162, 2163 − 1]) for some fundamental
discriminants of class number 200. The running time was measured on the SUN UltraSPARC
I.
We are now able to determine the bit-complexity of generateIsPrime. In practice we will
only make use of i1 = 2i0 − 1. Hence we restrict to this case.
Theorem 4.1.3 Let i0 be a positive integer and ∆ an imaginary quadratic discriminant
of class number h. If i1 = 2i0 − 1, the bit-complexity of generateIsPrime(∆, [i0, i1]) is
O(h · log4 i1).
Proof: For each tested integer n we have to perform a Miller-Rabin primality test of bit-
complexity O(log3 n) ([Coh95], Section 8.2, p. 415). According to Formula (4.1) we expect to
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test 2h · i1−i0+1li(i1)−li(i0) ∼ 2h ·
i1/2
pi(i1)−pi(i1/2) integers. We have
pi(i1)− pi(i1/2) ∼ i1log i1 −
i1/2
log i1/2
∼ i1
log i1
(
1− 1
2
· 1
1− log 2log i1
)
∼ 1
2
· i1
log i1
.
Thus the bit-complexity of all Miller-Rabin tests is 2h · i1/2i1/(2 log i1) · log3 i1 = O(h log4 i1).
If a tested integer n turns out to be a probable prime, we have to perform the algorithm of
Cornacchia. Its complexity is essentially the running time of computing a square root modulo
n and performing the Euclidian algorithm on integers of order of magnitude of n (see [Coh95],
Section 1.5.2, p. 34-36). We make use of Shank’s RESSOL for computing square roots. Its
complexity is O(log4 n) ([Coh95], Section 1.5.1, p. 33); in addition, the bit-complexity of the
Euclidian step is at most O(log3 n) ([Coh95], Section 1.3, p. 13). Thus the running time of
Cornacchia’s algorithm is O(log4 n). Theorem 4.1.2 states that we expect to pass 2h times
through Cornacchia’s algorithm. Thus the complexity of this part is O(h · log4 i1).
We conclude that the bit-complexity of generateIsPrime is O(h · log4 i1). uunionsq
4.1.2 Finding Suitable Primes by Randomly Choosing Primes
Our next approach extends algorithm generateIsPrime; we call it generateNextPrime. Its
underlying idea is as follows: As in the previous section we assume that an imaginary quadratic
discriminant ∆ and an interval I = [i0, i1] are given. However, in order to avoid choosing
integers independently in a given range, we take a random integer n in the interval I and
search for the next prime p ∈ I, that is we set p = min{x ∈ I : x ≥ n, x prime}, if such a
prime p exists. For given positive integers n and m, the function nextPrime(n,m) returns
min{x ∈ ZZ : x ≥ n, isPrime(x,m) = true}. Once, p is found, we have to decide whether
p is suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆. Again we make use of the function
cornacchia(∆, p) introduced on Page 46.
As in the previous section we assume that the asymptotic formula δ(S) = 12h is valid in I.
The main advantage of generateNextPrime with respect to generateIsPrime is that we
expect to choose only 2h random integers n before generateNextPrime terminates. For
instance, if ∆ has class number 200, we expect to choose 400 random integers n to find
a prime p suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆. Figure 4.2 plots the distribu-
tion of primes returned by generateNextPrime(−21311, [2162, 2163 − 1]). In addition, Table
4.2 lists further practical results. We deduce that our practical results affirm our assertion
δ(S) = 12h . Furthermore, we see from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 that generateNextPrime is
much faster in practice than generateIsPrime. Finally, Figure 4.2 indicates that the primes
returned by generateNextPrime are uniformly distributed within the set of primes suitable
for the CM-method of discriminant ∆. Hence, the primes returned by generateNextPrime
and generateIsPrime have the same properties.
Next, we explain how to efficiently implement nextPrime(n,m) by using sieving methods.
Let Pi denote the array which stores the first i odd primes. For example, we have P1 = {3},
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Algorithm 4.2: generateNextPrime(∆, [i0, i1])
Input: A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 mod 4.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN.
Output: A prime p ∈ I and an integer t such that 4p = t2 −∆y2 with an integer y.
m← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
n ∈R I;
p← nextPrime(n,m);
if p ∈ I then
t← cornacchia(∆, p);
if t 6= 0 then
return (p, t);
∆ Number of Number of Time of
tests tested primes generateNextPrime in seconds
-21311 10000 400.46 79.621
-23639 5000 405.88 40.425
-24311 5000 401.90 79.396
-25151 5000 397.64 78.194
Table 4.2: Data delivered by generateNextPrime for I = [2162, 2163 − 1]. All discriminants
are fundamental with h = 200. The running time was measured on the SUN UltraSPARC I.
P2 = {3, 5}, P3 = {3, 5, 7}. If the randomly chosen integer n ∈ I is odd, we set n′ = n;
otherwise we set n′ = n+ 1. We then initialize the array Ri with the remainders of n′ modulo
the primes stored in Pi, that is Ri = {n′ mod 3, n′ mod 5, . . . , n′ mod pi}, where pi denotes
the i-th odd prime. We perform the function isPrime(n′,m) on the current value of n′ if
and only if all entries of Ri are non-zero. If n′ turns out to be composite, we set n′ ← n′ + 2
and adapt Ri. Our implementation of nextPrime uses i = 7. We remark that the sieving
methods have been already implemented in the according LiDIA-function next prime of the
class bigint.
Finally, we prove that the complexity of generateNextPrime and generateIsPrime is the
same.
Theorem 4.1.4 Let i0 be a positive integer and ∆ an imaginary quadratic discriminant
of class number h. If i1 = 2i0 − 1, the bit-complexity of generateNextPrime(∆, [i0, i1]) is
O(h · log4 i1).
Proof: We first estimate the complexity of nextPrime(n,m). Let n be given. According to
the prime number theorem the density of primes in I is 1log i1 . Furthermore, the probability
that the current value of n′ is divisible by none of the primes in Pi is
∏
p∈Pi
p−1
p < 1. Hence,
we expect to perform log i1 ·
∏
p∈Pi
p−1
p times the Miller-Rabin test of complexity O(log
3 i1)
(the complexity of a Miller-Rabin test may be found in [Coh95], Section 8.2, p. 415). We
neglect the running time of sieving. Thus, the complexity of nextPrime(n,m) is O(log4 i1).
Furthermore, we have to perform the algorithm of Cornacchia on p if p ∈ I. However, the
probability of p 6∈ I vanishes in practice. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1.3 the complexity
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of primes returned by generateNextPrime(−21311, [2162, 2163−1]).
We evaluate 20000 primes. We subdivide the interval [2162, 2163−1] in 100 subintervals charted
at the abscissae. In y-direction we illustrate the ratio of the number of primes in a subinterval
to the mean value 200.
of cornacchia(∆, p) is O(log4 p) = O(log4 i1). As we expect to choose 2h initial values n
before finding a prime p suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆, the bit-complexity
of generateNextPrime is O(h · log4 i1). uunionsq
4.1.3 Comparison of both Approaches
Although generateIsPrime and generateNextPrime are of same bit-complexity, the latter
one turns out to be much faster in practice. We explain this fact. Using generateIsPrime
we have to perform the Miller-Rabin test for each chosen integer n. However, the frac-
tion of the number of primality tests in algorithm generateNextPrime with respect to
generateIsPrime is
∏
p∈Pi
p−1
p , as we have shown in the proof of Theorem 4.1.4. We set
Pi = {3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19} in our implementation. Thus
∏
p∈Pi
p−1
p = 0.342048 follows, and
making use of generateNextPrime we save about 65% of the timing of the Miller-Rabin test
with respect to generateIsPrime.
4.2 Finding Primes Suitable for the CM-method: Choosing
the Representation first
We discuss another approach for the following problem: Let an interval I = [i0, i1] and an
imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ be given. Find a prime p ∈ I suitable for the CM-method
of discriminant ∆. From Proposition 2.1.19 we know that a prime p is suitable for the CM-
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method of discriminant ∆ if and only if p is of the form p = t
2−∆y2
4 for some (t, y) ∈ ZZ2. In
this section we first choose the representation (t, y) and check whether the integer t
2−∆y2
4 is
a prime in I; obviously we have to take care of t ≡ y∆ mod 2. If p is prime, t is the trace of
a prime in O∆ over p.
First, we present our general algorithm generatePrimeRandomTrace which implements this
idea. We determine its complexity, which is equal to O(h · log4 i1/
√|∆|), where h denotes
the class number of ∆. Next, we show that this approach turns out to be much faster in
practice than the algorithms of Section 4.1. Then, we introduce the term of a proper repre-
sentation (t, y); we show how to speed up generatePrimeRandomTrace using proper repre-
sentations. Finally, we discuss whether the primes returned by generatePrimeRandomTrace
are K-uniformly distributed for some K ∈ IN.
Input of generatePrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1]) is an imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆
and an interval I. It returns a prime p ∈ I and a t ∈ IN such that 4p = t2 − ∆y2 with
an integer y. Its idea is quite trivial: Randomly choose pairs (t, y) ∈ IN2 such that t ≡
y∆ mod 2 and n = t
2−∆y2
4 ∈ I. If n turns out to be prime, the algorithm returns (n, t) and
terminates. generatePrimeRandomTrace is not optimized. It will be refined in Section 4.3
using congruence conditions and sieving methods.
Algorithm 4.3: generatePrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1])
Input: A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 mod 4.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN.
Output: A prime p ∈ [i0, i1] and a t ∈ IN such that 4p = t2 −∆y2 with an integer y.
m← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
t ∈R {1, . . . , 2 ·
⌊√
i1
⌋};
if 4i0−t
2
|∆| ≤ 0 then
y ∈R {1, . . . ,
⌊√
(4i1 − t2)/|∆|
⌋
};
else
y ∈R {
⌈√
(4i0 − t2)/|∆|
⌉
, . . . ,
⌊√
(4i1 − t2)/|∆|
⌋
};
if t 6≡ y∆ mod 2 then
t← t+ 1;
n← t2−∆y24 ;
if isPrime(n,m) = true then
return (n, t);
We determine the bit-complexity of generatePrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1]). We make use of
a theorem due to Gauss ([Coh62], Theorem 2, p. 160).
Theorem 4.2.1 Let ∆ ∈ ZZ<0 be a quadratic discriminant, and let (a, b, c) be a quadratic
form of discriminant ∆. Let n ∈ IN, and by Nn denote the number of pairs (x, y) ∈ ZZ2 with
ax2 + bxy + cy2 ≤ n. Then we have
Nn =
2pin√|∆| +O(√n) . (4.2)
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The bijection ρ from Proposition 2.1.21 shows that Nn = #{(t, y) ∈ ZZ2 : t2 − ∆y2 ≤ 4n};
geometrically ρ is the transformation of the ellipse ax2 + bxy+ cy2 = n to their principal axis
t and y. The normal form of the ellipse is(
t
2
√
n
)2
+
(
y
2
√
n/|∆|
)2
= 1 . (4.3)
In our application we have n ≥ i0 ≥ 2159 and almost always |∆| < 6000000, hence
√
n·|∆|
n <
4.05 · 10−21. Thus we approximate (4.2) by Nn = 2pin√|∆| . As in Section 4.1 we restrict to
intervals of the form [i0, 2i0 − 1].
Theorem 4.2.2 Let i0 be a positive integer and ∆ a negative quadratic discriminant of class
number h. If i1 = 2i0 − 1, the bit-complexity of generatePrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1]) is
O(h · log4 i1/
√|∆|).
Proof: According to our approximation of Nn, the total number of pairs (t, y) ∈ IN2 with
t2−∆y2
4 ∈ [i0, i1] is equal to 14 ·
(
2pi·i1√
|∆| −
2pi·(i1+1)
2
√
|∆|
)
≈ pi·i1
4
√
|∆| . As estimated in the proof of
Theorem 4.1.3 the number of primes in [i0, i1] suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆
is asymptotically equal to i14h log i1 . In Theorem 2.1.22 we showed that for a prime p =
t2−∆y2
4
the pair (t, y) ∈ IN2 is unique. Hence the probability of success for a randomly chosen
(t, y) ∈ IN2 is
√
|∆|
pih·log i1 . Thus we expect to choose NT :=
pih·log i1√
|∆| pairs (t, y) before finding
a prime. For each pair (t, y) we have to perform the Miller-Rabin test of bit-complexity
O(log3 i1). Hence the total bit-complexity is O(h · log4 i1/
√|∆|). uunionsq
The complexity of generatePrimeRandomTrace is the complexity of the algorithms of Section
4.1 divided by
√|∆|. Hence for fixed class number h and interval [i0, i1] the running time
is reciprocally proportional to
√|∆|; this fact is already observed by [SScK01]. However,
generatePrimeRandomTrace turns out to be much faster in practice than generateIsPrime
and generateNextPrime. The main reason is that we do not have to perform the algorithm
of Cornacchia of complexity O(log4 i1).
Table 4.3 lists practical timings of generatePrimeRandomTrace. Furthermore, let NP denote
the number of chosen pairs (t, y) before the algorithm terminates, and NT the theoretical
value of the proof of Theorem 4.2.2. In Table 4.3 we compare both quantities. As in Section
4.1 we use the fundamental discriminant ∆ = −21311 of class number 200. The relation
∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 implies t ≡ y mod 2 for a suitable pair (t, y). However, t ≡ y ≡ 1 mod 2 yields
t2−∆y2 ≡ 0 mod 8, hence t2−∆y24 is even. Thus we only choose pairs (t, y) with t and y both
even. Hence the theoretical value NT in Table 4.3 is only half the value of NT in Theorem
4.2.2. The correspondence between NT and NP is obvious. We remark that the running time
of generatePrimeRandomTrace is less than 1% of generateNextPrime.
We show how to speed up generatePrimeRandomTrace. We collect necessary conditions on
t and y for t
2−∆y2
4 to be prime. Let f be a quadratic form of discriminant ∆, and let (x,w)
be a representation of n by f, that is n = f(x,w). We clearly have gcd(x,w)2 | n. Thus if
gcd(x,w) > 1, n cannot be prime. Hence we introduce the term of a proper representation.
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b t in sec. NP NT NP /NT b t in sec. NP NT NP /NT
162 0.698132 242.62 243.143 0.99785 181 0.937181 271.342 271.484 0.999475
163 0.715722 245.002 244.634 1.0015 182 0.947603 272.825 272.976 0.999448
164 0.720645 243.015 246.126 0.987362 183 0.963641 276.496 274.468 1.00739
165 0.729743 244.991 247.618 0.989394 184 0.967674 275.647 275.959 0.998867
166 0.739651 246.785 249.109 0.99067 185 0.982415 277.475 277.451 1.00009
167 0.755673 250.94 250.601 1.00135 186 0.978763 275.744 278.943 0.988532
168 0.762538 251.5 252.093 0.997648 187 1.0009 281.131 280.434 1.00248
169 0.775076 254.421 253.584 1.0033 188 1.01307 282.449 281.926 1.00185
170 0.78834 257.631 255.076 1.01002 189 1.01088 281.123 283.418 0.991903
171 0.790928 256.939 256.568 1.00145 190 1.03372 285.273 284.909 1.00128
172 0.796734 257.608 258.059 0.998251 191 1.03764 284.976 286.401 0.995025
173 0.816813 259.932 259.551 1.00147 192 1.09867 289.452 287.893 1.00541
174 0.824681 264.007 261.043 1.01135 193 1.13454 287.405 289.384 0.99316
175 0.837814 262.421 262.534 0.999569 194 1.19993 292.439 290.876 1.00537
176 0.859094 264.093 264.026 1.00025 195 1.20121 291.386 292.368 0.996643
177 0.885041 262.864 265.518 0.990006 196 1.20976 289.641 293.859 0.985644
178 0.889852 262.778 267.009 0.984154 197 1.22771 292.999 295.351 0.992035
179 0.917819 269.734 268.501 1.00459 198 1.23822 293.47 296.843 0.988638
180 0.929265 269.844 269.993 0.999449 199 1.25851 296.476 298.334 0.993771
Table 4.3: Data delivered by generatePrimeRandomTrace(−21311, [2b, 2b+1 − 1]). ∆ =
−21311 is fundamental of class number 200. NP denotes the number of trials in practice
to find a prime, NT = pih·log i1
2
√
|∆| the theoretical value. For each bitlength b we performed 20000
tests. The running times were measured on the SUN UltraSPARC I.
Definition 4.2.3 Let f be a quadratic form of discriminant ∆ and let n be an integer. The
pair (x,w) ∈ ZZ2 is a proper representation of n by f if f(x,w) = n and gcd(x,w) = 1. By
C(R∆,f (n)) we mean the set of all proper representations of n by f . Furthermore, if ρ denotes
the bijection from Proposition 2.1.21, we set C(N∆(n)) = ρ−1(C(R∆,f (n))).
Now let f be the main form of discriminant ∆, and let (x,w) be a proper representation
of n by f. Set (t, y) = ρ−1(x,w) with the bijection ρ from Proposition 2.1.21. We present
conditions on the integers t and y such that (x,w) properly represents n.
Theorem 4.2.4 For n ∈ IN we have
C(N∆(n)) =

{(t, y) ∈ N∆(n) : gcd(t, y) = 1} ∪
{(t, y) ∈ N∆(n) : 2 || t, 2 | y, gcd( t2 , y) = 1} : ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4 ;
{(t, y) ∈ N∆(n) : gcd(t, y) = 1} ∪
{(t, y) ∈ N∆(n) : 2 = gcd(t, y), t 6≡ y mod 4} : ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4 .
Proof: By C′(N∆(n)) we denote the right side of the theorem. Let M1 and M2 be subsets
of N∆(n) and R∆,f (n), respectively, with ρ(M1) ⊆ M2 and ρ−1(M2) ⊆ M1. Application of
ρ−1 to the first inclusion yields M1 = ρ−1(ρ(M1)) ⊆ ρ−1(M2) ⊆ M1, i.e. ρ−1(M2) = M1.
Hence application of ρ to this equation gives ρ(M1) = M2. It therefore suffices to show
ρ(C′(N∆(n))) ⊆ C(R∆,f (n)) and ρ−1(C(R∆,f (n))) ⊆ C′(N∆(n)) in order to prove the theo-
rem.
I. Let ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4. We first show ρ(C′(N∆(n))) ⊆ C(R∆,f (n)). For (t, y) ∈ C′(N∆(n)) let l
be a positive divisor of both x and w with (x,w) = ρ(t, y) = ( t2 , y). First, let gcd(t, y) = 1.
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Because of gcd( t2 , y) | gcd(t, y) = 1 we get l = 1, i.e. ρ(t, y) ∈ C(R∆,f (n)). Now, let 2 || t, 2 | y,
and gcd( t2 , y) = 1. The last condition implies l = 1, and again we have ρ(t, y) ∈ C(R∆,f (n)).
Conversely, let (x,w) be a proper representation of n by f , and set (t, y) = ρ−1(x,w) =
(2x,w). In case of gcd(2x,w) = 1 we have ρ−1(x,w) ∈ C′(N∆(n)). Assume therefore
gcd(2x,w) > 1. As x and w are relatively prime the only possibility is gcd(2x,w) = 2, and we
get 2 | w, 2 - x. This is equivalent to 2 || t, 2 | y, and gcd( t2 , y) = 1, and ρ−1(x,w) ∈ C′(N∆(n))
holds.
II. Now let ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4. As ∆ is odd t2 −∆y2 is divisible by 4 if and only if t and y have
the same parity.
We first show ρ(C′(N∆(n))) ⊆ C(R∆,f (n)). Hence let (t, y) ∈ C′(N∆(n)). In addition, let l be
a positive divisor of both x and w with (x,w) = ρ(t, y) = ( t−y2 , y). The definition of ρ shows
l | t−y2 and l | y, i.e. there are integers t1, y1 with t−y2 = lt1 and y = ly1. This is equivalent to
y = ly1 and t = 2lt1 + ly1, i.e. l | gcd(t, y). First, let gcd(t, y) = 1. Thus only l = 1 is possible.
Therefore ρ(t, y) ∈ C(R∆,f (n)) follows. Second, assume 2 = gcd(t, y) and t 6≡ y mod 4. The
relation l | gcd(t, y) yields l | 2. Assuming l = 2 shows t = 4t1 + y, i.e. t ≡ y mod 4. However,
this contradicts the assumption t 6≡ y mod 4.
Conversely, let (x,w) be a proper representation of n by f, and set (t, y) = ρ−1(x,w) =
(2x + w,w). In case of gcd(t, y) = 1 we are done. Let l be a non trivial positive divisor
of t and y. Thus there is a l > 1 and integers w1 and x1 with w = lw1 and 2x + w = lx1,
i.e. l | 2x. Because of gcd(x,w) = 1 we get l = 2. Hence w is even. It remains to show
t 6≡ y mod 4. Thus assume 2x+ w ≡ w mod 4. This shows 2x ≡ 0 mod 4, hence 2 | x. This is
a contradiction to gcd(x,w) = 1. Thus again we have ρ−1(x,w) ∈ C′(N∆(n)). uunionsq
We get an obvious variant of algorithm generatePrimeRandomTrace when considering the
conditions of Theorem 4.2.4. However, in Section 4.3 we will show how to further speed it
up.
Finally, we discuss whether generatePrimeRandomTrace returns primes which are K-uni-
formly distributed in I for some reasonable K, say K ≥ 240. We deduce from Figure 4.3 that
this is not the case. However, when designing our optimized algorithm findPrimeDeltaFixed
in the following section, we ensure that condition (P3) of Chapter 3 will be respected, that is
the primes returned by the optimized algorithm are K-uniformly distributed for a given K.
4.3 Finding Suitable Cardinalities
In this section we extend the problem of the previous two sections as follows: Find a rational
prime p of the form p = t
2−∆y2
4 such that one of the numbers p + 1 − t or p + 1 + t is the
cardinality of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFp. We set N− = p + 1 − t and
N+ = p+ 1 + t in what follows.
As a result of the Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we state that the method of Section 4.2 is faster
both in theory and practice. Hence, we only consider this approach. We show how to
speed up algorithm generatePrimeRandomTrace by using congruence relations and sieving
methods. The result is our very efficient algorithm findPrimeDeltaFixed. However, we have
to distinguish three cases, depending on the residue class of ∆ modulo 8: ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8,
∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, and ∆ ≡ 0, 4 mod 8. There are different lower bounds of k0 in either case.
We will show in the following subsections that we have k0 ≥ 4 in case of ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 or
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of primes returned by generatePrimeRandomTrace(∆, I) for ∆ =
−21311, I = [2162, 2163 − 1]. We evaluate 20000 primes. We subdivide I in 100 subintervals
charted at the abscissae. In y-direction we illustrate the ratio of the number of primes in a
subinterval to the mean value 200.
∆ ≡ 0, 4 mod 16, and k0 ≥ 2 in case of ∆ ≡ 8, 12 mod 16. Hence, a necessary condition
for the elliptic curve to be of prime order is ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. We remark that discriminants
∆ ≡ 0, 4 mod 16 are not fundamental. Hence, we do not take this family of discriminants
into account. Our optimized subalgorithms of findPrimeDeltaFixed assume k0 to be chosen
minimal.
However, in order to get a theoretical bound of the complexity of findPrimeDeltaFixed,
we first extend generatePrimeRandomTrace to a non-optimized algorithm, which we call
generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1]). The naming of this algorithm will become clear
soon. In addition, algorithm generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace restricts to curves of prime
order and field discriminants, that is we assume ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 to be fundamental while
deriving the complexity of this general algorithm. It outputs a pair (p, t) ∈ IN2 such that
both p = t
2−∆y2
4 and p + 1 + t are prime and p ∈ [i0, i1]. We restrict to curves of order
p + 1 + t as we can determine the complexity of generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace in that
case. Nevertheless, a practical implementation will also consider curves of order p+1− t, and
the running time of this implementation is bounded by the running time of our algorithm.
We explain the naming of generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace. Let (t, y) ∈ IN2. Assume fur-
thermore that both p = t
2−∆y2
4 and p + 1 + t are prime. Thus there exists a pi ∈ O∆ such
that both p = pipi and p+ 1 + t = (pi+ 1)(pi + 1) are prime. Hence we search for a generalized
twin prime (pi, pi + 1) ∈ O∆ .
We next determine the complexity of generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace. We make use of a
conjecture of [GS00]. Before stating their conjecture we have to introduce some notation. Let
∆ be fundamental, α ∈ O∆ and K be the quadratic field of discriminant ∆. A reasonable
large subset of O∆ is a subset R = {a+b
√
∆ : (a, b) ∈ ZZ20, 2 ≤ N(a+b
√
∆) ≤ x} for sufficient
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Algorithm 4.4: generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1])
Input: A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN.
Output: A prime p ∈ [i0, i1] and a t ∈ IN such that 4p = t2 −∆y2 with an integer y, and such that
p+ 1 + t is prime, too.
m← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
t ∈R {1, ..., 2 · b
√
i1c}; // choose a random t
if 4i0−t
2
|∆| ≤ 0 then
y ∈R {1, ..., b
√
4i1−t2
|∆| c}; // compute bounds of y and choose random y
else
y ∈R {d
√
4i0−t2
|∆| e, ..., b
√
4i1−t2
|∆| c};
if t 6≡ y mod 2 then
t← t+ 1; // ensure that t2−∆y24 ∈ ZZ
n← t2−∆y24 ;
if isPrime(n,m) = true AND isPrime(n+ t+ 1,m) = true then
return (n, t);
large x. By Pα(K,R) we mean the number of primes a + b
√
∆ ∈ R such that a, b ≥ 0 and
a+ b
√
∆ +α ∈ R. Unfortunately the notation in [GS00] is not formally defined and somehow
confusing. Hence the above notation is our interpretation. Nevertheless, we will present
practical results, and the conformance of these results with the theoretical value justifies our
interpretation.
Conjecture 4.3.1 (Gross,Smith) Let K be a number field. Let p1, . . . , pr be the complete
list of prime ideals of K with norm 2, and let α be an element of OK divisible by each pi, and
only by those ideals. (If there are no prime ideals of K with norm 2, let α = 1.) Let R be a
reasonable large subset of OK . Then
Pα(K,R) ≈ 2r ·
∏
p
N (p) 6=2
(
1− 1
(N (p)− 1)2
)
· L(1, χ∆)−2 ·
∑
β∈R
|N(β) 6=0,1|
1
(log |N(β)|)2 (4.4)
where the interpretation of the symbol ≈ is that for a “reasonable” sequence of increasing
regions Ri, the ratio of the two sides tends to 1.
We evaluate Equation (4.4) for discriminants ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. Then χ∆(2) = −1 according to
Definition 2.1.16, and 2 is inert. Thus there is no OK-ideal with norm 2, and r = 0 and α = 1
follow. We next compute the three factors of Equation (4.4).
First, let PN (∆) denote the first factor. As 2 is inert we have
PN (∆) =
∏
p
(
1− 1
(N (p)− 1)2
)
=
∏
p∈IP(
∆
p
)
=1
(
1− 1
(p− 1)2
)2
·
∏
p∈IP(
∆
p
)
=−1
(
1− 1
(p2 − 1)2
)
·
∏
p∈IP(
∆
p
)
=0
(
1− 1
(p− 1)2
)
.
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Second, we evaluate the factor L(1, χ∆)−2 using the analytic class number formula (Equation
(2.6)). It is well known that we have u = 6 for ∆ = −3, u = 4 for ∆ = −4, and u = 2
otherwise. As we assume ∆ < −4 we have L(1, χ∆) = pih√|∆| .
Finally we turn to the sum. However, as stated above it is not clear over which region R
we have to sum up, and the explanations in [GS00] are somehow confusing or false. Our
interpretation is as follows. We are interested in principal prime ideals (pi) ⊂ O∆ with norm
in [2, x] such that (pi + 1) is a principal prime ideal with norm in [2, x], too. Hence if pi is
such an element, then pi is such an element, too. Thus when only considering generators of
principal prime ideals with positive real and imaginary part, we only get exactly half of the
ideals. Thus we consider this by introducing a factor 2 and setting R′ = {a+ b√∆ : (a, b) ∈
IN20, 2 ≤ N(a+ b
√
∆) ≤ x}. As in [GS00] we approximate the sum by an integral over the set
S = {a+ b√∆ : a, b ≥ 0, 2 ≤ N(a+ b√∆) ≤ x}.∑
β∈R
|N(β) 6=0,1|
1
(log |N(β)|)2 = 2 ·
∑
β∈R′
1
(log |N(β)|)2
≈ 2 ·
∫
S
da db
(log(a2 −∆b2))2
= 2 ·
∫ √x
√
2
∫ pi
2
0
r√
|∆|dr dϕ
(log(r2))2
(4.5)
= 2 · pi
2
√|∆|
∫ √x
√
2
2rdr
2(log(r2))2
(4.6)
=
pi
2
√|∆|
∫ x
2
dy
(log y)2
. (4.7)
In Equation (4.5) we make use of the bijective transformation φ : [
√
2,
√
x] × [0, pi2 ] → S,
(r, ϕ) 7→ (r cosϕ, r√|∆| sinϕ) of functional determinant
r√
|∆| . Next in (4.6) we substitute r
2
by y.
Now let i1 = 2i0 − 1. We develop a closed formula for the probability that the algorithm
succeeds for a randomly chosen pair (t, y). We denote this probability by W. From Section 4.2
we already know that there are 1/4 · 2pii0/
√|∆| pairs (t, y) ∈ IN20 such that (t2−∆y2)/4 ∈ I.
Hence using the above estimation on P1(K,R) and remembering that for a prime p = (t2 −
∆y2)/4 the pair (t, y) is unique we deduce
W =
PN (∆) ·
(
pih√
|∆|
)−2
· pi
2
√
|∆|
∫ i1
i0
dy
(log y)2
1
4 · 2pii0√|∆|
(4.8)
=
PN (∆) · |∆| ·
∫ i1
i0
dy
(log y)2
pi2h2i0
. (4.9)
In [Bro93], p.774, formula 470, we find
∫ i1
i0
dy
(log y)2
= − xlog x
∣∣∣i1
i0
+
∫ i1
i0
dy
log y =
i0
log i0
− i1log i1 +
li(i1) − li(i0). We will use this equation to compute the integral in practice. However, to
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estimate the complexity we make use of a formula used by [GS00] and [SScK01]: Both ap-
proximate the antiderivative by x
log2 x
∑N
k=1
k!
logk−1 x for a certain N ∈ IN. Thus, asymptoti-
cally we have
∫ i1
i0
dy
(log y)2
∼ i1
(log i1)2
− i0
(log i0)2
∼ i1
2(log i1)2
. Before determining the complexity of
generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.2 Let ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 be an imaginary quadratic field discriminant. Then
8
9
∏
p∈IP
p≥3
(
1− 1
(p− 1)2
)2
≤ PN (∆) ≤ 89
∏
p∈IP
p≥3
(
1− 1
(p2 − 1)2
)
. (4.10)
Proof: As p = 2 is inert in Q(
√
∆) we have a factor 1− 1
(22−1)2 =
8
9 in PN (∆). Let p ≥ 3. We
prove
(
1− 1
(p−1)2
)2 ≤ 1− 1
(p−1)2 ≤ 1− 1(p2−1)2 . As 0 < 1− 1(p−1)2 < 1, the first inequality is
obvious. The second one is equivalent to (p− 1)2 ≤ (p2 − 1)2, which again is obvious. Using
the above formula for PN (∆) completes the proof. uunionsq
We remark that the lower bound corresponds to the case where every prime p ≥ 3 splits
completely in Q(
√
∆), while the upper bound corresponds to the case where every prime
p ≥ 3 is inert in Q(√∆). We computed the bounds of Lemma 4.3.2 up to p = 15000179 using
a floating point precision of 100. Using this approximation, the first 10 significant digits of
the bounds are 0.3873898902 ≤ PN (∆) ≤ 0.8729859532. Next we state the complexity of
generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace.
Theorem 4.3.3 Let i0 be a positive integer, and let ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 be an imaginary quadratic
field discriminant. Furthermore, let h denote the class number of O∆ . If we set i1 = 2i0 − 1,
the bit-complexity of generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace(∆, [i0, i1]) is O(h2 · log5 i1/|∆|).
Proof: As above denote by W the probability that generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace suc-
ceeds for a randomly chosen pair (t, y). Equation (4.9) and the approximation of the in-
tegral yield W = PN (∆)·|∆|
pi2h2·(log i1)2 . Hence we expect to choose
pi2h2·(log i1)2
PN (∆)·|∆| pairs (t, y) before
generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace terminates. The factor PN (∆) varies with the discrimi-
nant. However, we have PN (∆) ∈ [0.38, 0.88], as we have shown in Lemma 4.3.2. For each
pair (t, y) we have to perform at most 2 Miller-Rabin tests, each of bit-complexity O(log3 i1)
([Coh95], Section 8.2, p. 415). Hence the total bit-complexity is O(h2 · log5 i1/|∆|). uunionsq
Finally, we show that Formula (4.9) well fits with practical tests. For example, we set ∆ =
−356131. We then have h(∆) = 200. For i0 = 2b with 159 ≤ b ≤ 180 we counted the number of
randomly chosen pairs (t, y) in our implementation of generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace. For
each b we performed 500 tests. The comparison of our practical data to the theoretical value of
Equation (4.9) is shown in Figure 4.4. The coincidence is obvious. We have PN (−356151) =
0.68386.
We next explain our efficient algorithm findPrimeDeltaFixed. Depending on the input
k0, findPrimeDeltaFixed first chooses an appropriate fundamental discriminant ∆ of class
number at least h0. More precisely, as explained above, if k0 = 1 and k0 ∈ {1; 2; 3} we have to
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of the number of randomly chosen pairs (t, y) in algorithm
generateTwinPrimeRandomTrace in both theory and practice. For each bitlength we per-
formed 500 tests. We set ∆ = −356131 with h(∆) = 200.
take care of ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 and ∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8, respectively. However, if ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and 3 - ∆
we may use the class polynomial W introduced in Section 2.2.3 to generate the ring class field.
This polynomial has rather small coefficients and hence may be computed efficiently. Thus
if k0 = 4, we only take discriminants ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 into account. The user may specify such
a discriminant with h(∆) ≥ h0; if no discriminant is specified, using our database delta h,
the algorithm chooses the largest discriminant ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆ of class number h0. In
the formal description of the algorithm we denote this proceeding as ”Get ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8;”.
In addition, in order to distinguish the different input k0, if k0 ∈ {2; 3} we only consider
discriminants ∆ ≡ 8, 12 mod 16. The discriminant is again chosen to be maximal of class
number h0. Again we ensure 3 - ∆ to make use of the polynomial G for generating the Hilbert
class field. Finally, if k0 = 1, we have to ensure ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8.
Once ∆ is chosen, findPrimeDeltaFixed determines an interval [i0, i1] with i0 = 2b, i1 =
2b+1−1, and b = blog2 r0k0c. It then invokes the appropriate subalgorithm. All subalgorithms
determine a prime p ∈ [i0, i1] and the cardinality of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve
over IFp having O∆ as endomorphism ring. Hence, r will be of bitlength at least blog2 r0c.
The algorithm is very efficient in practice. For instance, if b = 162 and ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 of class
number 200, the algorithm terminates after 0.2 seconds on the Pentium III. We will see in
what follows that the primes returned by findPrimeDeltaFixed are K-uniformly distributed
in [i0, i1] with K = 240.
4.3.1 Discriminants ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8
We discuss in detail our very efficient algorithm findPrime1Mod8(r0, k0,∆, [i0, i1]). We present
running times proving the efficiency in practice. For instance, when searching for a crypto-
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Algorithm 4.5: findPrimeDeltaFixed(r0, k0, h0)
Input: Positive integers r0, k0, and h0.
Output: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with h(∆) ≥ h0.
Rational primes p and r, and a positive integer k with r ≥ r0, k ≤ k0, and blog2 pc = blog2 rkc =
blog2 r0k0c, such that a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp exists with |E(IFp)| = rk
and End(E) = O∆ .
if k0 ≥ 4 then
Get ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8; //Explanation: see Page 60
b← blog2 4r0c; i0 ← 2b; i1 ← 2b+1 − 1;
findPrime1Mod8(r0, 4,∆, [i0, i1]);
else if k0 ≥ 2 then
Get ∆ ≡ 8, 12 mod 16; //Explanation: see Page 60
b← blog2 r0k0c; i0 ← 2b; i1 ← 2b+1 − 1;
findPrime0Mod4(r0, k0,∆, [i0, i1]);
else
Get ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8; //Explanation: see Page 60
b← blog2 r0c; i0 ← 2b; i1 ← 2b+1 − 1;
findPrime5Mod8(r0, 1,∆, [i0, i1]);
graphically strong elliptic curve over a 162-bit field, the running time of findPrime1Mod8 is
about 0.2 seconds on the Pentium III. Finally, we give evidence that for fixed discriminant its
bit-complexity is proportional to log4 i1. Hence, the complexity of Theorem 4.3.3 seems to be
an upper bound of the complexity of findPrime1Mod8. We are not aware of any comparable
fast algorithm. We first refine the conditions on t and y to properly represent an integer. The
following proposition is based on Theorem 4.2.4.
Proposition 4.3.4 Let ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8. For an odd integer n we have
C(N∆(n)) = {(t, y) ∈ N∆(n) : 2 = gcd(t, y), t 6≡ y mod 4} .
Proof: Let (t, y) ∈ C(N∆(n)). According to Theorem 4.2.4 it suffices to show gcd(t, y) > 1.
Thus assume gcd(t, y) = 1. As usual we have to ensure t ≡ ∆y mod 2. The assertion ∆ ≡
1 mod 8 shows t ≡ y mod 2. Furthermore, as we assume gcd(t, y) = 1, we have that both t
and y are odd. Thus t2 ≡ y2 ≡ 1 mod 8 and 4n = t2−∆y2 ≡ 1− 1 · 1 ≡ 0 mod 8. This shows
that n is even, which contradicts the assumption that n is odd. uunionsq
As both t and y are even we set t1/2 = t/2 and y1/2 = y/2 in what follows. Thus for odd n we
have C(N∆(n)) = {(2t1/2, 2y1/2) ∈ N∆(n) : 1 = gcd(t1/2, y1/2), t1/2 6≡ y1/2 mod 2}. In [BB00]
we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.5 If ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and t1/2, y1/2 are positive integers such that p = t21/2 −
∆y21/2 is a prime, then N− ≡ N+ ≡ 0 mod 4. Furthermore, if N+4 is prime, then we have
(t1/2 mod 4, y1/2 mod 4) ∈ {(1, 0), (3, 2)}, and if N−4 is prime, (t1/2 mod 4, y1/2 mod 4) ∈
{(1, 2), (3, 0)} follows.
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Hence we have k ≥ 4, and we set k = k0 = 4 in what follows. The basic idea of our variant
of generatePrimeRandomTrace is as follows: In generatePrimeRandomTrace we randomly
choose independent pairs (t1/2, y1/2) until a suitable one is found. However, given an initial
pair (t1/2, y1/2), we can collect congruence relations on (t1/2 mod m, y1/2 mod m) for small
moduli m such that t21/2 −∆y21/2 and either N−4 or N+4 may be prime. To be more precise for
fixed odd modulus m we are only interested in pairs (t1/2 mod m, y1/2 mod m), which satisfy
t21/2 −∆y21/2 6≡ 0 mod m and either N−4 6≡ 0 mod m or N+4 6≡ 0 mod m. If this is the case, we
say that this pair satisfies the congruence relation for ∆ and m. For fixed discriminant ∆ we
say that a pair satisfies the congruence relations, if it satisfies the congruence relation for each
evaluated m. Basing on the tables in Section A.1.1 of the appendix, we evaluate the moduli
m ∈ {3, 4, 5, 7}. Furthermore, we will show how to modify t1/2 respectively y1/2 such that the
modified pair will satisfy the congruence relations, too. Hence we do not choose independent
pairs (t1/2, y1/2). In addition, we will introduce sieving methods to minimize the amount of
computation of multiprecision numbers. Finally, to avoid distinguishing several cases and to
speed up sieving we fix an initial pair (t1/2, y1/2) and leave y1/2 unchanged, that is we only
modify t1/2.
We first explore the modulus m = 3. In addition assume ∆ ≡ 1 mod 3. The appropriate table
in Section A.1.1 shows that N−4 can only be prime in the case (t1/2 mod 3, y1/2 mod 3) = (2, 0).
Furthermore, in order for N+4 to be prime, we have to ensure (t1/2 mod 3, y1/2 mod 3) = (1, 0).
However, if ∆ ≡ 0, 2 mod 3 both choices are suitable, too. Hence, again to avoid distinguishing
several cases for different values ∆ mod 3 we only consider the pairs (t1/2 mod 3, y1/2 mod 3) =
(2, 0) and (t1/2 mod 3, y1/2 mod 3) = (1, 0) for N− and N+, respectively.
Next we consider the modulus m = 5. The tables in Section A.1.1 show that the crucial
values of ∆ are ∆ ≡ 1, 4 mod 5. More precisely, if ∆ mod 5 ∈ {1, 4} there are less pairs
(t1/2 mod 5, y1/2 mod 5) satisfying the congruence relations for ∆ and 5 than in case of ∆ mod
5 ∈ {0, 2, 3}. In all, for either ∆ ≡ 1 mod 5 or ∆ ≡ 4 mod 5, there are 18 such pairs. However,
as mentioned above, we have a fixed value y1/2. Obviously, there are 6 pairs of the form
(t1/2 mod 5, 0) for either discriminant, and for fixed y1/2 mod 5 this is maximal. Furthermore,
these pairs appear in each table of Section A.1.1. Hence, we set y1/2 such that y1/2 ≡ 0 mod 5.
Then if N−4 is prime, t1/2 mod 5 ∈ {2, 3, 4} follows. In addition, if N+4 is prime, we have
t1/2 mod 5 ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Analogously we proceed with the modulus 7. Values ∆ mod 7 with few pairs (t1/2 mod
7, y1/2 mod 7) satisfying the congruence relations for ∆ and 7 are ∆ mod 7 ∈ {1, 2, 4}. In
either case there are 5 pairs of the form (t1/2 mod 7, 0) yielding suitable values N− respec-
tively N+, and for fixed y1/2 mod 7 this is maximal. Furthermore, these pairs appear in
all tables of Section A.1.1. Hence we set y1/2 ≡ 0 mod 7. We consider N− if and only if
t1/2 mod 7 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and we consider N+ if and only if t1/2 mod 7 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Table
4.4 summarizes the congruence conditions of this section.
We introduce a bit b4 to keep track of the difference t1/2 − y1/2 mod 4 : We set b4 = 0 if
this difference is equal to 1, and we set b4 = 1 if t1/2 − y1/2 mod 4 = 3. In addition we set
t3 = t1/2 mod 3, t5 = t1/2 mod 5, and t7 = t1/2 mod 7. Next, assume (t1/2, y1/2) to be a pair
respecting the requirements of Table 4.4, that is
(b4, t3, t5, t7) ∈
{ {0} × {1} × {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in case of N+ ,
{1} × {2} × {2, 3, 4} × {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} in case of N− .
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m y1/2 mod m N− N+
4 0 t1/2 ≡ 3 mod 4 t1/2 ≡ 1 mod 4
4 2 t1/2 ≡ 1 mod 4 t1/2 ≡ 3 mod 4
3 0 t1/2 ≡ 2 mod 3 t1/2 ≡ 1 mod 3
5 0 t1/2 mod 5 ∈ {2, 3, 4} t1/2 mod 5 ∈ {1, 2, 3}
7 0 t1/2 mod 7 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} t1/2 mod 7 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Table 4.4: Congruence conditions on t1/2 and y1/2 for
N−
4 respectively
N+
4 to be prime. ∆
is congruent 1 mod 8.
If we are not successful for this pair, we modify it as follows: Due to m = 4 we have to
preserve the odd parity of t1/2. Hence we successively increase t1/2 by 2 until the modified
pair (t′1/2, y1/2) satisfies the congruence conditions, too, that is we search the minimal c ∈ IN
such that both (t1/2, y1/2) and (t1/2 + 2c, y1/2) respect the conditions of Table 4.4. In Table
4.5 we list the values of c for all initial vectors (b4, t3, t5, t7).
c (b4, t3, t5, t7)
17 (0, 1, 3, 4)
12 (1, 2, 3, 6), (0, 1, 3, 5)
11 (0, 1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1, 2), (0, 1, 2, 4), (0, 1, 2, 5)
7 (1, 2, 2, 2), (1, 2, 2, 3), (1, 2, 3, 2), (1, 2, 3, 3), (1, 2, 3, 4), (1, 2, 3, 5),
(1, 2, 4, 4), (1, 2, 4, 5)
6 (1, 2, 2, 4), (1, 2, 2, 5), (1, 2, 2, 6), (0, 1, 1, 3), (0, 1, 1, 4), (0, 1, 1, 5)
5 (0, 1, 2, 1), (0, 1, 2, 2), (0, 1, 2, 3), (0, 1, 3, 1), (0, 1, 3, 2), (0, 1, 3, 3)
1 (1, 2, 4, 2), (1, 2, 4, 3), (1, 2, 4, 6)
Table 4.5: Minimal values c such that both (b4, t3, t5, t7) and (b4+c mod 2, t3+2c mod 3, t5+
2c mod 5, t7 + 2c mod 7) respect the congruence conditions of Table 4.4.
We remark that if (t1/2, y1/2) is initialized such that (b4, t3, t5, t7) appears in Table 4.5, we
have b4 = 0 ⇔ t3 = 1 and b4 = 1 ⇔ t3 = 2. Hence we do not take b4 into account in
what follows. We introduce a method cycles1Mod8(t3, t5, t7). Let (t3, t5, t7) be such that the
corresponding (b4, t3, t5, t7) is an element of Table 4.5. Then cycles1Mod8(t3, t5, t7) returns
the value c of Table 4.5. For instance, we have cycles1Mod8(1, 3, 4) = 17.
Next, we show how to use sieving methods. The idea is similar to that mentioned in Section
4.1.2. Let pi denote the i-th odd prime. The primes 3, 5, and 7 are already covered by our
congruence conditions. Hence, for sieving we only consider the primes p4 = 11 to pM for some
M ≥ 4. For 0 ≤ i ≤M−4 we store the residues of t1/2 and t21/2−∆y21/2 modulo pi+4 in arrays
t[ ] and p[ ], respectively, that is we set t[i] = t1/2 mod pi+4 and p[i] = t21/2 −∆y21/2 mod pi+4
for 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 4, respectively. We tested different values of M in practice, and according
to our experience the choice M = 24 is optimal, that is our sieving primes are the rational
primes in the interval [11, 97]. Thus a necessary condition for t21/2 − ∆y21/2 to be prime is
p[i] 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 4. In addition, necessary conditions for N−4 and N+4 to be prime
are p[i] + 1− 2t[i] 6≡ 0 mod pi+4 and p[i] + 1 + 2t[i] 6≡ 0 mod pi+4, respectively.
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Algorithm 4.6: findPrime1Mod8(r0, 4,∆, [i0, i1])
Input: Positive integers r0 and k0 = 4.
A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN with i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159.
Output: The discriminant ∆.
A prime p ∈ [i0, i1].
A prime r ≥ r0 such that there exists a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp with
|E(IFp)| = 4r and End(E) = O∆ .
The cofactor k = 4.
K ← 240; l← b i1−i0+1K c; T ← 3000; M ← 24;
mR ← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
s ∈R {0, . . .K − 1}; v ← i0 + sl; w ← v + l − 1; //choose a random subinterval
τ ∈R {1, ..., b
√
vc}; µ←
⌈√
(v − τ2)/|∆|
⌉
;
t1/2 ← min{x ≥ τ : x ≡ 1 mod 210};
y1/2 ← min{x ≥ µ : x ≡ 0 mod 210, t1/2 − x ≡ 1 mod 4};
p← t21/2 −∆y21/2;
c← 0; cr ← 0; j ← 0;
t3 ← 1; t5 ← 1; t7 ← 1;
for i = 0 to M − 4 do
p[i]← p mod pi+4; //initialize p[ ], i.e. p mod 11, . . . , p mod 97
t[i]← t1/2 mod pi+4; // initialize t[ ], i.e. t1/2 mod 11, . . . , t1/2 mod 97
while j < T AND p ∈ [v, w] do
if p[i] 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
bm ← false; bp ← false; // booleans to keep track of loops
if t3 = 2 AND p[i] + 1− 2t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
p← p+ 4crt1/2 + 4c2r; t1/2 ← t1/2 + 2cr; cr ← 0; bm ← true;
if p ∈ [v, w] AND isPrime(p,mR) = true then
bp ← true;
if isStrong(r0, 4, p, p+ 1− 2t) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, (p+ 1− 2t)/4, 4 );
if t3 = 1 AND p[i] + 1 + 2t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
if bm = false then
p← p+ 4crt1/2 + 4c2r; t1/2 ← t1/2 + 2cr; cr ← 0;
if bp = true OR (bm = false AND p ∈ [v, w] AND isPrime(p,mR) = true) then
if isStrong(r0, 4, p, p+ 1 + 2t) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, (p+ 1 + 2t)/4, 4 );
c← cycles1Mod8(t3, t5, t7); cr ← cr + c
t3 ← t3 + 2c mod 3; t5 ← t5 + 2c mod 5; t7 ← t7 + 2c mod 7;
for i = 0 to M − 4 do
p[i]← p[i] + 4ct[i] + 4c2 mod pi+4; t[i]← t[i] + 2c mod pi+4;
j ← j + 1;
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We are now able to introduce our optimized algorithm findPrime1Mod8(r0, 4,∆, [i0, i1]). Its
input are the security parameters r0 and k0 = 4. In addition, it requires a discriminant
∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and positive integers i0 < i1. Its output is the discriminant ∆ and
a rational prime p ∈ [i0, i1]. Furthermore, it returns a rational prime r ≥ r0 such that there
exists a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E defined over IFp with |E(IFp)| = 4r and
End(E) = O∆ . Finally, findPrime1Mod8 returns the cofactor 4.
In Section 4.2 we stated that our generic algorithm generatePrimeRandomTrace returns
primes that are not K-uniformly distributed in [i0, i1] for some reasonable K, i.e. K ≥ 240.
In findPrime1Mod8 we set K = 240. Hence, our subintervals are of length l := b i1−i0+1K c.
In order for this quantity to be large enough we assume [i0, i1] to be sufficiently large, say
i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159, which is the case in cryptographic applications. We then choose a random
subinterval [v, w] = [i0 + sl, i0 + (s+ 1)l− 1] by choosing a random integer s ∈ [0, . . . ,K − 1].
We ensure p ∈ [v, w]; hence, the primes p returned by findPrime1Mod8 are K-uniformly
distributed in [i0, i0 + K · b i1−i0+1K c]. From a practical point of view, this is equivalent to a
K-uniformly distribution in [i0, i1].
Next, we explain how we initialize (t1/2, y1/2). First, we randomly choose a lower bound
of t1/2, which we denote τ. Once, τ is chosen, we search for a lower bound µ of y1/2 such
that τ2 − ∆µ2 ≈ v. More precisely, let τ ∈ {0, . . .√v} be a randomly chosen integer. Set
µ =
⌈√
(v − τ2)/|∆|
⌉
; hence we have τ2 − ∆(µ − 1)2 < v ≤ τ2 − ∆µ2. The initial pair
(t1/2, y1/2) has to respect the congruence conditions of Table 4.4. For efficiency reasons we
initialize t1/2 ≡ 1 mod q for q ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7}. Hence, we set t1/2 = min{x ≥ τ : x ≡ 1 mod 210}.
Furthermore, the initial value of y1/2 has to be an even number divisible by 105. As we
initialize t1/2 ≡ 1 mod 3 we have the additional boundary condition t1/2 − y1/2 ≡ 1 mod 4.
Thus we initialize y1/2 = min{x ≥ µ : x ≡ 0 mod 210, t1/2 − x ≡ 1 mod 4}.
Furthermore, making use of our sieving primes p[ ], we are able to reduce the computa-
tional amount with multiprecision integers. We keep track of the current values of p and
t1/2 by introducing a counter cr. More precisely, let (t1/2, y1/2) be a pair such that t21/2 −
∆y21/2 6≡ 0 mod pi+4 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 4. We set p = t21/2 − ∆y21/2 and cr = 0. If
findPrime1Mod8 does not terminate for the current pair (t1/2, y1/2), we increase cr succes-
sively by c = cycles1Mod8(t3, t5, t7) until p[i] 6= 0 and either p[i] + 1 − 2t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0
or p[i] + 1 + 2t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 4. Hence cr is the minimal number of
increasing steps of t1/2 by 2 such that no sieving prime indicates a failure. If this turns out
to be the case, we set p′ = (t1/2 + 2cr)2−∆y21/2 = p+ 4crt1/2 + 4c2r . In addition we adapt t1/2
by setting t′1/2 = t1/2 + 2cr .
Beyond it we introduce two booleans bp and bm. If no sieving prime of p[ ] indicate the
compositeness of the current value of p, we initialize bp and bm with false, respectively. bm
is set to true if the current value of p is built in order to check whether p + 1− 2t1/2 is the
order of a cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFp. In addition, if p turns out to be
in [v, w] and if p passes the Miller-Rabin primality tests, then bp is set to true. bp is used
to avoid performing the primality test twice on the same value of p. In addition, bm stores
whether p has to be built in the if-loop for p+ 1 + 2t1/2.
Finally, we initialize a new pair (t1/2, y1/2) if we are not successful for T adjacent pairs
respecting the requirements of Table 4.4. We tested several choices of T, and T = 3000 seems
to be optimal. Hence we can state findPrime1Mod8 as Algorithm 4.6.
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We demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithm in practice. For all 160 ≤ b ≤ 500, b divisible
by 10, we measured the timings of findPrime1Mod8(2b−3, 4,−21311, [2b−1, 2b − 1]) on the
Pentium III. For each bitlength b we performed 1000 tests. It turns out that findPrime1Mod8
is very fast in practice. For example, b = 160 yields an average running time of 0.2 seconds.
Furthermore, even if b = 500, findPrime1Mod8 is expected to terminate after about 20
seconds. In Figure 4.5 the running time is plotted as a function of b. In addition, Figure 4.5
shows the function T0 · b4/b40, where T0 is the running time for b0 = 160. Hence, Figure 4.5
indicates that for fixed discriminant ∆ the complexity of findPrime1Mod8(r0, 4,∆, [i0, i1]) is
proportional to b4 and hence to log4 i1. This result well fits to Theorem 4.3.3, as the latter
complexity is assumed to be an upper bound of the complexity of our optimized subalgorithms.
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Figure 4.5: Timings on the Pentium III of findPrime1Mod8(2b−3, 4,−21311, 2b−1, 2b − 1)
for 160 ≤ b ≤ 500. The running time is given in seconds and plotted as a function of b. In
addition, we provide a theoretical curve proportional to b4 passing through the timing for
b = 160.
4.3.2 Discriminants ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8
In this section we investigate discriminants ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. We discuss in detail our optimized
algorithm findPrime5Mod8(r0, 1,∆, [i0, i1]). Its task is, for given r0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, and [i0, i1],
to find a prime p in [i0, i1], which is suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆ and such
that there is a cryptographically strong elliptic curve of prime order r ≥ r0 over IFp with
endomorphism ring O∆ . The proceeding is very similar to the case ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 of the
Section 4.3.1.
As in the previous section, we first refine the conditions on a pair (t, y) ∈ IN2 to properly
represent a rational prime, if ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. Hence, let a prime p be given, and let (t, y) be a
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proper representation of p. In addition to the requirements of Theorem 4.2.4, as ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4,
it is easy to see that both t and y are either even or odd. First, let t and y both be odd. Then
t2−∆y2 ≡ 1− 5 ≡ 4 mod 8. Hence, p = t2−∆y24 , p+ 1− t, and p+ 1 + t are all odd. Next, let
t and y both be even; furthermore, assume p = t
2−∆y2
4 to be odd. Then both p + 1 − t and
p+ 1 + t are even. Thus we only consider the first case and set k0 = 1, that is we search for
pairs (t, y) ∈ IN2 such that p and either p + 1 − t or p + 1 + t are prime. We will show that
this case actually exists.
As in the case ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 we first collect congruence conditions on (t mod m, y mod m) for
small moduli m. We evaluate the moduli m ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7}. The congruence conditions on (t, y)
for m = 2 are already stated. Next, for m ∈ {3, 5, 7} we proceed as in the previous section.
The arguments for deducing the conditions on (t mod m, y mod m) are similar. Again, to
avoid distinguishing different cases, we leave y unchanged. We summarize the results in
Table 4.6.
m y mod m N− N+
2 1 t ≡ 1 mod 2 t ≡ 1 mod 2
3 0 t ≡ 1 mod 3 t ≡ 2 mod 3
5 0 t mod 5 ∈ {1, 3, 4} t mod 5 ∈ {1, 2, 4}
7 0 t mod 7 ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5, 6} t mod 7 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}
Table 4.6: Congruence conditions on t and y for N− respectively N+ to be prime in case of
∆ ≡ 5 mod 8.
Next, assume (t, y) to respect the congruence conditions of Table 4.6. We explain how to
preserve the congruence conditions when modifying (t, y). First, as y is fixed, we have to
ensure that t keeps odd. Hence, we successively increase t by 2 until the new residues of t
modulo 3, 5 and 7 fit to the requirements of Table 4.6, that is we determine the minimal
c ∈ IN such that both (t, y) and (t + 2c, y) respect the congruence conditions. Again, as in
the case ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, we set tm = t mod m for m ∈ {3, 5, 7}. The values of c are listed in
Table 4.7.
c (t3, t5, t7)
14 (1, 3, 3), (1, 4, 4)
8 (1, 1, 4), (1, 3, 1)
5 (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 3), (1, 1, 5), (1, 1, 6), (1, 4, 1), (1, 4, 3), (1, 4, 5), (1, 4, 6)
2 (1, 3, 4), (1, 3, 5), (1, 3, 6)
1 (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2), (2, 1, 3), (2, 1, 4), (2, 1, 6), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 3),
(2, 2, 4), (2, 2, 6), (2, 4, 1), (2, 4, 2), (2, 4, 3), (2, 4, 4), (2, 4, 6)
Table 4.7: Minimal values c such that both (t mod 3, t mod 5, t mod 7) and (t+2c mod 3, t+
2c mod 5, t+ 2c mod 7) respect the congruence conditions of Table 4.6.
As in the case ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 we introduce a method cycles5Mod8(t3, t5, t7). Let (t3, t5, t7) be
an element of Table 4.7. Then cycles5Mod8(t3, t5, t7) returns the appropriate value c ∈ IN of
Table 4.7. For example, cycles5Mod8(1, 3, 3) returns 14.
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Algorithm 4.7: findPrime5Mod8(r0, 1,∆, [i0, i1])
Input: Positive integers r0 and k0 = 1.
A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN with i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159.
Output: The discriminant ∆.
A prime p ∈ [i0, i1].
A prime r ≥ r0 such that there exists a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp with
|E(IFp)| = r and End(E) = O∆ .
The cofactor k = 1.
K ← 240; m← b i1−i0+1K c; T ← 2000; M ← 29;
mR ← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
s ∈R {0, . . .K − 1}; v ← i0 + sl; w ← v + l − 1; //choose a random subinterval
τ ∈R {1, ..., b2
√
vc}; µ←
⌈√
(4v − τ2)/|∆|
⌉
;
t← min{x ≥ τ : x ≡ 1 mod 210};
y ← min{x ≥ µ : x ≡ 105 mod 210};
p← (t2 −∆y2)/4;
c← 0; cr ← 0; j ← 0;
t3 ← 1; t5 ← 1; t7 ← 1;
for i = 0 to M − 4 do
p[i]← p mod pi+4; //initialize p[ ], i.e. p mod 11, . . . , p mod 113
t[i]← t mod pi+4; // initialize t[ ], i.e. t mod 11, . . . , t mod 113
while j < T AND p ∈ [v, w] do
if p[i] 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
bm ← false; bp ← false; // booleans to keep track of loops
if t3 = 1 AND p[i] + 1− t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
p← p+ crt+ c2r; t← t+ 2cr; cr ← 0; bm ← true;
if p ∈ [v, w] AND isPrime(p,mR) = true then
bp ← true;
if isPrime(p+ 1− t,mR) = true AND isStrong(r0, 1, p, p+ 1− t) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, p+ 1− t, 1 );
if t3 = 2 AND p[i] + 1 + t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
if bm = false then
p← p+ crt+ c2r; t← t+ 2cr; cr ← 0;
if bp = true OR (bm = false AND p ∈ [v, w] AND isPrime(p,mR) = true) then
if isPrime(p+ 1− t,mR) = true AND isStrong(r0, 1, p, p+ 1 + t) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, p+ 1 + t, 1 );
c← cycles5Mod8(t3, t5, t7); cr ← cr + c
t3 ← t3 + 2c mod 3; t5 ← t5 + 2c mod 5; t7 ← t7 + 2c mod 7;
for i = 0 to M − 4 do
p[i]← p[i] + ct[i] + c2 mod pi+4; t[i]← t[i] + 2c mod pi+4;
j ← j + 1;
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We next turn to our algorithm findPrime5Mod8(r0, 1,∆, [i0, i1]). It is very similar to al-
gorithm findPrime1Mod8. Hence we refer to the latter algorithm for details. Input of
findPrime5Mod8 are positive integers r0 and k0 = 1. In addition, it requires a discrimi-
nant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, and natural numbers i0 < i1. Its output is the discriminant ∆
and a rational prime p ∈ [i0, i1]. Furthermore, it returns a rational prime r ≥ r0 such that
there exists a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E defined over IFp with |E(IFp)| = r and
End(E) = O∆ . Finally, findPrime5Mod8 returns the cofactor 1.
The primes p returned by findPrime5Mod8 are K-uniformly distributed in [i0, i0 + K ·
b i1−i0+1K c], and in practice we set K = 240. Furthermore, the sieving arrays p[ ] and t[ ],
the initialization of a pair (t, y), and the initialization parameter T are analogous to the case
∆ ≡ 1 mod 8. Our tests indicate that the choices T = 2000 and M = 29 are optimal, that is
we make use of the primes in [11, 113] for sieving.
We tested findPrime5Mod8(r0, 1,∆, [i0, i1]) in practice for r0 = 2159, fundamental discrimi-
nants ∆ of class number 200, and the interval [2159, 2160 − 1]. Using this input, the running
time of findPrime5Mod8 on the Pentium III is about 0.25 - 0.3 seconds.
4.3.3 Discriminants ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4
In this section we present our algorithm findPrime0Mod4(r0, k0,∆, [i0, i1]). Its task is, for
given r0, k0, ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4, and [i0, i1], to find a prime p ∈ [i0, i1], which is suitable for the
CM-method of discriminant ∆ and such that there is a cryptographically strong elliptic curve
E over IFp of order rk with r ≥ r0, k ≤ k0, and endomorphism ring O∆ . The proceeding
is very similar to the cases ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 of the Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2,
respectively. We will only consider k0 ∈ {2; 3} and ∆ mod 16 ∈ {8; 12} as explained below.
Again we first work out congruence conditions for t and y, respectively. In this section we
evaluate the moduli m ∈ {3, 4, 5, 7}. When we derived the congruence conditions of Table
4.6, we used the tables of Section A.1.2 of the appendix; these tables list conditions for
∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8. Thus we make use of Table 4.6, too.
However, in Section 4.3.2 we used the modulus m = 2. Hence, in addition to Table 4.6 we
have to deduce conditions for the modulus m = 4. Let p be a prime with 4p = t2 − ∆y2;
modulo 4, this equation shows t2 ≡ 0 mod 4. Thus a first condition is 2 | t. We set t1/2 = t/2
and p = t21/2 − ∆4 y2 in what follows. Theorem 4.2.4 shows that we have to distinguish two
cases.
1. Let gcd(2t1/2, y) = 1. Hence y is odd. Let ∆ ≡ 0 mod 8. Thus ∆4 y2 is even, and t1/2 has to
be odd. Furthermore, we have p+1± t ≡ t21/2− ∆4 y2 +1±2t1/2 ≡ 1− ∆4 +1+2 ≡ −∆4 mod 4,
hence
p+ 1± t mod 4 =
{
0, if ∆ ≡ 0 mod 16 ,
2, if ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16 .
Thus we have k ≥ 4 and k ≥ 2 in case of ∆ ≡ 0 mod 16 and ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16, respectively.
As we are interested in curves having a cofactor as small as possible, we assume k0 ∈ {2; 3}.
Hence, if gcd(2t1/2, y) = 1 and ∆ ≡ 0 mod 8 we only consider discriminants ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16.
Next let ∆ ≡ 4 mod 8. Then ∆4 y2 is odd, and t1/2 has to be even. It follows p + 1 ± t ≡
−∆4 y2 + 1 ≡ −∆4 + 1 mod 4, hence
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p+ 1± t mod 4 =
{ −1 + 1 = 0, if ∆ ≡ 4 mod 16 ,
−3 + 1 = 2, if ∆ ≡ 12 mod 16 .
Thus we have k ≥ 4 and k ≥ 2 in case of ∆ ≡ 4 mod 16 and ∆ ≡ 12 mod 16, respectively.
Thus, if gcd(2t1/2, y) = 1 and ∆ ≡ 4 mod 8, we only consider discriminants ∆ ≡ 12 mod 16.
2. Let gcd(2t1/2, y) = 2 with odd t1/2. We write y = 2y1/2. Then we have p = t21/2 −∆y21/2 ≡
1 mod 4, and p+ 1± t ≡ 1 + 1 + 2 ≡ 0 mod 4 follows. Hence we have k ≥ 4 in this case, and
we ignore pairs (t, y) with gcd(t, y) = 2.
We abstain from a further investigation of discriminants ∆ ≡ 0, 4 mod 16 as in either case
the discriminant is not fundamental and the cofactor at least 4. For discriminants ∆ ≡
8, 12 mod 16 we summarize the results in Table 4.8.
∆ mod 16 k (t mod 4, y mod 4)
8 2 (2,1), (2,3)
12 2 (0,1), (0,3)
Table 4.8: Pairs (t mod 4, y mod 4) such that p and either N−k or
N−
k is odd with minimal k
in case of ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4.
We next explain how to initialize and modify a pair (t, y). Again, in order to avoid dis-
tinguishing different cases, we fix y with y mod 2 = 1. Thus, if ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16 we have to
ensure t mod 4 = 2, and t mod 4 = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we have to respect the require-
ments of Table 4.6. Hence, in addition, we initialize t and y such that t ≡ 1 mod 105 and
y ≡ 0 mod 105, respectively. However, as t mod 4 has to rest constant, we increase t by 4 in
each step. Now, we assume that (t, y) respects all requirements of the Tables 4.6 and 4.8. As
in the previous sections, we list in Table 4.9 minimal values c such that (t+4c, y) respects the
congruence conditions, too. This value is returned by our algorithm cycles0Mod4. Again, we
set tm = t mod m for m ∈ {3, 5, 7}.
c (t3, t5, t7)
8 (2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2)
7 (1, 3, 3), (1, 4, 4)
5 (2, 1, 6), (2, 4, 2)
4 (1, 1, 4), (1, 3, 1)
3 (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 3), (1, 1, 5), (1, 1, 6), (1, 4, 1), (1, 4, 3),
(1, 4, 5), (1, 4, 6), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 3), (2, 2, 4), (2, 2, 6),
(2, 4, 1), (2, 4, 3), (2, 4, 4), (2, 4, 6)
2 (2, 1, 2), (2, 1, 3), (2, 1, 4)
1 (1, 3, 4), (1, 3, 5), (1, 3, 6)
Table 4.9: Minimal values c such that both (t mod 3, t mod 5, t mod 7) and (t+4c mod 3, t+
4c mod 5, t+ 4c mod 7) respect the congruence conditions of Tables 4.6 and 4.8. We assume
∆ ≡ 0 mod 4.
We next present our efficient algorithm findPrime0Mod4. After the detailed discussion of the
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previous algorithms findPrime1Mod8 and findPrime5Mod8, the design details are obvious.
Finally, we present practical running times of findPrime0Mod4. We tested our implementation
on the Pentium III for r0 = 2179, k0 = 2, and [i0, i1] = [2180, 2181−1], that is the bitlength of r
is 180. For 200 ≤ h ≤ 6000, 200 | h we determined the maximal discriminants ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16
and ∆ ≡ 12 mod 16, respectively, with |∆| < 2.5 · 107, if such a discriminant exists. For
each input we performed 250 tests. The timings are shown in Figure 4.6. We are not able to
determine the correlation of timing and class number.
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Figure 4.6: Timings on the Pentium III of findPrime0Mod4(2179, 2,∆, 2180, 2181 − 1) for
maximal discriminants ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16 and ∆ ≡ 12 mod 16, respectively, of class numbers
200 ≤ h ≤ 6000, 200 | h. The running time is given in seconds and plotted as a function of h.
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Algorithm 4.8: findPrime0Mod4(r0, k0∆, [i0, i1])
Input: Positive integers r0 and k0.
A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 8, 12 mod 16.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN with i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159.
Output: The discriminant ∆.
A prime p ∈ [i0, i1].
A prime r ≥ r0 and an integer k ≤ k0 such that a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp
exists with |E(IFp)| = rk and End(E) = O∆ .
K ← 240; m← b i1−i0+1K c; T ← 2000; M ← 24;
if ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16 then
t4 ← 2; //if ∆ ≡ 8 mod 16, ensure t ≡ 2 mod 4
else
t4 ← 0; //if ∆ ≡ 12 mod 16, ensure t ≡ 0 mod 4
mR ← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
s ∈R {0, . . .K − 1}; v ← i0 + sl; w ← v + l − 1; //choose a random subinterval
τ ∈R {1, ..., b2
√
vc}; µ←
⌈√
(4v − τ2)/|∆|
⌉
;
t← min{x ≥ τ : x ≡ 1 mod 105, x ≡ t4 mod 4};
y ← min{x ≥ µ : x ≡ 105 mod 210};
p← (t2 −∆y2)/4;
c← 0; cr ← 0; j ← 0;
t3 ← 1; t5 ← 1; t7 ← 1;
for i = 0 to M − 4 do
p[i]← p mod pi+4; //initialize p[ ], i.e. p mod 11, . . . , p mod 97
t[i]← t mod pi+4; // initialize t[ ], i.e. t mod 11, . . . , t mod 97
while j < T AND p ∈ [v, w] do
if p[i] 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
bm ← false; bp ← false; // booleans to keep track of loops
if t3 = 1 AND p[i] + 1− t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
p← p+ 2crt+ 4c2r; t← t+ 4cr; cr ← 0; bm ← true;
if p ∈ [v, w] AND isPrime(p,mR) = true then
bp ← true;
if isPrime(p+ 1− t,mR) = true AND (r ← isStrong(r0, k0, p, p+ 1− t)) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, r, (p+ 1− t)/r );
if t3 = 2 AND p[i] + 1 + t[i] mod pi+4 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M − 4 then
if bm = false then
p← p+ 2crt+ 4c2r; t← t+ 4cr; cr ← 0;
if bp = true OR (bm = false AND p ∈ [v, w] AND isPrime(p,mR) = true)) then
if isPrime(p+ 1− t,mR) = true AND (r ← isStrong(r0, k0, p, p+ 1 + t)) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, r, (p+ 1 + t)/r );
c← cycles0Mod4(t3, t5, t7); cr ← cr + c
t3 ← t3 + 2c mod 3; t5 ← t5 + 2c mod 5; t7 ← t7 + 2c mod 7;
for i = 0 to M − 4 do
p[i]← p[i] + 2ct[i] + 4c2 mod pi+4; t[i]← t[i] + 4c mod pi+4;
j ← j + 1;
Chapter 5
Finding a Suitable Cardinality:
A Fixed Field Approach
In this chapter we present our algorithm findDiscriminant(p, r0, k0, h0). Its task is as follows:
Let a rational prime p and the security bounds r0, k0, and h0 be given. The algorithm finds
a fundamental discriminant ∆ with h(∆) ≥ h0 such that p is suitable for the CM-method of
discriminant ∆. In addition, if p = t
2−∆y2
4 , we have either p + 1 − t = rk or p + 1 + t = rk
with a rational prime r ≥ r0 and a positive integer k ≤ k0. Finally, rk is the order of
a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp with End(E) = O∆ . Throughout this
chapter we assume that the bitlength of p is reasonable, that is blog2 pc = blog2 r0k0c.
Our algorithm findDiscriminant bases on ideas due to Atkin and Morain ([AM93]) and
the abstractly formulated algorithm in section E.3.2.c of [X9.62]. However, [AM93] describe
their algorithm in the context of primality proving; hence they do not supply an algorithm
for our purposes. Furthermore, the algorithm in [X9.62] uses a high-level description and
does not address the problem of how to choose appropriate candidates of discriminants. We
will show how to extend both approaches to find an elliptic curve for use in cryptography.
In addition, we show how to efficiently implement our algorithm. Furthermore, in contrast
to [X9.62], we explicitely integrate the search for the discriminant in our algorithm, and we
take the parameter h0 into account. Finally, we give evidence that for r0 ≥ 2159, k0 = 1, and
h0 = 200, our generating algorithm cryptoCurve is rather fast in practice if the prime p is
set in algorithm findPrime. For instance, if r0 = 2159, we expect cryptoCurve to terminate
successfully in about a minute on the Pentium III.
Before explaining the algorithm, we first discuss some underlying details. We assume ∆ to
be fundamental. Thus ∆ factors as a product of pairwise different odd primes and a further
factor d, where d ∈ {−1,−4,−8}. Again, we denote by pj the j-th odd prime, and we write
∆ = −2e ·
M−1∏
j=0
δjpj+1 ·
L∏
k=1
qk , (5.1)
with e ∈ {0, 2, 3}. The further variables have the following meaning: M is the index of the
maximal odd prime which we use to speed up the decision whether p is suitable for the CM-
method of the current discriminant ∆. In our implementation, we set M = 25, that is we
consider the primes in [3, 101]. Furthermore, for 0 ≤ j ≤M − 1 we have δj = 1 if and only if
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pj+1 | ∆, and δj = 0 otherwise. Finally, the factors qk denote all odd primes > pM dividing
∆. In addition, as in [X9.62], we set D = −∆, if ∆ is odd, and D = −∆/4, if ∆ is even.
Hence, D is equal to the square-free part of −∆. We make use of the following congruence
conditions quoted in [X9.62], section E.3.2.1., p. 113:
p ≡ 3 mod 8 =⇒ D 6≡ 6 mod 8 ,
p ≡ 5 mod 8 =⇒ D ≡ 1 mod 2 ,
p ≡ 7 mod 8 =⇒ D 6≡ 2 mod 8 .
We next derive further conditions on ∆ basing on Legendre symbols. These ideas are already
mentioned in [AM93]. We assume, that p is suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆.
If l is an odd prime dividing ∆, the representation 4p = t2 −∆y2 becomes modulo l
p ≡ (t/2)2 mod l .
Hence, if p is suitable for the CM-method of discriminant ∆,
(p
l
)
= 1 follows for all odd prime
divisors of ∆.
Now let ∆ be a fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant. We assume that the factor-
ization (5.1) is known. In addition, let p be an odd rational prime. In order to efficiently
check the above conditions we introduce integers Bp and B∆ defined as follows:
Bp =
M+2∑
j=0
θj · 2j , θj =

1, if
(
p
pj+1
)
6= 1, 0 ≤ j ≤M − 1,
1, if p ≡ 3 mod 8, j = M,
1, if p ≡ 5 mod 8, j = M + 1,
1, if p ≡ 7 mod 8, j = M + 2,
B∆ =
M+2∑
j=0
δj · 2j , δj =

1, if D ≡ 6 mod 8, j = M,
1, if D ≡ 0 mod 2, j = M + 1,
1, if D ≡ 2 mod 8, j = M + 2,
and θj = 0 respectively δj = 0 otherwise for either j. Thus, in order for p to be suitable for the
CM-method of discriminant ∆, a necessary condition is Bp &B∆ = 0, where & denotes the
bitwise AND-operation. Given Bp and B∆, we can check this condition very fast in practice.
Finally, as deduced in Section 2.1, a further necessary condition for p to be suitable for the
CM-method of discriminant ∆ is
(
∆
p
)
= 1. We show that for a discriminant of odd class
number, this condition implies
(p
l
)
= 1 for all odd prime divisors l of ∆. We first remark
that if h(∆) is odd, −∆ is prime. Now assume
(
∆
p
)
= 1. We have to show
(
p
−∆
)
= 1. We
may assume 2 6= p 6= −∆ in our application. Thus, using quadratic reciprocity, we have(
p
−∆
)
·
(
−∆
p
)
= (−1)(p−1)(−∆−1)/4. We have
(
−∆
p
)
=
(
−1
p
)
·
(
∆
p
)
=
(
−1
p
)
, and in addition(
−1
p
)
= 1 and
(
−1
p
)
= −1, if p ≡ 1 mod 4 and p ≡ 3 mod 4, respectively. Furthermore, as
−∆ is prime, we have ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4; this shows −∆ ≡ 3 mod 4, thus (−1)(p−1)(−∆−1)/4 =
(−1)(p−1)/2. Hence, we have
(
p
−∆
)
= (−1)(p−1)/2 ·
(
−1
p
)
. If either p ≡ 1 mod 4 or p ≡ 3 mod 4,
this proves the assertion.
We next explain how to choose suitable candidates of discriminants. Basing on our database
delta h explained on Page 45, we determined all fundamental discriminants ∆ with |∆| < 6·106
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and 200 ≤ h(∆) ≤ 999. We store these discriminants with respect to their class number in a
further database, which we call fundamental delta h. In addition, if the class number is even,
we store B∆, L and Q together with ∆, where Q denotes an array of length L which contains
the prime factors qk, that is Q[k − 1] = qk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ L.
In order to be able to use our database fundamental delta h, we introduce the function
getDiscriminant(h,∆0) : Its input is a positive integer h with 200 ≤ h ≤ 999 and an integer
∆0 with |∆0| < 6 · 106. Using the database fundamental delta h, getDiscriminant(h,∆0) re-
turns the maximal imaginary quadratic fundamental discriminant ∆ with h(∆) = h, ∆ ≤ ∆0,
and |∆0| < 6 · 106 if such a discriminant exists. Otherwise, getDiscriminant returns 0. In
addition, if h is even, the function returns B∆, L, and the array Q.
We are now able to explain our algorithm findDiscriminant. Its input are the prime p and
the bounds r0, k0, and h0. In order to make use of our database fundamental delta h, we assume
200 ≤ h0 ≤ 999. findDiscriminant first computes Bp. In order to get a first candidate of
discriminant, the algorithm then invokes getDiscriminant(h0, 0). Let ∆ denote the discrim-
inant returned by getDiscriminant. If h0 is odd, we compute
(
∆
p
)
. If the Legendre symbol
is not equal to 1, we turn to the next discriminant by invoking getDiscriminant(h0,∆).
Otherwise, we make use of the algorithm of Cornacchia to decide whether p is suitable for
the CM-method of discriminant ∆; the according function cornacchia(∆, p) was already dis-
cussed in Section 4.1.1. If this is not the case, we choose the next discriminant. Otherwise,
using the representation 4p = t2−∆y2, we check if either p+ 1− t or p+ 1 + t is the order of
a cryptographically strong elliptic curve. If this is false, we invoke getDiscriminant(h0,∆).
Otherwise, the algorithm returns the values ∆, p, r, and k. If h0 is even, we first compute
Bp &B∆. If the result is a positive integer, we turn to the next discriminant. Otherwise, for
1 ≤ k ≤ L we successively compute
(
p
qk
)
. If one of the Legendre symbols is not equal to 1, we
choose the next discriminant. Otherwise, we compute
(
∆
p
)
and proceed as in the case of odd
h0. If we are not successful until getDiscriminant(h0,∆) returns 0, we set h = h0 + 1 and
invoke getDiscriminant(h, 0). We then proceed as in the case h0. Finally, if we are not able
to find suitable values ∆, r and k before h = 1000, the algorithm outputs an error message
and terminates. However, in practice, we set h0 = 200, 2159 ≤ r0 ≤ 2249, and 1 ≤ k0 ≤ 4. We
are not aware of any prime p where our algorithm fails.
We demonstrate the efficiency of findDiscriminant in practice. In Section A.2 we present
sample output of algorithm findDiscriminant(p, r0, k0, h0) for different bitlengths of p. If p
is a prime of bitlength b, we used r0 = 2b−1, k0 = 1, and h0 = 200 as input of our algorithm
findDiscriminant. We tested our algorithm for b = 160 and b = 250, that is r is of bitlength
160 and 250, respectively. For each b, we performed 100 tests. We first generated 100 random
primes of bitlength 160 and 250, respectively. For each input findDiscriminant terminated
successfully. All tests were performed on the Pentium III.
Let us first consider the case b = 160. The average running time of findDiscriminant was
23.6 seconds. In addition the average timing of the whole generating algorithm cryptoCurve
was 65.6 seconds. The best running time of cryptoCurve was 26.4 seconds; the corresponding
discriminant was −988867 of class number 200. In contrast, the discriminant of maximal
class number was ∆ = −4198963 with h(∆) = 319. The corresponding running time of
findDiscriminant and cryptoCurve was 140 seconds and about 259 seconds, respectively.
We remark that for our sample test primes p the timings of findDiscriminant are 72.6%
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Algorithm 5.1: findDiscriminant(p, r0, k0, h0)
Input: A prime p and positive integers r0, k0 with blog2 pc = blog2 r0k0c.
An integer h0 with 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 999.
Output: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with |∆| < 6 ·106 and 999 ≥ h(∆) ≥ h0.
The prime p.
A rational prime r and a positive integer k with r ≥ r0, k ≤ k0, and blog2 rkc = blog2 r0k0c, such that
a cryptographically strong elliptic curve E over IFp exists with |E(IFp)| = rk and End(E) = O∆ .
An error message, if no appropriate values ∆, r and k exist.
Compute Bp; h← h0; ∆← 0;
while h ≤ 999 do
if h ≡ 0 mod 2 then
(∆, B∆, L,Q)← getDiscriminant(h,∆);
if ∆ = 0 then
h← h+ 1; continue;
if Bp &B∆ > 0 OR
(
p
Q[j−1]
)
6= 1 for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ L then
continue;
else
∆← getDiscriminant(h,∆);
if ∆ = 0 then
h← h+ 1; continue;
if
(
∆
p
)
6= 1 OR (t← cornacchia(∆, p)) = 0 then
continue;
if (r ← isStrong(r0, k0, p, p+ 1− t)) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, r, (p+ 1− t)/r );
else if (r ← isStrong(r0, k0, p, p+ 1 + t)) 6= 0 then
return( ∆, p, r, (p+ 1 + t)/r );
Output( ”We are not able to find a suitable cardinality.” ); terminate;
faster than a variant of findDiscriminant without using Legendre symbols, which took us
86.8 seconds on average.
Next, we turn to sample tests for b = 250. In this case, the average running time of
findDiscriminant was 104 seconds. Furthermore, the average timing of the whole gen-
erating algorithm cryptoCurve was 176 seconds. The fastest timing of cryptoCurve was
42.5 seconds; the corresponding discriminant was −450059 of class number 200. In contrast,
the discriminant of maximal class number was ∆ = −4797227 with h(∆) = 519. Its run time
of findDiscriminant and cryptoCurve was 805 seconds and about 21 minutes, respectively.
We conclude that the Fixed Field Approach turns out to be faster than using randomly
chosen curves. This statement becomes more evident with increasing bitlength of p. However,
it turns out that this approach is slower in practice than the Fixed Discriminant Approach.
The main reason is that for given h0 findDiscriminant returns in general a discriminant ∆
with h(∆) > h0, which increases the running time.
Chapter 6
Computation of the Class Group
In this chapter we investigate two different algorithms to compute all reduced representatives
of integral binary quadratic forms of discriminant ∆. It turns out that a brute-force like al-
gorithm is the fastest way in practice to solve this task. We call this well known algorithm
classGroup; a variant of it may be found in [Coh95], algorithm 5.3.5, p. 228. Our second al-
gorithm called classGroupDivisors refines classGroup; it replaces the brute-force approach
by considering necessary conditions for reduced representatives, that is it only takes divisors
of a given integer into account. However, it turns out that classGroupDivisors is rather
inefficient in practice. We present running times of both algorithms at the end of this chapter.
As sample input we use discriminants of order of magnitude −106. While the running time
of classGroup is about 0.2 seconds on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi, classGroupDivisors is
about a factor 26 slower in practice.
We first recall some facts concerning class groups from Section 2.1. If an imaginary quadratic
discriminant ∆ is given, a reduced representative of an integral binary quadratic form of
discriminant ∆ is a triple (a, b, c) ∈ ZZ3, where a and c are positive integers, gcd(a, b, c) = 1,
|b| ≤ a ≤ c, and finally b > 0 if either |b| = a or a = c. The relation between ∆ and a
reduced representative (a, b, c) is given by ∆ = b2− 4ac. Considering this equation modulo 2,
we deduce b ≡ ∆ mod 2. We next state and prove some useful conditions on a, b, and c for
(a, b, c) to be a reduced representative.
Proposition 6.1.1 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant, and let (a, b, c) be a re-
duced representative of discriminant ∆. Furthermore, let B = b√|∆|/3c. Then a ≤ B and
a2 ≤ (b2 −∆)/4.
Proof: We prove the first assertion a ≤ B. Hence let (a, b, c) be a reduced representative of
discriminant ∆. Then we have |b| ≤ a ≤ b2−∆4a . As a is positive, we deduce 4a2 ≤ b2 −∆ ≤
a2−∆. This proves the first assertion. The second assertion is an obvious consequence of the
property a ≤ c = (b2 −∆)/(4a) of a reduced representative. uunionsq
In our algorithms classGroup and classGroupDivisors we make use of (b2 − ∆)/4 as an
upper bound of a2. As in Proposition 6.1.1 we set B = b√|∆|/3c in what follows.
We next explain our algorithm classGroup(∆), which is rather trivial. It requires an imag-
inary quadratic discriminant ∆ and returns an array R storing the reduced representatives
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(a, b, c) of discriminant ∆. Furthermore, it returns the class number h(∆). classGroup first
initializes b = ∆ mod 2, computes the bound B, and sets q = (b2−∆)/4; hence (1, b, q) is the
main form of discriminant ∆. In addition, the algorithm initializes the variable h holding the
current length of R; thus, when the algorithm terminates successfully, h is equal to the class
number. Next, we determine all reduced representatives of the form (a,∆ mod 2, c). Hence,
we leave b unchanged, and for all a, 2 ≤ a ≤ √q, we test whether a | q is true. If this is
not the case, we increase a by 1 and, if a2 ≤ q is also true, test for the adapted value of a
whether a | q holds. Otherwise we check if gcd(a, b, q/a) = 1. If this turns out to be false, we
turn to the next value a. Otherwise, (a, b, q/a) is a reduced representative; thus, we store it
in R and increase the counting variable h. We next decide whether (a,−b, q/a) is a further
reduced representative. We only have to check the conditions 0 6= b, b < a, and a < q/a for
the reduced representative (a, b, q/a). If all conditions hold, we also store (a,−b, q/a) in R
and again increase h. We then turn to the next value of a.
We increase a by 1 until a >
√
q. We then adapt b and q as follows: By b′ and q′ we denote
the adapted values of b and q, respectively. As we have to preserve the parity of b, we set
b′ = b + 2. If b′ > B the algorithm returns the pair (R, h) and terminates. Otherwise we
set q′ = (b′2 − ∆)/4 = q + b + 1. Finally, we identify b with b′ and q with q′. As described
above we proceed for all values a with b ≤ a ≤ √q. In Proposition 6.1.2, we prove that the
bit-complexity of classGroup is at most O(h2 log3 h).
Algorithm 6.1: classGroup(∆)
Input: An imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆.
Output: An array R storing the reduced representatives of integral binary quadratic forms of dis-
criminant ∆.
The class number h(∆).
b← ∆ mod 2; B ← b√|∆|/3c; q ← (b2 −∆)/4;
R[0]← (1, b, q); a← 2; h← 1; //h stores the current length of R
while b ≤ B do
while a ≤ √q do
if a | q AND gcd(a, b, q/a) = 1 then
R[h]← (a, b, q/a); h← h+ 1;
if b 6= 0 AND b < a AND a < q/a then
R[h]← (a,−b, q/a); h← h+ 1;
a← a+ 1;
q ← q + b+ 1; b← b+ 2; a← b;
return (R, h);
Proposition 6.1.2 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of class number h. The
bit-complexity of classGroup(∆) is at most O(h2 log3 h).
Proof: We may neglect the complexity of computing the initial values of B and q, respectively.
In all we pass O(
√|∆|) times through the outer while-loop. Obviously q = (b2 − ∆)/4 ≤
(−∆/3 − ∆)/4 = |∆|/3. Hence, for each b we pass at most O(√|∆|) times through the
inner while-loop. Thus in all we have to compute O(|∆|) greatest common divisors using
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the Euclidian algorithm of complexity at most O(log3 |∆|) (see e.g. [Coh95], p. 13). As
the division q/a is of complexity O(log2 |∆|), we may neglect this step. In addition, we do
not have to take the adaptation of q, a, and b into account. Hence, in all, the complexity
of classGroup(∆) is O(|∆| log3 |∆|). Finally, using the asymptotic formula |∆| = O(h2) of
Theorem 2.1.17, shows the assertion. uunionsq
In order to develop our algorithm classGroupDivisors, we refine algorithm classGroup as
follows. The main idea is to replace the brute-force proceeding with respect to a by only
taking divisors of the current value (b2 − ∆)/4 into account. More precisely, for fixed b we
determine all divisors a of q = (b2 − ∆)/4 with b ≤ a ≤ √q. This task is done by our
algorithm findDivisors(b, q) explained below. For each divisor a in this interval we test
whether (a, b, q/a) is a reduced representative or not.
We explain algorithm findDivisors(b, q). Input of findDivisors are non-negative integers
b and q. The algorithm returns an array D storing all divisors of q in the interval [b,
√
q]. In
addition, it returns the length of D. The proceeding of findDivisors(b, q) is quite simple.
It first computes the prime factorization of q; let
∏L
i=1 p
ei
i denote this factorization. For all
vectors (d1, . . . , dL), 0 ≤ di ≤ ei, it tests whether
∏L
i=1 p
di
i ∈ [b,
√
q]. If this is true,
∏L
i=1 p
di
i
is stored in D. Otherwise, findDivisors turns to the next divisor of q.
Algorithm 6.2: classGroupDivisors(∆)
Input: An imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆.
Output: An array R storing the reduced representatives of integral binary quadratic forms of dis-
criminant ∆.
The class number h(∆).
b← ∆ mod 2; B ← b√|∆|/3c; q ← (b2 −∆)/4;
R[0]← (1, b, q); a← 2; h← 1; //h stores the current length of R
while b ≤ B do
(D, l)← findDivisors(b, q); k ← 1;
while k ≤ l do
a← D[k − 1]; k ← k + 1;
if gcd(a, b, q/a) = 1 then
R[h]← (a, b, q/a); h← h+ 1;
if b 6= 0 AND b < a AND a < q/a then
R[h]← (a,−b, q/a); h← h+ 1;
q ← q + b+ 1; b← b+ 2;
return (R, h);
In order to determine the complexity of classGroupDivisors, we have to estimate the com-
plexity of computing the prime factorization. However, we make use of the according LiDIA-
implementation; this implementation mixes different approaches: the trial division, the Qua-
dratic Sieve, and the Elliptic Curve Method. Hence, it is not possible to get a closed formula
of the complexity of classGroupDivisors.
Instead, we compare practical running times of our algorithms. For all imaginary quadratic
discriminants ∆, −1.000.000 ≥ ∆ ≥ −2.000.000, we determine the practical running time of
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our algorithms classGroup(∆) and classGroupDivisors(∆), respectively. All timings are
measured on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi. Sample timings are given in Table 6.1. We deduce
that for discriminants in the given interval, classGroupDivisors is about 26 times slower
than classGroup. In addition, we see that the practical running time seems to depend on
the range of |∆| rather than on h.
∆ h(∆) time t1 of time t2 of t2/t1
classGroup classGroupDivisors
-1000000 200 0.18 4.70 26.1
-1025000 400 0.19 5.49 28.9
-1050000 400 0.19 5.27 27.7
-1075000 300 0.19 5.40 28.4
-1100000 600 0.21 5.56 26.5
Table 6.1: Running times of our algorithms to compute the class group of discriminant ∆.
All timings are given in seconds and are measured on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi.
Chapter 7
Efficient Computation of Class
Invariants
In this chapter we deal with the problem of how to efficiently compute the roots of a class poly-
nomial. The result of our investigation is our algorithm computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R),
which we will present in Section 7.3. As input the algorithm requires an imaginary quadratic
discriminant ∆, its class number h, and an array R storing the h reduced representatives of
discriminant ∆. computeClassInvariants returns an array I holding the h roots of a monic
polynomial with integer coefficients, which generates the ring class field L/Q(
√
∆). Hence I
stores the roots of a class polynomial. Depending on ∆ mod 24, computeClassInvariants
computes the roots of the polynomial H, G, or W, respectively; we refer to Section 2.2.3 for
details.
The underlying number-theoretical functions are the modular function j, its cube root γ2,
the Weber functions f, f1 and f2, and finally Dedekind’s η−function. Let g denote one of
these functions, and let (a, b, c) be a reduced representative stored in R. In Section 2.1 we
identified (a, b, c) with the complex number τ = (−b + i√|∆|)/(2a). The main routine of
computeClassInvariants is to evaluate g(τ). Hence, we investigate different algorithms for
this task in Section 7.2. However, our implementation computes g(τ) within a fixed floating
point precision F, that is we compute a complex number gτ such that |gτ −g(τ)| < 10−F , and
we equate g(τ) and gτ . We will explain in Chapter 9 how to choose F for a class polynomial
H, G, and W, respectively. Our algorithm getPrecision(∆), discussed in Chapter 9, returns
the according precision F.
In order to measure the efficiency of our algorithms we compare the running times of different
representations of either function in practice. It is easy to see that each function may be
represented as a Fourier series on h. Thus we first show in Section 7.1 how to efficiently
determine the Fourier coefficients of the functions involved. Next, in Section 7.2 we compare
different representations of either function g to evaluate g(τ) in practice. As far as Dedekind’s
η-function is concerned we will show that using a representation as a sum, which is due to L.
Euler, is most efficient in practice.
Furthermore, it turns out that using the η-function to represent the other functions is the
most efficient approach. A further advantage of our approach is that no precomputation
or no storage of any coefficients is needed. Finally, basing on the results of Section 7.2 we
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present our algorithm computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R) in Section 7.3. We show that its
bit-complexity is at most O(h6 log h).
7.1 Efficient Computation of Fourier Series
In this section we discuss algorithms to compute the Fourier series of the functions j, γ2, η,
and the Weber functions. These series will be used in Section 7.2 to compare running times
of different representations to evaluate these functions in practice.
7.1.1 Computing the Fourier Coefficients of the j-function
In this section we discuss an efficient algorithm to determine the Fourier series of the modular
function j. It is well known that the j-function is holomorphic on the upper complex half plane
h. Furthermore, j is invariant under the action of SL(2,ZZ) and hence periodic with period
1. Thus there is a unique Fourier series with j(τ) =
∑∞
n=−∞ cn · qn. Furthermore, as j has a
single pole at infinity we have cn = 0 for n ≤ −2 ([Cox89], Theorem 11.8, p. 225).
To compute the coefficients cn we make use of recursive formulae due to K. Mahler. Setting
0 for an empty sum we have for all n ∈ IN ([Mah76], Equation 46, p. 91):
c4n = c2n+1 +
c2n − cn
2
+
n−1∑
k=1
ckc2n−k , (7.1)
c4n+1 = c2n+3 − c2c2n +
c2n+1 − cn+1
2
+
c22n + c2n
2
(7.2)
+
n∑
k=1
ckc2n−k+2 −
2n−1∑
k=1
(−1)k−1ckc4n−k +
n−1∑
k=1
ckc4n−4k ,
c4n+2 = c2n+2 +
n∑
k=1
ckc2n−k+1 , (7.3)
c4n+3 = c2n+4 − c2c2n+1 −
c22n+1 − c2n+1
2
(7.4)
+
n+1∑
k=1
ckc2n−k+3 −
2n∑
k=1
(−1)k−1ckc4n−k+2 +
n∑
k=1
ckc4n−4k+2 .
However, to make use of the Formulae (7.1) - (7.4), we have to know the coefficients c−1, c0,
c1, c2, c3, and c5 : Obviously, for n = 1 the equations depend on c1, . . . , c3. However, (7.2)
shows c5 = c5 in this case, and we have to know c5 before using Mahler’s equations.
Thus we first determine these coefficients by evaluating the representation of j by the nor-
malized Eisenstein series E4 and E6 of weight 4 and 6, respectively. The Eisenstein series are
defined using the arithmetic function σk(n), which depends on two parameters k ∈ IN0 and
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n ∈ IN. We have the following definitions and relations ([Kob93], p. 110-112):
σk(n) =
∑
d|n,d>0
dk, k ∈ IN0, n ∈ IN, (7.5)
E4(τ) = 1 + 240 ·
∞∑
n=1
σ3(n) · qn, τ ∈ h, (7.6)
E6(τ) = 1− 504 ·
∞∑
n=1
σ5(n) · qn, τ ∈ h, (7.7)
j(τ) = 1728 · E
3
4(τ)
E34(τ)− E26(τ)
, τ ∈ h. (7.8)
We remark that the Fourier series of E4 and E6 converge locally uniformly on h; thus both
functions are holomorphic on h. Hence when performing arithmetic with the Fourier series we
do not have to care about convergence or the order of summation.
Let N ∈ IN be given. To compute c−1, c0, . . . , cN we first compute the Fourier series of
the numerator and denominator in (7.8). More precisely, we define sequences (rn)n∈IN0 and
(τn)n∈IN as Fourier coefficients of E34(τ) and (E34(τ) − E26(τ))/1728, respectively. We thank
Prof. Ko¨hler for pointing out to us this representation of the denominator. We determine rn
for 0 ≤ n ≤ N + 1. This can easily be done using Definitions (7.5) and (7.6). Furthermore,
we compute the coefficients τn for 1 ≤ n ≤ N + 2 using a formula of D. Niebur ([Nie75],
[Gou97]):
τn = n4 · σ1(n)− 24 ·
n−1∑
k=1
(35k4 − 52k3n+ 18k2n2) · σ1(k) · σ1(n− k) . (7.9)
It is well known that (E34(τ)−E26(τ))/1728 is up to a constant factor the classical discriminant
function ∆ on h ([Kob93]): ∆(τ) = (2pi)
12
1728 ·(E34(τ)−E26(τ)). As the discriminant function does
not vanish on h ([Cox89], Proposition 10.7, p. 206), (7.8) can be transformed to( ∞∑
n=−1
cn · qn
)
·
( ∞∑
n=1
τn · qn
)
=
∞∑
n=0
rn · qn . (7.10)
Thus we get a recursive formula to compute the coefficients cn−1 for 0 ≤ n ≤ N + 1 :
n∑
k=0
ck−1 · τn+1−k = rn. (7.11)
Our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfJViaEisenstein(N) gets a natural number N as
input. It returns the Fourier coefficients c−1, c0, . . . , cN of the modular function j. The
algorithm implements the relation of Equation 7.11. We remark that we make use of τ1 = 1.
Using computeCoefficientsOfJViaEisenstein(N) with N = 5 we get c−1 = 1, c0 = 744,
c1 = 196884, c2 = 21493760, c3 = 864299970, c4 = 20245856256, and c5 = 333202640600.
Finally making use of Mahler’s Equations (7.1) - (7.4) we compute the values of cn up to
n = 50000 and store them in a file of size 38.7 MByte. The running time on the Pentium III
was 9.87 hours. We list some more coefficients: c6 = 4252023300096, c7 = 44656994071935,
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Algorithm 7.1: computeCoefficientsOfJViaEisenstein(N)
Input: A natural number N.
Output: The Fourier coefficients c−1, . . . , cN of the modular function j.
Compute r0, . . . , rN+1 using the Formulae (7.5) - (7.6);
Compute τ1, . . . , τN+2 using Equation (7.9);
c−1 ← 1;
for n = 1 to N + 1 do
cn−1 ← rn −
∑n−1
k=0 ck−1 · τn+1−k;
return (c−1, . . . , cN );
c8 = 401490886656000, c9 = 3176440229784420, and c10 = 22567393309593600. In addition,
in Section A.3 of the appendix we list the coefficients cn for 49996 ≤ n ≤ 50000.
We remark that there are further efficient methods to compute the Fourier coefficients of j.
The first one is due to M. Kaneko ([Kan]), who extends work of D. Zagier. We refer to his
paper for details. The second one is due to G. Ko¨hler ([Ko¨h02]). Ko¨hler first computes the
Fourier coefficients of the function γ2 as described in Section 7.1.2. He then makes use of the
relation j = γ32 .
7.1.2 Computing the Fourier Coefficients of γ2
In this section we describe how to compute the Fourier coefficients of the function γ2. We
first derive a formula for the Fourier series. The cited arguments are well known. Let IE
denote the open unit disc in C, that is IE = {z ∈ C : |z| < 1}. Making use of the Fourier
series of j, we define a function h : IE → C as follows: h(q) := ∑∞n=0 cn−1qn. Hence we have
j(τ) = q−1 · h(q). As j, as a function of q, is meromorphic on IE with a single pole at 0, h is
holomorphic on IE. Obviously we have h(0) = 1 and h(x) ∈ IR for all x ∈ IE ∩ IR. Hence in
a neighbourhood U of q = 0 there is a holomorphic function r : U → C with r3(q) = h(q)
for all q ∈ U, r(0) = 1, and r(x) ∈ IR for all x ∈ U ∩ IR. We write ∑∞n=0 gnqn for its Laurent
expansion at 0. Thus we have j(τ) =
(
q−
1
3 · r(q)
)3
for all τ ∈ h with q ∈ U. Hence for these
values τ the function q−
1
3 · r(q) is a cube root of j that is real valued for all τ ∈ iIR with
q ∈ U. On the other hand, Equation (2.17) shows f2(τ) ∈ IR for all τ ∈ iIR∩h. Thus Equation
(2.20) yields γ2(τ) ∈ IR for these τ. However, γ2 is also a cube root of j, and γ2(τ) = q− 13 ·r(q)
follows for all τ with q ∈ U. As γ2 is holomorphic on h it follows that the Laurent expansion
of r(q) is valid on IE. Thus for τ ∈ h we have derived the formula
γ2(τ) = q−
1
3 ·
∞∑
n=0
gnq
n . (7.12)
Next we present two algorithms for computing the gn. The first one is similar to the case
of the modular function j, that is we present recursive formulae due to Mahler to compute
the Fourier coefficients gn. Second we use an approach due to Ko¨hler ([Ko¨h02]) who derives
a recursive formula for the coefficients gn using the representation γ2(τ) = E4(τ)/η8(τ). It
turns out that the second approach is much faster in practice.
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Let us turn to our first approach. Mahler takes a slightly different representation of the
Fourier series: He multiplies the term q−
1
3 into the sum and writes
γ2(τ) = q−
1
3 +
∞∑
n=0
b3n+2q
3n+2
3 . (7.13)
Hence we have g0 = 1 and gn = b3n−1 for n ≥ 1. If we set 0 for an empty sum we have for all
n ∈ IN0 ([Mah76], Equation 79, p. 115):
b12n+2 = b6n+2 +
n−1∑
k=0
b3k+2b6n−3k−1 , (7.14)
b12n+5 = b6n+5 − b2b6n+2 +
b23n+2 − b3n+2
2
+
b26n+2 + b6n+2
2
(7.15)
+
n−1∑
k=0
b3k+2b6n−3k+2 −
2n−1∑
k=0
(−1)k−1b3k+2b12n−3k+2 +
n−1∑
k=0
b3k+2b12n−12k−4 ,
b12n+8 = b6n+5 +
n−1∑
k=0
b3k+2b6n−3k+2 +
b23n+2 − b3n+2
2
, (7.16)
b12n+11 = b6n+8 − b2b6n+5 −
b26n+5 − b6n+5
2
(7.17)
+
n∑
k=0
b3k+2b6n−3k+5 −
2n∑
k=0
(−1)k−1b3k+2b12n−3k+8 +
n∑
k=0
b3k+2b12n−12k+2 .
Evaluating these equations for n = 0 we have b2 = b2, b5 = b5, b8 = b5 + (b22 − b2)/2 and
b11 = b8−b2b5−(b25−b5)/2+b2b5+b2b8+b22. Hence b2 and b5 uniquely determine all coefficients
bn. Equation (7.12) yields
j(τ) = γ32(τ) = q
−1 · (1 + 3g1q + 3(g21 + g2)q2 +O(q3)). (7.18)
Thus comparing (7.18) with the Fourier series of the j−function we get g1 = c0/3 and g2 =
c1/3− g21, hence b2 = g1 = 248 and b5 = g2 = 4124. Using gn = b3n−1 for n ≥ 3, we computed
the coefficients gn up to n = 50000. The memory to store these coefficients is 22.3 MByte.
The computation took us 5.23 hours on the Pentium III.
Now we turn to Ko¨hler’s approach. He makes use of the representation γ2(τ) = E4(τ)/η8(τ).
This representation is an easy consequence of Formula (7.8) and the well known relations
∆(τ) =
(2pi)12
1728
· (E34(τ)− E26(τ)) = (2pi)12 · η24(τ)
(see for instance [Apo90], Theorem 3.3, p. 51). Ko¨hler observes that η8(τ) may be written
as a Hecke theta series (see [Sch53], [Ser85], and [Ko¨h88]). More precisely, the function η8(τ)
may be written as a series
η8(τ) = q1/3 ·
∞∑
n=0
c8(n)qn , (7.19)
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where the coefficients c8(n) are given by
c8(n) =
∑
x∈IN,y∈IN0
x2+xy+y2=3n+1
(
x− y
3
)
· (x+ y · e2pii/6)3 . (7.20)
As usual
(
.
.
)
denotes the Jacobi symbol. Our task is to determine the coefficients gn, 0 ≤
n ≤ N, for some N ∈ IN. We assume that the coefficients c8(0), . . . , c8(N) are already known
(algorithm computeCoefficientsOfEtaTo8(N) described below computes these coefficients).
The representation γ2(τ) = E4(τ)/η8(τ) and the Fourier series in (7.12), (7.6), and (7.19) yield
∞∑
n=0
(
n∑
k=0
gkc8(n− k)
)
qn = 1 + 240 ·
∞∑
n=1
σ3(n) · qn . (7.21)
Making use of c8(0) = 1 we conclude g0 = 1 and gn = 240σ3(n)−
∑n−1
k=0 gkc8(n−k) for n ≥ 1.
It remains to explain algorithm computeCoefficientsOfEtaTo8(N), which again is due to
G. Ko¨hler ([Ko¨h02]). Input of the algorithm is some N ∈ IN, and it returns the coefficients
c8(n) for 0 ≤ n ≤ N. In order to get the coefficient c8(n) we have to find all pairs (x, y) ∈
IN× IN0 with x 6≡ y mod 3 and x2 + xy+ y2 = 3n+ 1. However, in order to avoid solving this
equation, Ko¨hler takes a different, brute-force like approach. The first observation is that for
all (x, y) ∈ IN× IN0 with x 6≡ y mod 3 we have x2 + xy + y2 ≡ 1 mod 3. Hence each such pair
yields a contribution to c8((x2 + xy+ y2 − 1)/3). Second, if (x, y) ∈ IN× IN, it is easy to that(
x− y
3
)
· (x+ y · e2pii/6)3 +
(
y − x
3
)
· (y + x · e2pii/6)3
=
(
x− y
3
)
· (2x3 + 3x2y − 3xy2 − 2y3)
=
(
x− y
3
)
· (x− y) · (2(x2 + xy + y2) + 3xy) .
Hence, if y 6= 0, it is sufficient to take pairs (x, y) with x > y into account.
Algorithm computeCoefficientsOfEtaTo8(N) proceeds as follows: For all 0 ≤ n ≤ N it
first initializes c8(n) with 0. Then, it goes through all relevant pairs (x, 0) with 1 ≤ x ≤√
3N + 1. We distinguish the cases x ≡ 1 mod 3 and x ≡ 2 mod 3 with corresponding Jacobi
symbols
(
x
3
)
equal to 1 and −1, respectively. The respective contribution ±x3 is added to
the coefficient c8((x2 − 1)/3). Next the algorithm considers all pairs (x, y) ∈ IN × IN with
x > y and x 6≡ y mod 3. We first fix y with 1 ≤ y ≤ √3N + 1. Then we pass through
all x with y < x ≤ −y/2 + √3N + 1− 3y2/4 and add the corresponding contribution to
c8((x2 + xy + y2 − 1)/3). Obviously, computeCoefficientsOfEtaTo8(N) is correct.
It turns out that this approach is much more efficient in practice than using the Mahler
formulae. For instance, the computation of the coefficients gn up to n = 50000 only takes
about an hour on the Pentium III. Some coefficients gn are listed in Table 7.1.
7.1.3 Computing the Fourier Coefficients of the η−function
In this section we present our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfEta. This algorithm com-
putes the Fourier coefficients of the η−function. However, as before, we first derive a formula
for the Fourier coefficients.
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Algorithm 7.2: computeCoefficientsOfEtaTo8(N)
Input: A natural number N.
Output: The Fourier coefficients c8(0), . . . , c8(N) of η8(τ).
for n = 0 to N do
c8(n)← 0; //initialize all coefficients c8(n) with 0
x← 1; //go through all relevant pairs (x, 0) with x ≡ 1 mod 3 and thus (x3 ) = 1
while x ≤ b√3N + 1c do
m← x2; c8((m− 1)/3)← c8((m− 1)/3) + x ·m; x← x+ 3;
x← 2; //go through all relevant pairs (x, 0) with x ≡ 2 mod 3 and hence (x3 ) = −1
while x ≤ b√3N + 1c do
m← x2; c8((m− 1)/3)← c8((m− 1)/3)− x ·m; x← x+ 3;
for y = 1 to b√3N + 1c do
for x = y + 1 to b−y/2 +√3N + 1− 3y2/4c do
if x 6≡ y mod 3 then
m← x2 + xy + y2;
c8((m− 1)/3)← c8((m− 1)/3) +
(
x−y
3
) · (x− y) · (2m+ 3xy);
return (c8(0), . . . , c8(N));
g0 1 g11 1749556736 g22 24551042107480
g1 248 g12 4848776870 g23 51301080086528
g2 4124 g13 12908659008 g24 105561758786885
g3 34752 g14 33161242504 g25 214100032685072
g4 213126 g15 82505707520 g26 428374478862400
g5 1057504 g16 199429765972 g27 846173187465216
g6 4530744 g17 469556091240 g28 1651298967150546
g7 17333248 g18 1079330385764 g29 3185652564830016
g8 60655377 g19 2426800117504 g30 6078963644150128
g9 197230000 g20 5346409013164 g31 11480231806541824
g10 603096260 g21 11558035326944 g32 21467177880529689
Table 7.1: Some Fourier coefficients of the function γ2
88 Efficient Computation of Class Invariants
The main result we make use of is due to Euler. It states
η(τ) = q
1
24
∑
n∈ZZ
(−1)nq 3n
2+n
2 . (7.22)
Multiplying q
1
24 into the sum and using some properties of the Jacobi symbol
(
.
.
)
, we get
η(τ) =
∑
n∈ZZ
(−1)nq (6n+1)
2
24 (7.23)
=
∞∑
n=1
(
12
n
)
q
n2
24 (7.24)
(we thank Prof. Ko¨hler for pointing out to us this relation). Equation (7.22) shows that we
can define a sequence (en)n∈IN0 by η(τ) = q
1
24
∑∞
n=0 enq
n. We prove the following result:
Proposition 7.1.1 Let en be as defined above. Then we have for all n ∈ IN0
en =
{
0, if 24n+ 1 is not a square in ZZ,(
12√
24n+1
)
, if 24n+ 1 is a square in ZZ.
Proof: Equation (7.24) and the definition of the en yield
∑∞
m=1
(
12
m
)
q
m2
24 =
∑∞
n=0 enq
24n+1
24 .
Comparing the coefficients, we get en =
(
12√
24n+1
)
, if m2 = 24n+1, and en = 0 otherwise. uunionsq
Proposition 7.1.1 shows that we have en ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Furthermore, as the exponents in (7.22)
grow quadratically coefficients en 6= 0 are rather sparse. In order to compute the coefficients
en, we make use of Equation (7.23). Thus we can avoid the computation of square roots and
Jacobi symbols.
We turn to our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfEta(N). Again we thank Prof. Ko¨hler for
helpful comments. The algorithm gets N ∈ IN as input and returns the coefficients e0, . . . , eN .
The idea is simply to initialize all en with 0 and assign ±1 to the appropriate coefficients.
The algorithm first computes the coefficients en 6= 0 for positive n in Equation (7.24). In
our algorithm, we set i(k) = (6k + 1)2. Thus we have e(i−1)/24 = (−1)k. In addition, we
remark that i(k+ 1)− i(k) = 72k+ 48. Let b = b(√24N + 1− 1)/6c. We have to compute the
coefficients e(i−1)/24 for all k with 0 ≤ k ≤ b. As we compute two coefficients en in one cycle,
we have to distinguish the cases of even and odd b, respectively. Then, the algorithm computes
the coefficients en for negative n in Equation (7.23). In this case we set i(k) = (6k − 1)2.
Thus we have i(k+ 1)− i(k) = 72k+ 24. Again, we have to distinguish the cases of even and
odd b, respectively.
A sample running of computeCoefficientsOfEta(N) with N = 5.000.000 took us 0.36 sec-
onds on the Pentium III. The memory to store these coefficients is 9.54 MByte. The first
coefficients en can be found in Table 7.2.
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Algorithm 7.3: computeCoefficientsOfEta(N)
Input: A natural number N.
Output: The coefficients e0, . . . , eN of the η−function.
for n = 0 to N do
en ← 0;
b← b(√24N + 1− 1)/6c; be ← false;
if 2 | b then
b← b− 1; be ← true;
k ← 0; i← 1; //we have i = (6k + 1)2
while k < b do
e(i−1)/24 ← 1; i← i+ 72k + 48; k ← k + 1;
e(i−1)/24 ← −1; i← i+ 72k + 48; k ← k + 1;
if be = true then
e(i−1)/24 ← 1;
b← b(√24N + 1 + 1)/6c; be ← true;
if 2 - b then
b← b− 1; be ← false;
k ← 1; i← 25; //we have i = (6k − 1)2
while k < b do
e(i−1)/24 ← −1; i← i+ 72k + 24; k ← k + 1;
e(i−1)/24 ← 1; i← i+ 72k + 24; k ← k + 1;
if be = false then
e(i−1)/24 ← −1;
return (e0, . . . , eN );
e0 1 e11 0 e22 1 e33 0 e44 0 e55 0
e1 -1 e12 -1 e23 0 e34 0 e45 0 e56 0
e2 -1 e13 0 e24 0 e35 -1 e46 0 e57 1
e3 0 e14 0 e25 0 e36 0 e47 0 e58 0
e4 0 e15 -1 e26 1 e37 0 e48 0 e59 0
e5 1 e16 0 e27 0 e38 0 e49 0 e60 0
e6 0 e17 0 e28 0 e39 0 e50 0 e61 0
e7 1 e18 0 e29 0 e40 -1 e51 1 e62 0
e8 0 e19 0 e30 0 e41 0 e52 0 e63 0
e9 0 e20 0 e31 0 e42 0 e53 0 e64 0
e10 0 e21 0 e32 0 e43 0 e54 0 e65 0
Table 7.2: Some Fourier coefficients en of the η−function
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7.1.4 Computing the Fourier Coefficients of the Weber function f2
In this section we show how to efficiently compute the Fourier coefficients of the Weber
function f2. Then, in Section 7.1.5 we use well known formulae connecting the functions f2, f1
and f to compute the Fourier coefficients of f1 and f. However, let us first turn to the function
f2.
The main task in computing the coefficients of the Fourier series of f2 is to determine the
representation of the infinite product in (2.17) by a power series in q. Obviously the product
in (2.17) can uniquely be written as a Fourier series
∑∞
n=0 f2,nq
n. An easy calculation shows
that for n ≥ 0 we have
f2,n = #{(a1, ..., al) ∈ INl0 : l > 0, a1 < a2 < ... < al,
l∑
j=1
aj = n}. (7.25)
However, our tests indicate that (7.25) is infeasible to compute f2,n for n > 140 in practice.
Instead, we make use of the Fourier series of the η−function from Section 7.1.3. Using
(2.14) and (2.17) one easily sees f2(τ) =
√
2 · η(2τ)η(τ) . In Section 7.1.3 we derived the formula
η(τ) = q
1
24
∑∞
n=0 enq
n. As the η-function does not vanish on h we use the Fourier series of f2
and η to get
∞∑
n=0
enq
2n =
∞∑
n=0
f2,nq
n ·
∞∑
n=0
enq
n
=
∞∑
n=0
(
n∑
k=0
f2,ken−k
)
· qn. (7.26)
Hence, making use of e0 = 1, Equation (7.26) yields for n ∈ IN0
f2,n =
{
−∑n−1k=0 f2,ken−k, if 2 - n,
en
2
−∑n−1k=0 f2,ken−k, if 2 | n.
Our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfF2(N, (e0, ..., eN )) gets a natural number N and the
first N+1 Fourier coefficients of the η-function as input; the algorithm returns the coefficients
f2,0, . . . , f2,N .
According to our experience this is the most efficient way in practice to compute the Fourier
coefficients of f2. As in the case of the j- and the γ2-function we determined all coefficients
f2,n up to n = 50000 using computeCoefficientsOfF2, which took us 22 minutes on the
Pentium III. The necessary amount of storage is 5.48 MByte. In Table 7.3 we list the first
coefficients f2,n.
We remark an alternative approach to determine the coefficients f2,n. Fix a natural number
N. Obviously f2,N is the coefficient of XN of the polynomial
∏N
k=1(1 + X
k). However, for
example to get the coefficient f2,1700 the polynomial is of degree 1445850. The CPU time to
get the coefficients f2,n up to N = 1700 was 305.7 hours on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi.
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Algorithm 7.4: computeCoefficientsOfF2(N, (e0, ..., eN ))
Input: An upper bound N ∈ IN.
The Fourier coefficients e0, . . . , eN of the η−function.
Output: The coefficients f2,n for 0 ≤ n ≤ N.
f2,0 ← 1;
for n = 1 to N do
if 2 | n then
f2,n ← en2 −
∑n−1
k=0 f2,ken−k;
else
f2,n ← −
∑n−1
k=0 f2,ken−k;
return (f2,0, . . . , f2,N );
f2,0 1 f2,11 12 f2,22 89 f2,33 448 f2,44 1816 f2,55 6378
f2,1 1 f2,12 15 f2,23 104 f2,34 512 f2,45 2048 f2,56 7108
f2,2 1 f2,13 18 f2,24 122 f2,35 585 f2,46 2304 f2,57 7917
f2,3 2 f2,14 22 f2,25 142 f2,36 668 f2,47 2590 f2,58 8808
f2,4 2 f2,15 27 f2,26 165 f2,37 760 f2,48 2910 f2,59 9792
f2,5 3 f2,16 32 f2,27 192 f2,38 864 f2,49 3264 f2,60 10880
f2,6 4 f2,17 38 f2,28 222 f2,39 982 f2,50 3658 f2,61 12076
f2,7 5 f2,18 46 f2,29 256 f2,40 1113 f2,51 4097 f2,62 13394
f2,8 6 f2,19 54 f2,30 296 f2,41 1260 f2,52 4582 f2,63 14848
f2,9 8 f2,20 64 f2,31 340 f2,42 1426 f2,53 5120 f2,64 16444
f2,10 10 f2,21 76 f2,32 390 f2,43 1610 f2,54 5718 f2,65 18200
Table 7.3: Some Fourier coefficients f2,n of the Weber function f2
92 Efficient Computation of Class Invariants
7.1.5 Computing the Fourier Series of the Weber functions f1 and f
We describe algorithms to compute the Fourier coefficients of the Weber functions f1 and f, re-
spectively. It turns out that up to sign the coefficients of both Fourier series are equal. Hence,
we will only present our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfF1 to determine the Fourier co-
efficients of f1. In order to describe algorithm computeCoefficientsOfF1, we first derive a
formula which links the Fourier coefficients of f2 and f1.
Thus let us turn to the Weber function f1. As in the case of f2, we have to represent the
infinite product in (2.16) by a power series in q. Again the infinite product is holomorphic
and periodic on h; however, as a function of τ its period is 2. Thus the product can be written
uniquely as a Fourier series
∑∞
n=−∞ f1,nq
n/2. Furthermore, Equation (2.16) shows f1,n = 0
for all n < 0. We next derive a formula, which will link the Fourier series of f and f1.
Proposition 7.1.2 For n ≥ 0 the coefficients f1,n satisfy
f1,n = (−1)n ·#{(a1, ..., al) ∈ INl : l > 0, a1 < a2 < ... < al,
l∑
j=1
(2aj − 1) = n}. (7.27)
Proof: We have
∏∞
n=1(1− qn−
1
2 ) =
∏∞
n=1(1− q
2n−1
2 ) =
∑∞
n=0 f1,n · q
n
2 . Fix n ∈ IN0. We want
to determine the coefficient f1,n. By a contribution to f1,n we mean a sequence of powers
q(2ai−1)/2, such that all ai are positive, distinct, and the product of all these powers equals
q
n
2 . The length of a contribution is the number of q-powers in the sequence. The product of
the coefficients of a contribution equals +1, if and only if its length is even, and -1 otherwise.
However, if n is even, the length of a contribution has to be even, too, and odd otherwise.
This proves the proposition. uunionsq
As in the case of the Weber function f2 we were not able to determine f1,n for n > 140 in
reasonable time using Proposition 7.1.2. Thus we make use of the following formula connecting
f1 and f2 ([Cox89], p. 256):
f1(τ) · f2
(τ
2
)
=
√
2 . (7.28)
We make use of Equation (2.16), (2.17), and (7.28) to get( ∞∑
n=0
f1,nq
n
2
)
·
( ∞∑
n=0
f2,nq
n
2
)
= 1. (7.29)
Both q-expansions converge locally uniformly on h. Thus their product series converges locally
uniformly, too, and the order of summation does not matter. Furthermore, both sides of (7.29)
are holomorphic and periodic functions with period 2 on h. Comparing their Fourier series
we get
f1,0 · f2,0 = 1, (7.30)
n∑
j=0
f1,n−j · f2,j = 0, 1 ≤ n. (7.31)
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Thus knowing the coefficients f2,0 = 1, . . . , f2,N we get a recursive formula to compute
f1,0, . . . , f1,N :
f1,0 = 1, (7.32)
f1,n = −
n∑
j=1
f1,n−j · f2,j , 1 ≤ n. (7.33)
Our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfF1(N, (f2,0, ..., f2,N )) gets a natural number N and
an array (f2,0, ..., f2,N ) consisting of the Fourier coefficients f2,n as input. The algorithm
returns an array (f1,0, ..., f1,N ) of length N + 1 storing the coefficients f1,n.
Algorithm 7.5: computeCoefficientsOfF1(N, (f2,0, ..., f2,N ))
Input: An upper bound N ∈ IN.
An array (f2,0, ..., f2,N ) storing the Fourier coefficients of f2.
Output: An array (f1,0, ..., f1,N ) storing the Fourier coefficients of f1.
f1,0 ← 1;
for n = 1 to N do
f1,n ← −
∑n
j=1 f1,n−j · f2,j ;
return (f1,0, ..., f1,N );
For N = 50000 our algorithm computeCoefficientsOfF1 terminates after about 76 minutes
on the Pentium III. The amount of storage of the coefficients f1,0, ..., f1,50000 is 3.87 MByte.
Table 7.4 lists some coefficients f1,n.
f1,0 1 f1,11 -2 f1,22 8 f1,33 -25 f1,44 63 f1,55 -144
f1,1 -1 f1,12 3 f1,23 -9 f1,34 26 f1,45 -68 f1,56 157
f1,2 0 f1,13 -3 f1,24 11 f1,35 -29 f1,46 72 f1,57 -168
f1,3 -1 f1,14 3 f1,25 -12 f1,36 33 f1,47 -78 f1,58 178
f1,4 1 f1,15 -4 f1,26 12 f1,37 -35 f1,48 87 f1,59 -192
f1,5 -1 f1,16 5 f1,27 -14 f1,38 37 f1,49 -93 f1,60 209
f1,6 1 f1,17 -5 f1,28 16 f1,39 -41 f1,50 98 f1,61 -223
f1,7 -1 f1,18 5 f1,29 -17 f1,40 46 f1,51 -107 f1,62 236
f1,8 2 f1,19 -6 f1,30 18 f1,41 -49 f1,52 117 f1,63 -255
f1,9 -2 f1,20 7 f1,31 -20 f1,42 52 f1,53 -125 f1,64 276
f1,10 2 f1,21 -8 f1,32 23 f1,43 -57 f1,54 133 f1,65 -294
Table 7.4: Some Fourier coefficients f1,n of the weber function f1
Finally, we turn to the Fourier coefficients of the Weber function f. Again, as in the case of
the Weber functions f1 and f2, the infinite product in Equation (2.15) can be written uniquely
as a Fourier series
∑∞
n=0 fnq
n
2 . We first give a formula for fn, which is up to sign the same as
for f1,n.
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Proposition 7.1.3 For n ≥ 0 the coefficients fn satisfy
fn = #{(a1, ..., al) ∈ INl : l > 0, a1 < a2 < ... < al,
l∑
j=1
(2aj − 1) = n}. (7.34)
Proof: The proof is the same as in the case of f1 except for the fact that any contribution to
fn yields a value +1. uunionsq
Proposition 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 show the relationship fn = (−1)n · f1,n for all n ∈ ZZ. Thus for
given n knowing fn is equivalent to knowing f1,n.
7.2 Computation of Class Invariants Using Different Repre-
sentations
This section deals with comparing alternative methods to compute class invariants. More
precisely, let an imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ and a reduced representative Q ∈ C(∆)
be given. Furthermore, fix a floating point precision F and a number-theoretical function
g ∈ {f, f1, f2, γ2, j}. We show that in practice the computation of g(τQ) within the precision
F using an efficient representation of the η-function is by far the most efficient alternative.
Furthermore, we present running times for all alternatives we make use of.
In order to avoid mentioning the floating precision F all the time, we simply say that we
compute g(τQ). However, as we have to implement our algorithms, we always mean that we
compute g(τQ) within the precision F.
The formulae and relations of the functions involved make the following proceeding plausible:
As the functions j, γ2, and the Weber functions may be expressed in terms of Dedekind’s η-
function, we first compare in Section 7.2.1 three different approaches to determine the value
η(τQ). We show that the representation of η by its Euler sum (7.22) is the most efficient way
in practice to compute η(τQ). Next, in Section 7.2.2, we explore alternatives of computing
f2(τQ) by its product formula (2.17), its Fourier series from Section 7.1.4, and finally by the
term f2(τQ) =
√
2η(2τQ)η(τQ) ; in the last expression we make use of our results on the η-function.
The result of Section 7.2.2 is that the last representation is most efficient one to evaluate
f2(τQ) in practice. Similarly, we deal in Section 7.2.3 with f1 and in Section 7.2.4 with f,
respectively. Again, a representation of f1 and f using the η-function turns out to be superior,
respectively.
Finally, in Section 7.2.5 we discuss the computation of γ2(τQ) and j(τQ), respectively. The
result of Section 7.2.5 is that using the Weber function f2 is in practice the most efficient
alternative to compute γ2(τQ) using Equation (2.20). Thus as j = γ32 the same is true for the
modular function j.
7.2.1 Efficient Computation of the η-function
In this section we compare different representations of Dedekind’s η-function to compute the
value η(τ) in practice, if τ ∈ h is given. From Section 7.1.3 we know three different ways to
represent η(τ) :
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• First, we make use of the product formula q 124 ·∏∞n=1(1−qn), that is we use the defining
Equation (2.14).
• Second, we compute η(τ) by evaluating its Fourier series q 124 ∑∞n=0 enqn from Section
7.1.3.
• Finally, we use the Euler sum q 124 ∑n∈ZZ(−1)nq 3n2+n2 from Equation (7.22).
The corresponding algorithms are computeEtaViaProduct, computeEtaViaFourierSeries,
and computeEtaViaEulerSum, respectively. We show that computeEtaViaEulerSum turns
out to be the most efficient way in practice to compute η(τ) within a given floating point
precision F.
Input of all three algorithms is a complex number τ in the upper complex half plane h.
In addition, the algorithms require a floating point precision F. Each algorithm returns the
value η(τ) within the precision F, that is either algorithm returns a complex number ητ with
|ητ − η(τ)| < 10−F .
We first describe our algorithm computeEtaViaProduct(τ, F ). It is a straightforward con-
sequence of the defining equation (2.14) of the η-function. Given τ and F, the algorithm
first computes q = e2piiτ within the precision F. For n ∈ IN we use the variable qn to store
the power qn, that is we have qn = qn. In addition, throughout the algorithm we store the
current value of
∏N
n=1(1− qn) in η; thus η stores the current approximation of η(τ)/q
1
24 . As
the convergence behavior of this product is not obvious, we introduce an array ηl of length
5 to store the five previous values of η. More precisely, if N ≥ 6 and η = ∏Nn=1(1 − qn), we
have ηl[k] =
∏N−5+k
n=1 (1 − qn) for 0 ≤ k ≤ 4. We are convinced that η is the correct value
of η(τ)/q
1
24 if |η − ηl[k]| < 10−F for all 0 ≤ k ≤ 4. We introduce a boolean ηb to check this
condition. The practical performance of computeEtaViaProduct for some sample input may
be found in Figure 7.1 and Table 7.5, respectively.
We next discuss our second algorithm computeEtaViaFourierSeries(τ, F ). This algorithm
makes use of the Fourier series of the η-function; this series was introduced in Section 7.1.3.
To sum up we showed that η(τ) = q
1
24
∑∞
n=0 enq
n with en ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. In addition, we stated
that this series is sparse, that is coefficients with en 6= 0 are rare. We assume that sufficiently
many coefficients are to our disposal; for instance, we make use of e0, . . . , e5000000.
As above the algorithm first computes q = e2piiτ within the precision F, and again we set
qn = qn for n ∈ IN0. Furthermore, we store the current value of
∑N
n=0 enq
n in η. Now let
n ∈ IN0 with en 6= 0. As the series is rather sparse, we store the value of n in l. In order to
avoid subsequent multiplications by q, we increase n by 1 until en 6= 0. Then we compute the
current value qn by multiplying ql with qn−l; furthermore, we compute the new value of η. As
the Fourier series is sparse we are convinced to have the right result within the precision F
if |qn| < 10−F . The proceeding of computeEtaViaFourierSeries is now obvious. Again the
practical performance of it for some sample input may be found in Figure 7.1 and Table 7.5,
respectively.
In our application we have τ = τQ with some reduced representative Q = (a, b, c) of discrimi-
nant ∆. From τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a and a ≤
√|∆|/3 it is easy to see that |q| ≤ e−pi√3. Hence as we
know en up to e5000000, our algorithm computeEtaViaFourierSeries terminates successfully
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Algorithm 7.6: computeEtaViaProduct(τ, F )
Input: A complex number τ ∈ h.
A natural number F serving as floating point precision.
Output: The value η(τ) within the floating precision F.
q ← e2piiτ ; qn ← q; //qn stores the current value qn
η ← 1; //η stores the current approximation of η(τ)/q 124
for k = 0 to 4 do
η ← η · (1− qn); qn ← qn · q;
ηl[k]← η; //ηl stores the previous values of η
while true do
η ← η · (1− qn); qn ← qn · q; ηb ← true;
for k = 0 to 4 do
if |η − ηl[k]| > 10−F then
ηb ← false; break;
if ηb = true then
return( q
1
24 · η );
for k = 1 to 4 do
ηl[k − 1]← ηl[k];
ηl[4]← η;
for all F with F ≤ 5000000·pi
√
3
log 10 = 11815846. However, this floating point precision is too large
to be of practical relevance.
Finally, we explain our third algorithm computeEtaViaEulerSum(τ, F ). This algorithm uses
the Euler sum of Equation (7.22) to represent the η-function. The Euler sum may be written
as follows, too:
q
1
24
∑
n∈ZZ
(−1)nq 3n
2+n
2 = q
1
24
(
1 +
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n(q 3n
2−n
2 + q
3n2+n
2 )
)
. (7.35)
The basic idea of computeEtaViaEulerSum is to split the sum of the right side of (7.35) in
two partial sums. We introduce new counting variables n− and n+ for either partial sum. In
addition we set N−(n−) =
3n2−−n−
2 and N+(n+) =
3n2++n+
2 , respectively. Thus N− and N+
are the exponents of q in either partial sum, respectively. The difference of two exponents is
N−(n− + 1) −N−(n−) = 3n− + 1 and N+(n+ + 1) −N+(n+) = 3n+ + 2, respectively. It is
easy to see that we always have N− 6= N+.
In computeEtaViaEulerSum we store the current approximation of η(τ)/q
1
24 in the variable
η, that is
η = 1 +
n−−1∑
n=1
(−1)nq 3n
2−n
2 +
n+−1∑
n=1
(−1)nq 3n
2+n
2 . (7.36)
In addition, we take care that in (7.36) the exponents N− and N+ are adjacent, that is we
ensure either N−(n− − 1) < N+(n+) or N+(n+ − 1) < N−(n−).
We first initialize n− = 2 and n+ = 2 and hence N− = 5 and N+ = 7. Furthermore, we
initialize η = 1−q−q2. In addition, we introduce a variable l which holds the previously used
exponent of q; thus we have to initialize l = 2. Next, in the while-loop we use an integer s to
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Algorithm 7.7: computeEtaViaFourierSeries(τ, F )
Input: A complex number τ ∈ h.
A natural number F serving as floating point precision.
Output: The value η(τ) within the floating precision F.
q ← e2piiτ ; qn ← 1; // qn stores the current value qn
η ← e0; η stores the current approximation of η(τ)/q 124
n← 1;
while true do
l← n− 1;
while en = 0 do
n← n+ 1;
qn ← qn · qn−l;
η ← η + en · qn;
if |qn| < 10−F then
return( q
1
24 · η );
n← n+ 1;
keep track of the sign of qn; we first set s = 1. Now, let m denote the minimum of {N−, N+}.
The algorithm passes through the corresponding assignments. In either loop we compute
qm = ql · qm−l. If m is odd, the sign of qm is −1; thus we set s = −1. Then we adapt either
the value of N− or N+. Finally, we compute the new value of η. Again, as the Euler sum is
sparse we are convinced to have the correct result if |qn| < 10−F . Again running times of this
algorithm are given in Figure 7.1 and in Table 7.5.
We next discuss the practical performance of our three algorithms. We only test the perfor-
mance in the context of our generating algorithm cryptoCurve. Thus let ∆ be a fundamental
discriminant of class number h. In addition, let Q = (a, b, c) be a reduced representative of
discriminant ∆. As usual we set τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a and q = e
2piiτQ . Obviously |q| = e−pi
√
|∆/a;
thus the running time to compute the value η(τQ) mainly depends on a. This fact was already
stated in Section 2.2.3.
In Figure 7.1 we plot the running time of either algorithm as a function of a, where a is
the first entry of a reduced representative (a, b, c) of discriminant ∆ = −21311. We remark
that ∆ is the maximal fundamental discriminant of class number 200. In our computation
we use the precision F = 2163, which comes from Formula (2.23). Figure 7.1 indicates that
computeEtaViaEulerSum(τQ, F ) is the most efficient of our algorithms to compute η(τQ) for a
high precision F, i.e. F ≥ 2000. In addition, the run time benefit of computeEtaViaEulerSum
seems to become more definitely with growing a, hence with growing |q|, which is the impor-
tant case for computing ring class polynomials. However, we tested our algorithms for low
precisions and got similar results.
In addition, we tested our algorithms for various imaginary quadratic discriminants. We
present some of the practical data in Table 7.5. The result is the same as in the case ∆ =
−21311. Hence, it affirms our claims. All discriminants in Table 7.5 are maximal for a given
class number.
In the context of algorithm cryptoCurve we have to compute the values η(τQ) where Q =
(a, b, c) is a reduced representative of discriminant ∆ with b ≥ 0. The reason is that if g(τQ)
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Algorithm 7.8: computeEtaViaEulerSum(τ, F )
Input: A complex number τ ∈ h.
A natural number F serving as floating point precision.
Output: The value η(τ) within the floating point precision F.
1: n− ← 2; n+ ← 2;
2: N− ← 5; N+ ← 7; //to store the exponents of the partial sums
3: l← 2; //to store the previous exponent
4: q ← e2piiτ ; qn ← q2; //qn stores the current value qn
5: η ← 1− q − qn; //η stores the current approximation of η(τ)/q 124
6: while true do
7: s← 1; //s stores the sign
8: if N− < N+ then
9: qn ← qn · qN−−l;
10: if 2 - n− then
11: s← −1;
12: l← N−;
13: N− ← N− + 3n− + 1; n− ← n− + 1;
14: else
15: qn ← qn · qN+−l;
16: if 2 - n+ then
17: s← −1;
18: l← N+;
19: N+ ← N+ + 3n+ + 2; n+ ← n+ + 1;
20: η ← η + s · qn;
21: if |qn| < 10−F then
22: return( q
1
24 · η );
is a class invariant, g(τ−Q) = g(τQ) is a class invariant, too. In all, there are hp(∆) such
reduced representatives. Thus in Table 7.5 we list the accumulated running time to compute
η(τQ) for all hp(∆) reduced representatives with b ≥ 0.
7.2.2 Efficient Computation of the Weber function f2
In this section we compare different representations of the Weber function f2 to compute the
value f2(τ) in practice, if τ ∈ h is given. We use three alternatives to represent f2(τ) :
• First, we make use of the defining equation (2.17), that is f2(τ) =
√
2q
1
24
∏∞
n=1(1 + q
n).
• Second, we compute f2(τ) by evaluating its Fourier series
√
2q
1
24
∑∞
n=0 f2,nq
n from Sec-
tion 7.1.4.
• Finally, we use the relation f2(τ) =
√
2 · η(2τ)η(τ) ([Cox89], Equation (12.14), p. 256).
The corresponding algorithms are computeF2ViaProduct, computeF2ViaFourierSeries, and
computeF2ViaEta, respectively. It turns out that using computeF2ViaEta is the most efficient
approach in practice. In addition, we show that the running times of computeF2ViaEta and
computeEtaViaEulerSum are approximately the same.
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Figure 7.1: Running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three alternatives to compute
η(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(−21311). We use the precision F = 2163.
∆ h(∆) hp(∆) F te in s tf in s tp in s te/tf te/tp tf/tp
-21311 200 101 2163 276.53 525.96 875.17 0.525762 0.315972 0.600980
-30551 250 126 2776 539.09 1082.06 1830.59 0.498207 0.294489 0.591099
-34271 300 151 3206 858.73 1807.50 3072.44 0.475092 0.279494 0.588294
-47759 350 176 3883 1656.29 3723.35 6442.08 0.444838 0.257104 0.577973
-67031 400 201 4698 2711.40 6404.25 11114.49 0.423375 0.243951 0.576207
-75599 450 226 5193 3549.77 8600.98 14971.23 0.412716 0.237106 0.574500
-96599 500 251 5971 5226.91 13056.94 22763.12 0.400316 0.229621 0.573600
Table 7.5: Total running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three algorithms to
compute all values η(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆) with b ≥ 0. te denotes the running time of
computeEtaViaEulerSum, tf the running time of computeEtaViaFourierSeries, and tp the
running time of computeEtaViaProduct, respectively.
As in the previous section, the input of either algorithm is a complex number τ ∈ h and a
floating point precision F. Each algorithm returns the value f2(τ) within the precision F, that
is either algorithm returns a complex number f2,τ with |f2,τ − f2(τ)| < 10−F .
We first turn to our algorithm computeF2ViaProduct(τ, F ). It is a straightforward conse-
quence of the defining equation (2.17) of the Weber function f2. In addition, as the infinite
product in (2.17) is up to sign of qn the same as in the defining equation (2.14) of Dedekind’s
η-function, computeF2ViaProduct is very similar to algorithm computeEtaViaProduct; this
algorithm was explained in Section 7.2.1. Thus we skip a detailed description and listing of
computeF2ViaProduct.
Next, we describe algorithm computeF2ViaFourierSeries. However, again this algorithm
is very similar to algorithm computeEtaViaFourierSeries. Thus we leave out a further
description of this algorithm, too.
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Finally, we explain computeF2ViaEta. This algorithm bases on computeEtaViaEulerSum.
computeF2ViaEta makes use of the relation f2(τQ) =
√
2η(2τQ)η(τQ) . The main observation is
that we can compute the numerator and denominator of this fraction simultaneously; this
is an obvious consequence of q(2τ) = q2. We get algorithm computeF2ViaEta(τ, F ) from
computeEtaViaEulerSum(τ, F ) if we change the following lines (η2 stores the current approx-
imation of η(2τ)/q
1
12 ):
Line computeEtaViaEulerSum computeF2ViaEta
5 η ← 1− q − qn; η ← 1− q − qn; η2 ← 1− q2 − q2n;
20 η ← η + s · qn; η ← η + s · qn; η2 ← η2 + s · q2n;
22 return( q
1
24 · η ); return( √2q 124 · η2η );
Obviously computeF2ViaEta returns the value f2(τ) within the precision F. We next discuss
the practical performance of our three algorithms. As in the previous section we only test
the performance in the context of our main algorithm cryptoCurve. Hence we only present
running times of our algorithms for input of the form (τQ, F ), where as usual τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a
for a reduced representative Q = (a, b, c) of fundamental discriminant ∆.
Again, we first compare the running times of our three algorithms of this section for the
reduced representatives of C(−21311); the running times of either algorithm is plotted in
Figure 7.2 as a function of a. Again we use the floating point precision F = 2163 in our
computation; this precision comes from Formula (2.23). It is obvious from Figure 7.2 that
the running times of either algorithm of this section is approximately the same as the running
time of the corresponding algorithm of Section 7.2.1 to compute η(τQ).
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Figure 7.2: Running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three alternatives to compute
f2(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(−21311). We use the precision F = 2163.
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Furthermore, Figure 7.2 indicates that computeF2ViaEta(τ, F ) is the most efficient of our
algorithms to compute f2(τQ) for high precision F, i.e. F ≥ 2000. However, corresponding to
our experiments the same holds for low precisions. In addition, as in the case of Dedekind’s
η-function, the run time benefit of computeF2ViaEta seems to become more definitely with
growing a.
In addition, we tested our algorithms of this section for various further imaginary quadratic
discriminants. Some of the practical data is given in Table 7.6. The result of the further
discriminants is the same as in the case ∆ = −21311. Hence, again the additional data
affirms our claims. All discriminants in Table 7.6 are maximal for a given class number.
∆ h(∆) hp(∆) F tη in s tf in s tp in s te/tf te/tp tf/tp
-21311 200 101 2163 276.75 497.26 819.63 0.556549 0.337652 0.606688
-30551 250 126 2776 570.48 1090.39 1823.69 0.523188 0.312816 0.597903
-34271 300 151 3206 893.68 1784.12 2994.91 0.500908 0.298399 0.595711
-47759 350 176 3883 1743.68 3723.75 6387.12 0.468259 0.272999 0.583009
-67031 400 201 4698 2876.84 6455.77 11110.81 0.445623 0.258922 0.581035
-75599 450 226 5193 3751.35 8644.82 14928.11 0.433941 0.251294 0.579096
-96599 500 251 5971 5488.81 13046.69 22581.76 0.420705 0.243063 0.577753
Table 7.6: Total running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three algorithms to
compute all values f2(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆) with b ≥ 0. tη denotes the running time of
computeF2ViaEta, tf the running time of computeF2ViaFourierSeries, and tp the running
time of computeF2ViaProduct.
7.2.3 Efficient Computation of the Weber function f1
In this section we compare different representations of the Weber function f1 to compute the
value f1(τ) in practice. We implement the following three representations of f1(τ) :
• First, we make use of the defining equation (2.16), that is f1(τ) = q− 148
∏∞
n=1(1−qn−
1
2 ).
• Second, we compute f1(τ) by evaluating its Fourier series q− 148
∑∞
n=0 f1,nq
n/2 from Sec-
tion 7.1.5.
• Finally, we use the well-known relation f1(τ) = η(τ/2)η(τ) ([Cox89], Equation (12.14),
p. 256).
The corresponding algorithms are computeF1ViaProduct, computeF1ViaFourierSeries, and
computeF1ViaEta, respectively. We show that using computeF1ViaEta is the most effi-
cient approach in practice. In addition, we show that computeF2ViaEta(τ, F ) is faster than
computeF1ViaEta(τ, F ).
As in the previous sections, the input of either algorithm is a complex number τ ∈ h and a
floating point precision F. Each algorithm returns the value f1(τ) within the precision F, that
is either algorithm returns a complex number f1,τ with |f1,τ − f1(τ)| < 10−F .
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The algorithms computeF1ViaProduct(τ, F ) and computeF1ViaFourierSeries(τ, F ) are
analogous to the algorithms to compute η(τ) and f2(τ), respectively. Hence they are straight-
forward, and their implementation is obvious. Thus we leave out a detailed description.
However, we explain computeF1ViaEta in detail. As mentioned above it makes use of the
relation
f1(τ) =
η( τ2 )
η(τ)
= q−
1
48 · 1 +
∑∞
n=1(−1)n(q
3n2−n
4 + q
3n2+n
4 )
1 +
∑∞
n=1(−1)n(q
3n2−n
2 + q
3n2+n
2 )
. (7.37)
It is obvious from Equation (7.37) that the q-powers of the denominator are the squares of the
q-powers of the numerator, respectively. Hence we can compute numerator and denominator
of Equation (7.37) simultaneously.
Our algorithm computeF1ViaEta mainly bases on algorithm computeEtaViaEulerSum. How-
ever, we make use of a variable q1/2 = epiiτ ; the reason is that in the numerator of Equation
(7.37) we have to know powers of qn/2. Furthermore, we introduce a variable η1/2 which stores
the current approximation of η(τ/2)/e
piiτ
24 . The further implementation of computeF1ViaEta
is the same as of computeEtaViaEulerSum. Thus we refer to Section 7.2.1 for details.
It is easy to see that computeF1ViaEta returns the correct result f1(τ) within the precision F.
We next turn to the practical performance of our three algorithms. As in the previous sections
we only test the performance in the context of algorithm cryptoCurve. Thus, again we only
present timings of our algorithms for input of the form (τQ, F ), where as usual τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a
for a reduced representative Q = (a, b, c) of fundamental discriminant ∆.
Again, we first compare the running times of our three algorithms of this section for the
reduced representatives of C(−21311); the running times of either algorithm is plotted in
Figure 7.3 as a function of a. Again we use the floating point precision F = 2163 in our
computation; this precision comes from Formula (2.23). It is obvious from Figure 7.3 that
only the timings of computeF1ViaProduct and computeF2ViaProduct are approximately the
same. The reason is that the products in (2.16) and (2.17) of f1 and f2 obviously have the
same convergence behavior, respectively.
However, in case of computeF1ViaFourierSeries and computeF1ViaEta the corresponding
algorithms to compute f2(τQ) are faster, respectively; the reason is that in either case the
convergence of the corresponding series of f2(τQ) is obviously better, as we make use of q
instead of q1/2 in this case. Hence, in case of f2 we achieve the truncation condition |qn| < 10−F
for smaller values n ∈ IN than in case of f1.
In addition, Figure 7.3 indicates that computeF1ViaEta(τ, F ) is the most efficient of our
algorithms to compute f1(τQ) for high precision F, that is F ≥ 2000. However, corresponding
to our experiments the same holds for low precisions. In addition, as in the case of Dedekind’s
η-function and the Weber function f2, the run time benefit of computeF1ViaEta seems to
become more definitely with growing a.
Furthermore, we tested our algorithms of this section for various further imaginary quadratic
discriminants. Some of the practical data is given in Table 7.7. The result of the further
discriminants is the same as in the case ∆ = −21311. Hence, again the additional data
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Algorithm 7.9: computeF1ViaEta(τ, F )
Input: A complex number τ ∈ h.
A natural number F serving as floating point precision.
Output: The value f1(τ) within the floating point precision F.
n− ← 2; n+ ← 2;
N− ← 5; N+ ← 7; //to store the exponents of the partial sums
l← 2; //to store the previous exponent
q1/2 ← epiiτ ; qn,1/2 ← q21/2; //qn,1/2 stores the current value qn1/2
η1/2 ← 1− q1/2 − qn,1/2; //η1/2 stores the current approximation of η(τ/2)/epiiτ24
η ← 1− q21/2 − q2n,1/2; //η stores the current approximation of η(τ)/e
2piiτ
24
while true do
s← 1; //s stores the sign
if N− < N+ then
qn,1/2 ← qn,1/2 · qN−−l1/2 ;
if 2 - n− then
s← −1;
l← N−;
N− ← N− + 3n− + 1; n− ← n− + 1;
else
qn,1/2 ← qn,1/2 · qN+−l1/2 ;
if 2 - n+ then
s← −1;
l← N+;
N+ ← N+ + 3n+ + 2; n+ ← n+ + 1;
η1/2 ← η1/2 + s · qn,1/2; η ← η + s · q2n,1/2;
if |qn,1/2| < 10−F then
return( q−
1
24
1/2 ·
η1/2
η );
affirms our claims. Again we point out the run time benefit of computeF2ViaEta compared
to computeF1ViaEta. All discriminants in Table 7.7 are maximal for a given class number.
7.2.4 Efficient Computation of the Weber function f
In this section we turn to our three approaches to compute f(τ). Our proceeding is similar to
our investigation in the previous sections. We make use of the following three alternatives to
represent f(τ) :
• First, we make use of the defining equation (2.15), i.e. f(τ) = q− 148 ∏∞n=1(1 + qn− 12 ).
• Second, we compute f(τ) by evaluating its Fourier series q− 148 ∑∞n=0 fnqn/2 from Section
7.1.5.
• Finally, we use the well-known relation f(τ) = e− 2pii48 η((τ+1)/2)η(τ) ([Cox89], Equation
(12.14), p. 256).
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Figure 7.3: Running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three alternatives to compute
f1(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(−21311). We use the precision F = 2163.
We call the corresponding algorithms computeFViaProduct, computeFViaFourierSeries,
and computeFViaEta, respectively. We show that using computeFViaEta is the most effi-
cient approach in practice. In addition, we show that computeF2ViaEta(τ, F ) is faster than
computeFViaEta(τ, F ).
As in the previous sections, the input of either algorithm is a complex number τ ∈ h and a
floating point precision F. Each algorithm returns the value f(τ) within the precision F, that
is either algorithm returns a complex number fτ with |fτ − f(τ)| < 10−F .
The algorithms computeFViaProduct(τ, F ) and computeFViaFourierSeries(τ, F ) are anal-
ogous to the algorithms to compute η(τ), f2(τ), and f1(τ), respectively. Hence they are
straightforward, and their implementation is obvious. Thus we skip a detailed description.
∆ h(∆) hp(∆) F tη in s tf in s tp in s te/tf te/tp tf/tp
-21311 200 101 2163 361.05 838.68 850.77 0.430497 0.424380 0.985789
-30551 250 126 2776 752.49 1879.07 1901.17 0.400458 0.395803 0.988375
-34271 300 151 3206 1169.49 3074.27 3091.10 0.380412 0.378341 0.994555
-47759 350 176 3883 2071.62 5805.93 5827.96 0.356811 0.355462 0.996219
-67031 400 201 4698 3780.04 11306.09 11304.36 0.334336 0.334387 1.0001
-75599 450 226 5193 4929.12 15195.27 15200.34 0.324385 0.324276 0.999666
-96599 500 251 5971 7134.08 23045.32 23001.43 0.309567 0.310158 1.00190
Table 7.7: Total running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three algorithms to
compute all values f1(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆) with b ≥ 0. tη denotes the running time of
computeF1ViaEta, tf the running time of computeF1ViaFourierSeries, and tp the running
time of computeF1ViaProduct.
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We next explain computeFViaEta. As mentioned above it makes use of the relation
f(τ) = e−
2pii
48 · η(
τ+1
2 )
η(τ)
= q−
1
48 · 1 +
∑∞
n=1(−1)n(e2pii·
3n2−n
4 q
3n2−n
4 + e2pii·
3n2+n
4 q
3n2+n
4 )
1 +
∑∞
n=1(−1)n(q
3n2−n
2 + q
3n2+n
2 )
. (7.38)
As in case of the Weber function f1 it is obvious from Equation (7.38) that the q-powers of
the denominator are the squares of the q-powers of the numerator, respectively. Hence, again
we can compute numerator and denominator of Equation (7.38) simultaneously.
However, we have to determine the factors e2pii·
3n2−n
4 and e2pii·
3n2+n
4 , respectively. Obviously
3n2 − n is even for all n ∈ IN. We set N := 3n2−n2 in what follows. Thus e2pii·
3n2−n
4 = 1
if N is even, and e2pii·
3n2−n
4 = −1 otherwise. The same is true for e2pii· 3n
2+n
4 . As in the
previous section we set q1/2 = epiiτ . The further design of computeFViaEta resembles algorithm
computeF1ViaEta. Thus we refer to this algorithm for details.
It is easy to see that computeFViaEta returns the value f(τ) within the precision F. We next
discuss the practical performance of our three algorithms. As in the previous sections we only
test the performance in the scope of our generating algorithm. Thus, again we only present
timings of our algorithms for input of the form (τQ, F ), where as usual τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a for a
reduced representative Q = (a, b, c) of fundamental discriminant ∆.
Again, we first compare the running times of our three algorithms of this section for the
reduced representatives of C(−21311); the running times of either algorithm is plotted in
Figure 7.4 as a function of a. Again we use the floating point precision F = 2163 in our
computation; this precision comes from Formula (2.23). It is obvious from Figure 7.4 that
the run time of either algorithm is about the same as the timing of the corresponding algorithm
to compute f1(τQ). The reason is that obviously either representation of f and f1, respectively,
has the same convergence behavior.
However, computeFViaFourierSeries and computeFViaEta are significantly slower than the
corresponding algorithms to compute f2(τQ), respectively; again the reason is that in either
case the convergence of the corresponding series of f2(τQ) is obviously better, as we make use
of q instead of q1/2 in this case.
In addition, Figure 7.4 indicates that computeFViaEta(τ, F ) is the most efficient of our algo-
rithms to compute f(τQ) for high precision F, that is F ≥ 2000. However, corresponding to
our experiments the same holds for low precisions. In addition, as in the case of Dedekind’s
η-function and the Weber functions f2 and f1, the run time benefit of computeFViaEta seems
to become more definitely with growing a.
Furthermore, we tested our algorithms of this section for various further imaginary quadratic
discriminants. Some of the practical data is given in Table 7.8. The result of the further
discriminants is the same as in the case ∆ = −21311. Hence, again the additional data
affirms our claims. Again we point out the run time benefit of computeF2ViaEta compared
to computeFViaEta. All discriminants in Table 7.8 are maximal for a given class number.
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Algorithm 7.10: computeFViaEta(τ, F )
Input: A complex number τ ∈ h.
A natural number F serving as floating point precision.
Output: The value f(τ) within the floating point precision F.
n− ← 2; n+ ← 2; N− ← 5; N+ ← 7; // to store the exponents of the partial sums
l← 2; // to store the previous exponent
q1/2 ← epiiτ ; qn,1/2 ← q21/2; // qn,1/2 stores the current value qn1/2
η1/2 ← 1 + q1/2 − qn,1/2; // η1/2 stores the current approximation of η((τ + 1)/2)/e2pii(τ+1)/48
η ← 1− q21/2 − q2n,1/2; // η stores the current approximation of η(τ)/e2piiτ/24
while true do
s1 ← 1; s2 ← 1; //s1 stores the sign in the numerator, s2 stores the sign in the denominator
if N− < N+ then
qn,1/2 ← qn,1/2 · qN−−l1/2 ;
if 2 - n− then
s2 ← −1;
if 2 | N− then
s1 ← −1;
else if 2 | n− AND 2 - N− then
s1 ← −1;
l← N−; N− ← N− + 3n− + 1; n− ← n− + 1;
else
qn,1/2 ← qn,1/2 · qN+−l1/2 ;
if 2 - n+ then
s2 ← −1;
if 2 | N+ then
s1 ← −1;
else if 2 | n+ AND 2 - N+ then
s1 ← −1;
l← N+; N+ ← N+ + 3n+ + 2; n+ ← n+ + 1;
η1/2 ← η1/2 + s1 · qn,1/2; η ← η + s2 · q2n,1/2;
if |qn,1/2| < 10−F then
return( q−
1
24
1/2 ·
η1/2
η );
7.2.5 Efficient Computation of the functions γ2 and j
In this section we describe efficient algorithms to compute γ2(τ) and j(τ), respectively. The
functions are related by j = γ32 . Thus we first investigate efficient algorithms to evaluate
γ2(τ). We make use of two different representations:
• We first represent γ2(τ) by its Fourier series q− 13 ·
∑∞
n=0 gnq
n of Section 7.1.2.
• We make use of Equation (2.20), that is
γ2(τ) =
f242 (τ) + 16
f82(τ)
. (7.39)
Our algorithms computeGamma2ViaFourierSeries(τ, F ) and computeGamma2ViaEta(τ, F )
implement these representations, respectively. However, as a result of the previous sections
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Figure 7.4: Running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three alternatives to compute
f(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(−21311). We use the precision F = 2163.
we have that computeF2ViaEta(τ, F ) turns out to be faster than both computeFViaEta(τ, F )
and computeF1ViaEta(τ, F ). For this reason we choose the Weber function f2 in Equation
(2.20).
Input of both algorithms is again a complex number τ ∈ h and a floating point precision F ;
both algorithms return the value γ2(τ) within the precision F. The idea and the implementa-
tion of computeGamma2ViaFourierSeries is straightforward; we refer to the similar algorithm
computeEtaViaFourierSeries of Section 7.2.1 for details. In addition, as we make use of
(7.39), the same is true for computeGamma2ViaEta. However, we point out that in Equation
(7.39) we use algorithm computeF2ViaEta(τ, F ) to compute f2(τ).
We next discuss the practical performance of our two algorithms. Again we only test the
performance in the framework of our generating algorithm. Thus, we only present timings
of our algorithms for input of the form (τQ, F ), where as usual τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a for a reduced
representative Q = (a, b, c) of fundamental discriminant ∆.
As before, we first compare the running times of our algorithms of this section for the reduced
representatives of C(−21311); the running time of either algorithm is plotted in Figure 7.5 as
a function of a. Again we use the floating point precision F = 2163 in our computation; this
precision comes from Formula (2.23). It is obvious from Figures 7.2 and 7.5 that the run time
of computeGamma2ViaEta is the same as the running time of computeF2ViaEta. However, the
reason is that once we know f2(τ) we can neglect the computational overhead of computing
γ2(τ) using Equation (7.39).
In addition, Figure 7.5 indicates that computeGamma2ViaEta(τ, F ) is more efficient in prac-
tice to compute γ2(τQ) for high precision F, that is F ≥ 2000. However, corresponding
to our experiments the same holds for low precisions. Again, the run time benefit of
computeGamma2ViaEta seems to become more definitely with growing a.
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∆ h(∆) hp(∆) F tη in s tf in s tp in s te/tf te/tp tf/tp
-21311 200 101 2163 365.87 851.07 862.82 0.429894 0.424039 0.986381
-30551 250 126 2776 764.95 1914.91 1934.84 0.399470 0.395355 0.989699
-34271 300 151 3206 1182.52 3101.45 3120.72 0.381279 0.378925 0.993825
-47759 350 176 3883 2069.72 5802.45 5823.18 0.35669 0.355427 0.996440
-67031 400 201 4698 3776.43 11287.38 11291.61 0.334571 0.334445 0.999625
-75599 450 226 5193 4928.73 15189.38 15191.03 0.324485 0.324450 0.999891
-96599 500 251 5971 7134.83 23055.32 23006.41 0.309465 0.310123 1.00212
Table 7.8: Total running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our three algorithms to
compute all values f(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆) with b ≥ 0. tη denotes the running time
of computeFViaEta, tf the running time of computeFViaFourierSeries, and tp the running
time of computeFViaProduct.
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Figure 7.5: Running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our two alternatives to compute
γ2(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(−21311). We use the precision F = 2163.
Furthermore, we tested our algorithms to evaluate γ2(τ) for various further imaginary qua-
dratic discriminants. Some of the practical data is given in Table 7.9. The result of the
further discriminants is the same as in the case ∆ = −21311. Again the additional data
affirms our claims. Once more we point out that the run time of computeF2ViaEta and
computeGamma2ViaEta are about the same. All discriminants in Table 7.9 are maximal for a
given class number.
Finally, we turn to the computation of singular moduli, that is to the computation of j(τQ)
if τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a . As in the case of the function γ2 we evaluate two approaches:
• We first represent j(τ) by its Fourier series ∑∞n=−1 cnqn of Section 7.1.1.
• We make use of the defining equation
j(τ) = γ32(τ) . (7.40)
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∆ h(∆) hp(∆) F tη in s tf in s tη/tf
-21311 200 101 2163 286.73 520.00 0.55140385
-30551 250 126 2776 606.18 1173.19 0.5166938
-34271 300 151 3206 957.56 1933.66 0.49520598
-47759 350 176 3883 1846.71 3966.54 0.46557201
-67031 400 201 4698 2909.43 6603.05 0.44061911
-75599 450 226 5193 3860.13 9021.52 0.42788022
-96599 500 251 5971 5685.60 13694.79 0.41516518
Table 7.9: Total running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our two algorithms to com-
pute all values γ2(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆) with b ≥ 0. tη denotes the running time of
computeGamma2ViaEta and tf the running time of computeGamma2ViaFourierSeries.
We call the algorithms computeJViaFourierSeries(τ, F ) and computeJViaEta(τ, F ), respec-
tively. The latter one uses algorithm computeGamma2ViaEta(τ, F ) to compute γ2(τ) within the
precision F. We show below that the practical performance of computeJViaEta is superior. In
addition, we give evidence that the run time of computeJViaEta and computeGamma2ViaEta
is about the same.
As usual the input of either algorithm is a complex number τ ∈ h and a floating point
precision F ; both algorithms return the value j(τ) within the precision F. As above the idea
and the implementation of computeJViaFourierSeries is straightforward; again we refer to
the similar algorithm computeEtaViaFourierSeries of Section 7.2.1 for details. In addition,
as we make use of (7.40) the same holds for computeJViaEta. Once more we remark that in
Equation (7.40) we use algorithm computeGamma2ViaEta(τ, F ) to compute γ2(τ).
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Figure 7.6: Running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of our two alternatives to compute
j(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(−21311). We use the precision F = 2163.
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We turn to practical run times of our two algorithms. Again we only test the performance
with regard to our generating algorithm. Thus, we only present timings of our algorithms
for input of the form (τQ, F ), where as usual τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a for a reduced representative
Q = (a, b, c) of fundamental discriminant ∆.
As before, we first compare the running times of our algorithms of this section for the reduced
representatives of C(−21311); the running time of either algorithm is plotted in Figure 7.6 as
a function of a. Again we use the floating point precision F = 2163 in our computation; this
precision comes from Formula (2.23). It is obvious from Figures 7.5 and 7.6 that the run time
of computeJViaEta is approximately the same as the running time of computeGamma2ViaEta.
The reason is that once we know γ2(τ) we can neglect the computational overhead to compute
j(τ) using Equation (7.40).
In addition, Figure 7.6 indicates that computeJViaEta(τ, F ) is more efficient in practice
to compute j(τQ) for high precision F, that is F ≥ 2000. However, corresponding to our
experiments the same holds for low precisions. Again, the run time benefit of computeJViaEta
seems to become more definitely with growing a.
Furthermore, we tested our algorithms to evaluate j(τ) for various further imaginary qua-
dratic discriminants. Some of the practical data is given in Table 7.10. The result of the
further discriminants is the same as in the case ∆ = −21311. Again the additional data
affirms our claims. Once more we point out that the run time of computeJViaEta and
computeGamma2ViaEta are about the same. All discriminants in Table 7.10 are maximal for
a given class number.
∆ h(∆) hp(∆) F tη in s tf in s tη/tf
-21311 200 101 2163 290.10 486.86 0.59585918
-30551 250 126 2776 609.02 1068.57 0.55590181
-34271 300 151 3206 959.46 1765.62 0.52981955
-47759 350 176 3883 1856.78 3663.97 0.49366671
-67031 400 201 4698 2914.84 6235.32 0.46634976
-75599 450 226 5193 3884.89 8371.53 0.45307011
-96599 500 251 5971 5691.53 12827.73 0.43838855
Table 7.10: Total running times on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi of the two alternatives to
compute all values j(τ(a,b,c)) for (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆) with b ≥ 0. tη denotes the running time of
computeJViaEta, tf the running time of computeJViaFourierSeries.
We close this section with pointing to a further advantage of algorithm computeJViaEta: It
is independent of any precomputation and does not make use of coefficients which have to be
stored. This is an obvious consequence of the same property of algorithm computeF2ViaEta,
which is invoked by algorithm computeGamma2ViaEta.
7.3 The Algorithm computeClassInvariants
In this section we describe our algorithm computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R). This algorithm
is a subalgorithm of our main generating algorithm cryptoCurve. At the end of this section
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we show that its bit-complexity is at most O(h6 log h). The input is an imaginary quadratic
discriminant ∆, its class number h, and an array R storing the reduced representatives of
discriminant ∆. The algorithm returns an array I holding the roots of a generating polynomial
of the ring class field L/Q(
√
∆); the underlying theory of this section may be found in Section
2.2.
In order to get the appropriate floating point precision, computeClassInvariants first in-
vokes algorithm getPrecision(∆), which we will discuss in Chapter 9. Next, if Q = (a, b, c)
denotes a reduced representative of discriminant ∆, the algorithm computes τQ = (−b +
i
√|∆|)/(2a). Then depending on the value of ∆ mod 24 the algorithm computes one of the
three following class invariants:
1. If ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆, that is if ∆ mod 24 ∈ {1; 17}, computeClassInvariants makes
use of the modified Weber function f introduced by Yui and Zagier ([YZ97]); the definition
may be found in Equation (2.21). Depending on a mod 2 and c mod 2 it computes the value
fi(τQ), where fi denotes the appropriate Weber function as defined in Equation (2.21); the
according implementation makes use of algorithm computeF{i}ViaEta from the previous
section. Finally, we have to consider the appropriate factor ζk48.
2. As explained in Section 2.2, if ∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆, that is if ∆ mod 24 ∈ {4, 5, 8, 13, 16, 20},
computeClassInvariants makes use of a modified function based on γ2 due to Atkin and
Morain ([AM93]). Hence, when computing the class invariant ζ(a−c+a
2c)b
3 γ2(τQ), we make use
of computeGamma2ViaEta from Section 7.2.5.
3. Finally, if ∆ ≡ 0 mod 3 we use computeJViaEta to compute the singular moduli j(τQ).
If Q and g(τQ) denote the current reduced representative and corresponding class invariant,
respectively, we have g(τ−Q) = g(τQ), if −Q 6= Q is a reduced representative, too. Hence, we
save computing about half of the class invariants. In addition, we assume that if both Q and
−Q belong to C(∆), they are stored adjacently in R; we remark that the array returned by
our algorithm classGroup has this property.
We next determine the bit-complexity of computeClassInvariants. As the decimal floating
point precision F is fixed, we may assume that both real and imaginary part of any complex
number involved is of decimal length F and thus of bitlength log 10log 2 F = O(F ), respectively. In
order to determine the bit-complexity of computeClassInvariants, we have to investigate
the algorithms computeEtaViaEulerSum, computeF{i}ViaEta, computeGamma2ViaEta, and
computeJViaEta, respectively.
We first estimate the bit-complexity of computeEtaViaEulerSum(τ, F ). We assume using stan-
dard algorithms for performing the underlying arithmetic. For instance, the multiplication of
two complex numbers is supposed to be of complexity O(F 2) and the computation of a power
zn for z ∈ h, n ∈ IN is O(log n · F 2) using fast exponentiation.
Lemma 7.3.1 Let ∆ be an imaginary quadratic discriminant of class number h.
1. Let Q = (a, b, c) be a reduced representative of discriminant ∆. As usual we set τQ =
−b+i
√
|∆|
2a and q = e
2piiτQ . We then have |q| ≤ e−
√
3pi.
2. There is an effectively computable constant c1 > 0 such that 10−B ≤ 10−F with B =
c1
√|∆|h, where F denotes the precision returned by algorithm getPrecision(∆), as explained
in Chapter 9.
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Algorithm 7.11: computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R)
Input: An imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ and its class number h.
An array R storing the reduced representatives of discriminant ∆.
Output: An array I holding the roots of a generating polynomial of the ring class field L/Q(
√
∆).
F ← getPrecision(∆); j ← 0;
while j < h do
(a, b, c)← R[j]; τ ← (−b+ i√|∆|)/(2a);
if ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 AND 3 - ∆ then
if 2 | a AND 2 | c then
I[j]← ζb(a−c−ac2)48 · computeFViaEta(τ, F );
else if 2 | a AND 2 - c then
I[j]← (−1)(∆−1)/8 · ζb(a−c−ac2)48 · computeF1ViaEta(τ, F );
else
I[j]← (−1)(∆−1)/8 · ζb(a−c+a2c)48 · computeF2ViaEta(τ, F );
else if 3 - ∆ then
I[j]← ζb(a−c+a2c)3 · computeGamma2ViaEta(τ, F );
else
I[j]← computeJViaEta(τ, F );
j ← j + 1;
if j < h AND R[j] = −R[j − 1] then
I[j]← I[j − 1]; j ← j + 1;
return(I);
Proof: 1. Let (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆). Then, according to Proposition 6.1.1 we have a ≤ √|∆|/3,
which is equivalent to −1/a ≤ −√3/|∆|. Hence, making use of the monotony of the e-function
on the real axis we get |q| = e−pi
√
|∆|
a ≤ e−
√
3pi.
2. Obviously we have 10−B ≤ 10−F if and only if F ≤ B. As in Chapter 9, let L =
pi
√|∆|/ log 10 ·∑(a,b,c)∈C(∆) 1/a. The decimal precision returned by getPrecision(∆) is ei-
ther F = 0.015L or F = O(h/4 +L). We have (1,∆ mod 2, ((∆ mod 2)2−∆)/4) ∈ C(∆) and
1 ≤ a for all (a, b, c) ∈ C(∆); hence 1 ≤ ∑ 1/a ≤ h follows. Thus we deduce F ≤ c1√|∆|h
for some effective computable constant c1 > 0. uunionsq
Algorithm computeEtaViaEulerSum terminates if |q|N < 10−F for a positive integer N. Let N ′
be the positive real number with e−
√
3piN ′ = e−c1
√
|∆|h. Hence, N ′ = c1√
3pi
√|∆|h = O(√|∆|h)
follows. Lemma 7.3.1 yields |q|N ′ ≤ e−
√
3piN ′ = e−c1
√
|∆|h ≤ 10−F . Thus, we set N ← dN ′e
yielding N = O(h2). If computeEtaViaEulerSum terminates, we have N ∈ {3n2+n2 , 3n
2−n
2 }
with a positive integer n. Thus, n ∼ 32
√
N = O(h) follows.
In order to determine the bit-complexity of computeEtaViaEulerSum the precomputation
before the while-loop is negligible. We pass at most 2n times through the while-loop. We
have to perform at most 2n additions, multiplications, and computations of powers qk with k ≤
3n+ 2, respectively. Thus, the complexity of all multiplications is O(n ·F 2) = O(h · |∆|h2) =
O(h5). In addition, the complexity of determining the q-powers is O(n log n ·F 2) = O(h log h ·
|∆|h2) = O(h5 log h). Hence, as the addition is negligible with respect to the multiplication,
the complexity of computeEtaViaEulerSum in terms of bit-operations is O(h5 log h).
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We next turn to the bit-complexity of algorithm computeF2ViaEta. With regard to al-
gorithm computeEtaViaEulerSum, we have to perform in each step of the while-loop of
computeF2ViaEta a supplementary squaring and addition, respectively. However, in all, this
yields an additional addend of n · F 2 to the complexity of computeEtaViaEulerSum. Thus,
both complexities are equal. Furthermore, a similar argument holds for computeFViaEta and
computeF1ViaEta, respectively. Next, given the value f2(τ), we have to perform 4 squarings,
1 multiplication, 1 addition, and 1 division of complex numbers in order to compute γ2(τ).
Thus, the complexity of computeGamma2ViaEta is O(h5 log h), too. Obviously, the same holds
for computeJViaEta.
Finally, we determine the bit-complexity of computeClassInvariants. Let g denote the
number-theoretical function corresponding to ∆ mod 24 as explained above. In order to get
the array I, we have to evaluate at most the h values g(τQ). However, if Q and −Q are
different and both in C(∆), we make use of g(τQ) = g(τ−Q). Thus we have to compute at
least h/2 class invariants g(τQ). Hence, the bit-complexity to determine all roots of the class
polynomial is O(h6 log h). As we assumed to make use of standard algorithms to perform the
basic computational operations we deduce the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3.2 The bit-complexity of algorithm computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R) is at
most O(h6 log h).
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Chapter 8
Fast Computation of Class
Polynomials for Given Class
Invariants
In this chapter we develop our efficient algorithm computeClassPolynomial. The algorithm
computes a class polynomial C if the roots of C are given. More precisely, we are concerned
with the following problem: Let C ∈ ZZ[X] be a monic and irreducible polynomial of degree
h, and let r1, . . . , rh be its roots. Given r1, . . . , rh, find the polynomial C. The roots ri are
returned by algorithm computeClassInvariants described in Chapter 7.
During the development of our efficient algorithm we compare different approaches. The
result of our investigation is that although all discussed algorithms have the same asymp-
totic complexity, an implementation of a generalization of a multiplication method due to
Karatsuba is about 25% faster in practice than the standard method.
In all we describe three approaches solving the task of this chapter; we turn to them in
Section 8.2. We will show that all algorithms have an asymptotic running time of O(h2)
in terms of multiplications of real numbers. Nevertheless, our most efficient algorithm
computePolynomialKaratsuba is about 25% faster in practice than the approaches using
standard techniques. Our approach bases on ideas due to Karatsuba [Kar95] and [BP01].
The most important algorithmic operation of Section 8.2 is the multiplication of monic poly-
nomials. Thus in Section 8.1 we first develop an efficient algorithm addressing this problem.
Finally, in Section 8.3 we show that the bit-complexity of algorithm computeClassPolynomial
is O(h6).
8.1 Multiplying Polynomials
In this section we present three algorithms for multiplying monic polynomials. All approaches
require two monic polynomials f and g as input and return the product r := fg. For the sake
of generality we consider polynomials over a commutative ring R with 1. We describe our
first algorithm in Section 8.1.1. This algorithm implements the standard techniques. It turns
out that this approach is rather slow in practice. Second, in Section 8.1.2 we develop an
algorithm which uses ideas due to Karatsuba ([Kar95]). In general this algorithm is superior
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to the standard methods. However, our Karatsuba variant requires deg(f) = deg(g). Next
we compare both algorithms in Section 8.1.3. Finally, in order for the Karatsuba algorithm
to be applicable for polynomials of different degree, we develop a hybrid algorithm basing on
the standard and the Karatsuba algorithm in Section 8.1.4.
8.1.1 The Standard Multiplication Method
Our first algorithm to compute the product r of two monic polynomials f and g is named
productPolynomialStandard(f, g); it bases on the standard multiplication method. We
assume the polynomials to be in R[X], where R denotes a commutative ring with 1. We
use the notation f =
∑k
j=0 fjX
j , g =
∑l
j=0 gjX
j and r =
∑k+l
j=0 rjX
j , respectively. Thus we
have rn =
∑n
j=0 fjgn−j for all 0 ≤ n ≤ k+ l, where we set fj = 0 if j > k and gj = 0 if j > l,
respectively. The implementation of productPolynomialStandard is obvious.
Algorithm 8.1: productPolynomialStandard(f, g)
Input: Two monic polynomials f =
∑k
j=0 fjX
j and g =
∑l
j=0 gjX
j in R[X].
Output: The polynomial r = f · g.
1: if k < l then
2: t← f ; f ← g; g ← t; //swap f and g
3: k ← deg(f); l← deg(g); //assign the degrees of f and g to k and l, respectively
4: for n = 0 to l − 1 do
5: rn ←
∑n
j=0 fj · gn−j ;
6: if k > l then
7: for n = l to k − 1 do
8: rn ← fn−l +
∑l
j=1 fn−l+j · gl−j ;
9: for n = k to k + l − 1 do
10: rn ← fn−l +
∑l−1
j=n−k+1 fn−j · gj + gn−k;
11: r ← Xk+l +∑k+l−1j=0 rjXj ;
12: return(r);
Obviously productPolynomialStandard actually returns the correct result. We next study
the complexity of productPolynomialStandard in terms of the number of additions and
multiplications in R. We prove the following result.
Proposition 8.1.1 Let R be a commutative ring with 1. Furthermore, let f and g be two
monic polynomials in R[X] of degree k and l, respectively. By Nm and Na we denote the
number of multiplications and additions in R, respectively, to compute the polynomial fg
using algorithm productPolynomialStandard. Then we have Nm = Na = kl.
Proof: Without loss of generality we may assume k ≥ l. First, we count the number
of multiplications Nm,1 and additions Na,1 in the first for-loop (lines 4 - 5) of algorithm
productPolynomialStandard. Obviously for fixed n we have to perform n+1 multiplications
and n additions in line 5. Hence Nm,1 =
∑l−1
n=0(n + 1) =
l(l+1)
2 and Na,1 =
∑l−1
n=0 n =
(l−1)l
2
follow.
Next we turn to the number of multiplications Nm,2 and additions Na,2 in the second for-loop
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(lines 7 - 8). For each n we have to perform l multiplications and l additions, respectively.
As we have to pass k − l times through the for-loop we have Nm,2 = Na,2 = (k − l)l.
Finally, we determine the number of multiplications Nm,3 and additions Na,3 in the third
for-loop (lines 9 - 10). For fixed n we have to compute l− (n−k+ 1) = k+ l−n−1 products
and l − 1− (n− k + 1) + 2 = k + l − n sums in R. Thus we have
Nm,3 =
k+l−1∑
n=k
(k + l − n− 1) = lk + l2 −
k+l−1∑
n=k
n− l = (l − 1)l
2
,
Na,3 =
k+l−1∑
n=k
(k + l − n) = Nm,3 + l = l(l + 1)2 .
Thus in all we get
Nm = Nm,1 +Nm,2 +Nm,3
=
l(l + 1)
2
+ (k − l)l + (l − 1)l
2
= kl ,
Na = Na,1 +Na,2 +Na,3
=
(l − 1)l
2
+ (k − l)l + l(l + 1)
2
= kl .
This proves the proposition. uunionsq
8.1.2 A Generalization of a Multiplication Method of Karatsuba
In this section we present a generalization of an idea due to Karatsuba [Kar95]. We call
this algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba. Again let f and g be monic polynomials with
coefficients in a commutative ring R with 1. Our algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba is
only applicable if the polynomials f and g are of the same degree. However, in our algorithm
computeClassPolynomial, which is the main algorithm of this chapter, we are mostly con-
cerned with multiplying polynomials of the same degree. Thus this is no restriction in our
framework.
In the context of efficient multiplication of polynomials of degree 2 our method is already
described by Bailey and Paar ([BP01]). However, we generalize the idea of Karatsuba and
Bailey/Paar to polynomials of arbitrary degree.
Let k denote the degree of both f and g. We show in Proposition 8.1.2 that the number
of multiplications in R to compute the product polynomial fg is equal to k(k + 1)/2; thus
compared to algorithm productPolynomialStandard this is only about half the number of
multiplications, as we proved in Proposition 8.1.1. However, the number of additions is
k(5k − 3)/2, which is more than the corresponding number in Proposition 8.1.1. For R = C
and R = IR we compare the efficiency of both algorithms in practice in Section 8.1.3.
We show in Section 8.1.3 that in practice a multiplication is a lot more time-consuming than
an addition. For instance, the multiplication of two real numbers is much more expensive
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than an addition in IR. Depending on the floating point precision in use the factor varies from
3−40. Thus in general the basic idea of Karatsuba is to reduce the number of multiplications
in R.
For example let k = 2, i.e. f = X2 + f1X + f0 and g = X2 + g1X + g0. Using algo-
rithm productPolynomialStandard Proposition 8.1.1 shows that we have to perform 4 ad-
ditions and 4 multiplications in R, respectively. However, Bailey/Paar ([BP01]) show that
we can proceed as follows, too: In order to determine the coefficients rj of fg one first
computes the products d0 = f0g0 and d1 = f1g1. Hence one has r0 = d0. In order to get
r1 = f0g1 + f1g0 one makes use of the relation r1 = (f0 + f1)(g0 + g1) − d0 − d1; thus
one only has to perform one multiplication in this step. However, the number of additions
increases from 1 to 4. Next one determines r2 = d1 + f0 + g0 and r3 = f1 + g1. Hence,
to get fg one has to perform 3 multiplications and 7 additions in R. Thus, in comparison
to productPolynomialStandard, one saves one multiplication and has to perform 3 further
additions. Our algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba generalizes this idea to arbitrary
degree.
Algorithm 8.2: productPolynomialKaratsuba(f, g)
Input: Two monic polynomials f =
∑k
j=0 fjX
j and g =
∑k
j=0 gjX
j in R[X].
Output: The polynomial r = f · g.
1: k ← deg(f); //assign degree of f to k
2: for n = 0 to k − 1 do
3: dn ← fn · gn;
4: r0 ← d0;
5: for n = 1 to k − 1 do
6: rn ←
∑b(n−1)/2c
j=0 (fj + fn−j) · (gj + gn−j)− dj − dn−j ;
7: if 2 | n then
8: rn ← rn + dn/2;
9: for n = k to 2k − 3 do
10: rn ←
∑b(n−1)/2c
j=n−k+1 (fj + fn−j) · (gj + gn−j)− dj − dn−j ;
11: if 2 | n then
12: rn ← rn + dn/2;
13: rn ← rn + fn−k + gn−k;
14: r2k−2 ← fk−2 + d(2k−2)/2 + gk−2;
15: r2k−1 ← fk−1 + gk−1;
16: r ← X2k +∑2k−1j=0 rjXj ;
17: return(r);
It is easy to see that algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba is correct. We next determine
the complexity of productPolynomialKaratsuba in terms of multiplications and additions
in R, respectively.
Proposition 8.1.2 Let R be a commutative ring with 1. Furthermore, let f and g be two
monic polynomials in R[X] of degree k. By Nm and Na we denote the number of multi-
plications and additions in R, respectively, to compute the polynomial fg using algorithm
productPolynomialKaratsuba. Then we have Nm =
k(k+1)
2 and Na =
k(5k−3)
2 .
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Proof: Let Nm,1 denote the number of multiplications in R in the first for-loop (lines 2 - 3).
Obviously we have Nm,1 = k.
Next, we turn to the for-loop in lines 5 - 8. We write Nm,2 for the number of multiplications in
R and Na,2 for the number of additions in R in this for-loop, respectively. We fix the index n
in lines 6 and 8. If n is even, we have to perform n2 multiplications and 4 · n2 +(n2 −1)+1 = 52n
additions in R. In case of odd n we have to compute n+12 products and 4 · n+12 + (n+12 − 1) =
5
2n+
3
2 sums in R. Hence for even k we conclude
Nm,2 =
k−1∑
n=1,3,...
n+ 1
2
+
k−2∑
n=2,4,...
n
2
=
(k−2)/2∑
m=0
2m+ 2
2
+
(k−2)/2∑
m=1
2m
2
=
(k−2)/2∑
m=0
m+
k
2
+
(k−2)/2∑
m=1
m = 2 · 1
2
· k − 2
2
· k
2
+
k
2
=
k2
4
,
Na,2 =
k−1∑
n=1,3,...
(
5
2
n+
3
2
)
+
k−2∑
n=2,4,...
5
2
n =
(k−2)/2∑
m=0
(
5
2
(2m+ 1) +
3
2
)
+
(k−2)/2∑
m=1
5
2
· 2m
=
(k−2)/2∑
m=0
(5m+ 4) +
(k−2)/2∑
m=1
5m = 2 · 5 · 1
2
· k − 2
2
· k
2
+ 4 · k
2
=
k(5k − 2)
4
.
For odd k we have
Nm,2 =
k−2∑
n=1,3,...
n+ 1
2
+
k−1∑
n=2,4,...
n
2
=
(k−3)/2∑
m=0
2m+ 2
2
+
(k−1)/2∑
m=1
m
=
1
2
· k − 3
2
· k − 1
2
+
k − 1
2
+
1
2
· k − 1
2
· k + 1
2
=
k2 − 1
4
,
Na,2 =
k−2∑
n=1,3,...
(
5
2
n+
3
2
)
+
k−1∑
n=2,4,...
5
2
n =
(k−3)/2∑
m=0
(5m+ 4) +
(k−1)/2∑
m=1
5m
= 5 · 1
2
· k − 3
2
· k − 1
2
+ 4 · k − 1
2
+ 5 · 1
2
· k − 1
2
· k + 1
2
=
(k − 1)(5k + 3)
4
.
Finally, we turn to the third for-loop (lines 9 - 13). By Nm,3 and Na,3 we denote the accu-
mulated number of multiplications and additions in R in this loop, respectively. Again fix n.
Let n be even. Then the number of multiplications in R equals n2 − (n− k + 1) = k − n2 − 1.
Furthermore, for the number of additions we get (4k−2n−4)+(k− n2 −2)+3 = 5k− 52n−3.
If n is odd the number of multiplications in R is n+12 − (n−k+1) = k− n2 − 12 and the number
of additions is equal to (4k − 2n− 2) + (k − n2 − 32) + 2 = 5k − 52n− 32 . Hence for even k we
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have
Nm,3 =
2k−4∑
n=k,k+2,...
(
k − n
2
− 1
)
+
2k−3∑
n=k+1,k+3,...
(
k − n
2
− 1
2
)
=
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
k − k + 2m
2
− 1
)
+
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
k − k + 2m+ 1
2
− 1
2
)
=
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
k
2
−m− 1
)
+
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
k
2
−m− 1
)
= 2 ·
(
k − 2
2
· k
2
− 1
2
· k − 4
2
· k − 2
2
− k − 2
2
)
=
k(k − 2)
4
,
Na,3 =
2k−4∑
n=k,k+2,...
(
5k − 5
2
n− 3
)
+
2k−3∑
n=k+1,k+3,...
(
5k − 5
2
n− 3
2
)
=
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
5k − 5
2
(k + 2m)− 3
)
+
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
5k − 5
2
(k + 2m+ 1)− 3
2
)
=
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
5
2
k − 5m− 3
)
+
(k−4)/2∑
m=0
(
5
2
k − 5m− 4
)
= 2 ·
(
k − 2
2
· 5k
2
− 5 · 1
2
· k − 4
2
· k − 2
2
− k − 2
2
· 3
)
− k − 2
2
=
(k − 2)(5k + 6)
4
.
For odd k we have
Nm,3 =
2k−4∑
n=k+1,k+3,...
(
k − n
2
− 1
)
+
2k−3∑
n=k,k+2,...
(
k − n
2
− 1
2
)
=
(k−5)/2∑
m=0
(
k − k + 1 + 2m
2
− 1
)
+
(k−3)/2∑
m=0
(
k − k + 2m
2
− 1
2
)
=
(k−5)/2∑
m=0
(
k
2
−m− 3
2
)
+
(k−3)/2∑
m=0
(
k
2
−m− 1
2
)
= 2 ·
(
k − 3
2
· k
2
− 1
2
· k − 5
2
· k − 3
2
− k − 3
2
· 1
2
)
− k − 3
2
+
k
2
− k − 3
2
− 1
2
=
(k − 1)2
4
,
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Na,3 =
2k−4∑
n=k+1,k+3,...
(
5k − 5
2
n− 3
)
+
2k−3∑
n=k,k+2,...
(
5k − 5
2
n− 3
2
)
=
(k−5)/2∑
m=0
(
5k − 5
2
(k + 1 + 2m)− 3
)
+
(k−3)/2∑
m=0
(
5k − 5
2
(k + 2m)− 3
2
)
=
(k−5)/2∑
m=0
(
5
2
k − 5m− 11
2
)
+
(k−3)/2∑
m=0
(
5
2
k − 5m− 3
2
)
=
k − 3
2
· 5
2
k − 5 · 1
2
· k − 5
2
· k − 3
2
− k − 3
2
· 11
2
+
k − 1
2
· 5
2
k − 5 · 1
2
· k − 3
2
· k − 1
2
− k − 1
2
· 3
2
=
5k2 − 4k − 9
4
.
Obviously we have Nm = Nm,1 + Nm,2 + Nm,3 and Na = Na,2 + Na,3 + 3. Hence for even k
we get Nm = k + k
2
4 +
k(k−2)
4 =
k(k+1)
2 and Na =
k(5k−2)
4 +
(k−2)(5k+6)
4 + 3 =
k(5k−3)
2 . In case
of odd k we get the same results. This proves the proposition. uunionsq
8.1.3 Comparing both Algorithms
In this section we compare the performance of our algorithms productPolynomialStandard
and productPolynomialKaratsuba in practice. We show that in general the latter algo-
rithm is superior. As usual let f and g be monic polynomials in R[X] of degree k ≥
2. In addition let CA and CM denote the complexity of an addition and a multiplica-
tion of two elements of R, respectively. Furthermore we write CS and CK for the com-
plexity of productPolynomialStandard and productPolynomialKaratsuba, respectively.
Hence, making use of Propositions 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 we get CS = k2(CA + CM ) and CK =
k(5k−3)
2 CA +
k(k+1)
2 CM , respectively. We assume that the practical running time of an im-
plementation is proportional to the complexity by some constant (positive) factor. Hence
productPolynomialKaratsuba is faster in practice if and only if CK < CS . We have
CK < CS
⇐⇒ k(5k−3)2 CA + k(k+1)2 CM < k2(CA + CM )
⇐⇒ 32(k2 − k)CA < 12(k2 − k)CM
⇐⇒ CACM < 13 .
We point out that this result is independent of the degree of the polynomials. We conclude
that productPolynomialKaratsuba is faster in practice if and only if the complexity of an
addition is less than one third of the complexity of a multiplication in R.
We next compare the complexities CA and CM . In our application we have to deal with
polynomials in IR[X] and C[X]. In general the coefficients are irrational numbers. Hence
in general the running time does not depend on the order of magnitude of the coefficients,
but on the floating point precision F we use in our computations. To determine the ratio
CA
CM
in case of real numbers for different F we proceed as follows: We randomly choose two
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numbers r1, r2 ∈ IR represented with respect to F. We compute the sum and the product
of r1 and r2, respectively. For each precision F we take 1000 random pairs (r1, r2) and
sum up the CPU-time for computing the sums and products, respectively. As we assume a
proportional relationship of running time and complexity with same constant for both addition
and multiplication, we get the ratio CACM . The practical results can be found in Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: Ratio of practical running times of an addition and a multiplication of two real
numbers. The ratio is plotted as a function of the floating point precision in use. The timings
were measured on the SUN UltraSPARC-I.
From Figure 8.1 we deduce that CACM <
1
3 if F ≥ 65. Hence when multiplying two monic
polynomials in IR[X] of same degree we use algorithm productPolynomialStandard if and
only if F < 65, and algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba otherwise.
Finally, we consider the case of polynomials in C[X]. A complex number is represented by its
real and imaginary part. As above we denote by CA and CM the complexity of an addition and
a multiplication of real numbers, respectively. Hence the complexity of adding two complex
numbers is twice the complexity of adding to real numbers, i.e. 2CA. Furthermore, the com-
plexity of multiplying two complex numbers using the standard method is equal to 2CA+4CM .
Thus productPolynomialKaratsuba is faster in practice than productPolynomialStandard
if and only if k(5k−3)2 · 2CA + (4CM + 2CA)k(k+1)2 < 2k2CA + (4CM + 2CA)k2, thus
(6k2 − 2k)CA + 2k(k + 1)CM < 4k2(CA + CM )
⇐⇒ 2(k2 − k)CA < 2(k2 − k)CM
⇐⇒ CACM < 1 .
However, Figure 8.1 implies that we have CACM < 1 for all floating point precisions we make
use of. Hence, in order to multiply monic complex polynomials of the same degree algorithm
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productPolynomialKaratsuba is always superior.
8.1.4 A Hybrid Algorithm
In this section we show how to use algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba if the de-
grees of the polynomials f and g are different. The result of this section is algorithm
productPolynomialHybrid(f, g). It is due to G. Ko¨hler ([Ko¨h02]). We assume that the
coefficients of f and g are elements of some commutative ring R containing 1. We explain
the idea of algorithm productPolynomialHybrid in what follows.
As usual we denote by k and l the degrees of f and g, respectively. As the case k = l is
already covered by productPolynomialKaratsuba(f, g) we may assume k > l. However, in
order to make use of productPolynomialKaratsuba(F,G) for some F,G ∈ R[X] we have to
ensure deg(F ) = deg(G). Hence we set F = f and G = g ·Xk−l. Let P denote the polynomial
returned by productPolynomialKaratsuba(F,G). Then we obviously have fg = P/Xk−l.
From a theoretical point of view the computation of G is for free as we simply shift the
coefficients of g, that is we set Gj+k−l = gj for 0 ≤ j ≤ l and Gj = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − l − 1.
However, we have to allocate memory for the additional coefficients and we have to perform
various assignments. Furthermore, we deal with polynomials of higher degrees.
In order to decide whether we make use of productPolynomialStandard(f, g) or algorithm
productPolynomialKaratsuba(f, g ·Xk−l) we compare the respective number of multiplica-
tions in R. In case of the standard algorithm we simply multiply f and g. Thus Proposition
8.1.1 yields that the number of multiplications in R is kl. According to Proposition 8.1.2
the corresponding number is k(k + 1)/2 in case of the Karatsuba method. We remark that
in the latter case we take the number of multiplications of an element of R with 0 into ac-
count. The standard algorithm is superior if and only if we have kl < k(k + 1)/2, hence if
l ≤ k/2. However, we will make use of productPolynomialHybrid in the context of com-
puting class polynomials. In order to be able to derive some closed formula for the number
of multiplications and additions of our most efficient algorithm in Section 8.2.3, our algo-
rithm productPolynomialHybrid invokes the standard multiplication algorithm if and only
if l < k/2. However, the computational overhead for the case l = k/2 is negligible.
Algorithm 8.3: productPolynomialHybrid(f, g)
Input: Two monic polynomials f =
∑k
j=0 fjX
j and g =
∑l
j=0 gjX
j in R[X].
Output: The polynomial r = f · g.
if k < l then
t← f ; f ← g; g ← t; //swap f and g
k ← deg(f); l← deg(g); //assign the degrees of f and g to k and l, respectively
if l < k/2 then
r ← productPolynomialStandard(f, g);
else
r ← productPolynomialStandard(f, g ·Xk−l);
r ← r/Xk−l;
return(r);
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8.2 Computing Polynomials for Given Roots
In this section we present our three algorithms to compute a polynomial if its roots are given.
We denote the polynomial by R as its coefficients are in general in IR. The input of either
algorithm are the roots of R, which are given as an array (r1, . . . , rh). For instance, if I is
the array returned by algorithm computeClassInvariants we write rj = I[j − 1] for all
1 ≤ j ≤ h. Furthermore, if rj is not real for a j ∈ {1, . . . , h}, we assume that either rj+1 = rj
or rj−1 = rj .
First, in Section 8.2.1 we describe our trivial approach computePolynomialComplex. This al-
gorithm simply multiplies the linear factors X−rj . Next, in Section 8.2.2 we improve our first
algorithm by using the relation rj ∈ {rj−1, rj+1} if rj 6∈ IR. Thus we only have to deal with
polynomials in IR[X]. The corresponding algorithm is named computePolynomialReal. Next,
in Section 8.2.3 we describe our algorithm computePolynomialKaratsuba, which bases on our
algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba from Section 8.1.2. Finally, in Section 8.2.4 we com-
pare the running times of our algorithms. It turns out that computePolynomialKaratsuba
is the most efficient approach in both theory and practice.
8.2.1 A First Approach
In this section we describe our first algorithm to compute a polynomial R if its roots are given.
The algorithm is called computePolynomialComplex. It is rather trivial: We first initialize
R with X − r1. Then for each 2 ≤ j ≤ h we multiply the linear factor X − rj with the
current polynomial R using algorithm productPolynomialStandard. Obviously this yields
the correct result.
Algorithm 8.4: computePolynomialComplex(r1, . . . , rh)
Input: An array (r1, . . . , rh) ∈ Ch. If Im(rj) 6= 0 we assume either rj+1 = rj or rj−1 = rj .
Output: The monic polynomial R ∈ IR[X] of degree h with R(rj) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , h}.
1: R← X − r1;
2: for j = 2 to h do
3: R← productPolynomialStandard(R,X − rj);
4: return(R);
We remark that computePolynomialComplex does not make use of rj ∈ {rj−1, rj+1} if
Im(rj) 6= 0. We next analyse the complexity of computePolynomialComplex in terms of
additions and multiplications in C and IR, respectively.
Proposition 8.2.1 Let NCa,1 and N
C
m,1 denote the number of additions and multiplications
of complex numbers in algorithm computePolynomialComplex, respectively. Then we have
NCa,1 = N
C
m,1 =
1
2(h−1)h. Furthermore, denote by Na,1 and Nm,1 the number of additions and
multiplications of real numbers in algorithm computePolynomialComplex, respectively. Then
Na,1 = Nm,1 = 2(h− 1)h.
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Proof: I. For each 2 ≤ j ≤ h we multiply in line 3 a monic polynomial of degree j − 1 with
a monic polynomial of degree 1. Hence Proposition 8.1.1 shows that for each 2 ≤ j ≤ h we
have to perform j − 1 additions and j − 1 multiplications in C, respectively. Thus we have
NCa,1 = N
C
m,1 =
∑h
j=2(j − 1) = 12(h− 1)h.
II. We represent a complex number by its real and its imaginary part. In addition, we assume
to make use of standard techniques for addition and multiplication, respectively. Hence an
addition of two complex numbers needs two additions of real numbers, and a multiplication
of two complex numbers needs two additions and four multiplications of real numbers. Thus
we conclude Na,1 = Nm,1 = 2(h− 1)h. uunionsq
Proposition 8.2.1 shows that the complexity in terms of multiplications of real numbers to
compute a polynomial R, if its roots are given, is O(h2) with constant 2.
8.2.2 An Improved Approach
In this section we present our second algorithm to compute a polynomial R if its roots are
given. We call the algorithm computePolynomialReal. We first initialize the polynomial R
with the constant polynomial 1. We then improve computePolynomialComplex by using the
property rj ∈ {rj−1, rj+1}, if rj is not real. Hence let Im(rj) 6= 0 and rj+1 = rj . In line 3
of algorithm computePolynomialComplex we simply computed (R · (X − rj)) · (X − rj+1).
Instead computePolynomialReal first calculates the polynomial (X − rj) · (X − rj+1) =
X2 − 2Re(rj)X + |rj |2, that is the minimal polynomial of rj over IR. Hence this polynomial
has real coefficients. Then using productPolynomialStandard we multiply R and X2 −
2Re(rj)X+ |rj |2. Thus we only have to deal with polynomials in IR[X]. Again the correctness
of computePolynomialReal is obvious.
Algorithm 8.5: computePolynomialReal(r1, . . . , rh)
Input: An array (r1, . . . , rh) ∈ Ch. If Im(rj) 6= 0 we assume either rj+1 = rj or rj−1 = rj .
Output: The monic polynomial R ∈ IR[X] of degree h with R(rj) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , h}.
1: j ← 1;
2: R← 1;
3: while j ≤ h do
4: if Im(rj) 6= 0 then
5: R← productPolynomialStandard(R,X2 − 2Re(rj)X + |rj |2);
6: j ← j + 2;
7: else
8: R← productPolynomialStandard(R,X − rj);
9: j ← j + 1;
10: return(R);
As above we analyse algorithm computePolynomialReal in terms of additions and multipli-
cations in IR. By n1 we denote the number of rj with rj ∈ IR, and by n2 the number of (up
to complex conjugation different) rj 6∈ IR. Hence we have h = n1 + 2n2.
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Proposition 8.2.2 Let Na,2 and Nm,2 denote the number of additions and multiplications of
real numbers in algorithm computePolynomialReal, respectively. Then we have Na,2 =
(h−1)h
2
and Nm,2 =
(h−1)h+2n2
2 .
Proof: I. If Im(rj) 6= 0 we have to perform 2 multiplications and 1 addition in IR to compute
|rj |2 = Re(rj)2 + Im(rj)2 in line 5. We neglect the time to compute 2Re(rj) as this operation
is simply a shift. Hence the computation of all n2 polynomials X2 − 2Re(rj)X + |rj |2 takes
n2 additions and 2n2 multiplications in IR.
II. Let {j1, j2, . . . , jn1} be the set of all indices of real values rj . If j ∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jn1} we
multiply in line 8 a monic polynomial of degree j − 1 with a monic polynomial of degree 1.
Hence Proposition 8.1.1 shows that the number of additions and multiplications in IR are
both equal to j− 1. If j 6∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jn1} we multiply in line 5 a monic polynomial of degree
j − 1 with a monic polynomial of degree 2. Hence again due to Proposition 8.1.1 the number
of additions and multiplications in IR are both equal to 2(j − 1). Thus the total amount of
additions and multiplications, respectively, is∑
j∈{j1,j2,...,jn1}
(j − 1) +
∑
j 6∈{j1,j2,...,jn1}
rj+1=rj
2(j − 1)
=
∑
j∈{j1,j2,...,jn1}
(j − 1) +
∑
j 6∈{j1,j2,...,jn1}
rj+1=rj
((j − 1 + j)− 1)
=
h∑
j=1
(j − 1)− n2 = (h− 1)h2 − n2 .
We remark that this result is independent of the position of the rj ∈ IR within the array
(r1, . . . , rh).
III. The results of I. and II. yield Na,2 = n2 +
(h−1)h
2 −n2 = (h−1)h2 and Nm,2 = 2n2 + (h−1)h2 −
n2 =
(h−1)h+2n2
2 . uunionsq
Obviously we have n2 ≤ h2 . We claim that for odd h we have n1 = 1 and n2 = h−12 ≤ h2 .
This is true because the elements rj uniquely correspond to ideal classes of class groups, and
we have rj ∈ IR if and only if the order of the corresponding ideal class in the class group is
at most 2. However, if h is odd there is no ideal class of order 2. Hence the only ideal class
yielding a real rj is the zero element of the class group.
We conclude from Proposition 8.2.2 that Nm,2 ≤ h2−h+h2 = h2/2. Thus the complexity of
computePolynomialReal in terms of the number of multiplications in IR is O(h2), too. How-
ever, in this case the constant is 12 , and we expect algorithm computePolynomialReal to be
four times faster than computePolynomialComplex. Our practical results of Section 8.2.4
confirm this assertion.
8.2.3 Computing Polynomials Using the Karatsuba Method
Finally, we turn to our third algorithm to compute a polynomial R if its roots r1, . . . , rh are
given. The algorithm is called computePolynomialKaratsuba. It makes use of algorithm
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productPolynomialKaratsuba of Section 8.1.2 and algorithm productPolynomialHybrid of
Section 8.1.4. We show that the complexity of computePolynomialKaratsuba in terms of mul-
tiplications in IR is O(h2). In Section 8.2.4 we will show that computePolynomialKaratsuba
is faster in practice than the previous two proposed algorithms.
As we know from Section 8.1.2 productPolynomialKaratsuba is only applicable for polyno-
mials of the same degree. Thus in algorithm computePolynomialKaratsuba we proceed as
follows: As in Section 8.2.2 we write h = n1 + 2n2, where n1 denotes the number of roots
rj ∈ IR. As in the proof of Proposition 8.2.2 let {j1, j2, . . . , jn1} be the set of all indices of real
values rj . Furthermore, let
∑t
k=0 hk2
k be the binary expansion of h.
First, we compute polynomials in IR[X] of degree 2, that is we determine X2−2Re(rj)X+|rj |2
if Im(rj) 6= 0 and (X − rjk1 )(X − rjk2 ) if Im(rjk1 ) = Im(rjk2 ) = 0. As the polynomials are of
degree 1 in the latter case, we make use of productPolynomialStandard. The polynomials
are stored in an array P of length h−h02 .
If h is odd, we showed at the end of Section 8.2.2 that n1 = 1; in this case we next initialize the
result polynomial R with X − rjn1 . Next, for 1 ≤ i ≤ h−h0−2h14 we multiply the polynomials
P2i−1 and P2i using algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba. The result is a monic poly-
nomial in IR[X] of degree 4, respectively. The polynomials of degree 4 are stored in an array
Q. If h−h02 is odd, i.e. if h1 = 1 there is an additional polynomial Ph−h0
2
stored in P. Hence
we have to multiply R and Ph−h0
2
. We make use of algorithm productPolynomialHybrid to
compute their product. We then assign the array Q to the array P.
For 3 ≤ j ≤ t we proceed analogously with polynomials Pi of degree 2j−1. The correctness of
algorithm computePolynomialKaratsuba is easy to see.
We next analyse algorithm computePolynomialKaratsuba in terms of additions and multi-
plications in IR, respectively. As above we denote by n1 the number of real rj , and again we
write h = n1 + 2n2.
Proposition 8.2.3 Let Na,3 and Nm,3 denote the number of additions and multiplica-
tions of real numbers in algorithm computePolynomialKaratsuba, respectively, and let
h =
∑t
k=0 hk2
k be the binary expansion of h. Then we have
Na,3 = n2 +
⌊n1
2
⌋
+
1
4
·
t∑
j=2
(5 · 2j−1 − 3) · t∑
k=j
hk · 2k
 (8.1)
+
t+1∑
j=2
hj−1 · 2j−2 ·
(
2 · (1− hj−2) ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 · (5 · 2j−1 − 3)
)
.
Nm,3 = 2n2 +
⌊n1
2
⌋
+
1
4
·
t∑
j=2
(2j−1 + 1) · t∑
k=j
hk · 2k
 (8.2)
+
t+1∑
j=2
hj−1 · 2j−2 ·
(
2 · (1− hj−2) ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 · (2j−1 + 1)
)
.
Proof: I. We first determine the number of additions and multiplications in line 7. This was
already done in step I of the proof of Proposition 8.2.2. Thus the number of additions and
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Algorithm 8.6: computePolynomialKaratsuba(r1, . . . , rh)
Input: An array (r1, . . . , rh) ∈ Ch. If Im(rj) 6= 0 we assume either rj+1 = rj or rj−1 = rj .
Output: The monic polynomial R ∈ IR[X] of degree h with R(rj) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , h}.
1: Compute the binary expansion
∑t
k=0 hk2
k of h;
2: i← 1; j ← 1; // initialize counting variables i and j
3: R← 1; T ← 1; // initialize result polynomial R and temporary polynomial T
4: P ← 0; Q← 0; // non-initialized arrays of polynomials
5: while j ≤ h do
6: if Im(rj) 6= 0 then
7: Pi ← X2 − 2Re(rj)X + |rj |2;
8: i← i+ 1; j ← j + 2; // increase counting variables
9: else
10: if T = 1 then
11: T ← X − rj ;
12: else
13: Pi ← productPolynomialStandard(T,X − rj);
14: T ← 1; i← i+ 1; // adapt T and increase counter i
15: j ← j + 1;
16: if T 6= 1 then
17: R← T ; // h is odd
18: j ← 2; // j stores the current exponent of 2 in the binary expansion of h
19: while j ≤ t do
20: i← 1; // initialize i for the current loop
21: u← h−
∑j−1
k=0 hk2
k
2j ; // u is current upper bound of counter i
22: while i ≤ u do
23: Qi ← productPolynomialKaratsuba(P2i−1, P2i);
24: i← i+ 1;
25: if hj−1 = 1 then
26: R← productPolynomialHybrid(R,Pi);
27: P ← Q; Q← 0; // assign array of polynomial Q to P and release Q
28: j ← j + 1;
29: R← productPolynomialHybrid(R,P1);
30: return(R);
multiplications is equal to n2 and 2n2, respectively.
II. Next we turn to line 13. We multiply two monic, linear polynomials in IR[X] using
algorithm productPolynomialStandard. Hence according to Proposition 8.1.1 we have to
perform in each pass one addition and one multiplication. Hence the total amount of both
additions and multiplications is equal to
⌊
n1
2
⌋
.
III. If h is odd we pass through line 17. However, as R = 1 in this case we do not have to
add or multiply real numbers in this step.
IV. Now let us look at line 23. In each pass we multiply two polynomials of degree 2j−1 using
algorithm productPolynomialKaratsuba. Thus, according to Proposition 8.1.2, for fixed j
we have to perform 2
j−1(5·2j−1−3)
2 additions and
2j−1(2j−1+1)
2 multiplications in IR, respectively.
In all, for fixed j we pass u(j) =
∑t
k=j hk ·2k−j times through line 23. Hence the contribution
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of line 23 to the number of additions in IR is
t∑
j=2
u(j) · 2j−2(5 · 2j−1 − 3) =
t∑
j=2
2j−2(5 · 2j−1 − 3) · t∑
k=j
hk · 2k−j

=
1
4
·
t∑
j=2
(5 · 2j−1 − 3) · t∑
k=j
hk · 2k
 .
Furthermore, the total amount of multiplications in IR is
t∑
j=2
u(j) · 2j−2(2j−1 + 1) = 1
4
·
t∑
j=2
(2j−1 + 1) · t∑
k=j
hk · 2k
 .
V. We turn to the lines 26 and 29.
For each j ∈ {2, . . . , t} if hj−1 6= 0 we multiply in line 26 monic polynomials of degree∑j−2
k=0 hk2
k and 2j−1. Obviously we have
∑j−2
k=0 hk2
k < 2j−1/2 if and only if hj−2 = 0. If this
is true, productPolynomialHybrid invokes algorithm productPolynomialStandard. Thus
according to Proposition 8.1.1 the number of both additions and multiplications in IR is
2j−1 ·∑j−2k=0 hk2k in this case. Otherwise the number of additions and multiplications in IR is
2j−2(5 · 2j−1 − 3) and 2j−2 · (2j−1 + 1), respectively. If hj−1 6= 0, the number of additions for
fixed j may be written as
2j−1 ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 ·
(
2j−2 · (5 · 2j−1 − 3)− 2j−1 ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k
)
= 2j−2 ·
(
2 · (1− hj−2) ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 · (5 · 2j−1 − 3)
)
.
If hj−1 6= 0, the number of multiplications for fixed j may be written as
2j−1 ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 ·
(
2j−2 · (2j−1 + 1)− 2j−1 ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k
)
= 2j−2 ·
(
2 · (1− hj−2) ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 · (2j−1 + 1)
)
.
Finally, in line 29 we multiply a monic polynomial of degree
∑t−1
k=0 hk2
k with a monic poly-
nomial of degree 2t. Hence we get the same formula as above for j = t + 1. We remark that
we always have hj−1 = 1 in this case.
Thus the contribution of the lines 26 and 29 to the number of additions is
t+1∑
j=2
hj−1 · 2j−2 ·
(
2 · (1− hj−2) ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 · (5 · 2j−1 − 3)
)
.
The corresponding number of multiplications is
t+1∑
j=2
hj−1 · 2j−2 ·
(
2 · (1− hj−2) ·
j−2∑
k=0
hk2k + hj−2 · (2j−1 + 1)
)
.
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The steps I-V yield the assertion. uunionsq
Unfortunately, Equations (8.1) and (8.2) are rather cumbersome. However, we discuss some
of their properties in what follows. First, as constituted in Section 8.1.3 the running time of
a multiplication is in general by far more time consuming than an addition. Thus the run
time of computePolynomialKaratsuba is dominated by the quantity Nm,3. However, for fixed
h, Nm,3 is maximal for maximal n2. In Section 8.2.2 we explained n2 ≤ h−22 for even h and
n2 = h−12 for odd h. Hence to get upper bounds of Nm,3 in case of even h we only consider
the worst case n2 = h−22 in what follows.
Second, let t be fixed. In line 29 algorithm productPolynomialStandard is invoked if and
only if ht−1 = 0. Let hI be some class number with 2t+ 1 ≤ hI ≤ 2t+ 2t−1−1. The difference
of the numbers Nm,3(hI) − Nm,3(hI − 1) is dominated by the difference of the number of
multiplications in line 29. This difference is 2t · (hI − 2t) − 2t · (hI − 2t − 1) = 2t. Thus
Nm,3(hI)−Nm,3(hI −1) is approximately constant in the interval [2t, 2t+ 2t−1−1]. Hence we
expect Nm,3 to grow linearly in this interval. This behavior is well demonstrated in Figure
8.2. We easily recover a linear growth in the intervals [210, 210 + 29 − 1] = [1024, 1535],
[211, 211 + 210 − 1] = [2048, 3071], and [212, 212 + 211 − 1] = [4096, 6143], respectively.
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Figure 8.2: Number of multiplications of real numbers to compute a polynomial if
its roots are given. We plot the corresponding numbers Nm,2(h) and Nm,3(h) of
computePolynomialReal and computePolynomialKaratsuba, respectively, for class numbers
h with 50 ≤ h ≤ 5000.
Third, again we fix t. If ht−1 = 1, then productPolynomialKaratsuba is invoked in line 29.
Let hI be some class number with 2t+2t−1 +1 ≤ hI ≤ 2t+1−1. The difference of the numbers
Nm,3(hI) − Nm,3(hI − 1) is now decreasing, as we deduce from Figure 8.2. We remark that
the difference of the number of multiplications in line 29 of computePolynomialKaratsuba is
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0 in this case.
Finally, we derive an upper bound of Nm,3. We first estimate the sum
∑t
k=j hk ·2k in Equation
(8.2). As we have j ≥ 2, we conclude ∑tk=j hk · 2k ≤∑tk=2 2k = 2t+1 − 4. Making use of this
upper bound we get
1
4
·
t∑
j=2
(2j−1 + 1) · t∑
k=j
hk · 2k
 ≤ 1
4
·
t∑
j=2
(
(2j−1 + 1) · (2t+1 − 4))
= (2t−1 − 1) · (2t + t− 3) .
It remains to estimate the last sum in Equation (8.2). Obviously for each j, 2 ≤ j ≤ t+1, the
factor in the brackets is maximal if we have hj−2 = 1. Thus the sum is bounded by
∑t+1
j=2 2
j−2 ·
(2j−1 + 1) = 22t+1/3 + 2t − 5/3. Using 22t+1/3 < 22t we conclude Nm,3 = O(22t). Hence in
terms of the number of multiplications computePolynomialKaratsuba is of complexity O(h2),
too. However, the more sparse the binary expansion of h the worse our estimation becomes.
8.2.4 Comparing the Algorithms
In this section we compare the run times of our three algorithms to compute a polynomial
R if its roots are given. More precisely, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} let Na,i(h) and Nm,i(h) denote the
number of additions and multiplications in IR of the corresponding algorithm, respectively.
We present explicit values of Na,i(h) and Nm,i(h) for various class numbers h, respectively. We
give evidence that Nm,1(h) ≈ 4Nm,2(h) and Nm,2(h) < Nm,3(h). In addition, we discuss the
performance of either algorithm in practice. We show that computePolynomialKaratsuba is
about 15% to 35% faster in practice than computePolynomialReal.
We first turn to explicit values of Na,i(h) and Nm,i(h). In Table 8.1 we present data for class
numbers h with 200 ≤ h ≤ 5000. As usual we only consider the worst case, that is if h is even
we assume n1 = 2 and n2 = h−22 .
In addition, as mentioned above, a plot of Nm,2(h) and Nm,3(h) for class numbers h with
50 ≤ h ≤ 5000 is given in Figure 8.2. We remark that due to Proposition 8.2.2 Nm,2(h) grows
quadratically in h. Furthermore, according to our explanation on page 130 Nm,3(h) grows
linearly in the interval [2t, 2t + 2t−1 − 1].
Next, we present run times of all our three algorithms. In Table 8.2 we list CPU-timings of
our approaches for class numbers up to 2500. Furthermore, we remark that the run time of
computePolynomialReal is about a quarter of the run time of computePolynomialComplex.
This result was already claimed at the end of Section 8.2.2. Its corresponding theoretical
fraction is Nm,2Nm,1 =
((h−1)h+2n2)/2
2(h−1)h ≈ 14 by Propositions 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. In addition, we deduce
from the last column in Table 8.2 that computePolynomialKaratsuba is about 15% to 35%
faster in practice than computePolynomialReal.
The large speed up of about 35% comes from class numbers 211 − a with some small a ≥ 0.
In general, the run time benefit of the Karatsuba algorithm with respect to the standard
algorithm should increase in intervals [2t + 2t−1, 2t+1], as we deduce from our discussion at
the end of Section 8.2.3 and from Figure 8.2. This behavior becomes more evident with
growing floating point precision, thus with growing t. Indeed Table 8.2 supports this claim.
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h n1 n2 Na,1 Na,2 Na,3 Nm,1 Nm,2 Nm,3
200 2 99 79600 19900 65732 79600 19999 14279
400 2 199 319200 79800 265468 319200 79999 56339
600 2 299 718800 179700 375848 718800 179999 114787
800 2 399 1278400 319600 1067552 1278400 319999 223599
1000 2 499 1998000 499500 1298436 1998000 499999 264407
1023 1 511 2091012 522753 1301759 2091012 523264 264958
1024 2 511 2095104 523776 1301760 2095104 524287 264959
1200 2 599 2877600 719400 1511660 2877600 719999 456595
1400 2 699 3917200 979300 1817016 3917200 979999 701955
1600 2 799 5116800 1279200 4282768 5116800 1279999 890479
1800 2 899 6476400 1619100 4982004 6476400 1619999 1006935
2000 2 999 7996000 1999000 5209804 7996000 1999999 1052611
2047 1 1023 8376324 2094081 5223423 8376324 2095104 1054718
2048 2 1023 8384512 2096128 5223424 8384512 2097151 1054719
2500 2 1249 12495000 3123750 6458073 12495000 3124999 2044278
5000 2 2499 49990000 12497500 25874740 49990000 12499999 8163799
Table 8.1: Number of additions and multiplications to compute a polynomial if its roots
are given. As usual Na,1 and Nm,1 denote the number of additions and multiplications in
IR, respectively, using computePolynomialComplex. In addition, Na,2 and Nm,2 denote the
number of additions and multiplications in IR, respectively, using computePolynomialReal.
Finally, Na,3 and Nm,3 denote the number of additions and multiplications in IR, respectively,
using computePolynomialKaratsuba.
8.3 The Algorithm computeClassPolynomial
In this section we explain our algorithm computeClassPolynomial(I, h). In addition, we
determine its complexity in terms of bit-operations. We will show in Theorem 8.3.1 that its
bit-complexity is equal to O(h6).
Input of the algorithm is an array I of length h storing the class invariants returned by
algorithm computeClassInvariants. In addition, the algorithm requires the class number
h. We stated in Section 8.2.4 that algorithm computePolynomialKaratsuba(I) is superior
to the further algorithms of Section 8.2. Hence algorithm computeClassPolynomial in-
vokes computePolynomialKaratsuba(I). Let R denote the polynomial returned by algorithm
computePolynomialKaratsuba(I). As we make use of floating point arithmetic, the coeffi-
cients of R are in general not in ZZ. However, if the floating point precision was chosen with
care, the coefficients are very close to integers.
We introduce a method round(x) to get the class polynomial C from R. Let R =
∑h
j=0 rjX
j ,
and let x denote one of the coefficients of R. Then round(x) returns bx + 1/2c, that is the
closest integer to x.
Theorem 8.3.1 The bit-complexity of computeClassPolynomial(I, h) is at most O(h6).
Proof: At the end of Section 8.2.3 we showed that computePolynomialKaratsuba requires
O(h2) multiplications of real numbers. In order to estimate the bit-complexity of a multi-
plication we proceed as in Section 7.3. More precisely, we assume each real number to be
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h ∆ Precision t1 t2 t3 t2/t1 t3/t2
200 -21311 32 1.14 0.24 0.19 0.210526 0.791667
400 -67031 69 5.37 1.11 0.88 0.206704 0.792793
600 -148511 111 14.27 3.44 2.54 0.241065 0.738372
800 -233999 152 30.53 6.53 5.34 0.213888 0.817764
1000 -412079 203 62.84 13.58 10.95 0.216104 0.806333
1023 -363359 201 63.18 13.33 10.84 0.210984 0.813203
1024 -328319 194 63.03 13.45 10.24 0.21339 0.761338
1200 -484679 238 103.28 22.44 16.95 0.217273 0.755348
1400 -666839 287 159.91 35.96 27.79 0.224876 0.772803
1600 -970679 344 257.04 58.62 45.56 0.228058 0.777209
1800 -982511 376 367.18 84.69 64.01 0.23065 0.755815
2000 -1275599 429 515.37 120.85 81.95 0.234492 0.678113
2047 -1634279 466 603.36 142.21 90.67 0.235697 0.637578
2048 -1333631 441 566.93 133.23 86.72 0.235003 0.650904
2500 -1958519 554 1147.86 289.43 219.87 0.252147 0.759666
Table 8.2: CPU-timings of our algorithms to compute a polynomial if its roots are given.
All timings are given in seconds and were measured on the Pentium III. For each h the
chosen discriminant ∆ is maximal with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆. The precision comes from the
formula in Table 9.1. t1, t2, and t3 denote the running times of computePolynomialComplex,
computePolynomialReal, and computePolynomialKaratsuba, respectively.
Algorithm 8.7: computeClassPolynomial(I, h)
Input: An array I returned by computeClassInvariants, and the class number h.
Output: The class polynomial C ∈ ZZ[X] of degree h corresponding to I.
R← computePolynomialKaratsuba(I);
j ← 0;
while j ≤ h do
cj ← round(rj); j ← j + 1;
return(
∑h
j=0 cjX
j);
of bitlength O(F ), where F denotes the floating point precision in use. In addition, using
standard techniques for multiplying real numbers, we assume a multiplication to be of bit-
complexity O(F 2). Hence, making use of lemma 7.3.1, the bit-complexity of a multiplication
is O(h4). As our chosen algorithm for a multiplication is assumed to be not optimal, we get
an upper bound of the bit-complexity. uunionsq
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Chapter 9
Precisions for Class Polynomial
Computations
In this chapter we investigate the floating point precision to compute a class polynomial. We
present precisions yielding a correct class polynomial H∆, G∆, and W∆, respectively; these
polynomials are defined in Section 2.2.3. The floating point precision in use is crucial for the
running time in practice. We assume that an imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ is given.
The result of this chapter is our algorithm getPrecision(∆) which returns the corresponding
precision for either polynomial; the algorithm is explained below. As usual we write C(∆)
for the set of reduced representatives of ideal classes of discriminant ∆. An element of C(∆)
is denoted by (a, b, c).
The main result of this chapter is as follows: Let
L =
pi
√|∆|
log 10
·
∑
(a,b,c)∈C(∆)
1
a
. (9.1)
If ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆, there is an α ∈ [0, 0.025] such that using the precision αL yields the
correct Weber polynomial W∆. The factor α depends on the platform and the implementation
of the underlying multiprecision package. Furthermore, we show that for our environment
we may set α = 0.015 . This new proposed precision gives a significant speed up in practice,
especially in case of discriminants having a large class number. For instance, if the class
number of ∆ is about 3000, our new precision has a run time benefit of about 45% with
respect to previously proposed precisions, as we show in Section 9.2. In addition, we provide
a proceeding to find an appropriate value of α for the current environment in use.
We restrict our thorough investigations to Weber polynomials, as only this class of polynomials
is feasible for discriminants of high class numbers. Our aim is to derive an easy formula for
the floating point precision to compute the Weber polynomial W∆. In case of the ring class
polynomial H∆ and the polynomial G∆ we investigate whether the formulae for the precision
published in articles (e.g. [LZ94]) delivers a correct polynomial. We will show that the answer
actually is ”yes”. We next introduce two terms which we need in our further proceeding.
Definition 9.1.1 Let C be a class polynomial. A minimal precision denoted by P is the
minimal positive integer having the following two properties:
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1. Using P as a floating point precision in cryptoCurve yields the correct polynomial C.
2. For all precisions F with F ≥ P we get the correct polynomial, too.
A sufficient precision is a floating point precision yielding the correct polynomial C.
Obviously we have P = max{F ∈ IN : F is not a sufficient precision}+1. Unfortunately, there
is no theoretically proven formula for a sufficient precision in case of any class polynomial.
Hence, we make use of some heuristics to justify our formula αL as a sufficient precision to
compute W∆. Nevertheless, as shown in Section 9.2 our result bases on the computation of
P for a large number of discriminants. Our proposals for the precisions to compute a class
polynomial may be found in Table 9.1. The precisions in case of G∆ and H∆ are due to
Lay/Zimmer ([LZ94]), respectively.
Condition on ∆ Class Polynomial proposed precision
∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3 W∆ d0.015Le
∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3 G∆ d(L+ h/4 + 5)/3e
None H∆ L+ dh/4e+ 5
Table 9.1: Sufficient precisions to compute a class polynomial W∆, G∆, and H∆, respectively.
Our algorithm getPrecision(∆) is quite easy to explain. It requires an imaginary quadra-
tic discriminant and, depending on the value of ∆ mod 24, returns a sufficient precision to
compute the class polynomial corresponding to ∆ as listed in Table 9.1.
This chapter is organized as follows: As our main formula αL bases on observations on the ring
class polynomial H∆, we first review the precision to compute H∆ in Section 9.1. In addition,
Section 9.1 deals with the precision to determine G∆. Next, in Section 9.2 we investigate in
detail the precision to compute Weber polynomials.
9.1 Sufficient Precisions to Compute the Class Polynomials
H∆ and G∆
In this section we derive a formula for a sufficient precision to compute the ring class poly-
nomial H∆. We discuss two proposals, that is the precision proposed by [AM93]/[BSS99] and
the precision which may be found in [LZ94]. However, none of them gives evidence that
their proposal actually is appropriate. We present practical data supporting the formula of
Lay/Zimmer [LZ94]. In addition, we present a formula for the precision in case of the class
polynomial G∆. As usual we write H and G instead of H∆ and G∆, respectively.
Similar to [AM93]/[BSS99] we start with some heuristics to get a proposal for the floating
point precision of H. We first recall that for a reduced representative Q = (a, b, c) we set τQ =
(−b+ i√|∆|)/(2a) and q = e2piiτQ . Thus |q| = e−pi√|∆|/a. Hence, for fixed ∆, |q| only depends
on a, and using the Fourier series of j (see Section 7.1.1) we get |j(τQ)| ≈ |1/q| = epi
√
|∆|/a. We
deduce that the constant term of H is up to sign of order of magnitude epi
√
|∆|∑(a,b,c)∈C(∆) 1/a.
In most cases the constant term of H is up to sign the biggest coefficient; for instance, we
refer to the third column of Table 9.2. Furthermore, its decimal length can be approximated
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by Equation (9.1). In order to compute H two different proposals for sufficient precisions F
are known:
1. Atkin, Morain ([AM93]) and Blake, Seroussi, Smart ([BSS99]): F =
(
h
bh/2c
) · L+ 10 ,
2. Lay, Zimmer ([LZ94]): F = L+ h/4 + 5 .
The sufficient precision proposed in [AM93] and [BSS99] bases on the observation that the
coefficients of H are symmetric functions in the h singular moduli j(τQ). More precisely, if
we write the ring class polynomial H as H =
∑h
i=0 aiX
i, we have ah = 1 and
ah−i = (−1)i ·
∑
1≤k1<...<ki≤h
j(τQk1 ) · . . . · j(τQki ) , 1 ≤ i ≤ h . (9.2)
Let i be fixed. Then the decimal length of the absolute value of each addend in (9.2) is
bounded by L. Furthermore, there are at most
(
h
bh/2c
)
addends, namely for i = bh/2c. Thus(
h
bh/2c
) · L is an upper bound of the decimal length of |ai|. However, it turns out that this
upper bound is not applicable in practice and rather bad; for example, if ∆ = −21311 we
compute (
h
bh/2c
)
· L+ 10 = 9.05485 · 1058 · 2107.02 + 10 = 1.90876 · 1062 .
However, Lay and Zimmer only estimate the decimal length of |a0|; in addition, they vary it
by adding a linear term in h. Obviously, their proposed sufficient precision is much lower than
the value proposed by [AM93] and [BSS99]. Again, looking at ∆ = −21311, their proposal
gives a sufficient precision of 2163 .
Basing on the sufficient precision of Lay and Zimmer we computed some dozens of ring class
polynomials using the precision F = L + dh/4e + 5. The discriminants are divisible by 3
and have even class numbers in the interval [200, 208]. More precisely, for each even class
number h ∈ [200, 208] we computed H for the n largest discriminants of class number h,
where 18 ≤ n ≤ 34. In any case we actually get the ring class polynomial; we decide whether
H is the ring class polynomial by using a probabilistic correctness test similar to the test
isWeberPolynomial which we will present in Section 9.2. Furthermore, we always have
F > max{log10 |ai| : 0 ≤ i ≤ h}. Our results are listed in Table 9.2. We conclude that in case
of H the precision of Table 9.1 is sufficient.
Finally, we turn to the computation of a polynomial G. The roots of G are of the form
ζk3γ2(τQ) where k is an integer. The relation j(τ) = γ2(τ)
3 shows |j(τ)| = |γ2(τ)|3. Thus, if
F is a sufficient precision to compute H, the precision F/3 should be a sufficient precision to
determine G. As in the case of the ring class polynomial we determined dozens of polynomials
G using the precision of Table 9.1, and in either case we get the correct polynomial. We remark
that this precision was already proposed by Lay and Zimmer ([LZ94]).
9.2 Precision to Compute Weber Polynomials
In this section we investigate sufficient precisions to compute the Weber polynomial W∆ in
practice. We simply write W for a Weber polynomial in what follows. Our result is that for a
given discriminant ∆ with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆, αL is a sufficient precision, where L is defined
in Equation (9.1) and α ∈ [0, 0.025]. This precision is much lower than the precision proposed
by Lay and Zimmer ([LZ94]). We show that an implementation using our new precision is
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h number of number of ∆, sample ∆ maxblog10 |ai|c+ 1, index i F
tested ∆ for which |a0| 0 ≤ i ≤ h of max |ai|
is not maximal
200 18 1 -29559 2187 0 2245
-48351 2485 2 2547
202 34 3 -35439 2347 0 2409
-341244 3122 2 3190
204 28 3 -31191 2260 0 2319
-36039 2343 1 2406
206 18 3 -51351 2697 0 2756
-113991 3663 4 3731
208 18 1 -34359 2341 0 2403
-43911 2397 1 2460
Table 9.2: Statistics for the coefficients of some ring class polynomials.
about 45% faster than the same implementation using the precision of Lay and Zimmer. The
factor α depends on the environment in use, that is the multiprecision package, the computer
algebra library, and the compiler. At the end of this section we describe a proceeding to find
an appropriate value α for the current environment.
As in case of the ring class polynomial H we present some heuristics for deriving our main
formula αL. The roots of W are of the form ζk48g(τQ) where k is an integer and g ∈ {f, f1, f2}.
We have
j(τ) =
(f(τ)24 − 16)3
f(τ)24
=
(f1(τ)24 + 16)3
f1(τ)24
=
(f2(τ)24 + 16)3
f2(τ)24
.
Hence, assuming |g(τ)|  1, we estimate |j(τ)| ≈ |g(τ)|48. Thus, if F is a sufficient precision
to compute the ring class polynomial, F/48 should be a sufficient precision to determine W.
Indeed, Lay and Zimmer claim that (L + h/4 + 5)/47 + 1 is a sufficient precision for Weber
polynomials.
However, we present data showing that even αL is a sufficient precision. As already mentioned
the factor α depends on the environment in use. As shown below, for our environment we
may set α = 0.0150 < 148 = 0.0208 . Using this precision we get a significant speed up in
practice to compute W. In order to confirm our claim, we identified the minimal precision P
for a large set of discriminants.
We explain how we determine the minimal precision P for a given discriminant ∆. This
task is accomplished by our algorithm findMinimalPrecision(∆). Its input is an imaginary
quadratic discriminant ∆ with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3. The algorithm outputs the
minimal precision P for the used environment to compute the class polynomial W.
We first describe how to get the Weber polynomial W. We are convinced that W actually is
the Weber polynomial if our probabilistic correctness test isWeberPolynomial(∆,W ) returns
true. The algorithm requires an imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8,
3 - ∆. In addition, it gets a monic polynomial W ∈ ZZ[X] as input. isWeberPolynomial
proceeds as follows: It first determines a prime p of bitlength about 60 which is suitable for
the CM-method of discriminant ∆. As usual we write p = (t2 −∆y2)/4 with (t, y) ∈ IN2. If
W mod p does not have a root in IFp, the algorithm returns false. Otherwise, let cp denote
such a root. Making use of cp the algorithm computes twisted elliptic curves E1 and E2 over
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IFp as explained at the end of Section 2.3.4. If W is the Weber polynomial, one of the curves
is of order p + 1 − t. Let P1 ∈ E1(IFp) \ {O} and P2 ∈ E2(IFp) \ {O} be randomly chosen
points on E1 and E2 over IFp, respectively. If [p + 1 − t]P1 6= O and [p + 1 − t]P2 6= O,
isWeberPolynomial returns false. Otherwise it returns true. The probability of accepting
a false polynomial is negligible in practice.
In order to compute W we make use of our algorithm computePolynomial(∆, F ). This algo-
rithm mainly consists of the algorithms classGroup(∆), computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R),
and computeClassPolynomial(I, h). However, in computeClassInvariants(∆, h, R) we set
the floating point precision to F instead of invoking getPrecision(∆). Our initial choice of
F is the sufficient precision proposed by Lay and Zimmer. We are not aware of any example
where the computation within this precision failed. However, if isWeberPolynomial returns
false for the first computed polynomial we iteratively increase F by 1 until we find a poly-
nomial passing isWeberPolynomial. In this case, findMinimalPrecision returns the last
used precision. If our first computed polynomial turns out to be the Weber polynomial, we
successively decrease the precision by 1 and compute a polynomial Wˆ within this precision,
until we have W 6= Wˆ for the first time. In this case, findMinimalPrecision returns the
last but one precision.
Algorithm 9.1: findMinimalPrecision(∆)
Input: An imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3.
Output: The minimal precision P yielding the Weber polynomial W corresponding to ∆.
L← pi
√
|∆|
log 10 ·
∑
(a,b,c)∈C(∆)
1
a ; F ← d(L+ h/4 + 5)/47 + 1e;
W ← computePolynomial(∆, F );
if isWeberPolynomial(∆,W ) = false then
while true do
F ← F + 1;
W ← computePolynomial(∆, F );
if isWeberPolynomial(∆,W ) = true then
return (F );
else
while true do
F ← F − 1;
Wˆ ← computePolynomial(∆, F );
if W 6= Wˆ then
return (F + 1);
We derive our main formula F = αL. Using algorithm findMinimalPrecision(∆) we com-
puted the minimal precision P for lots of discriminants ∆ as listed in Table 9.3. We remark
that we have ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and ∆ 6≡ 0 mod 3 for all discriminants.
In all we tested 62103 discriminants of various different class numbers. All tests were per-
formed on the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi. In Figure 9.1 we plot P/L as a function of L for all
these discriminants. We see that we have P/L < 0.015 for all tested discriminants. Hence,
α = 0.015 seems to be a good choice. In addition, for some randomly chosen discriminants we
determined P on the Pentium III, too; we got the same results as on the SUN UltraSPARC-
IIi. Furthermore, we successfully used our precision αL to compute the Weber polynomials
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h condition on ∆ number of tested ∆
200 to 499 |∆| ≤ 6 · 106 51603
500 to 999 the first 20 discriminants 10000
1000 to 1495, 5 | h the first 5 discriminants 500
Table 9.3: Test discriminants to derive the precision for Weber polynomials. All discrimi-
nants are congruent 1 modulo 8 and not divisible by 3.
for discriminants of large class number in Section 11.1.2, that is for discriminants of class
numbers up to 15000.
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Figure 9.1: Minimal precisions P to compute a class polynomial W. We plot P/L as a
function of L for all discriminants of Table 9.3.
We next demonstrate the run time benefit of our new floating point precision to compute W.
Let FL denote the precision proposed by Lay/Zimmer, that is we have FL = d(L + h/4 +
5)/47+1e. We choose discriminants of class numbers in the range 3000 to 5000. More precisely,
using our database delta h which stores discriminants according to their class numbers, for
each class number h with 3000 ≤ h ≤ 5000, 500 | h we determined the maximal discriminant
∆ of class number h with the boundary conditions ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and 3 - ∆. If ∆ denotes
such a discriminant, we invoke computePolynomial(∆, F ) using F = dαLe and F = FL,
respectively. All our timings are measured on the Pentium III. The results are given in Table
9.4.
We deduce from Table 9.4 that the fraction of our new precision to the precision FL of
Lay/Zimmer is approximately constant in the tested interval. In addition, we see that our
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h ∆ dαLe tα FL tL dαLe/FL tα/tL
3000 -2668511 678 515.98 978 939.89 0.69325 0.54898
3500 -3670631 811 910.49 1171 1725.9 0.69257 0.52755
4000 -4728671 941 1659.8 1357 2516.4 0.69344 0.65959
4500 -5899871 1076 1973.3 1552 3355.3 0.69330 0.58811
5000 -6961631 1195 2703.4 1722 5116.6 0.69396 0.52836
Table 9.4: Run time benefit of our new proposed precision αL to compute a class polynomial
W. All discriminants are maximal of the given class number with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and 3 - ∆.
tα and tL denote the timing of computePolynomial(∆, F ) with F = dαLe and F = FL in
seconds on the Pentium III, respectively.
precision yields a run time benefit of up to 47% for discriminants of large class numbers. This is
a rather promising result to compute Weber class polynomials corresponding to discriminants
of large class numbers.
Finally, we define a proceeding to determine an appropriate value of α for the current envi-
ronment in use. In our above sample of discriminants from Table 9.3 we find the following
discriminants of largest values P/L; these values of P/L may be seen in Figure 9.1.
∆ P/L h ∆ P/L h
-582223 0.014299 253 -759247 0.0144964 316
-1648903 0.0143295 400 -412367 0.0144966 436
-1133647 0.0143332 312 -1026823 0.0145172 384
-1109263 0.0143841 390 -1387687 0.0147036 384
-1706023 0.0144432 408 -2334655 0.0149082 424
Table 9.5: Largest values of P/L for the discriminants of Table 9.3.
We assume that the largest values P/L are the same for all environments. Hence we first
determine the fraction P/L for all discriminants of Table 9.5. The maximum of these values
is assumed to be in [0, 0.025]. Then we simply choose
α =
d1000 ·max{P/L}e
1000
.
This gives an appropriate choice of α. The program find appropriate alpha in the appl-
directory of our library gec implements this proceeding and may be used in order to determine
an appropriate value α for the environment in use.
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Chapter 10
Complexity and Security
Considerations
We investigate the bit-complexity of our main algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0). We develop
a closed formula of the bit-complexity of cryptoCurve in Section 10.1. The result is Formula
(10.1). Next, in Section 10.2 we discuss the number of ”different” elliptic curves which may
be output by cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) if the input is fixed. The term ”different” depends on
the underlying attacker model. We discuss two rather strong attacker models and conclude
that in each model the number of different curves is large. This has an important implication
with respect to security as the curves returned by cryptoCurve are not special and hence
seem to be not amenable to special attacks.
10.1 Complexity of cryptoCurve
We derive the bit-complexity of our main algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0). As explained
in Chapter 3, our main algorithm consists of the subalgorithms findPrime(r0, k0, h0) and
findCurve(∆, p, r, k), respectively. Hence, we have to determine the respective bit-complexity.
Let us first consider algorithm findPrime. Depending on whether a prime field is chosen, it
either invokes findPrimeDeltaFixed or findDiscriminant. However, as explained in Chap-
ter 5 we were not able to determine the complexity of the latter algorithm. Thus our following
discussion is only valid if findPrime invokes findPrimeDeltaFixed. In addition, we assume
that ∆ is chosen such that h(∆) = h0. Using the reasonable assumptions of Gross and Smith
in [GS00] we proved in Theorem 4.3.3 that if ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 the bit-complexity of finding a
generalized twin prime pair (pi, pi + 1) ∈ O∆ with log2 pipi = log2 r0k0 is O(h20 · log5 r0k0/|∆|).
Furthermore, we assumed that this complexity is an upper bound of the complexity of all
optimized algorithms in Chapter 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3, respectively. We justified these as-
sumptions in the corresponding sections. Hence making use of Theorem 2.1.17 we conclude
O(log5 r0k0) for the bit-complexity of findPrime.
We next turn to algorithm findCurve. The most time-consuming step of this subalgorithm is
algorithm findRoot. Besides algorithm find root the bit-complexity of either subalgorithm
of findRoot is already determined. In Theorem 10.1.1 we present the bit-complexity of
find root.
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Theorem 10.1.1 Let p be a rational prime and C ∈ ZZ[X] a polynomial of degree d which
splits modulo p into d different linear polynomials. The bit-complexity of find root(p, C) is
O(d2 log d log log d · log4 p).
Proof: As stated in Chapter 3 algorithm find root makes use of a very efficient polynomial
arithmetic due to Shoup. In his paper [Sho95] Shoup investigates the complexity of his
algorithm in terms of scalar operations modulo p. On page 4 in [Sho95] he states that his
algorithm takes O(d2 log d + d2 log d log log d · log p) scalar operations in IFp. However, such
a scalar operation mainly consists of a Euclidian step and is thus of bit-complexity at most
O(log3 p) (see [Coh95], p.13). Asymptotically this proves the assertion. uunionsq
In Table 10.1 we summarize the bit-complexities of the subalgorithms of findRoot.
Sub-algorithm Bit-complexity Reference
classGroup O(h20 log
3 h0) Proposition 6.1.2
computeClassInvariants O(h60 log h0) Theorem 7.3.2
computeClassPolynomial O(h60) Theorem 8.3.1
find root O(h20 log h0 log log h0 · log4 r0k0) Theorem 10.1.1
Table 10.1: Bit-complexities of the subalgorithms of findRoot
The final computation of a root jp of the ring class polynomial H modulo p in findRoot is
of bit-complexity log3 r0k0 and thus can be neglected. The same holds for the decision in
algorithm findCurve which of the twisted elliptic curves is of order rk. Thus, in all we have
shown the following theorem.
Theorem 10.1.2 If no prime field is chosen in algorithm findPrime, the bit-complexity of
algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) is at most
O(log4 r0k0(log r0k0 + h20 log h0 log log h0) + h
6
0 log h0) . (10.1)
10.2 Security Considerations
In this section we investigate the number of different elliptic curves that may be returned
by cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) for some fixed input (r0, k0, h0). We call such a curve a reachable
elliptic curve for (r0, k0, h0). More precisely, let (r0, k0, h0) be given. Our algorithm outputs a
curve having a maximal order of class number at least h0 as endomorphism ring. If no prime
field is set in algorithm findPrime, there are no further restrictions for the discriminant of
the endomorphism ring. However, if a field is chosen, we have to consider the boundary
conditions ∆ > −6.000.000 and h(∆) ≤ 2000. In addition, for efficiency reasons we assume
3 - ∆, that is the Hilbert class field is generated by the polynomial G. We call an elliptic
curve reachable if it respects the requirements for ∆.
Conversely, if such a curve is given, it is easy to see that this curve is the output of our
algorithm with a non-vanishing probability. Let E denote this curve and let IFp be its field
of definition. We furthermore assume, that its cardinality N and factorization N = rk
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are known. Otherwise, we make use of the efficient SEA-algorithm to determine N ; using
trial division we find k and finally r. Next, using (p + 1 − N)2 − 4p we easily compute the
fundamental discriminant ∆. This is true since |∆| is the minimal divisor of |(p+1−N)2−4p|
such that −|∆| is an imaginary quadratic discriminant. Once knowing ∆, p, r, and k we invoke
findCurve(∆, p, r, k). Let jp denote the root of H mod p returned by algorithm findRoot,
and finally let E′ denote the elliptic curve returned by cryptoCurve. With probability 1/h
the j-invariants of E and E′ are the same; hence assuming that a IFp-twisted curve of E is
not cryptographically strong, with probability 1/h E and E′ are IFq-isomorph and may thus
be regarded as the same curve.
An important implication with respect to security is that the more curves are reachable the
less ”special” and hence more secure the curves are. We distinguish two forms of attacks. For
each model of attacks we count the number of different reachable curves. We get different
results in either model. However, to our knowledge both models are rather strong, that is
no real attacker is able to perform the described attacks in practice. Hence, in practice the
number of different curves is larger than in either attacker model.
We investigate the following attacker models: Our first model of attacks assumes that the
adversary is able to compute the lift E of E over the Hilbert class field and solves the ECDLP
in E . We call this scenario the lift-attack model, and we discuss the number of different curves
in this model in Section 10.2.1. We remark that the lift-attack model is the strictest security
model and that there is no evidence that a lift-attack will ever be feasible. Next, we assume
that the ECDLP only depends on the j-invariant of the curve. More precisely, given two
elliptic curves E1 and E2 over IFp with j(E1) = j(E2), the ECDLP in E1(IFp) may be reduced
to the ECDLP in E2(IFp) in polynomial time. This model is called the j-attack model. We
discuss the j-attack model in Section 10.2.2.
In both cases we show that there is a large number of different elliptic curves which may be
returned by our algorithm. Throughout this section let G be a point of order r in E(IFp) and
for some l with 1 ≤ l ≤ r we set P = [l]G. Hence, given G and P the ECDLP consists in
computing the integer l.
10.2.1 Number of Curves in the Lift-Attack Model
In this section we discuss the number of different elliptic curves over a prime field in the
lift-attack model. We first explain the lift of an elliptic curve. Let E be an elliptic curve
over a prime field IFp with End(E) = O∆, where O∆ is a maximal order. In addition, let
L be the Hilbert class field of O∆ . A lift of E over L is an elliptic curve E defined over L
with End(E) = O∆ and such that there is a prime P of L over pZZ with OL /P = IFp and
E = E mod P.
In the lift-attack model we assume that an adversary is able to perform some attack on a
lift E of E. More precisely, the attacker computes lifted points G of G and H of H in E(L),
respectively, and solves the ECDLP for G andH. We have the following commutative diagram.
G [l]G−−−−→ Pxlift xlift
G
[l]G−−−−→ P
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Hence, two curves are different in the lift-attack model if and only if their endomorphism rings
have different discriminants. Thus we have to count all fundamental discriminants ∆ of class
number between 200 and 2000 such that 3 - ∆ and ∆ > −6.000.000. As we have different lower
bounds of the cofactors for ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, and ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, respectively, we
distinguish these three cases. Let D0(h), D1(h), andD5(h), denote the number of fundamental
discriminants ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, and ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 of class number h, respectively,
having the properties cited above. For example, we have D0(200) = 1484, D1(200) = 200, and
D5(200) = 1772. The numbers Di(h) are rather volatile. Hence for 200 ≤ h ≤ 2000 we plot
their aggregate number
∑h
k=200Di(k) in Figure 10.1. The values Di(h) for 200 ≤ h ≤ 2000
may be estimated from Figure 10.1, too.
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Figure 10.1: Number of different elliptic curves in the lift-attack model: Aggregate numbers∑h
k=200Di(k) for i ∈ {0, 1, 5} and 200 ≤ h ≤ 2000.
We conclude that there are sufficiently many fundamental discriminants inducing elliptic
curves for use in cryptography. For instance, we have
2000∑
k=200
D0(k) = 419201 ,
2000∑
k=200
D1(k) = 373051 ,
2000∑
k=200
D5(k) = 376046 .
10.2.2 Number of Curves in the j-attack model
In this section we determine the number of different elliptic curves defined over a finite prime
field in the j-attack model. This model assumes the existence of a polynomial time reduction
of the ECDLP for curves of identical j-invariants. More precisely, two elliptic curves over
IFp are considered as different if and only if their j-invariants are different. Hence, for a
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given elliptic curve E over IFp all IFp-isomorphic and all IFp-twisted curves are considered as
essentially the same one.
In case of IFp-isomorphic curves the polynomial time reduction is easy to see. Let E = (a, b) be
an elliptic curve defined over IFp, and assume the ECDLP to be easy in E(IFp). In addition,
assume E′ = (a′, b′) to be IFp-isomorphic to E. Theorem 2.3.21 shows the existence of an
element α ∈ IF×p with (aα4, bα6) = (a′, b′). If either b = 0 or a′ = 0 we have α4 = a′/a or
α6 = b′/b, respectively. Otherwise α2 = ab′/(a′b) follows. Hence, the computation of α is
polynomial in log p. The polynomial reduction of the ECDLP in E′(IFp) to the ECDLP in
E(IFp) is shown in the following diagram.
G′ = (x′0, y′0)
[l]G′−−−−→ P ′ = (x′1, y′1)yE′→E yE′→E
G = (x′0α−2, y′0α−3)
[l]G−−−−→ P = (x′1α−2, y′1α−3)
Let us turn to IFp-twisted curves. We are not aware of any polynomial time reduction in
log p between IFp-twisted curves. If E′ = (a′, b′) is IFp-twisted to E, there exists a non-
square β ∈ IF×p with (aβ2, bβ3) = (a′, b′). If a′ 6= 0 6= b, which is in general the case, we
have β = ab′/(a′b). Hence, the computation of β is polynomial in log p. However, there is no
isomorphism E′ → E which is defined over IFp. Over IFp2 an isomorphism may be defined
using a square root γ ∈ IFp2 of β. This is an obvious consequence of (aγ4, bγ6) = (a′, b′). The
polynomial time reduction of the ECDLP in E′(IFp2) to the ECDLP in E(IFp2) is shown in
the following diagram.
G′ = (x′0, y′0)
[l]G′−−−−→ P ′ = (x′1, y′1)yE′→E yE′→E
G = (x′0γ−2, y′0γ−3)
[l]G−−−−→ P = (x′1γ−2, y′1γ−3)
We remark that from an attacker’s point of view the assumptions on the reduction for twisted
curves are rather optimistic. Hence concerning security the j-attack model is very strong.
We next turn to the number of different cryptographically strong elliptic curves in the j-attack
model. We fix a discriminant ∆. Then the number of such curves is essentially equal to the
number of primes p of the form (t2 −∆y2)/4 such that either p+ 1− t or p+ 1 + t is nearly
prime. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 we are only able to determine this number in the
case ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. Nevertheless, we assume that in case of ∆ ≡ 0 mod 4 and ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8
the number of curves is of same order of magnitude, respectively.
In order to derive a formula for the number of different cryptographically strong elliptic curves
of discriminant ∆ in the j-attack model, let ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 be fundamental and not divisible
by 3. Furthermore, let O denote the maximal order of discriminant ∆. We are only interested
in primes p suitable for the CM-method such that either p+ 1− t or p+ 1 + t is prime, too.
As discussed in Section 4.3 this is equivalent to the existence of a generalized twin prime
(pi, pi+ 1) ∈ O2 . We write T (b,∆) for the number of twin primes in O with blog2 pipic+ 1 = b.
In addition, as |t| < 2√p, the probability of blog2 pipic 6= blog2(pi + 1)(pi + 1)c is negligible.
Hence we may assume that T (b,∆) is the number of primes p of bitlength b such that p+1+ t
is prime of bitlength b, too.
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From Section 4.3 we know that T (b,∆) is equal to the numerator in Equation (4.8), that is
T (b,∆) =
PN (∆)
√|∆|
2pih2
∫ 2b−1
2b−1
dy
(log y)2
. (10.2)
In Lemma 4.3.2 we have shown that C1 ≤ PN (∆) ≤ C2 with two (absolute) constants C1 and
C2. In addition, making use of the asymptotic formula
√|∆| = O(h) of Theorem 2.1.17 and
the approximation of the integral by O(2b/(log 2b)2) we deduce T (b,∆) = O(2b/(b2 ·h)). Thus
for fixed h the number of different elliptic curves in the j-attack model grows exponentially
in b. This behavior is well demonstrated by Figure 10.2. We choose ∆ = −125579, as ∆ is
the largest fundamental discriminant congruent 5 modulo 8 of class number 200. Figure 10.2
shows log10(T (b,−125579)) as a function of b.
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Figure 10.2: Number of different elliptic curves in the j-attack model: log10(T (b,−125579))
as a function of b for 160 ≤ b ≤ 300.
Although Equation (10.2) bases on conjectures of Gross and Smith [GS00] and our interpre-
tation of their claims, our practical tests shown in Figure 4.4 indicate that (10.2) is correct.
We conclude that in the j-attack model the number of different elliptic curves for use in
cryptography is very large. For illustration, assume that there are 6 · 109 people living on
earth. We further claim that we are only interested in an elliptic curve of prime order defined
over a 160-bit field and having an endomorphism ring of discriminant −125579. In this case
there are 3.3587189 · 1040 generalized twin primes pi such that pipi ∈ [2159, 2160 − 1]. Hence
each person gets 5.5978645 · 1030 different curves, and neither curve is chosen twice. Thus,
even in this very special case, the set of curves to choose from is sufficiently large.
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Chapter 11
Performance and Extensions of
cryptoCurve
This chapter first presents in Section 11.1 sample running times of our generating algorithm
cryptoCurve in practice. We measure its performance for various security levels, that is for
different input r0, k0, and h0. We show that the algorithm is able to generate an elliptic
curve suitable for use in cryptography in about 12 seconds on the Pentium III without any
precomputation. In addition, we will show that we are able to compute the coefficients of an
elliptic curve having an endomorphism ring of class number 15000 in about 24 minutes on
the Pentium III using a precomputed class polynomial.
Next, in Section 11.2 we extend our generating algorithm to find an elliptic curve such that
both the curve and a twist of this curve are of prime order and suitable for use in cryptography.
An application of this extension is a pseudo random number generator using elliptic curves, as
described in [Kal86]. Finally, Section 11.3 describes an algorithm to find an elliptic curve of
prime order over an Optimal Extension Field suitable for use in cryptography. This algorithm
uses our ideas published in [Bai01c] and [Bai01d].
11.1 Practical Performance of cryptoCurve
This section provides sample running times of our algorithm cryptoCurve in practice. All
timings are measured on the Pentium III. In addition, we refer to the data published in
[BB00]; these timings come from the SUN UltraSPARC-IIi. All our timings show that our
algorithm is very efficient in practice. First, in Section 11.1.1 we present running times of our
algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) without any precomputation and using the Fixed Discrim-
inant Approach of Chapter 4. It turns out that cryptoCurve is very fast for h0 ∈ {200; 1000}.
For example, if r0 = 2159, k0 = 4 and h0 = 200 the running time of cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0)
is less than 12 seconds on the Pentium III.
Second, in Section 11.1.2 we describe our database classPolynomials, which stores class poly-
nomials W for various discriminants. We provide timings for the computation of a class
polynomial W if a discriminant of large class number is chosen (that is a class number in
the range [3000; 15000] ). Furthermore, we give sample timings of cryptoCurve using the
database classPolynomials. Again, we use the Fixed Discriminant Approach of Chapter 4.
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For example, the running time to compute an elliptic curve having an endomorphism ring of
class number 15000 takes less than 24 minutes on the Pentium III. Hence our algorithm is
applicable even in case of discriminants having a very large class number.
Finally, we refer to Chapter B of the appendix for sample curves of the following sections.
11.1.1 Performance without Using Precomputed Class Polynomials
We present running times of our algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) without precomputation
of a class polynomial. All timings in this section come from the Fixed Discriminant Approach
of Chapter 4.
We first turn to timings of cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) for r0 = 2159, k0 = 4, and 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 1000.
The timings are given in Table 11.1. As the cofactor is allowed to be at most 4, we choose
∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and 3 - ∆. Thus our subalgorithm findRoot computes the class polynomial
W. In addition, for given h0 we choose ∆ to be maximal and fundamental with h(∆) = h0,
∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, and 3 - ∆. From Table 11.1 we conclude that even for a discriminant of class
number 1000 we are able to compute an elliptic curve in about 80 seconds. Furthermore, we
see that most of the time is spent to compute a root of W mod p.
∆ h0 time of computeClassInvariants time of time of
and computeClassPolynomial find root cryptoCurve
-21311 200 0.62 10.39 11.29
-30551 250 0.87 11.81 13.18
-34271 300 1.18 20.96 22.84
-47759 350 1.58 22.26 24.17
-67031 400 2.2 24.07 26.72
-75599 450 2.6 25.35 28.41
-96599 500 3.45 26.67 30.66
-148511 600 5.33 45.8 51.43
-185471 700 7.23 50.13 57.7
-233999 800 10.12 52.96 63.68
-299519 900 13.94 56.75 71.1
-412079 1000 19.47 59.63 79.81
Table 11.1: Running times of cryptoCurve(2159, 4, h0) on the Pentium III for 200 ≤ h0 ≤
1000. All timings are given in seconds. For given h0, the discriminant ∆ is maximal and
fundamental with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆ and h(∆) = h0. The class polynomial W is computed
during the algorithm.
In Section A.4 of the appendix we provide additional sample running times in case of k0 = 4.
For instance, Table A.1 on Page 204 lists timings of cryptoCurve(r0, 4, 200) on the Pentium III
for r0 = 2b, 159 ≤ b ≤ 499. The discriminant is ∆ = −21311; ∆ is the maximal fundamental
discriminant of class number 200, which is congruent 1 modulo 8 and not divisible by 3.
Table A.1 shows that cryptoCurve(2499, 4, 200) terminates successfully after 2 minutes and
15 seconds. Furthermore, Table A.2 on Page 205 provides running times if the class number
of the discriminant is 500.
Next, we present running times to find elliptic curves of prime order. Table 11.2 lists timings
11.1 Practical Performance of cryptoCurve 153
of cryptoCurve(2159, 1, h0) for 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 1000. As the elliptic curve is of prime order, we
have to ensure ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. In addition, we choose ∆ to be not divisible by 3. Hence in
this case our subalgorithm findRoot uses the class polynomial G. As above, if h0 is given,
∆ is chosen to be maximal and fundamental with h(∆) = h0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 and 3 - ∆. We
conclude from Table 11.2 that we are able to generate an elliptic curve of prime order suitable
for use in cryptography in less than 30 seconds. In addition, if we choose a discriminant of
class number 500 the computation takes about 7 minutes.
In contrast to the timings in case of k0 = 4, most of the time is spent to compute the class
polynomial G. Roughly speaking, the proportion of this step increases with growing class
number. If the class number is chosen to be 1000, cryptoCurve becomes rather slow. In this
case the running time to generate an elliptic curve of prime order is about 73 minutes; 98.6%
of this time is spent to compute the polynomial G.
∆ h0 time of computeClassInvariants time of time of
and computeClassPolynomial find root cryptoCurve
-125579 200 18.52 9.61 28.7
-184091 250 39.28 10.96 50.75
-223739 300 61.06 20.14 81.76
-294971 350 105.31 21.9 127.87
-428819 400 182.32 23.3 206.42
-539579 450 284.11 23.94 308.62
-742979 500 405.03 26.05 432.02
-834539 600 654.55 45.76 701.37
-1166051 700 1189.32 48.39 1240.22
-1390091 800 1859.46 52 1912.45
-1908539 900 2739.03 53.97 2794.28
-2656979 1000 4314.21 57.75 4374.04
Table 11.2: Running times of cryptoCurve(2159, 1, h0) on the Pentium III for 200 ≤ h0 ≤
1000. All timings are given in seconds. For given h0, the discriminant ∆ is maximal and
fundamental with ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, 3 - ∆ and h(∆) = h0. The class polynomial G is computed
during the algorithm.
Furthermore, Section A.4 of the appendix provides additional sample run times to compute
curves of prime order. Table A.3 on Page 206 gives timings of cryptoCurve(r0, 1, 200) on
the Pentium III for r0 = 2b, 159 ≤ b ≤ 499. The discriminant is ∆ = −125579; ∆ is the
maximal fundamental discriminant of class number 200, which is congruent 5 modulo 8 and
not divisible by 3. We conclude from Table A.3 that we are able to generate an elliptic curve
of prime order over a 500-bit field and having an endomorphism ring of class number 200 in
about 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
11.1.2 Performance Using Precomputed Class Polynomials
In this section we present running times of our algorithm cryptoCurve if the class polynomial
has been computed in advance. We first describe our database classPolynomials, which stores
class polynomials W. We then give timings to compute a class polynomial W for discriminants
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of class numbers in [3000; 15000]. Again, all timings are measured on the Pentium III; in
cryptoCurve we make use of the Fixed Discriminant Approach of Chapter 4.
Let us first turn to our database classPolynomials. It stores class polynomials W for various
discriminants. Table 11.3 gives an overview of the database. In all, classPolynomials comprises
178897 class polynomials W. The amount of storage is about 23 GByte. For instance, the
class polynomial W according to the discriminant ∆ = −55222439 of class number 15000
uses 45.0 MByte memory. Its largest coefficient (with respect to the absolute value) is w3862,
which is the coefficient of X3862. This coefficient may be found in Section A.5 of the appendix.
Its bitlength and decimal length is 11892 and 3580, respectively.
class number h additional condition on ∆ number of polynomials
200 ≤ h ≤ 799 ∆ > −6000000 143526
800 ≤ h ≤ 1499 first 50 discriminants 35000
1500 ≤ h ≤ 4900, 100 | h first 10 discriminants 350
5000 ≤ h ≤ 15000, 500 | h first discriminant 21
Table 11.3: Overview of database classPolynomials. We only consider discriminants ∆ which
are congruent 1 modulo 8 and not divisible by 3. For either discriminant classPolynomials
stores the corresponding class polynomial W.
We next turn to the running time to compute a class polynomial W of large degree. If h
denotes a class number, we choose the discriminant ∆ to be maximal and fundamental with
h(∆) = h, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, and 3 - ∆. Figure 11.1 plots the CPU-timings on the Pentium III as
a function of the class number h. While the computation of a class polynomial W for h = 3000
only takes about 8 and a half minutes, the CPU-time in case of h = 15000 increases to 47.9
hours.
In Table A.4 on Page 208 we present CPU-timings of cryptoCurve(2159, 4, h0) on the Pentium
III, if 3000 ≤ h0 ≤ 15000 and if we make use of our database classPolynomials. We deduce
from this table that cryptoCurve(2159, 4, 3000) terminates successfully after 4 and a half
minutes. Furthermore, if we choose h0 = 15000 the running time is about 23 and a half
minutes. This proves that our algorithm is applicable even for very large class numbers, that
is class numbers ≥ 10000.
In addition to the run time benefit when using class polynomials stored in the database
classPolynomials we mention a further advantage. All polynomials in classPolynomials have
passed successfully the probabilistic correctness test isWeberPolynomial explained at Page
138. Hence we are convinced that all polynomials in classPolynomials are correct.
11.2 Generating Curves and Twists of Prime Order
In this section we present a first extension of our algorithm cryptoCurve. We show how
to efficiently find an elliptic curve E defined over IFp such that both E(IFp) and E′(IFp)
are cryptographically strong, where E′ denotes a twisted curve of E over IFp. We call our
algorithm twistedPair.
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Figure 11.1: Timings on the Pentium III to compute a class polynomial W of large degree.
For each class number h with 3000 ≤ h ≤ 15000, 500 | h, the maximal fundamental discrimi-
nant with h(∆) = h, ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, and 3 - ∆ is chosen. The running time is given in hours
and plotted as a function of h.
twistedPair may be used to implement a pseudo random bit generator using elliptic curves.
Such a generator was first proposed by B. Kaliski in [Kal86] and [Kal88]. The security of the
bit generator bases on the ECDLP. However, to put Kaliski’s proposal into practice, one has
to find an elliptic curve E defined over IFp such that the ECDLP is intractable in both E(IFp)
and E′(IFp). In addition, one has to know generating points of both groups. In general these
points are found using the Weil-pairing, and this is a non-trivial task.
In order to avoid the Weil-pairing, we propose to apply elliptic curves of prime order. More
precisely, we adapt our main algorithm cryptoCurve to find an elliptic curve E such that
both E(IFp) and E′(IFp) are of prime order and cryptographically strong. Hence, every non-
zero point generates the set of rational points over IFp. Thus we get the group structure for
free. In addition, as the cofactor is 1 arithmetic on the curves for given security level is
rather efficient. Furthermore, we present running times demonstrating the efficiency of our
generating algorithm in practice. We are not aware of any further algorithm finding such
curve pairs.
Definition 11.2.1 Let p ≥ 5 be prime and E be an elliptic curve over IFp. Furthermore, let
E′ be IFp-twisted to E. If both E(IFp) and E′(IFp) are of prime order and cryptographically
strong, we call the pair (E,E′) a twisted pair.
We describe our algorithm twistedPair(∆, [i0, i1]). Its input is an imaginary quadratic dis-
criminant ∆ and an interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN. The algorithm outputs a prime p and a twisted pair
(E,E′) such that |E(IFp)|, |E′(IFp)| ∈ [i0, i1] and End(E) = End(E′) = O∆ .
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Our requirement that both |E(IFp)| and |E′(IFp)| are of prime order imposes some restrictions
on the choice of ∆. First, as discussed in Section 4.3, we have to ensure ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8. Second,
from the tables in Section A.1.2 we deduce the condition ∆ ≡ 2 mod 3. Thus we have to take
care of the congruence ∆ ≡ 5 mod 24.
We discuss the algorithm in detail in what follows. twistedPair first invokes algorithm
findPrimeTwistedPair(∆, [i0, i1]). Given the discriminant ∆ and the interval [i0, i1], this
method returns primes p, r, and r′ having the following three properties: First, the norm
equation 4p = t2 − ∆y2 has a solution (t, y) ∈ ZZ2. Second, the primes r and r′ are of the
form p + 1 − t and p + 1 + t, respectively. Third, r respectively r′ are orders of IFp-twisted
cryptographically strong elliptic curves over IFp having O∆ as endomorphism ring. This task
is similar to the problem discussed in Section 4.3.2. Hence, findPrimeTwistedPair is alike
to algorithm findPrime5Mod8. However, we have to consider some changes.
m t mod m y mod m
2 1 1
3 0, 1, 2 1, 2
5 1, 4 0
7 1, 3, 4, 6 0
11 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 0
Table 11.4: Congruence conditions on t and y for p+ 1− t and p+ 1 + t to be prime. ∆ is
assumed to be congruent 5 mod 24.
First, as in Section 4.3.2, we collect congruence conditions on (t mod m, y mod m) for small
moduli m. We evaluate the moduli m ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7, 11}. Again, to avoid distinguishing a
multitude of cases, the initial chosen value of y leaves unchanged. We refer to Section 4.3.2
for the derivation of the conditions and summarize the results in Table 11.4.
c (t5, t7, t11)
19 (1, 1, 3), (1, 3, 3)
14 (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 10), (1, 3, 1), (1, 4, 4), (1, 6, 4), (1, 6, 6)
11 (4, 3, 1), (4, 3, 10)
10 (1, 4, 6), (4, 4, 7)
9 (1, 4, 1), (1, 4, 3), (1, 4, 5), (1, 4, 7), (1, 4, 8), (1, 4, 10), (1, 6, 1), (1, 6, 3),
(1, 6, 5), (1, 6, 7), (1, 6, 8), (1, 6, 10)
6 (4, 3, 3), (4, 6, 7)
5 (1, 1, 4), (1, 1, 5), (1, 1, 6), (1, 1, 7), (1, 1, 8), (1, 3, 5), (4, 1, 7), (4, 3, 4),
(4, 3, 5), (4, 3, 6), (4, 3, 7), (4, 3, 8)
4 (1, 3, 4), (1, 3, 6), (1, 3, 7), (1, 3, 8), (1, 3, 10)
1 (4, 1, 1), (4, 1, 3), (4, 1, 4), (4, 1, 5), (4, 1, 6), (4, 1, 8), (4, 1, 10), (4, 4, 1),
(4, 4, 3), (4, 4, 4), (4, 4, 5), (4, 4, 6), (4, 4, 8), (4, 4, 10), (4, 6, 1), (4, 6, 3),
(4, 6, 4), (4, 6, 5), (4, 6, 6), (4, 6, 8), (4, 6, 10)
Table 11.5: Minimal values c such that both (t5, t7, t11) and (t5+2c mod 5, t7+2c mod 7, t11+
2c mod 11) respect the requirements of Table 11.4.
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Next, assume (t, y) to be a pair respecting the requirements of Table 11.4. We explain how
we modify (t, y) such that the modified pair satisfies the congruence conditions, too. To keep
track of the residues of t modulo the primes m of Table 11.4 we introduce variables t5, t7, and
t11. They are simply defined as t mod 5, t mod 7, and t mod 11, respectively. We remark that
we do not have to consider requirements for t mod 3. However, when modifying t we have to
ensure that t keeps odd. Hence we successively increase t by 2 until the modified residues t5,
t7, and t11 all turn up in Table 11.4, too. Hence, we determine the minimal value c such that
all t5, t7, t11, t5 + 2c mod 5, t7 + 2c mod 7, and t11 + 2c mod 11 appear in Table 11.4. The
values of c are listed in Table 11.5.
Our function cyclesTwistedPair(t5, t7, t11) implements the requirements of Table 11.5.
Given (t5, t7, t11) it returns the corresponding c from Table 11.5.
We remark that the primes p returned by algorithm findPrimeTwistedPair are K-uniformly
distributed in [i0, i0 + K · b i1−i0+1K c]. Hence, if K does not divide i1 − i0 + 1, we cut off the
end of the interval. In our implementation, we set K = 240. Furthermore, according to our
tests the choice M = 24 and T = 2500 seems to be optimal.
Once the primes p, r, and r′ are determined, twistedPair proceeds similarly as our main
algorithm cryptoCurve. As we have ∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8 and 3 - ∆ the subalgorithm findRoot
makes use of the class polynomial G to generate the ring class field. It returns the j-invariant
of elliptic curves over IFp of order r and r′, respectively. Using this j-invariant, we determine
the coefficients of the curves. Finally, by trial and error, we assign the appropriate cardinality
to either curve.
Finally, we come up with sample practical running times. In Table 11.6 we list timings
measured on the Pentium III. For each class number the chosen discriminant is maximal
with ∆ ≡ 5 mod 24. In addition, all discriminants are fundamental. The timings are given in
seconds. The running time for findPrimeTwistedPair is the average time of 100 tests. The
total time of twistedPair is roughly the sum of the given timings.
We conclude that we are able to find a twisted pair respecting all requirements of Section
2.3.5 in about 40 seconds on an average PC. Furthermore, even for discriminants of class
number 500 we generate a twisted pair in less than 10 minutes. Hence, twistedPair is a very
efficient algorithm to generate twisted pairs. We are not aware of any comparable algorithm.
∆ h Time of Time to compute Time of
findPrimeTwistedPair class polynomial G find root
-356131 200 2.1096 25.73 9.73
-467011 250 2.0866 45.58 11.14
-881011 300 2.8276 95.52 20.31
-1190251 350 2.1262 171.81 21.41
-1531339 400 2.4975 248.51 23.01
-1825291 450 2.1254 356.62 24.49
-2299699 500 2.3858 545.13 26.16
Table 11.6: Running times of twistedPair(∆, [2159, 2160−1]) on the Pentium III. All timings
are given in seconds. The running time of twistedPair is roughly the sum of the given
subalgorithms.
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Algorithm 11.1: findPrimeTwistedPair(∆, [i0, i1])
Input: A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 24.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN with i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159.
Output: A prime p ∈ [i0, i1].
Primes r ≥ i0 and r′ ≥ i0 being orders of cryptographically strong IFp-twisted elliptic curves E and
E′ over IFp with End(E) = End(E′) = O∆ .
K ← 240; m← b i1−i0+1K c; T ← 2500; M ← 24;
mR ← 50; //set the number of Miller-Rabin tests to 50
while true do
s ∈R {0, . . .K − 1}; v ← i0 + sm; w ← v +m− 1; //choose a random subinterval
τ ∈R {1, ..., b2
√
vc}; µ←
⌈√
(4v − τ2)/|∆|
⌉
;
t← min{x ≥ τ : x ≡ 1 mod 770};
y ← min{x ≥ µ : x ≡ 385 mod 770, 3 - x};
p← (t2 −∆y2)/4;
c← 0; cr ← 0; j ← 0;
t5 ← 1; t7 ← 1; t11 ← 1;
for i = 0 to M − 5 do
p[i]← p mod pi+5; //initialize p[ ], i.e. p mod 13, . . . , p mod 97
t[i]← t mod pi+5; //initialize t[ ], i.e. t mod 13, . . . , t mod 97
while j < T do
if p[i] 6= 0 AND p[i]+1−t[i] mod pi+5 6= 0 AND p[i]+1+t[i] mod pi+5 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤M−5
then
p← p+ crt+ c2r; t← t+ 2cr; cr ← 0; j ← j + 1;
if isPrime(p,mR) = true AND isPrime(p+1− t,mR) = true AND isPrime(p+1+ t,mR)
= true then
if isStrong(i0, 1, p, p+ 1− t) 6= 0 AND isStrong(i0, 1, p, p+ 1 + t) 6= 0 then
return( p, p+ 1− t, p+ 1 + t );
c← cyclesTwistedPair(t5, t7, t11); cr ← cr + c;
t5 ← t5 + 2c mod 5; t7 ← t7 + 2c mod 7; t11 ← t11 + 2c mod 11;
for i = 0 to M − 5 do
p[i]← p[i] + ct[i] + c2 mod pi+5; t[i]← t[i] + 2c mod pi+5;
In Section B.4 we list some sample twisted pairs over finite prime fields IFp. First, in Section
B.4.1, we present examples defined over a field of minimal bitlength, that is p is of bitlength
160. The class number of the endomorphism ring of the curves in Section B.4.1 varies from
200 to 500. In addition, in Section B.4.2 we consider fields of bitlength up to 500. In Section
B.4.2 the discriminant of the endomorphism ring is chosen to be -356131. It is the maximal
fundamental discriminant of class number 200 which is congruent 5 modulo 24.
In order to ensure an efficient implementation of the curve arithmetic, all twisted pairs in
Section B.4 are of the form ((−3, b), (−3, b′)) for some b, b′ ∈ IFp. However, it turns out that
the existence of a twisted pair of the form ((−3, b), (−3, b′)) implies p ≡ 3 mod 4, as we now
see.
Proposition 11.2.2 Let p > 3 be prime and let ((−3, b), (−3, b′)) be a twisted pair for some
b, b′ ∈ IFp. Then p ≡ 3 mod 4.
Proof: Let ((−3, b), (−3, b′)) be a twisted pair. According to Definition 2.3.21 there exists a
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Algorithm 11.2: twistedPair(∆, [i0, i1])
Input: A discriminant ∆ ∈ ZZ<0, ∆ ≡ 5 mod 24.
An interval [i0, i1] ⊂ IN with i1 − i0 + 1 ≥ 2159.
Output: A prime p ∈ [i0, i1] of the form (t2 −∆y2)/4.
Primes r ≥ i0 and r′ ≥ i0 of the form p+ 1− t and p+ 1 + t, respectively.
IFp-twisted cryptographically strong elliptic curves E and E′ over IFp with |E(IFp)| = r, |E′(IFp)| =
r′, and End(E) = End(E′) = O∆ .
Generating points G and G′ of E(IFp) and E′(IFp), respectively.
(p, r, r′)← findPrimeTwistedPair(∆, [i0, i1]);
jp ← findRoot(∆, p);
Select a quadratic non-residue sp mod p; κp ← jp/(1728− jp); ap ← 3κp; bp ← 2κp;
E1 ← (ap, bp); E2 ← (aps2p, bps3p);
G1 ∈R E1(IFp) \ {O}; G2 ∈R E2(IFp) \ {O};
if rG1 = O then
return (p,E1, G1, r, E2, G2, r′);
else
return (p,E2, G2, r, E1, G1, r′);
non-square β ∈ IF×p with −3 = −3β2. As we assume p ≥ 5, we have β2 = 1. This equation
has the two different solutions {1;−1}. As 1 is obviously a square, we deduce β = −1. Thus
−1 is a non-square in IF×p . However, −1 is a non-square in IF×p if and only if p ≡ 3 mod 4. uunionsq
11.3 Elliptic Curves of Prime Order over Optimal Extension
Fields Suitable for Use in Cryptography
We present an algorithm for generating elliptic curves of prime order over Optimal Extension
Fields suitable for use in cryptography. We call our algorithm oefCurve. Furthermore, we
demonstrate the efficiency of the algorithm in practice by giving practical running times. In
addition, we present statistics on the number of cryptographically strong elliptic curves of
prime order for Optimal Extension Fields of cardinality (232 + c)5 with c < 0. We conclude
that there are sufficiently many curves in this case.
As of today, only two families of finite fields have found consideration for elliptic curve crypto-
graphy in practice: Finite fields of characteristic 2 and finite prime fields of large characteristic.
Algorithms to find elliptic curves for use in cryptography are well known for both families
of fields. Recently, a new type of finite fields was proposed for use in practice: Optimal
Extension Fields ([BP98], [BP01]). Optimal Extension Fields consider the hardware in use
(i.e. the word size of the processor) and thus yield an efficient way of implementing finite
field arithmetic, especially the inversion. As the inversion is the most time-consuming step for
adding points on elliptic curves over finite fields, Optimal Extension Fields have the potential
to be considered as a third family of finite fields for elliptic curve cryptography.
Processors of word size 32-bit play a crucial role in practice. Hence, we will show that our
algorithm is very fast in this case. Let p be a 32-bit prime with 232 − p < 216. Our algorithm
finds a cryptographically strong elliptic curve of prime order over an Optimal Extension Field
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IFp5 in about 22 seconds using an ordinary PC. In addition, we present data on the number
of suitable elliptic curves over Optimal Extension Fields of the form IFp5 . We conclude that,
for fields of this form, their quantity is sufficiently large.
This section is organized as follows: First, in Section 11.3.1 we review the basic terms in the
framework of Optimal Extension Fields. Next we present our generating algorithm in Section
11.3.2. Finally, in Section 11.3.3 we give running times of our implementation, and discuss
statistics on the number of elliptic curves of prime order over fields of the form IFp5 with a
32-bit prime p.
11.3.1 Elliptic Curves over Optimal Extension Fields
We review the definition and some properties of Optimal Extension Fields. Let us first turn
to its definition.
Definition 11.3.1 Let c be a rational integer, and let p = 2n + c be prime with n ∈ IN.
Furthermore, assume |c| ≤ √2n, and let m ∈ IN. If there is a ω ∈ IFp such that the binomial
Xm − ω is irreducible in IFp[X], then IFpm is called an Optimal Extension Field.
The basic idea of introducing Optimal Extension Fields is to adapt the arithmetic over finite
extension fields to the hardware in use (see [BP98], [BP01]). For instance, when implementing
an elliptic curve cryptosystem on a 32-bit processor, one may choose n = 32 and c < 0 such
that 232 + c is prime. Hence, the arithmetic in IFp fits in a word size. Furthermore, let ω be
as in Definition 11.3.1. We represent IFpm as the factor ring IFp[X]/(Xm−ω) with respect to
the polynomial basis {1, X,X2, . . . , Xm−1}. Thus in IFpm the identity Xm = ω holds, yielding
an easy reduction of Xk for k ≥ m. In addition, all coefficients of a polynomial representative
may be represented within one register of the processor.
Bailey and Paar [BP01] distinguish two special types of Optimal Extension Fields: First, if
|c| = 1, the according Optimal Extension Field is called a Type I OEF. Second, if Xm − 2 is
irreducible in IFp[X], they call the according field Type II OEF. In this thesis we do not make
use of Type I OEFs.
In order to decide whether an irreducible binomial of degree m exists in IFp[X] we make use
of the following theorem.
Theorem 11.3.2 Let p and m be rational primes. For ω ∈ IF×p the following properties are
equivalent:
1. The binomial Xm − ω is irreducible in IFp[X].
2. m divides the order e of ω in IF×p , but not
p−1
e .
3. We have m | p− 1 and ω p−1m 6≡ 1 mod p.
Proof: The equivalence between 1 and 2 is a special case of theorem 3.75 in [BP01].
Let p − 1 = mem · R with (R,m) = 1. Obviously, property 2 is equivalent to e = mem · R′
with R′ | R. Furthermore, ω p−1m 6≡ 1 mod p is equivalent to e - p−1m = mem−1 ·R. If 2 holds we
obviously have e - p−1m , hence 3 follows. Finally, assume 3. Hence we have e -
p−1
m = m
em−1 ·R.
However, as e has to divide p− 1, e has to be of the form mem ·R′ with some R′ | R. uunionsq
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Using the property that IF×p is a cyclic group, the following corollary is an easy consequence
of property 3 in Theorem 11.3.2.
Corollary 11.3.3 Let p and m be primes. There exists an irreducible binomial of degree m
in IFp[X] if and only if m | p− 1.
In our investigation we focus on Optimal Extension Fields of the form p5 with a 32-bit prime
p. The reason for the choice m = 5 is twofold. Due to the theorem of Hasse (Theorem 2.3.18)
we have |E(IFq)| ≈ q. Hence, in order to generate an elliptic curve of prime order r with
r ≈ 2160 we have to ensure m ≥ 5. Thus the choice m = 5 is minimal. Second, we restrict to
extension fields of prime degree as some of our subalgorithms of Section 11.3.2 are very efficient
in this case. However, the security implication of the Weil-descent ([GHS01]) on extension
fields of degree 5 is not yet clear. For instance, in case of fields of the form IF2155 there
are different statements. Smart argues in [Sma01] that given the current state of knowledge
and technology elliptic curves over IF2155 are secure if they respect similar requirements as
in Section 2.3.5. In contrast to Smart’s statement is the investigation of Jacobson, Menezes,
and Stein in [JMS01]. They showed that for an instance of an elliptic curve over IF2155 which
resists all previously known attacks, an attack using the Weil-descent was successful. However,
these investigations consider fields of characteristic 2. Nevertheless, the generalization of our
approach to composite m ≥ 6 is easy.
We are not aware of any further efficient algorithm to find an elliptic curve over an Optimal
Extension Field of characteristic ≥ 5 respecting all these requirements. Although the Schoof-
Elkies-Atkin (SEA) algorithm is of polynomial complexity in the bitlength of q for arbitrary
finite fields IFq and efficiently implemented for Optimal Extension Fields, it turns out to be
much slower in practice. The main reason is that we have to choose a number of curves and
determine their cardinalities before finding a suitable one. Furthermore, the very efficient
Satoh-algorithm for fields of characteristic 2 ([Sat99], [FGH01]) does not apply to Optimal
Extension Fields.
11.3.2 The Algorithm oefCurve
In this section we present our generating algorithm oefCurve. The algorithm is listed at the
end of this section. oefCurve makes use of the theory of complex multiplication. However,
we have to extend the proceeding described in Chapter 3. Our aim is to find rational primes
p and m, and an elliptic curve defined over IFpm , but not over IFp. If E was defined over IFp,
then E(IFp) would be a subgroup of E(IFpm). Hence, for a 32-bit prime p, the curve would
not respect the requirement k ≤ 4.
We first have to find a prime power pm and a discriminant ∆, such that the norm equation
t2 −∆y2 = 4pm (11.1)
has a solution (t, y) ∈ ZZ2, while the equation t′2 − ∆y′2 = 4p does not have a solution
(t′, y′) ∈ ZZ. If this is true, using complex multiplication (similar as described in Section 3),
we find elliptic curves E1,q and E2,q over IFpm , both not defined over IFp, with
|E1,q(IFpm)| = pm + 1− t, |E2,q(IFpm)| = pm + 1 + t (11.2)
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analogously as explained in Section 2.3.4.
As usual, let H := H∆ be the ring class polynomial. Modulo p the polynomial H splits into
irreducible factors of degree m, while it splits in IFpm [X] into pairwise distinct linear factors.
Let jq ∈ IFpm be a zero of H mod p. If ∆ < −4, we have jq /∈ {0; 1728}, and for any non-square
sq ∈ IFpm we set as usual
κq =
jq
1728− jq , (aq, bq) = (3κq, 2κq) . (11.3)
Then we have
{E1,q, E2,q} = {(aq, bq), (aqs2q , bqs3q)}. (11.4)
After this construction it is not known which of the curves is E1,q and which is E2,q. However,
by choosing points on each curve and testing whether their order is a divisor of pm + 1 + t or
pm + 1− t, the curves E1,q and E2,q can be identified.
Input of our algorithm oefCurve(n,m, h0) is a positive integer n (e.g. the word size of the
processor in use), the prime degree m of the Optimal Extension Field over its prime field,
and an integer h0 ≥ 200. The algorithm returns a prime p of bitlength n such that IFpm is an
Optimal Extension Field, an irreducible binomial Xm − ω in IFp[X], and an elliptic curve E
defined over IFpm such that |E(IFpm)| is of prime order r and respects requirements similar to
those of Section 2.3.5. Furthermore, the endomorphism ring of E is a maximal order of class
number at least h0. In addition, oefCurve returns a generating point of E(IFpm). In order to
get reasonable results we have to ensure n ·m ≥ 160.
We next explain our main algorithm oefCurve. It splits into several subalgorithms, which
we discuss in what follows. The first subalgorithm findOEFField(n,m, h0) determines an
Optimal Extension Field of cardinality pm and a prime r being the group order of a crypto-
graphically strong elliptic curve defined over IFpm \ IFp. To be more precise, findOEFField
computes among other things a prime p of the form 2n + c with c < 0 and |c| < √2n such
that m | p − 1. Although it is not clear if such a prime p exists for a random pair (n,m),
the asymptotic density of such primes for growing n is 1(m−1)·log(2n) due to the Prime Number
Theorem and a theorem of Dirichlet on the number of primes in arithmetic progressions.
Hence, for example, if n = 32 and m = 5 (i.e. the case we are most interested in), there
should be about 2
16
4 log(232)
= 739 primes congruent 1 modulo 5 in the interval [232 − 216, 232].
Indeed their number is 733. Thus we may assume, that an appropriate prime p exists.
In order to be successful, findOEFField has to solve the norm equation (11.1) for some ∆ and
p. We explain how to find appropriate ∆ and p. A necessary condition on ∆ for |E(IFpm)| to
be of prime order is ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 (see Section 4.3). Using our database fundamental delta h
introduced on Page 75 we may assume that a sufficiently large number of fundamental imag-
inary quadratic discriminants ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 of class number at least 200 is to our disposal.
In our tests we make use of all such discriminants in fundamental delta h, that is all such
fundamental discriminants with ∆ > −6000000. Our function getDiscriminantOEF(h,∆)
returns the maximal fundamental discriminant ∆′ ≡ 5 mod 8 of class number h with ∆′ < ∆.
In contrast to algorithm getDiscriminant of Chapter 5 this function only returns ∆.
In order to minimize the run time we want h and |∆| to be as small as possible. A necessary
condition, due to class field theory, we have to take care of is m | h(∆). Hence we set
h = min{h′ ∈ IN : h′ ≥ h0,m | h′}. Let ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 be maximal of class number h. We set
p = max{p′ ∈ ZZ : p′ < 2n, p′ ≡ 1 mod m, p′ prime}. We determine whether the norm equation
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t2 −∆y2 = 4p has a solution (t, y) ∈ ZZ2 by using cornacchia(∆, p) explained on Page 46. If
t2−∆y2 = 4p has no integer solution, we turn to the norm equation t2−∆y2 = 4pm. In order
to decide whether this equation has an integer solution or not, we extended the algorithm
of Cornacchia to prime powers: cornacchiaPrimePower(∆, pm) gets an imaginary quadratic
discriminant ∆ and a prime power pm as input. It returns t 6= 0 if the norm equation (11.1)
has an integer solution, and 0 otherwise.
If we have found a prime p with an integer solution of the norm equation for pm, but not
for p, we make use of (11.2) to check corresponding conditions of Section 2.3.5 for prime
powers. Analogously to algorithm isStrong(r0, k0, p,N), this task is performed by the func-
tion isStrongOEF(2nm, 1, pm, N); it returns the prime r if N turns out to be the order of a
cryptographically strong elliptic curve over IFpm , and 0 otherwise. This yields our algorithm
findOEFField(n,m, h0).
Algorithm 11.3: findOEFField(n,m, h0)
Input: A positive integer n, a prime m, such that nm ≥ 160, and an integer h0 ≥ 200.
Output: A prime p of bitlength n, such that IFpm is an Optimal Extension Field, if such a p exists.
A prime r and a fundamental discriminant ∆, such that r is the cardinality of a cryptographically
strong elliptic curve E defined over IFpm \ IFp with End(E) = O∆ and h(∆) ≥ h0.
p← max{p′ ∈ ZZ : p′ < 2n, p′ ≡ 1 mod m, p′ prime};
if 2n − p > √2n then
output( ”No OEF found. Terminating.” ); terminate;
h← min{h′ ∈ IN : h′ ≥ h0,m | h′};
while true do
∆← getDiscriminantOEF(h, 0);
while ∆ > −6000000 do
p← max{p′ ∈ IN : p′ < 2n, p′ ≡ 1 mod m, p′ prime};
while 2n − p < √2n do
t← cornacchia(∆, p);
if t = 0 then
t← cornacchiaPrimePower(∆, pm);
if t 6= 0 then
if (r ← isStrongOEF(2nm, 1, pm, pm + 1− t)) 6= 0 AND r = pm + 1− t then
return(p, r,∆);
else if (r ← isStrongOEF(2nm, 1, pm, pm + 1 + t)) 6= 0 AND r = pm + 1 + t then
return(p, r,∆);
p← max{p′ ∈ ZZ : p′ < p, p′ ≡ 1 mod m, p′ prime};
∆← getDiscriminantOEF(h,∆);
h← h+m;
Once knowing the cardinality pm of an Optimal Extension Field, we turn to the computa-
tion of an irreducible binomial Xm − ω in IFp[X]. Our algorithm findBinomial(p,m) is a
straightforward consequence of Theorem 11.3.2 and Corollary 11.3.3.
We remark that if Xm − ω is reducible in IFp[X], Xm − ωd is reducible for all d ∈ IN, too.
However, due to the simplicity of algorithm findBinomial(p,m) we do not take this fact into
account.
Finally, we turn to algorithm findOEFCurve(∆, pm, r). This algorithm is similar to our algo-
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Algorithm 11.4: findBinomial(p,m)
Input: Rational primes p and m with p ≡ 1 mod m.
Output: An irreducible binomial Xm − ω in IFp[X] with minimal ω ∈ IN.
ω ← 2;
while true do
d← ω p−1m mod p;
if d 6= 1 then
return(Xm − ω);
ω ← ω + 1;
rithm findCurve. The main differences come from the subalgorithm findOEFRoot explained
below. As said above, given a root jq of H mod p in IFpm , findOEFCurve computes the coef-
ficients of elliptic curves over IFpm of order pm+ 1± t, and it decides by trial and error, which
of these curves is of order r.
Algorithm 11.5: findOEFCurve(∆, pm, r)
Input: A fundamental imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8.
A prime power pm such that there exists an elliptic curve of prime order r over IFpm .
Output: An elliptic curve E over IFpm with |E(IFpm)| = r and endomorphism ring of discriminant ∆.
A generating point G of E(IFpm).
jq ← findOEFRoot(∆, pm);
Select a non-square sq ∈ IFpm ; κq ← jq/(1728− jq); aq ← 3κq; bq ← 2κq;
E1 ← (aq, bq); E2 ← (aqs2q, bqs3q); //assign curve parameters
G1 ∈R E1(IFpm) \ {O}; G2 ∈R E2(IFpm) \ {O}; //choose random points
if rG1 = O then
return (E1, G1);
else
return (E2, G2);
We next discuss findOEFRoot(∆, pm), i.e. the proceeding to determine a root of H mod p
in IFpm . Similar to findRoot the first step of findOEFRoot(∆, pm) consists in determining a
generating polynomial of the ring class field of Q(
√
∆). As ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8 we may not use the
class polynomial W. However, if 3 - ∆ we compute the class polynomial G according to ∆. If
we have 3 | ∆, we compute the ring class polynomial H.
It remains to explain how to get a root of a class polynomial C modulo p. We extend the
LiDIA-function find root(p, C) to a function find root(pm, C). As input it requires a prime
power pm and a polynomial C ∈ ZZ[X], such that C mod p splits into linear factors in IFpm [X].
It returns a zero of C mod p in IFpm . Again we implement the Cantor-Zassenhaus split in
find root(pm, C) and make use of a polynomial arithmetic due to Shoup [Sho95].
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Algorithm 11.6: oefCurve(n,m, h0)
Input: A positive integer n, a prime m, such that nm ≥ 160, and an integer h0 ≥ 200.
Output: A prime p of bitlength n, such that IFpm is an Optimal Extension Field, if such a p exists.
An irreducible binomial Xm − ω in IFp[X].
A cryptographically strong elliptic curve E of prime order r defined over IFpm \IFp having a maximal
order of class number at least h0 as endomorphism ring.
A generating point G of E(IFpm).
(p, r,∆)← findOEFField(n,m, h0);
f ← findBinomial(p,m);
(E,G)← findOEFCurve(∆, pm, r);
return (p, r, f, E,G);
11.3.3 Performance and Statistics
In this section we first give sample running times measured on the Pentium III. Next, we argue
that even for an input of the form (32, 5, h0), 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 400 the number of curves which may
be output by our algorithm is sufficiently large. Sample curves returned by oefCurve(32, 5, h0)
may be found in Section B.5 of the appendix.
First, we present sample output of oefCurve(32, 5, h0) and CPU-timings for 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 250,
5 | h0.
h0 h ∆ p ω CPU-time in seconds
200 200 -125579 4294920991 2 21.8
205 205 -140411 4294963921 2 23.5
210 210 -265235 4294903891 7 52.8
215 215 -240899 4294933021 2 43.2
220 220 -268931 4294931761 2 65.3
225 225 -316859 4294958881 2 54.4
230 230 -405803 4294931071 2 64.0
235 235 -339539 4294931341 2 53.2
240 240 -170651 4294946191 2 38.5
245 245 -411683 4294908721 5 65.0
250 250 -254579 4294940641 3 54.6
Table 11.7: Data provided by oefCurve(32, 5, h0).
From Table 11.7 we see that in all our sample tests the output discriminant is of class number
h0. Furthermore, we deduce that the running time in practice may decrease for increasing
input h0. As such an example from Table 11.7 we consider h0 = 235 and h0 = 240, respectively.
The reason for the decreasing running time in practice is twofold.
First, compared to h0 = 235 the time of findOEFField is much lower in case of h0 = 240. If
h0 = 235, we have to pass 9 times through the while-loop on ∆ in findOEFField. However,
if h0 = 240, findOEFField is successful for the first chosen discriminant. Second, the floating
point precision depends on both h0 and ∆. Thus the increasing effect on the running time of
an increasing h0 may be inferior to the decreasing effect of a decreasing |∆|. Similar arguments
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are true for other input bounds h0, too.
Finally, we give some statistical data on the number of non-isomorphic elliptic curves of prime
order over Optimal Extension Fields IFp5 where p is a 32-bit prime. Roughly speaking this
quantity should be as large as possible, as in this case the output curves are not special in
some sense.
First, we determine for each class number h with 200 ≤ h ≤ 400, h divisible by 5, the number
of pairs (∆, p), where ∆ > −6000000 is a fundamental discriminant congruent 5 mod 8 and p
a 32-bit prime, such that there exists a cryptographically strong elliptic curve of prime order
r over IFp5 having an endomorphism ring of discriminant ∆. In all, there are 5579 such pairs.
Furthermore, in 4563 of the cases, the corresponding field IFp5 is a Type II OEF. The results
are plotted in the following figure.
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Next, we determine the number of non-isomorphic elliptic curves for the pairs (∆, p) as above.
For each such pair (∆, p) there are h(∆) non-isomorphic elliptic curves having the properties
cited above. In all, there are 1546830 non-isomorphic curves, and 1263850 of them are defined
over a Type II OEF. The number of curves for each class number h with 200 ≤ h ≤ 400 is
plotted in the figure below. We deduce that, even in our special case, the set of non-isomorphic
curves for use in cryptography is sufficiently large to choose from.
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Chapter 12
The Library gec
In this closing chapter we shortly present our library gec. It comprises the algorithms de-
scribed in this thesis. gec allows to generate an elliptic curve suitable for use in cryptography
for a chosen security level, that is for a chosen bitlength of the cryptographic relevant prime
r. gec is part of the computer algebra library LiDIA ([LiDIA]). As LiDIA is implemented in
C++, our library is implemented in C++, too.
In addition to the algorithms of this thesis, gec implements the random approach. The random
approach makes use of the point counting package eco, which is mainly due to V. Mu¨ller
([Mu¨l95]). eco is also part of LiDIA and implements the point counting algorithm of Schoof-
Elkies-Atkin (SEA) over finite prime fields and fields of characteristic 2, respectively.
gec_point_counting_mod_2ngec_point_counting_mod_pgec_complex_multiplication
gec
gec_E_and_twist_prime
Figure 12.1: Class hierarchy of the library gec
The class hierarchy of gec is shown in Figure 12.1. The virtual basic class gec comprises
the members and methods, which are common for both the CM approach and the random
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approach. For instance, gec holds as members the prime field p, the prime power q, the prime
r, the cofactor k, and the parameters of the elliptic curve. In addition, it stores the variables
r0, k0, and h0. Furthermore, it provides the accessors for these members. For more details of
the members we refer to the source code of gec and to Section 12.1.
The class gec complex multiplication provides the algorithms described in this thesis.
Furthermore, the classes gec point counting mod p and gec point counting mod 2n im-
plement the SEA-algorithm for fields IFp and IF2n , respectively. All these classes inherit from
the base class gec. In addition, the class gec E and twist prime generates twisted pairs as
explained in Section 11.2. We refer to Section 12.1 for a short description of these classes.
In Section 12.2 we describe the interface of our library gec to Java. The interface permits to
generate elliptic curves suitable for use in cryptography from within the Java Cryptography
Architecture (JCA, see e.g. [Knu98]). Indeed, this interface is used by the FlexiECProvider
for the JCA; this provider is part of the FlexiProvider.
12.1 The Classes of gec
In this section we describe the main features of the classes of the library gec. In addition, we
show a sample program to generate an elliptic curve suitable for use in cryptography.
We first turn to the base class gec. gec holds all information and provides all interfaces
which are independent of the generating algorithm. However, gec does not yield a method
for generating elliptic curve parameters. In Table 12.1 we list the main members of the class
gec.
name in gec name in cryptoCurve LiDIA-type
p p bigint
q q bigint
lower bound bitlength r blog2 r0c lidia size t
r r bigint
upper bound k k0 bigint
k k bigint
a 4 a gf element
a 6 b gf element
delta ∆ bigint
h h(∆) lidia size t
delta field ∆K bigint
h field h(∆K) lidia size t
according to bsi - bool
Table 12.1: The main members of the class gec and their type.
The boolean according to bsi essentially decides whether the class number is taken into ac-
count as a security requirement. Furthermore, gec provides the accessors and, if available,
the mutators for these members. As usual accessors and mutators may be recognized by their
prefix ”get” and ”set”, respectively. For instance, to set the prime p, one simply has to invoke
the mutator set p(const bigint &); the accessor get p() returns the prime p. All publicly
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accessible member functions are explained in the gec-manual. The complex multiplication
part of the manual may be found in Chapter C of the appendix.
We next describe the class gec complex multiplication. Its most important additional
member is class polynomial of type polynomial<bigint>. It may be set for example by the
method set class polynomial( const polynomial < bigint > & ). The function generate()
implements our main algorithm cryptoCurve.
The program in Figure 12.2 shows the easy use of our library. The program generates an
elliptic curve of order rk, where r is at least of bitlength 160 and k ≤ 4. The discriminant ∆
is −21311; it is maximal and fundamental of class number 200. Hence, as ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, we
will have k = 4. The boolean bsi decides that we respect the strong requirements of GISA
explained in Section 2.3.5.
#include <LiDIA/bigint.h>
#include <LiDIA/gec/gec_complex_multiplication.h>
int
main()
{
lidia_size_t bitlength_r = 160;
bigint bound_k = 4;
bool bsi = true;
bigint delta( -21311 );
gec_complex_multiplication I;
I.set_lower_bound_bitlength_r( bitlength_r );
I.set_upper_bound_k( bound_k );
I.set_according_to_BSI( bsi ); // respect requirements of GISA
I.set_delta(delta);
I.VERBOSE = 1; // print a lot of information to standard output
I.generate(); // generate the curve parameters
return( 0 );
}
Figure 12.2: A sample program using gec complex multiplication.
The use of the further classes is similar. We refer to the manual for details.
12.2 The Interface of gec to Java
We shortly describe the Java interface of our library gec. This interface enables the use of gec
by classes of the Java Cryptography Architecture. We provide Java-wrapper classes, which
mirror the members and functions of the classes of gec. In all, we implement the Java classes
GEC, GECComplexMultiplication, and GECPointCounting. Currently, GECPointCounting
only supports the random approach modulo p.
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The interface makes use of the Java Native Interface (JNI). The dynamic library providing
the interface functions is called jni gec. Thus on UNIX machines the full library name is
libjni gec.so . It resides in the library directory of LiDIA.
We remark that besides the use of the interface within the JCA we have implemented two
applications of the Java-wrapper classes. First, a Graphical User Interface (GUI). The GUI
uses the Swing package of Java. Using the GUI one may choose between the CM-method and
the random approach. In addition, one may set the security level according to one’s needs.
Second, we have implemented a servlet based webinterface. We refer to the website of our
institute for a test of it in practice.
Appendix A
Additional Data and Information
A.1 Congruence Conditions on t and y
We supply tables to deduce the congruence relations of Section 4.3. We use the notation
of Section 4.3, that is for given ∆, t, and y we set p = (t2 − ∆y2)/4, N− = p + 1 − t, and
N− = p + 1 + t. Furthermore, let m ∈ {3, 5, 7}. For all pairs (t mod m, y mod m) ∈ IF2m we
compute p mod m, N− mod m, and N+ mod m, respectively. Thus a necessary condition for
p to be a ”large” prime is p 6≡ 0 mod m.
In addition, our aim is to have either N− or N+ to be nearly prime, that is of order r, 2r
or 4r, where r denotes a prime. Hence if both p 6≡ 0 mod m and N− 6≡ 0 mod m for a pair
(t mod m, y mod m), we indicate this by plotting a star in the corresponding row. We proceed
analogously with N+.
We distinguish the two cases ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8 and ∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8. The reason is that in the first
case we know from Section 4.3.1 that both t and y are even. Hence we derive conditions for
t1/2 and y1/2, where t = 2t1/2 and y = 2y1/2. However, if ∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8 we have to consider t
and y.
A.1.1 Discriminants ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8
Congruence Relations for m = 3
∆ ≡ 0 mod 3
t1/2 mod 3 y1/2 mod 3 p mod 3 N− mod 3 N+ mod 3 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 *
2 0 1 1 0 *
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 *
2 1 1 1 0 *
0 2 0 1 1
1 2 1 0 1 *
2 2 1 1 0 *
174 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 1 mod 3
t1/2 mod 3 y1/2 mod 3 p mod 3 N− mod 3 N+ mod 3 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 *
2 0 1 1 0 *
0 1 2 0 0
1 1 0 2 0
2 1 0 0 2
0 2 2 0 0
1 2 0 2 0
2 2 0 0 2
∆ ≡ 2 mod 3
t1/2 mod 3 y1/2 mod 3 p mod 3 N− mod 3 N+ mod 3 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 *
2 0 1 1 0 *
0 1 1 2 2 * *
1 1 2 1 2 * *
2 1 2 2 1 * *
0 2 1 2 2 * *
1 2 2 1 2 * *
2 2 2 2 1 * *
Congruence Relations for m = 5
∆ ≡ 0 mod 5
t1/2 mod 5 y1/2 mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 4 * *
3 0 4 4 1 * *
4 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 4 *
2 1 4 1 4 * *
3 1 4 4 1 * *
4 1 1 4 0 *
0 2 0 1 1
1 2 1 0 4 *
2 2 4 1 4 * *
3 2 4 4 1 * *
4 2 1 4 0 *
0 3 0 1 1
1 3 1 0 4 *
2 3 4 1 4 * *
3 3 4 4 1 * *
4 3 1 4 0 *
0 4 0 1 1
1 4 1 0 4 *
2 4 4 1 4 * *
3 4 4 4 1 * *
4 4 1 4 0 *
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∆ ≡ 1 mod 5
t1/2 mod 5 y1/2 mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 4 * *
3 0 4 4 1 * *
4 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 4 0 0
1 1 0 4 3
2 1 3 0 3 *
3 1 3 3 0 *
4 1 0 3 4
0 2 1 2 2 * *
1 2 2 1 0 *
2 2 0 2 0
3 2 0 0 2
4 2 2 0 1 *
0 3 1 2 2 * *
1 3 2 1 0 *
2 3 0 2 0
3 3 0 0 2
4 3 2 0 1 *
0 4 4 0 0
1 4 0 4 3
2 4 3 0 3 *
3 4 3 3 0 *
4 4 0 3 4
∆ ≡ 2 mod 5
t1/2 mod 5 y1/2 mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 4 * *
3 0 4 4 1 * *
4 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 3 4 4 * *
1 1 4 3 2 * *
2 1 2 4 2 * *
3 1 2 2 4 * *
4 1 4 2 3 * *
0 2 2 3 3 * *
1 2 3 2 1 * *
2 2 1 3 1 * *
3 2 1 1 3 * *
4 2 3 1 2 * *
0 3 2 3 3 * *
1 3 3 2 1 * *
2 3 1 3 1 * *
3 3 1 1 3 * *
4 3 3 1 2 * *
0 4 3 4 4 * *
1 4 4 3 2 * *
2 4 2 4 2 * *
3 4 2 2 4 * *
4 4 4 2 3 * *
176 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 3 mod 5
t1/2 mod 5 y1/2 mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 4 * *
3 0 4 4 1 * *
4 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 2 3 3 * *
1 1 3 2 1 * *
2 1 1 3 1 * *
3 1 1 1 3 * *
4 1 3 1 2 * *
0 2 3 4 4 * *
1 2 4 3 2 * *
2 2 2 4 2 * *
3 2 2 2 4 * *
4 2 4 2 3 * *
0 3 3 4 4 * *
1 3 4 3 2 * *
2 3 2 4 2 * *
3 3 2 2 4 * *
4 3 4 2 3 * *
0 4 2 3 3 * *
1 4 3 2 1 * *
2 4 1 3 1 * *
3 4 1 1 3 * *
4 4 3 1 2 * *
∆ ≡ 4 mod 5
t1/2 mod 5 y1/2 mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 4 * *
3 0 4 4 1 * *
4 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 1 2 2 * *
1 1 2 1 0 *
2 1 0 2 0
3 1 0 0 2
4 1 2 0 1 *
0 2 4 0 0
1 2 0 4 3
2 2 3 0 3 *
3 2 3 3 0 *
4 2 0 3 4
0 3 4 0 0
1 3 0 4 3
2 3 3 0 3 *
3 3 3 3 0 *
4 3 0 3 4
0 4 1 2 2 * *
1 4 2 1 0 *
2 4 0 2 0
3 4 0 0 2
4 4 2 0 1 *
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Congruence Relations for m = 7
∆ ≡ 0 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 4 *
2 1 4 1 2 * *
3 1 2 4 2 * *
4 1 2 2 4 * *
5 1 4 2 1 * *
6 1 1 4 0 *
0 2 0 1 1
1 2 1 0 4 *
2 2 4 1 2 * *
3 2 2 4 2 * *
4 2 2 2 4 * *
5 2 4 2 1 * *
6 2 1 4 0 *
0 3 0 1 1
1 3 1 0 4 *
2 3 4 1 2 * *
3 3 2 4 2 * *
4 3 2 2 4 * *
5 3 4 2 1 * *
6 3 1 4 0 *
0 4 0 1 1
1 4 1 0 4 *
2 4 4 1 2 * *
3 4 2 4 2 * *
4 4 2 2 4 * *
5 4 4 2 1 * *
6 4 1 4 0 *
0 5 0 1 1
1 5 1 0 4 *
2 5 4 1 2 * *
3 5 2 4 2 * *
4 5 2 2 4 * *
5 5 4 2 1 * *
6 5 1 4 0 *
0 6 0 1 1
1 6 1 0 4 *
2 6 4 1 2 * *
3 6 2 4 2 * *
4 6 2 2 4 * *
5 6 4 2 1 * *
6 6 1 4 0 *
178 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 1 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 6 0 0
1 1 0 6 3
2 1 3 0 1 *
3 1 1 3 1 * *
4 1 1 1 3 * *
5 1 3 1 0 *
6 1 0 3 6
0 2 3 4 4 * *
1 2 4 3 0 *
2 2 0 4 5
3 2 5 0 5 *
4 2 5 5 0 *
5 2 0 5 4
6 2 4 0 3 *
0 3 5 6 6 * *
1 3 6 5 2 * *
2 3 2 6 0 *
3 3 0 2 0
4 3 0 0 2
5 3 2 0 6 *
6 3 6 2 5 * *
0 4 5 6 6 * *
1 4 6 5 2 * *
2 4 2 6 0 *
3 4 0 2 0
4 4 0 0 2
5 4 2 0 6 *
6 4 6 2 5 * *
0 5 3 4 4 * *
1 5 4 3 0 *
2 5 0 4 5
3 5 5 0 5 *
4 5 5 5 0 *
5 5 0 5 4
6 5 4 0 3 *
0 6 6 0 0
1 6 0 6 3
2 6 3 0 1 *
3 6 1 3 1 * *
4 6 1 1 3 * *
5 6 3 1 0 *
6 6 0 3 6
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∆ ≡ 2 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 5 6 6 * *
1 1 6 5 2 * *
2 1 2 6 0 *
3 1 0 2 0
4 1 0 0 2
5 1 2 0 6 *
6 1 6 2 5 * *
0 2 6 0 0
1 2 0 6 3
2 2 3 0 1 *
3 2 1 3 1 * *
4 2 1 1 3 * *
5 2 3 1 0 *
6 2 0 3 6
0 3 3 4 4 * *
1 3 4 3 0 *
2 3 0 4 5
3 3 5 0 5 *
4 3 5 5 0 *
5 3 0 5 4
6 3 4 0 3 *
0 4 3 4 4 * *
1 4 4 3 0 *
2 4 0 4 5
3 4 5 0 5 *
4 4 5 5 0 *
5 4 0 5 4
6 4 4 0 3 *
0 5 6 0 0
1 5 0 6 3
2 5 3 0 1 *
3 5 1 3 1 * *
4 5 1 1 3 * *
5 5 3 1 0 *
6 5 0 3 6
0 6 5 6 6 * *
1 6 6 5 2 * *
2 6 2 6 0 *
3 6 0 2 0
4 6 0 0 2
5 6 2 0 6 *
6 6 6 2 5 * *
180 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 3 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 4 5 5 * *
1 1 5 4 1 * *
2 1 1 5 6 * *
3 1 6 1 6 * *
4 1 6 6 1 * *
5 1 1 6 5 * *
6 1 5 1 4 * *
0 2 2 3 3 * *
1 2 3 2 6 * *
2 2 6 3 4 * *
3 2 4 6 4 * *
4 2 4 4 6 * *
5 2 6 4 3 * *
6 2 3 6 2 * *
0 3 1 2 2 * *
1 3 2 1 5 * *
2 3 5 2 3 * *
3 3 3 5 3 * *
4 3 3 3 5 * *
5 3 5 3 2 * *
6 3 2 5 1 * *
0 4 1 2 2 * *
1 4 2 1 5 * *
2 4 5 2 3 * *
3 4 3 5 3 * *
4 4 3 3 5 * *
5 4 5 3 2 * *
6 4 2 5 1 * *
0 5 2 3 3 * *
1 5 3 2 6 * *
2 5 6 3 4 * *
3 5 4 6 4 * *
4 5 4 4 6 * *
5 5 6 4 3 * *
6 5 3 6 2 * *
0 6 4 5 5 * *
1 6 5 4 1 * *
2 6 1 5 6 * *
3 6 6 1 6 * *
4 6 6 6 1 * *
5 6 1 6 5 * *
6 6 5 1 4 * *
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∆ ≡ 4 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 3 4 4 * *
1 1 4 3 0 *
2 1 0 4 5
3 1 5 0 5 *
4 1 5 5 0 *
5 1 0 5 4
6 1 4 0 3 *
0 2 5 6 6 * *
1 2 6 5 2 * *
2 2 2 6 0 *
3 2 0 2 0
4 2 0 0 2
5 2 2 0 6 *
6 2 6 2 5 * *
0 3 6 0 0
1 3 0 6 3
2 3 3 0 1 *
3 3 1 3 1 * *
4 3 1 1 3 * *
5 3 3 1 0 *
6 3 0 3 6
0 4 6 0 0
1 4 0 6 3
2 4 3 0 1 *
3 4 1 3 1 * *
4 4 1 1 3 * *
5 4 3 1 0 *
6 4 0 3 6
0 5 5 6 6 * *
1 5 6 5 2 * *
2 5 2 6 0 *
3 5 0 2 0
4 5 0 0 2
5 5 2 0 6 *
6 5 6 2 5 * *
0 6 3 4 4 * *
1 6 4 3 0 *
2 6 0 4 5
3 6 5 0 5 *
4 6 5 5 0 *
5 6 0 5 4
6 6 4 0 3 *
182 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 5 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 2 3 3 * *
1 1 3 2 6 * *
2 1 6 3 4 * *
3 1 4 6 4 * *
4 1 4 4 6 * *
5 1 6 4 3 * *
6 1 3 6 2 * *
0 2 1 2 2 * *
1 2 2 1 5 * *
2 2 5 2 3 * *
3 2 3 5 3 * *
4 2 3 3 5 * *
5 2 5 3 2 * *
6 2 2 5 1 * *
0 3 4 5 5 * *
1 3 5 4 1 * *
2 3 1 5 6 * *
3 3 6 1 6 * *
4 3 6 6 1 * *
5 3 1 6 5 * *
6 3 5 1 4 * *
0 4 4 5 5 * *
1 4 5 4 1 * *
2 4 1 5 6 * *
3 4 6 1 6 * *
4 4 6 6 1 * *
5 4 1 6 5 * *
6 4 5 1 4 * *
0 5 1 2 2 * *
1 5 2 1 5 * *
2 5 5 2 3 * *
3 5 3 5 3 * *
4 5 3 3 5 * *
5 5 5 3 2 * *
6 5 2 5 1 * *
0 6 2 3 3 * *
1 6 3 2 6 * *
2 6 6 3 4 * *
3 6 4 6 4 * *
4 6 4 4 6 * *
5 6 6 4 3 * *
6 6 3 6 2 * *
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∆ ≡ 6 mod 7
t1/2 mod 7 y1/2 mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 4 *
2 0 4 1 2 * *
3 0 2 4 2 * *
4 0 2 2 4 * *
5 0 4 2 1 * *
6 0 1 4 0 *
0 1 1 2 2 * *
1 1 2 1 5 * *
2 1 5 2 3 * *
3 1 3 5 3 * *
4 1 3 3 5 * *
5 1 5 3 2 * *
6 1 2 5 1 * *
0 2 4 5 5 * *
1 2 5 4 1 * *
2 2 1 5 6 * *
3 2 6 1 6 * *
4 2 6 6 1 * *
5 2 1 6 5 * *
6 2 5 1 4 * *
0 3 2 3 3 * *
1 3 3 2 6 * *
2 3 6 3 4 * *
3 3 4 6 4 * *
4 3 4 4 6 * *
5 3 6 4 3 * *
6 3 3 6 2 * *
0 4 2 3 3 * *
1 4 3 2 6 * *
2 4 6 3 4 * *
3 4 4 6 4 * *
4 4 4 4 6 * *
5 4 6 4 3 * *
6 4 3 6 2 * *
0 5 4 5 5 * *
1 5 5 4 1 * *
2 5 1 5 6 * *
3 5 6 1 6 * *
4 5 6 6 1 * *
5 5 1 6 5 * *
6 5 5 1 4 * *
0 6 1 2 2 * *
1 6 2 1 5 * *
2 6 5 2 3 * *
3 6 3 5 3 * *
4 6 3 3 5 * *
5 6 5 3 2 * *
6 6 2 5 1 * *
184 Additional Data and Information
A.1.2 Discriminants ∆ 6≡ 1 mod 8
Congruence Relations for m = 3
∆ ≡ 0 mod 3
t mod 3 y mod 3 p mod 3 N− mod 3 N+ mod 3 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 *
2 0 1 0 1 *
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 *
2 1 1 0 1 *
0 2 0 1 1
1 2 1 1 0 *
2 2 1 0 1 *
∆ ≡ 1 mod 3
t mod 3 y mod 3 p mod 3 N− mod 3 N+ mod 3 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 *
2 0 1 0 1 *
0 1 2 0 0
1 1 0 0 2
2 1 0 2 0
0 2 2 0 0
1 2 0 0 2
2 2 0 2 0
∆ ≡ 2 mod 3
t mod 3 y mod 3 p mod 3 N− mod 3 N+ mod 3 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 *
2 0 1 0 1 *
0 1 1 2 2 * *
1 1 2 2 1 * *
2 1 2 1 2 * *
0 2 1 2 2 * *
1 2 2 2 1 * *
2 2 2 1 2 * *
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Congruence Relations for m = 5
∆ ≡ 0 mod 5
t mod 5 y mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 4 4 1 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 1 4 0 *
4 0 4 1 4 * *
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 4 4 1 * *
2 1 1 0 4 *
3 1 1 4 0 *
4 1 4 1 4 * *
0 2 0 1 1
1 2 4 4 1 * *
2 2 1 0 4 *
3 2 1 4 0 *
4 2 4 1 4 * *
0 3 0 1 1
1 3 4 4 1 * *
2 3 1 0 4 *
3 3 1 4 0 *
4 3 4 1 4 * *
0 4 0 1 1
1 4 4 4 1 * *
2 4 1 0 4 *
3 4 1 4 0 *
4 4 4 1 4 * *
∆ ≡ 1 mod 5
t mod 5 y mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 4 4 1 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 1 4 0 *
4 0 4 1 4 * *
0 1 1 2 2 * *
1 1 0 0 2
2 1 2 1 0 *
3 1 2 0 1 *
4 1 0 2 0
0 2 4 0 0
1 2 3 3 0 *
2 2 0 4 3
3 2 0 3 4
4 2 3 0 3 *
0 3 4 0 0
1 3 3 3 0 *
2 3 0 4 3
3 3 0 3 4
4 3 3 0 3 *
0 4 1 2 2 * *
1 4 0 0 2
2 4 2 1 0 *
3 4 2 0 1 *
4 4 0 2 0
186 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 2 mod 5
t mod 5 y mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 4 4 1 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 1 4 0 *
4 0 4 1 4 * *
0 1 2 3 3 * *
1 1 1 1 3 * *
2 1 3 2 1 * *
3 1 3 1 2 * *
4 1 1 3 1 * *
0 2 3 4 4 * *
1 2 2 2 4 * *
2 2 4 3 2 * *
3 2 4 2 3 * *
4 2 2 4 2 * *
0 3 3 4 4 * *
1 3 2 2 4 * *
2 3 4 3 2 * *
3 3 4 2 3 * *
4 3 2 4 2 * *
0 4 2 3 3 * *
1 4 1 1 3 * *
2 4 3 2 1 * *
3 4 3 1 2 * *
4 4 1 3 1 * *
∆ ≡ 3 mod 5
t mod 5 y mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 4 4 1 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 1 4 0 *
4 0 4 1 4 * *
0 1 3 4 4 * *
1 1 2 2 4 * *
2 1 4 3 2 * *
3 1 4 2 3 * *
4 1 2 4 2 * *
0 2 2 3 3 * *
1 2 1 1 3 * *
2 2 3 2 1 * *
3 2 3 1 2 * *
4 2 1 3 1 * *
0 3 2 3 3 * *
1 3 1 1 3 * *
2 3 3 2 1 * *
3 3 3 1 2 * *
4 3 1 3 1 * *
0 4 3 4 4 * *
1 4 2 2 4 * *
2 4 4 3 2 * *
3 4 4 2 3 * *
4 4 2 4 2 * *
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∆ ≡ 4 mod 5
t mod 5 y mod 5 p mod 5 N− mod 5 N+ mod 5 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 4 4 1 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 1 4 0 *
4 0 4 1 4 * *
0 1 4 0 0
1 1 3 3 0 *
2 1 0 4 3
3 1 0 3 4
4 1 3 0 3 *
0 2 1 2 2 * *
1 2 0 0 2
2 2 2 1 0 *
3 2 2 0 1 *
4 2 0 2 0
0 3 1 2 2 * *
1 3 0 0 2
2 3 2 1 0 *
3 3 2 0 1 *
4 3 0 2 0
0 4 4 0 0
1 4 3 3 0 *
2 4 0 4 3
3 4 0 3 4
4 4 3 0 3 *
188 Additional Data and Information
Congruence Relations for m = 7
∆ ≡ 0 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 2 2 4 * *
2 1 1 0 4 *
3 1 4 2 1 * *
4 1 4 1 2 * *
5 1 1 4 0 *
6 1 2 4 2 * *
0 2 0 1 1
1 2 2 2 4 * *
2 2 1 0 4 *
3 2 4 2 1 * *
4 2 4 1 2 * *
5 2 1 4 0 *
6 2 2 4 2 * *
0 3 0 1 1
1 3 2 2 4 * *
2 3 1 0 4 *
3 3 4 2 1 * *
4 3 4 1 2 * *
5 3 1 4 0 *
6 3 2 4 2 * *
0 4 0 1 1
1 4 2 2 4 * *
2 4 1 0 4 *
3 4 4 2 1 * *
4 4 4 1 2 * *
5 4 1 4 0 *
6 4 2 4 2 * *
0 5 0 1 1
1 5 2 2 4 * *
2 5 1 0 4 *
3 5 4 2 1 * *
4 5 4 1 2 * *
5 5 1 4 0 *
6 5 2 4 2 * *
0 6 0 1 1
1 6 2 2 4 * *
2 6 1 0 4 *
3 6 4 2 1 * *
4 6 4 1 2 * *
5 6 1 4 0 *
6 6 2 4 2 * *
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∆ ≡ 1 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 5 6 6 * *
1 1 0 0 2
2 1 6 5 2 * *
3 1 2 0 6 *
4 1 2 6 0 *
5 1 6 2 5 * *
6 1 0 2 0
0 2 6 0 0
1 2 1 1 3 * *
2 2 0 6 3
3 2 3 1 0 *
4 2 3 0 1 *
5 2 0 3 6
6 2 1 3 1 * *
0 3 3 4 4 * *
1 3 5 5 0 *
2 3 4 3 0 *
3 3 0 5 4
4 3 0 4 5
5 3 4 0 3 *
6 3 5 0 5 *
0 4 3 4 4 * *
1 4 5 5 0 *
2 4 4 3 0 *
3 4 0 5 4
4 4 0 4 5
5 4 4 0 3 *
6 4 5 0 5 *
0 5 6 0 0
1 5 1 1 3 * *
2 5 0 6 3
3 5 3 1 0 *
4 5 3 0 1 *
5 5 0 3 6
6 5 1 3 1 * *
0 6 5 6 6 * *
1 6 0 0 2
2 6 6 5 2 * *
3 6 2 0 6 *
4 6 2 6 0 *
5 6 6 2 5 * *
6 6 0 2 0
190 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 2 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 3 4 4 * *
1 1 5 5 0 *
2 1 4 3 0 *
3 1 0 5 4
4 1 0 4 5
5 1 4 0 3 *
6 1 5 0 5 *
0 2 5 6 6 * *
1 2 0 0 2
2 2 6 5 2 * *
3 2 2 0 6 *
4 2 2 6 0 *
5 2 6 2 5 * *
6 2 0 2 0
0 3 6 0 0
1 3 1 1 3 * *
2 3 0 6 3
3 3 3 1 0 *
4 3 3 0 1 *
5 3 0 3 6
6 3 1 3 1 * *
0 4 6 0 0
1 4 1 1 3 * *
2 4 0 6 3
3 4 3 1 0 *
4 4 3 0 1 *
5 4 0 3 6
6 4 1 3 1 * *
0 5 5 6 6 * *
1 5 0 0 2
2 5 6 5 2 * *
3 5 2 0 6 *
4 5 2 6 0 *
5 5 6 2 5 * *
6 5 0 2 0
0 6 3 4 4 * *
1 6 5 5 0 *
2 6 4 3 0 *
3 6 0 5 4
4 6 0 4 5
5 6 4 0 3 *
6 6 5 0 5 *
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∆ ≡ 3 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 1 2 2 * *
1 1 3 3 5 * *
2 1 2 1 5 * *
3 1 5 3 2 * *
4 1 5 2 3 * *
5 1 2 5 1 * *
6 1 3 5 3 * *
0 2 4 5 5 * *
1 2 6 6 1 * *
2 2 5 4 1 * *
3 2 1 6 5 * *
4 2 1 5 6 * *
5 2 5 1 4 * *
6 2 6 1 6 * *
0 3 2 3 3 * *
1 3 4 4 6 * *
2 3 3 2 6 * *
3 3 6 4 3 * *
4 3 6 3 4 * *
5 3 3 6 2 * *
6 3 4 6 4 * *
0 4 2 3 3 * *
1 4 4 4 6 * *
2 4 3 2 6 * *
3 4 6 4 3 * *
4 4 6 3 4 * *
5 4 3 6 2 * *
6 4 4 6 4 * *
0 5 4 5 5 * *
1 5 6 6 1 * *
2 5 5 4 1 * *
3 5 1 6 5 * *
4 5 1 5 6 * *
5 5 5 1 4 * *
6 5 6 1 6 * *
0 6 1 2 2 * *
1 6 3 3 5 * *
2 6 2 1 5 * *
3 6 5 3 2 * *
4 6 5 2 3 * *
5 6 2 5 1 * *
6 6 3 5 3 * *
192 Additional Data and Information
∆ ≡ 4 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 6 0 0
1 1 1 1 3 * *
2 1 0 6 3
3 1 3 1 0 *
4 1 3 0 1 *
5 1 0 3 6
6 1 1 3 1 * *
0 2 3 4 4 * *
1 2 5 5 0 *
2 2 4 3 0 *
3 2 0 5 4
4 2 0 4 5
5 2 4 0 3 *
6 2 5 0 5 *
0 3 5 6 6 * *
1 3 0 0 2
2 3 6 5 2 * *
3 3 2 0 6 *
4 3 2 6 0 *
5 3 6 2 5 * *
6 3 0 2 0
0 4 5 6 6 * *
1 4 0 0 2
2 4 6 5 2 * *
3 4 2 0 6 *
4 4 2 6 0 *
5 4 6 2 5 * *
6 4 0 2 0
0 5 3 4 4 * *
1 5 5 5 0 *
2 5 4 3 0 *
3 5 0 5 4
4 5 0 4 5
5 5 4 0 3 *
6 5 5 0 5 *
0 6 6 0 0
1 6 1 1 3 * *
2 6 0 6 3
3 6 3 1 0 *
4 6 3 0 1 *
5 6 0 3 6
6 6 1 3 1 * *
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∆ ≡ 5 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 4 5 5 * *
1 1 6 6 1 * *
2 1 5 4 1 * *
3 1 1 6 5 * *
4 1 1 5 6 * *
5 1 5 1 4 * *
6 1 6 1 6 * *
0 2 2 3 3 * *
1 2 4 4 6 * *
2 2 3 2 6 * *
3 2 6 4 3 * *
4 2 6 3 4 * *
5 2 3 6 2 * *
6 2 4 6 4 * *
0 3 1 2 2 * *
1 3 3 3 5 * *
2 3 2 1 5 * *
3 3 5 3 2 * *
4 3 5 2 3 * *
5 3 2 5 1 * *
6 3 3 5 3 * *
0 4 1 2 2 * *
1 4 3 3 5 * *
2 4 2 1 5 * *
3 4 5 3 2 * *
4 4 5 2 3 * *
5 4 2 5 1 * *
6 4 3 5 3 * *
0 5 2 3 3 * *
1 5 4 4 6 * *
2 5 3 2 6 * *
3 5 6 4 3 * *
4 5 6 3 4 * *
5 5 3 6 2 * *
6 5 4 6 4 * *
0 6 4 5 5 * *
1 6 6 6 1 * *
2 6 5 4 1 * *
3 6 1 6 5 * *
4 6 1 5 6 * *
5 6 5 1 4 * *
6 6 6 1 6 * *
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∆ ≡ 6 mod 7
t mod 7 y mod 7 p mod 7 N− mod 7 N+ mod 7 N− N+
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 2 4 * *
2 0 1 0 4 *
3 0 4 2 1 * *
4 0 4 1 2 * *
5 0 1 4 0 *
6 0 2 4 2 * *
0 1 2 3 3 * *
1 1 4 4 6 * *
2 1 3 2 6 * *
3 1 6 4 3 * *
4 1 6 3 4 * *
5 1 3 6 2 * *
6 1 4 6 4 * *
0 2 1 2 2 * *
1 2 3 3 5 * *
2 2 2 1 5 * *
3 2 5 3 2 * *
4 2 5 2 3 * *
5 2 2 5 1 * *
6 2 3 5 3 * *
0 3 4 5 5 * *
1 3 6 6 1 * *
2 3 5 4 1 * *
3 3 1 6 5 * *
4 3 1 5 6 * *
5 3 5 1 4 * *
6 3 6 1 6 * *
0 4 4 5 5 * *
1 4 6 6 1 * *
2 4 5 4 1 * *
3 4 1 6 5 * *
4 4 1 5 6 * *
5 4 5 1 4 * *
6 4 6 1 6 * *
0 5 1 2 2 * *
1 5 3 3 5 * *
2 5 2 1 5 * *
3 5 5 3 2 * *
4 5 5 2 3 * *
5 5 2 5 1 * *
6 5 3 5 3 * *
0 6 2 3 3 * *
1 6 4 4 6 * *
2 6 3 2 6 * *
3 6 6 4 3 * *
4 6 6 3 4 * *
5 6 3 6 2 * *
6 6 4 6 4 * *
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A.2 Sample Tests of Algorithm findDiscriminant
In this section we present sample output of algorithm findDiscriminant(p, r0, k0, h0) for
primes p of different bitlength. Let p be a prime of bitlength b. In our tests, we make
use of b = 160 and b = 250, respectively. We tested findDiscriminant(p, r0, k0, h0) for
r0 = 2b−1, k0 = 1, and h0 = 200. For fixed b, we performed 100 tests on the Pentium III. In
order to perform the tests, we first determined 100 random primes of bitlength 160 and 250,
respectively.
In addition, we determined the timing of the whole generating algorithm cryptoCurve. All
timings are given in seconds and come from the tests on the Pentium III. The rows are sorted
in increasing order with respect to the timing of cryptoCurve.
The output for b = 160 is given in the tables on the Pages 196 - 198. We present the
discriminant ∆, its class number h(∆), the prime r, the cofactor k = 1, and the timings
of findDiscriminant and cryptoCurve in seconds. Furthermore, the output for b = 250
is given in the tables on the Pages 199 - 201. We replace the listing of r by its bitlength
blog2 rc+ 1.
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202 Additional Data and Information
A.3 Sample Large Fourier Coefficients of j
We list the Fourier coefficients cn of the modular function j for 49996 ≤ n ≤ 50000.
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133140995375163682146161277450639761150751801250464769790047333811760697090959668621 \
658047807751768082824547620445171874597101285833185648886831838171461999868608567665 \
026781211766568690823662638456282942171550439866335050669681368578723001350020027882 \
62838851174314607305798473847882792854502
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A.4 Running Times of cryptoCurve
We provide practical running times of our generating algorithm cryptoCurve(r0, k0, h0) for
various input r0, k0, and h0. We use the Fixed Discriminant Approach.
blog2 rc+ 1 time of computeClassInvariants time of find root time of cryptoCurve
and computeClassPolynomial
160 0.63 10.2 11.09
170 0.63 11.99 12.86
180 0.63 13.61 14.51
190 0.62 14.33 15.25
200 0.62 16.63 18.17
210 0.63 17.55 20.39
220 0.63 19.43 20.38
230 0.62 22.21 23.76
240 0.62 23.05 24.95
250 0.63 25.12 27.86
260 0.62 28.26 29.64
270 0.62 28.44 32.29
280 0.62 32.98 37.27
290 0.62 36.38 39.43
300 0.63 36.92 39.01
310 0.63 40.52 42.52
320 0.62 44.99 47.12
330 0.62 46.41 49.97
340 0.62 49.21 52.03
350 0.62 51.31 55.35
360 0.62 56.13 61.75
370 0.62 59.87 64.95
380 0.62 61.48 67.82
390 0.62 65.13 72.67
400 0.62 71.42 78.75
410 0.62 70.11 80.61
420 0.62 78.81 89.31
430 0.62 85.37 97.85
440 0.62 87.05 101.08
450 0.62 94.03 108.43
460 0.62 100.25 114.13
470 0.62 92.05 118.57
480 0.62 111.58 121.64
490 0.62 114.42 127.82
500 0.62 113.86 135.81
Table A.1: Running time of cryptoCurve(2b, 4, 200) on the Pentium III for 159 ≤ b ≤
499. All timings are given in seconds. The discriminant is ∆ = −21311; it is maximal and
fundamental with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆ and h(∆) = 200. The class polynomial W is computed
during the algorithm.
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blog2 rc+ 1 time of computeClassInvariants time of find root time of cryptoCurve
and computeClassPolynomial
160 3.43 26.77 30.55
170 3.5 31.21 35.52
180 3.45 35.49 39.33
190 3.45 37.89 41.89
200 3.43 43.23 47.96
210 3.41 45.58 49.6
220 3.42 51.77 55.97
230 3.43 56.67 60.61
240 3.44 60.2 64.23
250 3.45 66.62 72.03
260 3.44 77.94 82.5
270 3.43 79.92 88.9
280 3.44 86.35 91.89
290 3.43 96 104.13
300 3.46 98.48 102.52
310 3.44 109.64 115.09
320 3.41 116.27 123.85
330 3.43 125.65 130.48
340 3.43 129.86 135.97
350 3.44 141.29 149.32
360 3.45 143.58 157.56
370 3.43 155.35 161.26
380 3.42 162.89 167.59
390 3.41 176.74 195.71
400 3.41 188.87 198.57
410 3.42 184.3 193.68
420 3.43 211.93 217.47
430 3.41 219.49 229.36
440 3.45 226.91 237.22
450 3.42 252.16 258.32
460 3.46 258.59 264.97
470 3.45 259.28 266.97
480 3.41 290.51 311.13
490 3.41 296.55 317.22
500 3.45 292.59 333.04
Table A.2: Running time of cryptoCurve(2b, 4, 500) on the Pentium III for 159 ≤ b ≤
499. All timings are given in seconds. The discriminant is ∆ = −96599; it is maximal and
fundamental with ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, 3 - ∆ and h(∆) = 500. The class polynomial W is computed
during the algorithm.
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blog2 rc+ 1 time of computeClassInvariants time of find root time of cryptoCurve
and computeClassPolynomial
160 18.49 9.88 28.84
170 18.48 11.87 31.11
180 18.44 12.55 31.53
190 18.41 13.72 32.77
200 18.41 16.2 37.28
210 18.4 16.73 36.92
220 18.4 19.4 39.75
230 18.4 21.46 40.98
240 18.41 22.94 42.09
250 18.41 24.99 47.07
260 18.41 28.04 47.13
270 18.41 29.13 53.05
280 18.4 31.97 52.12
290 18.41 33.93 58.23
300 18.41 36 56.53
310 18.42 39.01 63.62
320 18.4 41.32 69.85
330 18.39 45.77 66.8
340 18.4 48.97 69.14
350 18.41 49.72 70.28
360 18.4 54.78 78.85
370 18.47 59.16 82.72
380 18.41 58.81 87.24
390 18.43 64.59 92.21
400 18.41 69.95 97.87
410 18.42 72.14 103.15
420 18.4 81.19 107.39
430 18.42 84.14 111.89
440 18.42 84.94 115.08
450 18.41 87.71 119.21
460 18.41 92.34 125.74
470 18.41 95.6 130.02
480 18.41 99.66 134.12
490 18.41 105.71 142.59
500 18.41 112.13 151.56
Table A.3: Running time of cryptoCurve(2b, 1, 200) on the Pentium III for 159 ≤ b ≤ 499.
All timings are given in seconds. The discriminant is ∆ = −125579; it is maximal and
fundamental with ∆ ≡ 5 mod 8, 3 - ∆ and h(∆) = 200. The class polynomial G is computed
during the algorithm.
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A.5 Class Polynomials W of Large Degree
We first give the largest coefficient (with respect to the absolute value) of the Weber polyno-
mial W for ∆ = −55222439 of class number h(∆) = 15000.
w3862 = −53401689755047741652638443003152146258318417100077612189360950785873882341509933624 \
9045642814849881749241565278264568169834052852723012827450855629023779480418548972597 \
9246584649821722915976999808513564284211249109952534524539760714300518962037376030107 \
3661089704877230322108675003237639836323062414935581914482958562498766801130963159680 \
3229146808886638014293213200638610128323266302801921262707643782615766178869226728756 \
0013289695837487720709573430964765300451806802057668418581464047589387151192178604681 \
5616821612298320178595361784901000934283692717379445208905668224073478639670048037134 \
8426191975897440559233031402648709566470406092217096214165103362293103318248623588329 \
0400976594095382114497719435967058356917931794096436713188759745624208612454033902980 \
4981556249593092497211911861333990369166145681304318184950069734108840181185278099246 \
3943292199731784447480795158955747425695095206389882542462913600585469843440589471334 \
9816672960943459886041061890361568717890481813484473011286616991563119863282187351945 \
5746534516397290798623979086961696190201430931199388967631251433918957423347350395581 \
3888502817882882011270548271363973050910084440806103883977707740224958177506407717913 \
5228661117125859143853090595756401677273646901065897227016640832746659553774568392497 \
6046852030486353596773452007747956814279496042253997371152922253515966327788780197484 \
5246081300576520495958152151514948406768627284077586365243636830961232490135231292999 \
4105392656134769013024824877809118578822813942146358192166786233627221938533397396630 \
3519347697928579138878439641614095773164142554453396318247913195000943404642940507040 \
8705121298397611098058338365822380571003512880679964668966260232740500116913041354540 \
1777865762282086181984688585472257683774705917018969235304312032285964192099901225915 \
0343216244808629349744877991879420378738961921760430520721660562295854200406462495196 \
4603711774238731224266436271752131596663081276232421741150488792146196803575207413626 \
7535342801654742173430395507134034147594879704937676024543562781103991919551606011485 \
5741734903377175168337011509193612445290577352327744158166885337880227879062308150827 \
5248596055488368860157348324374715823162508364195795046024645022041600342712267775502 \
5473200244977910100717971664478623102682972037999538954066022686561205743872507900648 \
2892093766649457103988349009182216159333969673602009081751975453721882521730553305931 \
1823725441795320481736337302294333395517890930409551192561521353295699148642129431319 \
4596598399651641885738623516842369644532047688756945335057816150763317961724139055017 \
7526363829832055644591164834004858802890165330928556982999475133251187749370123508990 \
7029371918524360711477876210757736210798432539851857488417291862622438778124508736011 \
6209271611320529487669996812578015349000362072667142384833411600012704298650074674733 \
4280626061472833144019950363296733265318870111419295690324597326160022565368828707186 \
4326761269352221340399039849253717837514778878660130178137515989580216821272259570424 \
2706473556499524117277165190142590097622494332192013194986527144095545223807902173248 \
3728647928782841733773983595378518652599843839597009734939818508394355943293624530582 \
4853696167743765544691631846256798741052847615671215787865808407395255064898453852637 \
2462473176723421175963178428917486519258683489936752377033850316508225933445566343788 \
2364486764260016401881402305659601913288119757019322881948426331586311565062779053209 \
6845882234270603921987987914518850850747555127461301288431578293813147844616324777930 \
8370960312153660629537513908029186763828081198141864052574625129357730882087624619594 \
799870894022
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We next present CPU-timings of our algorithm cryptoCurve(2159, 4, h0) if h0 is at least 3000.
∆ h = h0 time of findPrime time of find root time of cryptoCurve
-2668511 3000 0.2978 265.7 266.78
-3670631 3500 0.295 289.91 291.25
-4728671 4000 0.2718 310.92 312.45
-5899871 4500 0.3486 513.7 515.79
-6961631 5000 0.2448 533.71 535.99
-8666831 5500 0.282 558.96 561.5
-10112231 6000 0.2788 584.54 587.34
-11658191 6500 0.311 617.49 621.19
-13090271 7000 0.2502 636.81 640.44
-14796911 7500 0.353 651.41 655.34
-18039551 8000 0.3014 678.66 683.45
-18365591 8500 0.3096 1097.48 1102.55
-19829039 9000 0.2496 1113.04 1118.38
-21649151 9500 0.2046 1151.41 1157.24
-23512271 10000 0.2418 1174.46 1181.36
-26589239 10500 0.2054 1183.68 1190.54
-31624031 11000 0.2084 1220.19 1228.22
-36419759 11500 0.306 1258.29 1268.22
-37398479 12000 0.3948 1295.38 1304.82
-43263359 12500 0.4314 1300.28 1311.05
-42631391 13000 0.2472 1332.79 1343.56
-43531199 13500 0.296 1332.51 1343.44
-46429631 14000 0.308 1392.67 1403.91
-50279759 14500 0.3652 1421.89 1434.75
-55222439 15000 0.4484 1400.18 1413.42
Table A.4: Timings of cryptoCurve(2159, 4, h0) for 3000 ≤ h0 ≤ 15000 on the Pentium III
using the database classPolynomials. All timings are given in seconds.
Appendix B
Sample Elliptic Curves
We list various elliptic curves suitable for use in cryptography. All curves in the subsequent
sections respect the requirements of Section 2.3.5. Hence, either curve is in conformance with
the German Digital Signature Act. In addition, all curves are of the form (−3, b). Elliptic
curves with a = −3 are attractive for software implementation of the curve arithmetic.
First, in Section B.1 we present elliptic curves of cofactor 4. The endomorphism ring of each
curve has a discriminant congruent 1 modulo 8. All curves are defined over a field of minimal
bitlength, that is over a 162-bit field. We distinguish the case of a small and a large class
number of the endomorphism ring of the curve, respectively. More precisely, we first list in
Section B.1.1 elliptic curves whose endomorphism ring is of class number at most 1000. Next,
in Section B.1.2 we present curves corresponding to class numbers up to 15000.
Second, in Section B.2 we present curves of cofactor 4 which are defined over fields of dif-
ferent bitlength, that is fields of bitlength up to 502. In Section B.2.1 we list curves whose
endomorphism ring has discriminant −21311. Next, in Section B.2.2 we present curves having
−96599 as discriminant of their endomorphism ring.
Third, Section B.3 lists curves of prime order. Again, we consider curves over a field of
minimal bitlength, that is fields of bitlength 160. In addition, we present curves over fields of
bitlength up to 500.
Fourth, in Section B.4 we give some examples of twisted pairs for various discriminants. In
addition, sample twisted pairs over fields of a bitlength up to 500 are given. All elliptic curves
and their twists are of the form (−3, b) and (−3, b′), respectively.
Finally, Section B.5 presents sample elliptic curves of prime order defined over Optimal Ex-
tension Fields suitable for use in cryptography. The curves are output of findOEF(32, 5, h0)
for 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 500, 50 | h0.
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B.1 Elliptic Curves over 162-bit Fields with k = 4
B.1.1 Elliptic Curves of Small Class Number
We present elliptic curves defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is of bitlength 162. All
curves have a cofactor k equal to 4. In addition, either group order is divisible by a prime
r of bitlength 160. The parameters of each curve are of the form (−3, b) for some b ∈ IFp.
Furthermore, all curves respect the requirements of Section 2.3.5.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is congruent 1 modulo 8. The
class numbers are in [200; 1000]. Either discriminant is maximal and fundamental of a given
class number.
∆ = -21311
h(∆) = 200
p = 4851153405388300807747012264970932348292382494329
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1212788351347075201936753488952938384214999551721
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4851153405388300807747012264970932348292382494326
b = 3470480439468070909197335033793459289389154158465
G = (2386151837551453510251391501288346764749306656066,
4440769293185010680333318455928923979935968282925 )
∆ = -30551
h(∆) = 250
p = 4865479563844608810330145506427114158649890669121
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1216369890961152202582537089915532627525193151061
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4865479563844608810330145506427114158649890669118
b = 2313911626012429565578031592169553660911255107012
G = (2111331143079256983035963667789099600391479614593,
716756175456003302230004619141754783175930540742)
∆ = -34271
h(∆) = 300
p = 4035469895214029328696656679159574478452645226341
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1008867473803507332174163682727528543154984279171
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4035469895214029328696656679159574478452645226338
b = 3752683199813409865196505768382206250233749898338
G = (471947776607623737496386700021735083783400650076,
235435433253096179249627788415422036635058449740)
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∆ = -47759
h(∆) = 350
p = 4615682049725149516804156346826276140219604637741
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1153920512431287379201038744199812555021860892871
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4615682049725149516804156346826276140219604637738
b = 2349704243856959661932556515611861365473188357462
G = (1766299635684032512428849462526710470067811580719,
171703491022532908643141938142401393378631199223)
∆ = -67031
h(∆) = 400
p = 3540234137424956311822615699655782073803211752321
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 885058534356239077955654317113163030774648373761
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3540234137424956311822615699655782073803211752318
b = 750261320355185714401223457564399210484430461766
G = (413814562411521608412745268111846710084954405896,
1073292009462402875882242039150375510409042568169)
∆ = -75599
h(∆) = 450
p = 4654971515896503520420873026795889449260920204921
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1163742878974125880105217841039525329739726446461
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4654971515896503520420873026795889449260920204918
b = 241658859363724241329704130650469062568421767098
G = (557998885539023174929880647365250335996530688440,
310707785555202736913399955605548392982382037281)
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∆ = -96599
h(∆) = 500
p = 2927770502218943791515883519583218735299658488769
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 731942625554735947878970388457517964619739358449
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 2927770502218943791515883519583218735299658488766
b = 2789149723987523832556551545515501850792614639075
G = (2260013073501545987783218567964190987977496290122,
63806018095672659709551091859616871728799975292)
∆ = -148511
h(∆) = 600
p = 5382788825193566426954616694213095739010165164381
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1345697206298391606738654294115701542443949819791
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5382788825193566426954616694213095739010165164378
b = 4192456367164294821431348237226635889184744442883
G = (3263839595841540731507286748785481757886463821975,
1882325410379767766295977026248193197180096363454)
∆ = -185471
h(∆) = 700
p = 5014072027267286489326237640993453291318209567909
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1253518006816821622331559910182942997313095737979
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5014072027267286489326237640993453291318209567906
b = 1501590922966115673818546035033581870006108018345
G = (111430112168105290582626376799338852408388968268,
3731641011192055057244938283592244362990131490612)
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∆ = -233999
h(∆) = 800
p = 5774515809599967695177856056034293335589046526081
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1443628952399991923794463868862348550251716634741
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5774515809599967695177856056034293335589046526078
b = 5219256733383140511365441986471378489739663859126
G = (4117445311960102264720615939236063999368902027864,
1183847702915992868001865366395159449505591226541)
∆ = -299519
h(∆) = 900
p = 4303354457516771890644431207058634410834995614789
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1075838614379192972661108247903929406502359960531
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4303354457516771890644431207058634410834995614786
b = 460872319528424852164549979963852943157512903945
G = (753616462846189765621178704448388880010221188775,
3429694740791694701162025697209206415812007815630)
∆ = -412079
h(∆) = 1000
p = 4073264438606706647856493969231774118309254778029
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1018316109651676661964123122687647594135863695671
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4073264438606706647856493969231774118309254778026
b = 4014827246356680484196521432933751540586129394517
G = (2264022454720551304170945761542222867686037637437,
3247293366153863548840718558755357782427332882667)
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B.1.2 Elliptic Curves of Large Class Number
In this section we present elliptic curves defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is of
bitlength 162. All curves have a cofactor k equal to 4. In addition, either group order is
divisible by a prime r of bitlength 160. The parameters of each curve are of the form (−3, b)
for some b ∈ IFp. Furthermore, all curves respect the requirements of Section 2.3.5.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is congruent 1 modulo 8. For
each integer h in [3000; 15000], h divisible by 500, we choose a discriminant to be maximal
and fundamental of class number h. For either discriminant we make use of the precomputed
class polynomial W.
∆ = -2668511
h(∆) = 3000
p = 5344838313207869713895363895687717332851030722361
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1336209578301967428473840505255324053328074716681
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5344838313207869713895363895687717332851030722358
b = 4481392867402437811788177434987304623974918109603
G = (4733814643321565515134205638468824454335001016899,
3909867118393929033778400157369955964183915041172)
∆ = -3670631
h(∆) = 3500
p = 4103214159149066309380216914207460982532331026421
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1025803539787266577345053353158264863771412924411
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4103214159149066309380216914207460982532331026418
b = 3259537366807430962938467155181598353613102603267
G = (3266979161142957396078670843199557816587699730835,
996308498959166712027104773682000602102811927068)
∆ = -4728671
h(∆) = 4000
p = 4839046335241562541261207941550674118177476719369
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1209761583810390635315301835208907450941715971749
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4839046335241562541261207941550674118177476719366
b = 2437575613899393405570894592994749144096928522015
G = (1968412447872474280754638798280544879140072679865,
4055800733597202174658260241484491553203785249360)
B.1 Elliptic Curves over 162-bit Fields with k = 4 215
∆ = -5899871
h(∆) = 4500
p = 3524117907302393133122060787608773210486496379241
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 881029476825598283280515767850347827211219566421
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3524117907302393133122060787608773210486496379238
b = 419866067301764996083119938106562763196618498123
G = (2322161239032549783702605886102697574980512462912,
225054359999547347076444533992505416026436020509)
∆ = -6961631
h(∆) = 5000
p = 3466206836598496980968501138660576946792816345769
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 866551709149624245242125683732091208715645000961
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3466206836598496980968501138660576946792816345766
b = 800388995371433774329007961145830277951571279290
G = (152809600451457807160552247490537300813220593139,
3396402454821228089780765212260825190616246809746)
∆ = -8666831
h(∆) = 5500
p = 5631175122971288669552299265822786029736716353469
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1407793780742822167388075561364081666251790749911
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5631175122971288669552299265822786029736716353466
b = 2506857889470170451565941756323886772552037785768
G = (4935894548596613741093707059485415596243422349801,
5148133516348755564308063336488862861251512440709)
∆ = -10112231
h(∆) = 6000
p = 5378732686732722539100170694328365262821001096369
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1344683171683180634775043708578615505349252092249
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5378732686732722539100170694328365262821001096366
b = 4881875668777275768889285327674765091897404062853
G = (3809707698326906280258351519904586113031449837332,
1759325605461596887272096880291597349079418271152)
216 Sample Elliptic Curves
∆ = -11658191
h(∆) = 6500
p = 3447813272605186252330819851095946418394517126181
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 861953318151296563082705272563225798372042385291
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3447813272605186252330819851095946418394517126178
b = 513051049819235883336753536284499396840170789001
G = (3044657623779428018231516807212207274706713301038,
3010622181617369010347760073564605365701330913047)
∆ = -13090271
h(∆) = 7000
p = 4807143746365855140142669053261852543838242234901
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1201785936591463785035667905089340120893029095851
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4807143746365855140142669053261852543838242234898
b = 723615305072037058244749862347605552956305273478
G = (2901112419299417622788274563081688952661711672376,
3485482024516114199820707725218813507506840717682)
∆ = -14796911
h(∆) = 7500
p = 5069123918410239683687165953001698948934047821001
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1267280979602559920921790647025272149920606804901
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5069123918410239683687165953001698948934047820998
b = 3299185553273881968812022781330961116990637727085
G = (1943754639502512691556013865224729551318285493446,
4205895740668599638424407215042300612659450657467)
∆ = -18039551
h(∆) = 8000
p = 4314927753049186338677044552571376142708157261029
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1078731938262296584669262117594046528833520046819
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4314927753049186338677044552571376142708157261026
b = 2475631356987151188886954766294795809523789816484
G = (726297145421329852982628054946389100931352364611,
2290214142604697560230340952441667358500478580676)
B.1 Elliptic Curves over 162-bit Fields with k = 4 217
∆ = -18365591
h(∆) = 8500
p = 3533784746474823935590631329992038576516183075089
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 883446186618705983897657273598001741029785788681
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3533784746474823935590631329992038576516183075086
b = 2737654941346653767723057687712195290508283494691
G = (1305182957453932461489756380906080304140817624251,
1970065104232334534492721928044853481550414600796)
∆ = -19829039
h(∆) = 9000
p = 3860328953147520215974031210442747147016139397289
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 965082238286880053993507235482278006148593017781
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3860328953147520215974031210442747147016139397286
b = 2004827071635757824840245256078687165086194646051
G = (483517428131187576885921278808994454900439478074,
1358525640649869414174231779260082753689465730115)
∆ = -21649151
h(∆) = 9500
p = 3912170962100388395268096857298807118158523191289
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 978042740525097098817025155264311553365254412989
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3912170962100388395268096857298807118158523191286
b = 1810773346323066371924326299633926023131895042603
G = (2949423416378228355342412063214530077678544653057,
3749001975073355699765202492007035253290206637234)
∆ = -23512271
h(∆) = 10000
p = 4996178418093166424753699677300792729698900532309
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1249044604523291606188424868294804546016855170979
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4996178418093166424753699677300792729698900532306
b = 226118355505798530949526443857370994196256176666
G = (250901849293790762699509952410883116366530049113,
2866516738086650720153086891557461858574042030732)
218 Sample Elliptic Curves
∆ = -26589239
h(∆) = 10500
p = 4419466588304680359119776545977448398095143705349
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1104866647076170089779943695893137236532255203059
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4419466588304680359119776545977448398095143705346
b = 524347753052919280256584817362587250803884184956
G = (2461178428890847330810854314391566628271981128089,
4060891319723433242201224639265440879059937491809)
∆ = -31624031
h(∆) = 11000
p = 3275271138093867025462454443360781206798864190329
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 818817784523466756365613597711273671182254453721
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3275271138093867025462454443360781206798864190326
b = 2093397842915312675763118629631326036111667431432
G = (815056124095789349480409860532689412876843431627,
1744971575435356979238877858895293800143860200037)
∆ = -36419759
h(∆) = 11500
p = 5475114392027708885360189309336558999428404849709
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1368778598006927221340046418300685146695790307479
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 5475114392027708885360189309336558999428404849706
b = 4131170923297761841771214137175467310518072067961
G = (4021737970297239665547276845650305057684356729771,
5423049110668653894012270958612919714498229350118 )
∆ = -37398479
h(∆) = 12000
p = 3896047159259594991513551851874277568353197483029
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 974011789814898747878387330270415716160820807171
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3896047159259594991513551851874277568353197483026
b = 907554658311091317088896231180705989782519430657
G = (2645360259687507953995614730361984486305262523273,
2617503919995790763120321420343949137989105530603)
B.1 Elliptic Curves over 162-bit Fields with k = 4 219
∆ = -43263359
h(∆) = 12500
p = 4337191973120037732674981224985010428749147608889
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1084297993280009433168746246323572109232090776189
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4337191973120037732674981224985010428749147608886
b = 3439081379460299469928655642577959797090255985394
G = (3054815087403127766298177910259958043339882344621,
3268636493548428815728120806308387376885927481095)
∆ = -42631391
h(∆) = 13000
p = 3378172917733756536081931272027224179553633224489
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 844543229433439134020481931331269514550771940081
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3378172917733756536081931272027224179553633224486
b = 1732878243750582119239012595566753799288470242380
G = (2262480156087189114288937507024505229083427543999,
410067776510981111811881642325125422430682737586)
∆ = -43531199
h(∆) = 13500
p = 4547665569977440907970736255094603837207860843909
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1136916392494360226992683238009258272396949840651
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4547665569977440907970736255094603837207860843906
b = 1597907760757503759149013767614180326928529622944
G = (4521194322109125312446912526259700672323232196375,
3595870570478818828757052441603218524423167882375)
∆ = -46429631
h(∆) = 14000
p = 3198310969621052490443964351176399677552817672401
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 799577742405263122610991915047533132007957716201
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 3198310969621052490443964351176399677552817672398
b = 1661018089780258065399691952543998330257816874613
G = (1801336338579512548283188443137240997003724161642,
372848410589282366441416635228752219733160122949)
220 Sample Elliptic Curves
∆ = -50279759
h(∆) = 14500
p = 4094494628923587104286327336368588028591214438801
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1023623657230896776071581185421150882457516740301
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4094494628923587104286327336368588028591214438798
b = 1202312463471390332831392955644328902319584139223
G = (2916579140370775688332091557667035677166919647309,
3339849012418118354943584653855395266768200119521)
∆ = -55222439
h(∆) = 15000
p = 4672789767224953783016242954288640487797945208169
blog2 pc+ 1 = 162
r = 1168197441806238445754060319348126047276984508961
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 4
a = 4672789767224953783016242954288640487797945208166
b = 241734408954495607893412116784649174438938492767
G = (2595140563809773843626951170078739841203645397719,
4285724896175776505438729334593736934229882098818)
B.2 Elliptic Curves over Fields of Different Bitlength with k = 4 221
B.2 Elliptic Curves over Fields of Different Bitlength with
k = 4
B.2.1 Elliptic Curves with ∆ = −21311
We present elliptic curves defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is a prime of bitlength
b in [182; 502], b ≡ 22 mod 40. All curves have a cofactor k equal to 4. In addition, either
group order is divisible by a prime r of bitlength b− 2. The parameters of each curve are of
the form (−3, b) for some b ∈ IFp. Furthermore, all curves respect the requirements of Section
2.3.5.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is ∆ = −21311. Its class number
is 200.
p = 4230743339293683719259792443264572487980281346195030609
blog2 pc+ 1 = 182
r = 1057685834823420929814948109949698703281517033526485101
blog2 rc+ 1 = 180
k = 4
a = 4230743339293683719259792443264572487980281346195030606
b = 3760785426652154273157864787276376294955035766231128328
G = (2517251182744787391565264039534329060952093011382856332,
3738794800062038048536651449044353279573768330503168007)
p = 6680057172190460346490498087385064332391474822659911153882162238809
blog2 pc+ 1 = 222
r = 1670014293047615086622624521846265910554785819139259498022963983529
blog2 rc+ 1 = 220
k = 4
a = 6680057172190460346490498087385064332391474822659911153882162238806
b = 2775964682022949029937719221348010749147680480413391290816032782775
G = (3273087149587867830217540007672673529594541888101174650483627468250,
3632535628769125907469948650495700127162100147607889067766327603983)
p = 5331369449787147210725799182247363710162558951080875268627741810017\
386746493149
blog2 pc+ 1 = 262
r = 1332842362446786802681449795561840927540869571121424054459187605073\
720511411159
blog2 rc+ 1 = 260
k = 4
a = 5331369449787147210725799182247363710162558951080875268627741810017\
386746493146
b = 8808842535654359666556380433494756852865478556389536949350714054793\
98028333100
G = (508173180599759546364796877622430706754706062920297490273573965992\
8355409323038,
8291339351528036362764097908361461263815578639057850151667575229518\
32251490088)
222 Sample Elliptic Curves
p = 4744331764675234892260237708941773023509425038059772525624154161285\
801256523709186601091949
blog2 pc+ 1 = 302
r = 1186082941168808723065059427235443255877356259784206533290418021529\
279460212355521368786759
blog2 rc+ 1 = 300
k = 4
a = 4744331764675234892260237708941773023509425038059772525624154161285\
801256523709186601091946
b = 4437583652749548634062869480562004918339860381936577407513536467549\
330390988678360190268652
G = (121217108747276636904992828350146224032022594041361053987259968753\
2429797411316008524592466,
8597985220238033439830624169219692841215495374553825267084530302901\
51908844972867411707220)
p = 7153338370075270348096695325057864552493004810586185863048089808890\
536552937741894326755905221035474869
blog2 pc+ 1 = 342
r = 1788334592518817587024173831264466138123251202646547037468659034538\
643186588002091518277756495093469411
blog2 rc+ 1 = 340
k = 4
a = 7153338370075270348096695325057864552493004810586185863048089808890\
536552937741894326755905221035474866
b = 1030377414181471437025928015831066585710185924778001472839179098921\
411158176611575058518658938161370806
G = (602698084935627725932911801217105281448045188144459783359844767282\
1002219453526629617566429819486966688,
5646236367291429026526062685398524078338359500178459546433232611128\
252589492006194982530376952045295547)
p = 6842023284346544466028236541767432094119081341362555840793762583609\
038027823887128953059288680120345259333398481149
blog2 pc+ 1 = 382
r = 1710505821086636116507059135441858023529770335340638960199462892707\
160082011388270622092449210817261334402908278991
blog2 rc+ 1 = 380
k = 4
a = 6842023284346544466028236541767432094119081341362555840793762583609\
038027823887128953059288680120345259333398481146
b = 4885120389420065125503704332483277942395206457636335431347368727770\
535209223143804025777494807476028416304696557599
G = (387427503274552721475252725597193537317280882833563459916513143586\
7311781188184529572923610470646379919013443531931,
1298052735167747719640880085350631298712805683248779591683024812663\
627219896534304472882948317269285490522352621853)
B.2 Elliptic Curves over Fields of Different Bitlength with k = 4 223
p = 7133882622439190079555400098665814113937633564039525975657630295585\
872213251722114677736875940583796616651325885607458852160529
blog2 pc+ 1 = 422
r = 1783470655609797519888850024666453528484408391009881493914407573532\
442624386937109541654646351391835481465492354551065416925321
blog2 rc+ 1 = 420
k = 4
a = 7133882622439190079555400098665814113937633564039525975657630295585\
872213251722114677736875940583796616651325885607458852160526
b = 2022029846176310189139716244753977656220299910123947358577019776327\
482294229207267605690922926003253721236813039853556704176910
G = (670848443168778883114597638151820757481201961884295396849717606691\
9293634111186533196857522922566653905099490531858440343304336,
4005178031885755301044559542005286493242978982612384896975086736734\
562209992219095774123697135193457456015023554897969873992189)
p = 9852366332541745043594885288843055684602430120813359937142926471390\
3207150809649129076282901604840531751278935171946205559027025375661\
20589
blog2 pc+ 1 = 462
r = 2463091583135436260898721322210763921150607530203339984285731617847\
5816875611556262401565233937908517481547986026914464993559585461735\
67239
blog2 rc+ 1 = 460
k = 4
a = 9852366332541745043594885288843055684602430120813359937142926471390\
3207150809649129076282901604840531751278935171946205559027025375661\
20586
b = 8935821714328498166812111631207034235569903208957489438293040687291\
7044350035989569722668624292429425846234357389337943745432806886191\
04533
G = (299995370999312176864068802359171131908902103371800805114910495056\
0128564158671658729441867831166239529659337488563230740034911638950\
834237,
7440382139876596251278440831798965927895974074734843708447014612231\
3102450628418181226105112188393962819030371317957168597464585838548\
37902)
p = 7325540502857292181979874638235525749161746537062415436025679955271\
3230608400561048451074412459406798468881634083062589884548310753682\
72170301408181889
blog2 pc+ 1 = 502
r = 1831385125714323045494968659558881437290436634265603859006419988817\
8307652105223655463192222925610998482905771385972371467103636396214\
72619615937001589
blog2 rc+ 1 = 500
k = 4
a = 7325540502857292181979874638235525749161746537062415436025679955271\
3230608400561048451074412459406798468881634083062589884548310753682\
72170301408181886
b = 4780541011808811364803164416682836023936883161129404301734835895518\
1275066509741017407609921320551272595960804361743128806771463182839\
33629633474145779
G = (149813988095774374795669682273522551001633106803859686370548653107\
8542200017110624332180962235502940893980851935922866498252171843474\
744384710699892392,
4868015122186683203902839036631387907079945767541980630320979042505\
6145741136210156067225410056135095284936363975959963585939518401044\
13300627792218895)
224 Sample Elliptic Curves
B.2.2 Elliptic Curves with ∆ = −96599
We present elliptic curves defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is a prime of bitlength
b in [182; 502], b ≡ 22 mod 40. All curves have a cofactor k equal to 4. In addition, either
group order is divisible by a prime r of bitlength b− 2. The parameters of each curve are of
the form (−3, b) for some b ∈ IFp. Furthermore, all curves respect the requirements of Section
2.3.5.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is ∆ = −96599. Its class number
is 500.
p = 6077377618095597229736797063406746192100604795363728749
blog2 pc+ 1 = 182
r = 1519344404523899307434199265392154005905117888789618359
blog2 rc+ 1 = 180
k = 4
a = 6077377618095597229736797063406746192100604795363728746
b = 4218145954333777691993507627184900897970504511038469924
G = (856296978109005641599232995162096981527081841628097771,
1651690541471028145292211823395911733197906775222406255)
p = 4399865446429693230361079742667503092491455153126714641528193544009
blog2 pc+ 1 = 222
r = 1099966361607423307590269935666874781376411371197052475078740869701
blog2 rc+ 1 = 220
k = 4
a = 4399865446429693230361079742667503092491455153126714641528193544006
b = 1142242632338455549271616271627626658808075769673115653432145863257
G = (2935716838641456979173970523268151557927187881819643688074500892133,
163846963071714555202887199793635676129278301855751313592120598550)
p = 5356253158676014012144606838720189601934859677929464364089080339182\
077732828149
blog2 pc+ 1 = 262
r = 1339063289669003503036151709680047400484145909274109726253061655716\
315742884659
blog2 rc+ 1 = 260
k = 4
a = 5356253158676014012144606838720189601934859677929464364089080339182\
077732828146
b = 9541982236568351230366738892638609078700636888038845260299738390219\
07715846922
G = (195089780182489593301777603736059525185980674335251813250907884372\
367143000292,
2643354046977683078956340264923427772668709747725356030963161982493\
339781386217)
B.2 Elliptic Curves over Fields of Different Bitlength with k = 4 225
p = 5331480953298331065124894266452488023018648532168316706017066987712\
813091797372668774691229
blog2 pc+ 1 = 302
r = 1332870238324582766281223566613122005754662133375365261849910060158\
971852290961105133527119
blog2 rc+ 1 = 300
k = 4
a = 5331480953298331065124894266452488023018648532168316706017066987712\
813091797372668774691226
b = 3362000851390284945153099035694493640836756299179807003789190557741\
312661697862621294758072
G = (186853418342790194118048533374709436812245872324694691378327187474\
0847782095323735381993892,
284479798839656455612310140447058693820691992275831942978744608466\
4436486269647065104036543)
p = 6873502563776013943542225046304599151226223661142692429065349000916\
356389309683882573492711380952289489
blog2 pc+ 1 = 342
r = 1718375640944003485885556261576149787806555915285671816487218942898\
122955217738439953523991849285452889
blog2 rc+ 1 = 340
k = 4
a = 6873502563776013943542225046304599151226223661142692429065349000916\
356389309683882573492711380952289486
b = 6448784449284641098459572720420008506605013370077233640812511139368\
802902010097002970747682858977771531
G = (627713347214692131121973571358451644319558453519325092534733174535\
9207318135814289203819884540172719125,
3133168889493184144323879559604245994081992122888532176029789488517\
321597952856453701976149446104611410)
p = 7627062722108113794370165995397518964237487869867693585734776811250\
365575621602442806187560804711648534769385930001
blog2 pc+ 1 = 382
r = 1906765680527028448592541498849379741059371967466923396432867787027\
375636842704697309916541417239078581145659021901
blog2 rc+ 1 = 380
k = 4
a = 7627062722108113794370165995397518964237487869867693585734776811250\
365575621602442806187560804711648534769385929998
b = 5366498165998709682646604050589041277233627022582278841088353789989\
791925026984223862357183006795528724043846955877
G = (612859740553133344765294849271459126475505855768900556504615290418\
4144564601373276512330239651510343452778355467144,
4388279219896971569787997777788146681446080609652997552379630357833\
849769130430293034881530446593777266503237274292)
226 Sample Elliptic Curves
p = 1031747967084845985607634124500541074169913792121041381034437930696\
7009742433300210659962841213888704515056154161418659658353289
blog2 pc+ 1 = 422
r = 2579369917712114964019085311251352685424784480302603452586094827393\
667131344168958995998156478077347520860778981762601248198081
blog2 rc+ 1 = 420
k = 4
a = 1031747967084845985607634124500541074169913792121041381034437930696\
7009742433300210659962841213888704515056154161418659658353286
b = 5185369231948604512513215708093019419839076964063571474101430235440\
492001758667056470766931482886530899148023460642504184019929
G = (258418259268746420134365600267597415969005416122811499098746763424\
0972418186776104876524361830975271389443494680345125679805335,
1560626328260482647016644798785310384541704470175135542268847457009\
182678630991140814503418289287772851884145364157558843996444)
p = 9465189720666593607556778802831345572662914344307716040236913500951\
2944634502037238352565004648048002478888221282890012719659793950902\
22061
blog2 pc+ 1 = 462
r = 2366297430166648401889194700707836393165728586076929010059228375237\
8239956529762186976282634472037909478703638179711446499346599762189\
89031
blog2 rc+ 1 = 460
k = 4
a = 9465189720666593607556778802831345572662914344307716040236913500951\
2944634502037238352565004648048002478888221282890012719659793950902\
22058
b = 3870433709246269575248884260663397232079278523367059906132606656459\
4824052306875946439116669354366565325410212991454086976569771026151\
28712
G = (696039676933451496081999113203691037612415665056346927080496102666\
8113532569187467832214319906649344499292308966691496347052097647119\
993716,
5480022897783563057416020225963076240534434487563010089384021132012\
8128333557557420555974725353284776972307041820625507247133357070633\
76186)
p = 1287678681047425262386872820287016439033143830060333454350554535487\
9527438047451323919801656267620309902502387152360086924749226375594\
479279088857110841
blog2 pc+ 1 = 502
r = 3219196702618563155967182050717541097582859575150833635876386338719\
8818595113865478288083008277830776290703084109682123518062807313155\
64609209395005821
blog2 rc+ 1 = 500
k = 4
a = 1287678681047425262386872820287016439033143830060333454350554535487\
9527438047451323919801656267620309902502387152360086924749226375594\
479279088857110838
b = 4608363754515556825167108301685160724107772095242286745332162664292\
1415224929556271141447401042058326189855995022521153065713586286185\
69340905293961658
G = (645369074914167399659792158609912832931379954364712629478686256023\
4652758761219903512837806064040340036079224035691159753454411962761\
92685871103889066,
8372325044894354016857114377468040616872520923536438501967051604466\
6018605713959255210484365827505466454602558262948771459693529232245\
71143315617591005)
B.3 Elliptic Curves of Prime Order 227
B.3 Elliptic Curves of Prime Order
B.3.1 Elliptic Curves over a 160-bit Field
We present elliptic curves defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is of bitlength 160.
All curves are of prime order. The parameters of each curve are of the form (−3, b) for some
b ∈ IFp. Furthermore, all curves respect the requirements of Section 2.3.5.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is congruent 5 modulo 8. The
class numbers are in [200; 1000]. Either discriminant is maximal and fundamental of a given
class number.
∆ = -125579
h(∆) = 200
p = 831184991995438527046820150461113181889751761329
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 831184991995438527046821312318038356568772986059
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 831184991995438527046820150461113181889751761326
b = 117759898201510996297167902939879268929396610982
G = (710211282216605132908873764007346339500982938581,
618437687637132233166137735257102408245679062707)
∆ = -184091
h(∆) = 250
p = 815900031752626540650354198833917562751681213199
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 815900031752626540650354701528337030533309119561
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 815900031752626540650354198833917562751681213196
b = 70097091698444302196315811505752090052028507442
G = (418723928080572569986689031558916852614983482526,
332911933974190962962949796020195494009022217811)
∆ = -223739
h(∆) = 300
p = 1034984595870937275049311029781681530862228084979
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1034984595870937275049311420955271049089100105751
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1034984595870937275049311029781681530862228084976
b = 725569714846833027827650094695838128627874006402
G = (964182528103914974494271992150032650764137673163,
9500316127049580887162958092485796520675141507)
228 Sample Elliptic Curves
∆ = -294971
h(∆) = 350
p = 1309269195941077297231344765707434896583909561801
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1309269195941077297231345781208802920152499961879
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1309269195941077297231344765707434896583909561798
b = 434391801919780072135634220121662732733748945333
G = (581793252971854690950081335963053887603619984480,
202424508840409172379121796228404020566412608751)
∆ = -428819
h(∆) = 400
p = 1227215444871476685771634869084769115422235359141
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1227215444871476685771635916267591800263113972109
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1227215444871476685771634869084769115422235359138
b = 817724535572897082170195481440459548404485112915
G = (583575304032094748222919431593623717042002996685,
216382461218147397617633876515550889320659329784)
∆ = -539579
h(∆) = 450
p = 1014933552709755957935990641044211913192182282639
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1014933552709755957935990827181135631758364518299
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1014933552709755957935990641044211913192182282636
b = 125513560580825589628491625977446558179608424065
G = (396147047317039466845596890767587458354743195768,
788773537721649551634338670150254419256404873704)
B.3 Elliptic Curves of Prime Order 229
∆ = -742979
h(∆) = 500
p = 883110220759529382266411248915814137158154559659
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 883110220759529382266411540829503751426802665529
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 883110220759529382266411248915814137158154559656
b = 179794742354663498420193738749627875675208641407
G = (300363866870560899854708653513151925746231107893,
475429819934886234513274746426088116805547586034)
∆ = -834539
h(∆) = 600
p = 985152662523364125375258163426313272896593404849
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 985152662523364125375259274557248364745600841889
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 985152662523364125375258163426313272896593404846
b = 759120864018005777421664211021283895009924629100
G = (320383311988387616932517525257197671804802801153,
725256858363800960119120664802358198787743175245)
∆ = -1166051
h(∆) = 700
p = 1031978779500310223794579426228784174164575243319
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1031978779500310223794580222638535097480097229569
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1031978779500310223794579426228784174164575243316
b = 989971651147055317047243680709043023377938848754
G = (12470013333833367116354922216924788584054013470,
775122973701471159313520293948941043832882577278)
230 Sample Elliptic Curves
∆ = -1390091
h(∆) = 800
p = 1319433215367977140505810118857908380278436143029
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1319433215367977140505810455253559246370141202659
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1319433215367977140505810118857908380278436143026
b = 39623247448406028234057567068263825918737939001
G = (880136673608949488335398826948820009405778964896,
1170367856584213561117086212056594648714753109884)
∆ = -1908539
h(∆) = 900
p = 884770987135482718657255137635954308023831616201
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 884770987135482718657255283642185738054817498029
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 884770987135482718657255137635954308023831616198
b = 759715018180429818802132698743020337488307920962
G = (337864187644724783510354757013108645586795167797,
745129137363059263238813077177404356022434673572)
∆ = -2656979
h(∆) = 1000
p = 1321154335715921385844396158220531578454201216021
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1321154335715921385844396691840238637480368811069
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1321154335715921385844396158220531578454201216018
b = 754983587592374527589557853265053239553577728695
G = (55072809278708436657407726061439233294839526182,
173196936949517196129783456416058826636584802124)
B.3 Elliptic Curves of Prime Order 231
B.3.2 Elliptic Curves over Fields of Different Bitlength
We present elliptic curves defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is a prime of bitlength
b in [180; 500], b ≡ 20 mod 40. All curves are of prime order. The parameters of each curve
are of the form (−3, b) for some b ∈ IFp. Furthermore, all curves respect the requirements of
Section 2.3.5.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is ∆ = −125579 Its class number
is 200.
p = 1321954682381448433654350458233279321390542430721856409
blog2 pc+ 1 = 180
r = 1321954682381448433654350459786766646842828378818229291
blog2 rc+ 1 = 180
k = 1
a = 1321954682381448433654350458233279321390542430721856406
b = 980325259892152119704529023581357799844979981845455866
G = (855163031696488631301639043321918738448472708955940903,
265870058284021339020750943319639320671874671748043494)
p = 979569092461915959142237682564589271772197987996625854744466929099
blog2 pc+ 1 = 220
r = 979569092461915959142237682564590474133248109887490395849662543511
blog2 rc+ 1 = 220
k = 1
a = 979569092461915959142237682564589271772197987996625854744466929096
b = 796594505251564421403364655690008205209953529002284189867096391237
G = (635826678534782203117197325820033459838842894259450888268137376000,
397096217776286822955931690292859459241485034846840324998715975199)
p = 1314270048971507733995936189723482186669609361158608358580193783937\
874472842041
blog2 pc+ 1 = 260
r = 1314270048971507733995936189723482186671755984901984149271726282194\
903313140959
blog2 rc+ 1 = 260
k = 1
a = 1314270048971507733995936189723482186669609361158608358580193783937\
874472842038
b = 1309418421208447048155464893874074233481244858145602753087635781316\
164628313882
G = (219915967879367026623827324824790383884843183403628793561977776404\
902038775321,
8331217023960069169146759485905009271097854418723474092795340365086\
06464270757)
232 Sample Elliptic Curves
p = 1726646668938819420966880479662135095395875752451422250670529314373\
944570060652609936196929
blog2 pc+ 1 = 300
r = 1726646668938819420966880479662135095395875753247428334412592505666\
572716399637499272530351
blog2 rc+ 1 = 300
k = 1
a = 1726646668938819420966880479662135095395875752451422250670529314373\
944570060652609936196926
b = 7572233839003486947140659319015902307352054871976506532166045814433\
95990678740536062343766
G = (132237344740368492427294346980686989813412907129655609203384255722\
4167323986463725404654177,
8184591950568547021396363501431704161826401788330412089443576424529\
68105764992779626841428)
p = 1304652228323701388128381524515842581423425986662153811770786417791\
723463401952427383785142832589153731
blog2 pc+ 1 = 340
r = 1304652228323701388128381524515842581423425986662155075068440051858\
171000778454641519667524843698599839
blog2 rc+ 1 = 340
k = 1
a = 1304652228323701388128381524515842581423425986662153811770786417791\
723463401952427383785142832589153728
b = 7024010620815646589515348808416684489151157331814756505725555174839\
791033600435658553835235213223334
G = (166470852591772535515977977449796814905608282128022144767524765067\
734093164721117868606536214814711924,
5393662733690315471597057433022307771515849454201060805999497545731\
67746698437595618744388546187038911)
p = 2107683934254786153578607182592349957989670103483767740845895579119\
857791957790859777258092024785566561248544900059
blog2 pc+ 1 = 380
r = 2107683934254786153578607182592349957989670103483767740847108265587\
075325948185961835193557662891295826420623285841
blog2 rc+ 1 = 380
k = 1
a = 2107683934254786153578607182592349957989670103483767740845895579119\
857791957790859777258092024785566561248544900056
b = 3784523139108595137935786439857624756103612904608983724040999835376\
45440906613946786516790440181912989856473705673
G = (286085962156093267621914086536217547556130851511119826934580761949\
805586892614460229363592052500322466980392677,
1816075390817165655318287610636029908119344069422496743173603289336\
354405081420420283165048171547796085913207186880)
B.3 Elliptic Curves of Prime Order 233
p = 2105381454087648573374968693621366403519754382592797763332260677737\
871954268793860778575841103863081095709573884441066601275019
blog2 pc+ 1 = 420
r = 2105381454087648573374968693621366403519754382592797763332260678572\
592785424499555156941530377252745674439735957473359274368571
blog2 rc+ 1 = 420
k = 1
a = 2105381454087648573374968693621366403519754382592797763332260677737\
871954268793860778575841103863081095709573884441066601275016
b = 1973783395319585058153151485162527440304565440455861639546880118126\
404717737774187993781559772793712580783929870309026712149118
G = (180901525497410027434359534813838880774384145703460547596616375360\
4920194304712231004876146171493198408370824847845354323131951,
1638963523032852001752443277394762765508550137667536646934556470055\
827861756211341284872424451680273079821267144300632158417798)
p = 1992726392382236746627420007088469436855251462730383378510172476869\
3943485879915379812650392160488086155247426531692880352450406308280\
16331
blog2 pc+ 1 = 460
r = 1992726392382236746627420007088469436855251462730383378510172476869\
3965805457585763352310389611283257793840133729068155831240195460918\
92839
blog2 rc+ 1 = 460
k = 1
a = 1992726392382236746627420007088469436855251462730383378510172476869\
3943485879915379812650392160488086155247426531692880352450406308280\
16328
b = 5314136043841502713348244781838601875489778842634399131399923937120\
8062971371537075569405156068034670022229045839061270106955556161247\
8930
G = (694362711352878612280573006636084191978817222953266726762033781747\
9725331321096758631898305864395476307590984845806861787309343165294\
31850,
6630269670947080653599999421812012376064065709959445791167745893073\
3848547014533591282590550100365060974630148577509322142738789865268\
4874)
p = 2274092557576603680891127704247574209447154522659728337701583219215\
3108322693352150513301192615056084411923363074283739177519664168682\
43576268395457649
blog2 pc+ 1 = 500
r = 2274092557576603680891127704247574209447154522659728337701583219215\
3108322711610850316965513940976808780803247865362071345110715616395\
23472249705845639
blog2 rc+ 1 = 500
k = 1
a = 2274092557576603680891127704247574209447154522659728337701583219215\
3108322693352150513301192615056084411923363074283739177519664168682\
43576268395457646
b = 2868407406879335130363104118709682294102499574351865480613103729985\
4808069946950192611390652663878714736609784027000171830071043361179\
9513278451418660
G = (778371596508786101232474934343653284510802869168128321140750074863\
1799375335117619957684812519958108917592805096486397498094264640204\
4253406975821355,
2245440546085020547594765470019734854598235250102738027272689946474\
4883062805356283583771236493501011624299707280094894107909888613564\
39137548736922034)
234 Sample Elliptic Curves
B.4 Sample Twisted Pairs
B.4.1 Twisted Pairs over a 160-bit field
We list some sample twisted pairs defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is of bitlength
160. According to Definition 11.2.1 all elliptic curves and their twists are of prime order and
respect the requirements of Section 2.3.5, respectively. The parameters of each curve and its
twist are of the form (−3, b) and (−3, b′), respectively, for some b, b′ ∈ IFp. As explained in
Section 11.2, we have to ensure p ≡ 3 mod 4.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is congruent 5 modulo 24. The
class numbers are in [200; 500]. Either discriminant ∆ is maximal and fundamental of a given
class number with the property ∆ ≡ 5 mod 24.
∆ = -356131
h(∆) = 200
p = 859930367154478455706777652934856251164297185639
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 859930367154478455706776773256618162702869307881
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 859930367154478455706777652934856251164297185636
b = 528228061876465954195650594528318719872952412079
G = (85544217531992200883195924977416110500747605373,
612536680028626994386544817765470437702610581287)
r′ = 859930367154478455706778532613094339625725063399
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 859930367154478455706777652934856251164297185636
b′ = 331702305278012501511127058406537531291344773560
G′ = (142835027876730419442745454782072148193643873423,
679922187991150908578451755494872540938925191119)
∆ = -467011
h(∆) = 250
p = 1446495879078530457450264992260584792175973538359
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1446495879078530457450263185220247294365002286329
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1446495879078530457450264992260584792175973538356
b = 1183048817443472037120941710534367126849506482622
G = (442723487819934872992539753898522906124104552121,
1093467065824443656657421343267155550386864128716)
r′ = 1446495879078530457450266799300922289986944790391
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 1446495879078530457450264992260584792175973538356
b′ = 263447061635058420329323281726217665326467055737
G′ = (1182967830131222056811240150086689478042536336371,
883708187899748063485537949411444981588689134529)
B.4 Sample Twisted Pairs 235
∆ = -881011
h(∆) = 300
p = 1395796223972629432075281438380902717170837027559
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1395796223972629432075280553328846335494621144879
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1395796223972629432075281438380902717170837027556
b = 502602491991040647544723721537709438982678901819
G = (217740072685098653900510907492025732672041367632,
51082903529503215588401700136673764403441079736)
r′ = 1395796223972629432075282323432959098847052910241
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 1395796223972629432075281438380902717170837027556
b′ = 893193731981588784530557716843193278188158125740
G′ = (1359203003140499168001165593498854084762575756021,
167233443353220686969919682942290539684506295031)
∆ = -1190251
h(∆) = 350
p = 1230133995799863846795431602934273368039037052899
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1230133995799863846795429553229354852981931838039
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1230133995799863846795431602934273368039037052896
b = 369920195767386650595754922246693028538298707355
G = (456568904518372589474712924469833831000452970347,
448156672344914884705937152074179407358995767470)
r′ = 1230133995799863846795433652639191883096142267761
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 1230133995799863846795431602934273368039037052896
b′ = 860213800032477196199676680687580339500738345544
G′ = (881749518032297112860662440596223051854681938546,
81620567881093271068462886425625297926533611161)
∆ = -1531339
h(∆) = 400
p = 1233804393045350930523803492557430492903221794059
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1233804393045350930523801990992153123356752947129
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1233804393045350930523803492557430492903221794056
b = 888640658822653640758427683162908711223124055256
G = (612830330561138211900546316085972730953027094218,
1046916908584594757434063176906698522160560693463)
r′ = 1233804393045350930523804994122707862449690640991
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 1233804393045350930523803492557430492903221794056
b′ = 345163734222697289765375809394521781680097738803
G′ = (164494888087154880358749598678069771510596998124,
20895199146125342926320282749728489100957729585)
236 Sample Elliptic Curves
∆ = -1825291
h(∆) = 450
p = 743486841569609678531390152934970803801473088119
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 743486841569609678531389838698848403587061275869
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 743486841569609678531390152934970803801473088116
b = 686634380573280383949663899290883368912244532567
G = (314947139036634065756560839928167402348516851248,
23254548100832641795105873518532099209603914677)
r′ = 743486841569609678531390467171093204015884900371
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 743486841569609678531390152934970803801473088116
b′ = 56852460996329294581726253644087434889228555552
G′ = (433266552669865259634358008443496293488241555375,
306296351160555388509362208746010600838821521290)
∆ = -2299699
h(∆) = 500
p = 1266594787097494284965688033347561541412420523539
blog2 pc+ 1 = 160
r = 1266594787097494284965687045483036147164752043331
blog2 rc+ 1 = 160
k = 1
a = 1266594787097494284965688033347561541412420523536
b = 269000320180367427587511953454384399505312160980
G = (518747066632550224639989312317610607431173230217,
1154199655134064638574425437324559045732079723226)
r′ = 1266594787097494284965689021212086935660089003749
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 160
k′ = 1
a′ = 1266594787097494284965688033347561541412420523536
b′ = 997594466917126857378176079893177141907108362559
G′ = (552007359050750605583157796741302472230082176417,
328699900892546192896550216886006370386917369960)
B.4 Sample Twisted Pairs 237
B.4.2 Twisted Pairs over Fields of Different Bitlength
We present sample twisted pairs defined over a finite prime field IFp, where p is a prime of
bitlength b in [180; 500], b ≡ 20 mod 40. The parameters of each curve and its twist are of the
form (−3, b) and (−3, b′), respectively, for some b, b′ ∈ IFp. All primes are congruent 3 modulo
4.
The discriminant ∆ of the endomorphism ring of each curve is ∆ = −356131. Its class number
is 200. ∆ is maximal of class number 200 with ∆ ≡ 5 mod 24.
p = 1075433050694156749250466429969802312218754032972784619
blog2 pc+ 1 = 180
r = 1075433050694156749250466428493633170987557002772535269
blog2 rc+ 1 = 180
k = 1
a = 1075433050694156749250466429969802312218754032972784616
b = 563697610298953819558072871221376143881612339876587799
G = (997918472409719873494412251770042564384396804059617448,
292863164766361847397780288047281543603146765349893515)
r′ = 1075433050694156749250466431445971453449951063173033971
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 180
k′ = 1
a′ = 1075433050694156749250466429969802312218754032972784616
b′ = 511735440395202929692393558748426168337141693096196820
G′ = (1003737460855868841612420167436775995944325173812325663,
711187556205908079232181220096335658544592704083093803)
p = 1529028808454253423989972367813619227848642414514060174803703791699
blog2 pc+ 1 = 220
r = 1529028808454253423989972367813618984750472065585537988687390538089
blog2 rc+ 1 = 220
k = 1
a = 1529028808454253423989972367813619227848642414514060174803703791696
b = 1005069702517894383614788145449607319557137249597110699176354916549
G = (263806037213223864985327923825153098481928836785824437211705646586,
1522577529996687682022483699684475411290465620275350155660862592061)
r′ = 1529028808454253423989972367813619470946812763442582360920017045311
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 220
k′ = 1
a′ = 1529028808454253423989972367813619227848642414514060174803703791696
b′ = 523959105936359040375184222364011908291505164916949475627348875150
G′ = (487320795236796724639862588098511961107904594290512968211171227711,
1219633427095783074876059012156431782019268696017343394717870649067)
238 Sample Elliptic Curves
p = 1593758134703409939757852593188441169132595610102811674126250787025\
662881712459
blog2 pc+ 1 = 260
r = 1593758134703409939757852593188441169131096807658308925517319374225\
342118861429
blog2 rc+ 1 = 260
k = 1
a = 1593758134703409939757852593188441169132595610102811674126250787025\
662881712456
b = 8765642639136885077057756256293174888222919431207454213725506037882\
46105465157
G = (341627581636816035282177706138590727019533551830466597068276406839\
225703219207,
7258780765623631559319744013332289038316240042320217375641479827040\
79446839003)
r′ = 1593758134703409939757852593188441169134094412547314422735182199825\
983644563491
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 260
k′ = 1
a′ = 1593758134703409939757852593188441169132595610102811674126250787025\
662881712456
b′ = 7171938707897214320520769675591236803103036669820662527537001832374\
16776247302
G′ = (951058400494900982592635333232988719959021651595527979829512092640\
981294612084,
1617173616712002911327932570201878874836149708519143980215957839184\
90242000293)
p = 1275659457698428492563982286720172061188626264206879037707206800324\
679527774631565279394699
blog2 pc+ 1 = 300
r = 1275659457698428492563982286720172061188626263931438050832866850383\
603608509227679634508339
blog2 rc+ 1 = 300
k = 1
a = 1275659457698428492563982286720172061188626264206879037707206800324\
679527774631565279394696
b = 1158158716004525703574266480912701194410624068852266688964413270537\
732411572971773278259858
G = (592766759477268955204109519454055387685102212923266598157528533322\
905737267193595609211933,
1134324388405425191663116816035829094194101149173662066729989475681\
499953742952166151074744)
r′ = 1275659457698428492563982286720172061188626264482320024581546750265\
755447040035450924281061
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 300
k′ = 1
a′ = 1275659457698428492563982286720172061188626264206879037707206800324\
679527774631565279394696
b′ = 1175007416939027889897158058074708667780021953546123487427935297869\
47116201659792001134841
G′ = (764263285083135331836012434315591298215236564988200630598240338974\
99710071843458017482111,
6591286694519204116328189293586667339374505362521929475712533524574\
98652668255660477840899)
B.4 Sample Twisted Pairs 239
p = 1931367867400133214224518006794466061917397834232616324821366362238\
997064097243282593884973351359307699
blog2 pc+ 1 = 340
r = 1931367867400133214224518006794466061917397834232614177825239624439\
366766156498717311438686899442221061
blog2 rc+ 1 = 340
k = 1
a = 1931367867400133214224518006794466061917397834232616324821366362238\
997064097243282593884973351359307696
b = 1000206825698571097158898205853106749592470938373911930399807770171\
048382780419427325331878977887900967
G = (762368807120257224679495252013527408565034501662181563624093050641\
908510917402225571995171663423773787,
1274155095368963638611461257774894897588865654881302459316170348199\
570865828892499828913384506811128997)
r′ = 1931367867400133214224518006794466061917397834232618471817493100038\
627362037987847876331259803276394339
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 340
k′ = 1
a′ = 1931367867400133214224518006794466061917397834232616324821366362238\
997064097243282593884973351359307696
b′ = 9311610417015621170656198009413593123249268958587043944215585920679\
48681316823855268553094373471406732
G′ = (185666608526308825385937620555224125600948230558068900249359954819\
4453067750379053448808641715331320940,
7436561443198037523498561665476782851633045755927059739710433465278\
06075932360728747773127301870532527)
p = 1974577290215921752474179846067090885642946746244547654387827095121\
956494708096524947421919716900150949219634910059
blog2 pc+ 1 = 380
r = 1974577290215921752474179846067090885642946746244547654385585331649\
106351952342445173185021844972067306433634107379
blog2 rc+ 1 = 380
k = 1
a = 1974577290215921752474179846067090885642946746244547654387827095121\
956494708096524947421919716900150949219634910056
b = 1653181435672768779176839334082807460231037688304560296245597670239\
417093588528153694688147333776697225041063791438
G = (948961428321345698086103704864520763069869615006477616137564424039\
237383171344469026800620783692644755040863215308,
8885483414683256097988770309092017582370332244111704755593247365960\
07664390000477610570228947029825430641311855292)
r′ = 1974577290215921752474179846067090885642946746244547654390068858594\
806637463850604721658817588828234592005635712741
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 380
k′ = 1
a′ = 1974577290215921752474179846067090885642946746244547654387827095121\
956494708096524947421919716900150949219634910056
b′ = 3213958545431529732973405119842834254119090579399873581422294248825\
39401119568371252733772383123453724178571118621
G′ = (158159674549343448436090314265377281042943090651014588046734578323\
1388554381086030783793671342900455746310541298152,
4737408235226047099528029000886508815798511031053832948851284875749\
69920319823811780245887933782214481087017826539)
240 Sample Elliptic Curves
p = 2599894273715272850008654445023269235097063614015144987460522126081\
979199796686531677331342084898711090604182260176839601796399
blog2 pc+ 1 = 420
r = 2599894273715272850008654445023269235097063614015144987460522123419\
864386041406206566622262341225116781978537433646767028108889
blog2 rc+ 1 = 420
k = 1
a = 2599894273715272850008654445023269235097063614015144987460522126081\
979199796686531677331342084898711090604182260176839601796396
b = 2033216290112920706223237306212327426365769082031931598496213761442\
91264845242175915062736043784554980720576760632918412101646
G = (715081378751024426289990197811964749511841259861268871010413876674\
026185601228089571077229987565782282542330188732989904605171,
4052668117896675621112910981724909840497704725874298426747743218362\
33118187588977857759106103847541061740497426867055206489899)
r′ = 2599894273715272850008654445023269235097063614015144987460522128744\
094013551966856788040421828572305399229827086706912175483911
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 420
k′ = 1
a′ = 2599894273715272850008654445023269235097063614015144987460522126081\
979199796686531677331342084898711090604182260176839601796396
b′ = 2396572644703980779386330714402036492460486705811951827610900749937\
687934951444355762268606041114156109883605499543921189694753
G′ = (244168915449929969530207934327083181878421615258162714803397753265\
6856243529874578891372977910021431816818020112655061916891417,
1545373983221783935935643252095004794757741541465637665240126380753\
609967547129681017622412629637486487431177876097901681556321)
p = 1957711529932838790904291775947669531350504418222114749587291125781\
4457243201946618034575610273279998572591631680523885551925738935993\
41319
blog2 pc+ 1 = 460
r = 1957711529932838790904291775947669531350504418222114749587291125781\
4455621578150294271876602750776500727327087265315467486479122365069\
69569
blog2 rc+ 1 = 460
k = 1
a = 1957711529932838790904291775947669531350504418222114749587291125781\
4457243201946618034575610273279998572591631680523885551925738935993\
41316
b = 3813218034163163341353010226109450848042982489430416477236401802201\
3037388978809300570805820406320266249330450159637674614621554432153\
5060
G = (120851420424515541187077110565674759864123577924077482628123279838\
6033821791101833524611173935026186086678732176904269880029075256454\
735103,
5384847599988535634785378729047142199991556827869337928173529059585\
8197670974304605395264312056717883187573759352466378202021391232384\
6904)
r′ = 1957711529932838790904291775947669531350504418222114749587291125781\
4458864825742941797274617795783496417856176095732303617372355506917\
13071
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 460
k′ = 1
a′ = 1957711529932838790904291775947669531350504418222114749587291125781\
4457243201946618034575610273279998572591631680523885551925738935993\
41316
b′ = 1576389726516522456768990753336724446546206169279073101863650945561\
3153504304065687977495028232647971947658586664560118090463583492778\
06259
G′ = (502766372611315170799591239960577066812897145090297823338811870596\
1579173534122440077730195297799190441120292432792397804099642862312\
44291,
1651365799987299380891151238480097965349828472429356379076440569504\
9538369725251838925886770139481256803342801280621615620292809021482\
6950)
B.4 Sample Twisted Pairs 241
p = 1954603147354763585091506709892759127856853532417311017312675495176\
5967933182955626941001355654115920803649992475230037831218619024289\
46909018727838899
blog2 pc+ 1 = 500
r = 1954603147354763585091506709892759127856853532417311017312675495176\
5967933169244421726464188758984637293774864062424475656337812609748\
87473131217570389
blog2 rc+ 1 = 500
k = 1
a = 1954603147354763585091506709892759127856853532417311017312675495176\
5967933182955626941001355654115920803649992475230037831218619024289\
46909018727838896
b = 1017506004833196016833916997149712091824551789867782890563417209208\
0748919897238180597537607211945054334281014369085615079952033170085\
7743664845918984
G = (174851142189670292762458304428120492676305505083329419178270891546\
9497313979936346921878449682428727306874492347589393512127324368508\
986755427688876423,
5711385529720652047560077800011976967701321434865766698725541544795\
6432919125092553604729678860398972457739661426711002889291163019357\
6684096025923013)
r′ = 1954603147354763585091506709892759127856853532417311017312675495176\
5967933196666832155538522549247204313525120888035600006099425438830\
06344906238107411
blog2 r′c+ 1 = 500
k′ = 1
a′ = 1954603147354763585091506709892759127856853532417311017312675495176\
5967933182955626941001355654115920803649992475230037831218619024289\
46909018727838896
b′ = 1852852546871443983408115010177787918674398353430532728256333774255\
7893041193231808881247594932921415370221891038321476323223415707280\
89165353881919915
G′ = (976841500038584805158843512405648073810756005179533753906120760017\
1372187084873733642621566460929852954360328685133647733729274568102\
95357365606721615,
1494047627389328448604950500949034217394555651167678434101826150062\
6785006568241657373316996327904182127351704586641696592170637349211\
61026502451984236)
242 Sample Elliptic Curves
B.5 Sample Elliptic Curves over Optimal Extension Fields
We give sample elliptic curves of prime order defined over Optimal Extension Fields suitable
for use in cryptography. The curves are output of findOEF(32, 5, h0) for 200 ≤ h0 ≤ 500,
50 | h0.
h0 = 200
p = 4294920991
p5 = 1461422855154656276375246691389613755707993345951
r = 1461422855154656276375244308087074996229811558097
∆ = -125579
h = 200
f = X5 − 2
a = 4268796136X4 + 608938058X3 + 596605303X2
+4138815490X + 4132637335 mod f
b = 278978933X4 + 411480498X3 + 3077264248X2
+3245827116X + 2284547224 mod f
Gx = 1778236220X4 + 275799952X3 + 645659615X2
+2510908108X + 3042669843 mod f
Gy = 1939043504X4 + 3721906723X3 + 3329509813X2
+1078338789X + 4117271912 mod f
h0 = 250
p = 4294940641
p5 = 1461456286761355436053754012243104344770295439201
r = 1461456286761355436053755427217314521582314459929
∆ = -254579
h = 250
f = X5 − 3
a = 162530878X4 + 1434759357X3 + 3360802834X2
+2325410416X + 1615712460 mod f
b = 1855689095X4 + 2040806798X3 + 1831304219X2
+3017388316X + 4105657423 mod f
Gx = 25846706X4 + 2626164724X3 + 1930438558X2
+3983702370X + 453012047 mod f
Gy = 118998812X4 + 3402773465X3 + 2495112494X2
+2606285246X + 2711221906 mod f
B.5 Sample Elliptic Curves over Optimal Extension Fields 243
h0 = 300
p = 4294946041
p5 = 1461465474180289675134151386194236101750995386201
r = 1461465474180289675134153762228208866377971067629
∆ = -414851
h = 300
f = X5 − 2
a = 3063095858X4 + 2250048299X3 + 1227629041X2
+2778000899X + 2334717501 mod f
b = 2011771569X4 + 2450373594X3 + 2713668309X2
+1343344406X + 3782740697 mod f
Gx = 2519765339X4 + 1484568211X3 + 1890379562X2
+4033214317X + 2772079756 mod f
Gy = 1423502591X4 + 325230747X3 + 1248217441X2
+2075517958X + 3483474078 mod f
h0 = 350
p = 4294922341
p5 = 1461425151963024659833421718534534696672193607701
r = 1461425151963024659833421799241929059403985908529
∆ = -814379
h = 355
f = X5 − 2
a = 1090432821X4 + 1845057900X3 + 3930518830X2
+3187193331X + 1821748098 mod f
b = 837115239X4 + 3913395918X3 + 4054795192X2
+1342690143X + 2470311794 mod f
Gx = 3659778998X4 + 1629153926X3 + 3716994632X2
+3999793509X + 1252226858 mod f
Gy = 1687217169X4 + 3131806240X3 + 2429646086X2
+746907931X + 3665787462 mod f
h0 = 400
p = 4294921051
p5 = 1461422957234966883894402493148363918278475630251
r = 1461422957234966883894400567650974759228682544723
∆ = -850043
h = 405
f = X5 − 3
a = 2503430324X4 + 1389142557X3 + 153775671X2
+3912616042X + 1024738588 mod f
b = 635763311X4 + 3453827885X3 + 1532141585X2
+3160150527X + 574724140 mod f
Gx = 4149911725X4 + 4229024405X3 + 595953743X2
+756779967X + 971847968 mod f
Gy = 3897363592X4 + 4179338582X3 + 3448789063X2
+1290370184X + 597283985 mod f
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h0 = 450
p = 4294957081
p5 = 1461484257491683831369162989777073474456006769401
r = 1461484257491683831369163301118907834828306571529
∆ = -717659
h = 455
f = X5 − 3
a = 3547595190X4 + 1549130649X3 + 309575423X2
+1026341689X + 3542034721 mod f
b = 1891696257X4 + 3714031196X3 + 1643008985X2
+1950309539X + 1112960195 mod f
Gx = 2971758684X4 + 3367594823X3 + 3387263308X2
+3036356326X + 1513878336 mod f
Gy = 365879670X4 + 1139499263X3 + 326478353X2
+1826093072X + 3369983575 mod f
h0 = 500
p = 4294906591
p5 = 1461398356045076634353290373406880319279418553951
r = 1461398356045076634353292284980322466135601171777
∆ = -880739
h = 500
f = X5 − 2
a = 1025225944X4 + 1252157679X3 + 4290687620X2
+2427519008X + 2603133748 mod f
b = 2753540856X4 + 2701278011X3 + 3640333909X2
+1638819043X + 786445471 mod f
Gx = 2597365134X4 + 1211849507X3 + 1115371594X2
+1080009322X + 344361619 mod f
Gy = 3178621928X4 + 3717126658X3 + 2776153561X2
+654821585X + 844138528 mod f
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Name
gec_complex_multiplication . . . class for generating elliptic curves for use in cryptography
Abstract
The class gec_complex_multiplication generates elliptic curves over finite fields suitable
for use in cryptography. It uses the theory of complex multiplication.
Description
gec_complex_multiplication is a class for generating elliptic curves over finite fields suitable
for use in cryptography. The class implements algorithms which use the theory of complex
multiplication. Currently, curves over finite prime fields and curves over Optimal Extension
Fields may be generated using this package.
A central term in the theory of complex multiplication is an imaginary quadratic discriminant.
We denote such a discriminant by ∆. An imaginary quadratic discriminant is simply a negative
integer congruent 0 or 1 modulo 4. Associated to ∆ is a class number, which we denote by
h(∆). In addition, for each imaginary quadratic discriminant ∆ there exists a fundamental
discriminant ∆K ; ∆K is the largest imaginary quadratic discriminant dividing ∆.
Let p be a prime, and let m be either 1 or a prime. We set q = pm. Let E = (a4, a6) be
an elliptic curve defined over Fq. E is suitable for cryptographic purposes, if it respects the
following conditions ([GIS01]):
1. We have |E(Fpm)| = r · k with a prime r > 2159 and a positive integer k ≤ 4.
2. The primes r and p are different.
3. The order of q in F×r is at least B := 104.
4. The class number of the maximal order which contains End(E) is at least h0 := 200.
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However, the choicesB and h0 may be set differently be setting the boolean according_to_bsi
to false. If according_to_bsi=false, the last requirement is not taken into account. In
addition, B has to be at least B0 in this case, where B0 is minimal with rB0 > 21999.
If another security level is required, the user may invoke set_lower_bound_bitlength_r or
set_upper_bound_k to set different bounds for r and k, respectively. For example, if r has to
be of bitlength at least 180, that is r > 2179, one has to invoke set_lower_bound_bitlength_r
with 180 as argument.
During the computation the algorithm computes a class polynomial, that is a polynomial
with coefficients in Z generating the ring class field of the imaginary quadratic order of
discriminant ∆ over Q(
√
∆). If 3 - ∆, we make use of a polynomial G due to Atkin/Morain
to generate the ring class field. If in addition ∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, the algorithm uses a polynomial
W due to Yui/Zagier. If 3 - ∆, the class member generation_mode is set to 3. If in addition
∆ ≡ 1 mod 8, generation_mode is set to 4. Furthermore, if generation_mode = 1, then the
ring class polynomial H is used.
The boolean VERBOSE may be set to true to get a lot of information during the computation.
Constructors/Destructor
ct gec_complex_multiplication ()
initializes an empty instance.
ct gec_complex_multiplication (const bigint & D)
initializes an instance and sets ∆ = D.
ct gec_complex_multiplication (lidia_size_t d)
initializes an instance and sets the extension degree of the finite field Fq over Fp to d.
dt ~gec_complex_multiplication ()
Assignments
Let I be an instance of gec_complex_multiplication.
void I.set_field (const bigint & l)
sets p = l.
void I.set_degree (lidia_size_t d)
sets degree of finite field Fq over its prime field to d.
Mutators of static variables to set security level.
void I.set_default_lower_bound_bitlength_r (lidia_size_t b0)
sets default lower bound of bitlength of r to b0. The default value is 160.
void I.set_default_upper_bound_k (const bigint & k0)
sets default upper bound of k to k0. The default value is 4.
void I.set_default_lower_bound_extension_bitlength (lidia_size_t l)
sets default lower bound of the bitlength of finite fields in which the discrete logarithm
problem is considered intractable, to l. The default value is 2000.
The gec-manual 247
Mutators of non-static variables to set security level.
void I.set_lower_bound_bitlength_r (lidia_size_t b0)
sets lower bound of bitlength of r to b0. The prime r will satisfy r > 2b0−1.
void I.set_upper_bound_k (const bigint & k0)
sets upper bound of k to k0. The cofactor k will respect k ≤ k0.
Mutators to set variables in the context of the requirements of the German Information
Security Agency (GISA, BSI).
void I.set_according_to_BSI (bool b)
if b is equal to true, the requirements 1 - 4 cited above are respected. If b is equal to
false, requirement 4 is ignored. In addition, in requirement 3 we only ensure that the
order of q in F×r is at least B0, where B0 is minimal with rB0 > 2b0−1. b0 is equal to
default_lower_bound_extension_bitlength.
void I.set_BSI_lower_bound_h_field (lidia_size_t h0)
ensures that the maximal imaginary quadratic order corresponding to ∆ has a class
number at least h0. The default value is 200 (see requirement 4). This function is only
relevant if according_to_BSI=true.
void I.set_BSI_lower_bound_extension_degree (lidia_size_t d0)
ensures that the order of q in F×r is at least d0. The default value is 10000 (see require-
ment 3). This function is only relevant if according_to_BSI=true.
Mutators which are specific to gec_complex_multiplication.
void I.assign (const gec_complex_multiplication & J)
initializes I with J.
void I.set_delta (const bigint & D)
sets ∆ = D.
void I.set_generation_mode (unsigned int i)
sets generation_mode = i. The user is responsible that i and ∆ fit together.
void I.set_complex_precision (long i)
sets the floating point precision to compute the class polynomial corresponding to
generation_mode to i. The user is responsible that the precision is sufficient to get
a correct polynomial.
void I.set_class_polynomial (const polynomial<bigint> & g)
sets the class polynomial to g.
void I.set_class_polynomial (const bigint & D, const lidia_size_t h,
char * input_file)
sets ∆ = D and the class number to h. The user is responsible that h(∆) = h. Let
C =
∑h
k=0 ckX
k denote a class polynomial corresponding to ∆. The coefficients are
read from the file h ¡h¿/¡D¿ in the directory ¡input file¿, beginning with ch.
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Access Methods
Let I be an instance of gec_complex_multiplication. Most of the accessors are only mean-
ingful if the method generate has been invoked before.
Accessors for finite field, elliptic curve and its order.
const bigint & I.get_p () const
returns p. Either p has been set using set_field or the method generate has been
invoked before. Otherwise, 0 is returned.
const bigint & I.get_q () const
returns the prime power q = pm. The method generate has to be invoked before.
Otherwise, 0 is returned.
const bigint & I.get_r () const
returns the prime r. The method generate has to be invoked before. Otherwise, 0 is
returned.
const bigint & I.get_k () const
returns the cofactor k. The method generate has to be invoked before. Otherwise, 0 is
returned.
const gf_element & I.get_a4 () const
returns the parameter a4 of the curve E = (a4, a6). The method generate has to be
invoked before. Otherwise, 0 is returned.
const gf_element & I.get_a6 () const
returns the parameter a6 of the curve E = (a4, a6). The method generate has to be
invoked before. Otherwise, 0 is returned.
const point<gf_element> & I.get_G () const
returns a point G ∈ E(Fq) of order r. The method generate has to be invoked before.
Otherwise, 0 is returned.
Accessors for static variables.
lidia_size_t I.get_default_lower_bound_bitlength_r () const
returns the default lower bound of bitlength of r.
lidia_size_t I.get_default_upper_bound_k () const
returns the default upper bound of k.
const bigint & I.get_default_lower_bound_extension_bitlength () const
returns the default lower bound of the bitlength of finite fields in which the discrete
logarithm problem is considered intractable.
Accessors for non-static variables to set security level.
lidia_size_t I.get_lower_bound_bitlength_r () const
returns the lower bound of bitlength of r.
const bigint & I.get_upper_bound_k () const
returns the upper bound of k.
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const bigint & I.get_delta_field () const
returns ∆K .
lidia_size_t I.get_h_field () const
returns h(∆K).
lidia_size_t I.get_lower_bound_h_field () const
returns lower bound of h(∆K).
Accessors to get variables in the context of the requirements of the German Information
Security Agency (GISA, BSI).
bool I.get_according_to_BSI () const
returns true if and only if the generated curve respects the requirements of GISA.
lidia_size_t I.get_BSI_lower_bound_h_field () const
returns the lower bound of the class number of the the maximal order containing the
endomorphism ring of the curve.
lidia_size_t I.get_BSI_lower_bound_extension_degree () const
returns the lower bound of the order of q in F×r .
Accessors which are specific to gec_complex_multiplication.
const bigint & I.get_delta () const
returns ∆.
lidia_size_t I.get_h () const
returns h(∆).
unsigned int I.get_generation_mode () const
returns the generation mode.
long I.get_complex_precision () const
returns the floating point precision to compute the class polynomial corresponding to
generation_mode.
const polynomial<bigint> & I.get_class_polynomial () const
returns the class polynomial.
High-Level Methods and Functions
Let I be an instance of gec_complex_multiplication.
void I.generate ()
generates the field (if not already set) and the elliptic curve corresponding to the security
level in use.
void I.generate_oef ()
generates the Optimal Extension Field (the degree has to be set by the user) and the
elliptic curve of prime order over this field corresponding to the security level in use.
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void I.compute_class_polynomial_karatsuba ()
computes the class polynomial corresponding to the chosen discriminant ∆ and genera-
tion mode. The computation uses an efficient arithmetic basing on ideas of Karatsuba.
Input/Output
Input/Output of instances of gec_complex_multiplication is currently not possible.
See also
gec_point_counting_mod_p, gec_point_counting_mod_2n.
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class invariant, 20
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ring class polynomial, 21
classPolynomials, see database
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congruence subgroup, 19
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cofactor, 34
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cryptographically strong, 33
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j-invariant, 26
lift, 145
non-supersingular, 30
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endomorphism ring, see elliptic curve
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integral binary quadratic, 12
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quadratic, see integral binary quadra-
tic
fundamental delta h, see database
Hilbert class field, 20
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relatively prime, 18
imaginary quadratic field, 10
inertial degree, 18
integral domain, 10
isogeny, see elliptic curve
K-uniformly distributed, 39
lattice, 27
homothetic, 27
lift, see elliptic curve
modular function, 21
modulus, 18
norm, 14
number field, 17
Optimal Extension Field, 160
Type I, 160
Type II, 160
order
imaginary quadratic, 10
maximal imaginary quadratic, 10
point at infinity, 24
precision
minimal precision, 135
sufficient precision, 136
quadratic character, see character
ramification index, 18
ramify, 18
rational points, 23
reachable, see elliptic curve
reasonable large subset, 56
representation, 14
proper representation, 54
ring class field, 20
special linear group, 12
splits completely, 18
suitable cardinality, see cardinality
trace, see elliptic curve trace
twisted pair, 155
Weber functions, 21
Weierstrass ℘-function, 28
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